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DEVOTgD TO SOUTHERN RIGHTS, MORALITY, AGRICULTURE, LITERATURE. AND JlJ iJil EOUS NEWS. JA1ES H. NORWOOD, EDITOR.] To thine oienself be true; And it must follow as the night the day; Them ranst not then be false to any man.—Hamlet. VOL. 1. DARLINGTON C. H., S. C., WEDNESDAY MORNII^ MAY 21, 1851 [JOHN F. DE LORRE. PROPRIETOR. NO. 1^. THE DARLINGTON FLAG, IS PUBLISHED 1 EVERY WEDNESDAY MORNING, AT DARLINGTON, C. H., 8. C., BY JOHN F. DE LORMF. TEWS OF SUBSCRIPTION I In advance, (per annum,) - - - $2 00 At the expiration of six months -• 2 50 At the eud of the year - .... 3 00 ADVERTISING: * Advf.rtiseme»ts, inserted at 75 cents a square (fourteen lines or less,) for the first, and 37$ cts. for each subsequent insertion. Business CAiius^not exceeding ten lines, inserted at $5, a year. NT All business connected with the Flag, will be transacted with the Proprie tor at his Office, one door above the Dar lington Hotel, or with the Editor at his law Office would never have arisen. Long before this generation saw the the question of slavery would hav o» 3 light, exfeen POLITICAL. (From the Charleston Mercury.) AN EXAMINATION INTO THE POLICY OF STATE ACTION. Addressed to the Members of the Con- lion to assemble in Charleston, on the 5th of May, 1851. If, then, we have nothing to hope from the present state of parties; if the Southern States refuse to act in con cert; if the state of public affairs is suph jbat delay is danger; and these are the points we have so far attempt ed to prove, there remains but one question for us to ask: Will the sepa rate action of South Carolina dissolve the Union, and lead to the construction of a Southern Confederacy? And if not, can South Carolina maintain her existence as a separate ami indepen dent power ? And when we talk thus of separate action, it is necessary that the time and sort of action should be definitely stated, to avoid all vagueness and uncertainty in the argument. It is now of the, fir«t importance that wc should understand each other: not on ly that we exchange sentiments, hut we should know how far wo agree In serious practical details of the grave business which lies before us. When we speak, therefore, of separate State action, we mean a call of the State Convention at some period between the 1st February, 1852, and the probable adjournment of., the next session of Congress^the Iftvficr after the 1st of February the better, for the sole and simple purpose of deefering South CiBt olina an independent State, free to con trol her own fortunes, whether they be for better. M worst'. And this mea- be preceded course settled. But the irreconcilable differ- ware, &c., is consumed in the ucigl ence between Northern and Southern 1 — :V1 -— - e c '--' sentiment has aggravated its bitterness every year for more than half a centu ry ; and however much they may re- gref the uncontrollable current of po litical events, the South must recognise in us, a little sooner or a little later, the necessary consequence of their own doctrines, professions and practices.— Every one who is at all familiar with the history of the country, knows that the ? uestions which the secession of South Carolina would force upon Congress for settlement, arftfhose very questions which have in theory divided the par ties for many years—that the party strife upon them, has waxed fiercer and fiercer, and what is more to the point, that upon them parties have assumed an eminently sectional character; and we ask, with confidence that the reply is not to be found, what is there to cause the belief that on these questions, put in their most aggravated form, at the most critical period of our histo- Georgia and Alabama; and a large, in deed it has been said the largest, por tion of her imports of dry goods, hard V boring States. Now-, if the State se cedes, and the Federal Government does not direct an armed resistance against this measure, they will at least lay heavy tariffs upon all imports from, and exports into, South Carolina, by the neighboring States, and these added to the duties necessary for the revenue of the State, will at once prostrate both the import and export trade of the State. And it is a fair remark at the outset, probable that in the present disturbed state of Southern sentiment, the Fed eral Government w ill venture upon this broad and palpable imposition on such Southern States as remain in the Union? A seceded State is a dangerous exam ple to a discontented neighbor. Can any one doubt but that if during the Creek troubles, Georgia had been j in order to obtain bounded by an independent and sym- Because, if at this pathizing State, she would have settled her difficulties by a natural and profita ble ftllutnce, and can any one now doubt whether if the Federal Govern- |ieftceablc secession.. But what if the 1 Government appeal to w ar, that ulti- i mate and highest arbiter in national affairs? We answer first, that if the}’ do, the more unanimous the sentiment by which that war is supported, the less support does the argument drawn from it give to those who urge delay Southern concert, moment, after all the valiant and ioffignant rhetoric which has echoed throngh the Southern States, the South unites with the North in forcibly preventing the secession of ernr iMOtattempt to injure South Caro- j Carolina, why this fact is proof con that this argument is, to some extent, j linn, ffirough her neighbors, by annoy- elusive that the state of Southern sen a local one; that it affects, particularly ing them with vexatious burdens on timent is such, that concert of tin and directly, only Charleston, the coni- their trade, ns must necessarily be done Southern States, with a view to the dis- mercial city of South Carolina, and : on the above supposition, tliatthey will solution of the Union, is an ascertain- -«tty applies, indirectly, to the State at large, mak* 1 common cause ? We cannot, only so far as the State may determine therefore, realize the dangers to South to raise her revenue by duties on im ports; and even then, when it is con sidered that all trade into the State wilj be foreign trade, and duties would be imposed, not merely on European importations, through Charleston, but also on the large domestic trade in cat tle, grain and pork, which takes place endeavoring to meet presumes, even supposing that such a scheme of pro hibiting tariffs should be possible; it would only present import trade which looks to re-export; all import for home con sumption would profit necessarily.— ry, the South will desert her old creed, over the inland border, the force of the Take the Planter: his cotton and rice and in order to gratify Northern fauati- objection is still further weakened.— would as usual go to Charleston for cism, desolate Carolina with the rava- But we have no idea that South Caro- sale; there would be no duty on its ex- ges of war, and in order to strengthen Una would resort to a duty on foreign port, and its market could in no w ise the doctrine of State rights, will vote importations as we understand them,at l>e effected by Federal Legislation: millions to the destruction of a sove- ; present, and we believe the imposition whereas, everything that he buys in re- reign State! | of a discriminating Lax, by the Federal turn, negro cloth, hardware, woollens. ed impossibility, delay what period of time we choose. But without South ern trade which the argument we are i cm support, the Government could not wage war for a day. The probability, therefore, of a warlike resistance on the part of the Government, is at once affect that portion of our | evidence that our position in the Union is that of a subject and unconsidered minority, which has no mode open to it but an appeal to that Power who does not always give the race to the swift, nor the battle to the strong. If the South will not support us in se cession, there is no possible princi ple on which it can lie reasoned that they will support us in any „ r . „ ...v , other mode of redress. A Southern In the next place, secession thus | Government, on foreign goods import- all the luxuries of life, coming here Confederaay is only a multitude of se- timed would lie effected upon the eve of ed through Carolina, utterly impossible, under a system of free trade, would l>e , cessions ; anil the spirit which is to cf- a Presidential election. It would be in the first place the Government can- so much cheaper as even to allow for feet the greater revolution, will not another difficulty to be met—a new not, under the express language of the increased direct taxation for the pur- | surely lend itself to the repression of Constitution, lay a heavier tax on goods imported through a frontier town of Carolina, into North Carolina or Geor gia, than it can on the same goods im ported through Now York; for the ex plicit provision of Section 8, Article 1, is: “All duties, imnosts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United to import at present $10QBQt) worth I of wmch i i is con- and dangerous issue to be joined ; an element of mischief, dangerous to be used, and impossible to be neglected. Confounding as such a question would be to the party tactics of Congressional legislation, no man can estimate what results it would produce if thrown among the people at such a juncture. .South Carolina seceded—the practical question thus brought home to every Southern heart—strong, able, ardent minorities at work in every South- j sumed in South Carolina, and the hal eru State—the people in one mad fer- ance sent into Tennessee, Georgia and uient from Maine to Toms, wkh the North Carolina, dee. At present he excitement of the Presidential election pays his duty to the General Govern- —Congress ft argumentative confusion meut at the port of Charleston. South where would the government find Carolina secedes, aiM in necessary strength to support a war, the very policy makes Charleston a free port, manifesto of which would lie a chal- The same merchant imports again lenge to a party strife in the bosom of l the beligercnt Republic ? The advan tages, then, of secession at such a time pose of revenue. Take again the Man- the less. The possibility of a war, ufatoturer; under the Constitution no * then, on the part of the General Gov States.” Suppose, then, a merchant at present 8It of dry goods, 850,000 of sure h J Su the' withdrawal of^he United 'tates Senators and wie members of Congress from their responsi bilities at Washington. In discussing the probable results of such a course of action, w’c are noL it must bo re membered, discussing tne general poli cy of secession from the Union. That matter the State has already argued, and in her judgment, at least, settled. We are now discussing only the merits of one special mode of secession—that is, by a single State at a given time.— In this view, then, the first advantage ofihis course would be, that, seceding during the session of Congress, before the Administration could, under the Constitution, act, the National Legis lature would be called on to settle the jierplexed question of State rights. Had we a purely freesoil section, the solu tion, of course, would be as prompt as powtive; but the Southern States, still renresented a t Washington, have a fear ful interest in the answer, and it will be for them to declare a civil war iigaiust State sovereignty, and to aban don their traditionary hostility to a military and Consolidated Government, at the very moment that such a Gov ernment has grown from a mere Con stitutional possibility into an armed re ality, before the Government dare fire n gun. Now, is there any fair ground for believing that the Southern States are prepared to arm the Government against the doctrine of the political in violability of a single State. A civil war commenced against the votes of the South, will of necessity, unless hu man nature has changed its character, force that Southern minority into the lines of the beleaguesed State, and those whom they would at first protect, by their votes, they will finally assist with their arms. Now, what chance is there of a Southern vote for the arm ed repression* of 84Mi Caro lina re bellion ? Of course, if with the North againsfc us, there was unanimity at the South in the same way of think ing, our cause would ba hopeless ; but if the South were unanimous in their opposition to our views of the great questions of the day, the present »shuc are: I. That we give the question a practical character, which apjieals at once and directly to the sympathies of the whole Southern people. 2. That our secession is based on principles to which most of the Southern States are committed, and to which, upon the re turn of every Presidential election, the great parties in the country formally pledge themselves; and 3. That we strike at the very moment of all others when an administration is weakest to resist. Their period of power in the last quarter of its existence—every mea sure tested in Congress by reference to party ends—the national council to which it must appeal for support, dis tracted and divided—the doctrines against which they must declare war, proclaimed openly in the Senate—the commerce of the freesoil action of the country trembling in apprehension of even successful hostilities. Where, in the whole circle of Constitutional ap- plianoe Jls the administration to find that reMfttless and resistless strength— that terrible unity and energy of pur- jKise which alone can give to tyranny the semblance of a just authority ? If then, acting on these impressions, South Carolina secedes at the time proposed, it will be for the federal government to decide on the course they will pursue; whether they will regprt to lorce to drag the seceding State back intolhe Union, or whether they will leave ns to to ourselves, satisfied that the results of our experiment will soon bring us back, craving dtlce more the shelter of the old fold. If resort to force lie the policy of the government, a state of affairs will arise which we will exam ine presently; but as our previous re marks indicate, the difficulty lying hi the way of such a decision, and as the highest political authorities of the State 1 have been quoted in support of the opinion that we will be allowed to work out our experiment undisturbed, we shall first examine the position of the State under the latter aspect The ar gument of those opposed to State ac tion may in this case be thus fairly stated. 8100,000 worth of merchandize; the portion consumed in the state pa}s no duty at all, a clear gain of so much to the people; the balance, if sent into the neighboring States, cannot, r.ccor- duty could be imposed by the Federal Government on the raw material; the Cotton which now comes from our neighboring States, so that his condi tion would in no wise be altered. And so with the cotton factor who now ex ports from Charleston: there would lie no additional cost on cotton coming from the Union; and how, if the Charles ton market still offered fair prices, could his business be affected ? Granting, then, even tiro almost impossible case of an increased duty by the Federal Government on goods imported into Charleston, the import merchant only would be reached, and he only to the excess of his importation over the con sumption at home; and it is a fair in ference that increased cheapness of supply under • free port system, would give an increased home consumption. Where then are the dangers to our in- ding to t « Constitution, ■ as quoted dustry? In increased direct taxation above, be made to pay a heavier duty j for the support of an independent gov than at New Y’ork, or those at Charles ton, if we were still in the Union; and the only practical difference to the im porting merchant is, that he pays the duty on such of his cargo as he sends into the Union, a few hundred miles more inland, than he did before. Be sides which, the Federal Government, in the attempt to collect duties on such eminent, an army and navy. &c., is the reply. Now this reply is based on an assumption os yet unproven, in that wo need a government so vastly more expensive than our present one. W’e do notlielieve it. As the State of South Carolina would not surely un dertake to play arbiter in the affairs of the world, our object would be to hus- a line of frontier «s the inland line of band our own resources, perfect our Carolina, would be involved m an ex- |>ense, at once so immense and so Idle, as to baffle the ingenuity of an indebt ed Treasury and an economical Ad ministration. And so with exports; the express language of the Constitution declares in the some article and section: “No tax or duty shall bo laid on articles ex- based on the acquiescence of the Fed- own institutions, and show How wide the limfts stand. Between a splendid and a happy land. Against whom would we require an army and navy at the commencement of our national career ? The whole argument we have been making is ported from any State.” Now, in the face of this provision, how is it possi ble for the Federal Government to pre vent tho continuance of the present trade from Georgia, Alabama, Tenues- see, &c. We will be a foreign nation; they will lie exporting States of the Union, and under the provisions of their Constitution, will trade with us so long as suits their interests. There is not a solitary article which at present cqpies to Charleston from the interior —not a pound of cotton which the Gov ernment of the Union can constitution- tionally charge with one cent of duty on its way to us. We, therefore, ac cept and return the argument of those who oppose the action of the State.— We will admit that the wealth of the State depends ou the im|>orts and ex porta. With those imports, whether from the Union or abroad, tho Federal Government cannot interfere; those exports, they cannot control; or if by a technical adherence to the Constitu tion, they violate its spirit and purpose in declaring one set of duties on goods imported directly from Europe, and another set on goods imported through Carolina, what will that bo but saying the people of Tennessee and North oral Government in our departure, and in what possible way would we come in contact with the groat powers of the earth ? And if we do, if there is such a tiling as political necessity, dare the United States stand by and see us fall in a contest with a foreign power ?— The fact is incontrovertible, that in such a case, our onemies would be our natu ral and necessary allies. Our foreign relations would certainly call for no immense expenditure, and the burden of new expenses would be called for only or chiefly for government ma chinery, for the collection of taxes, and and the institution of a system of post roads and offices through the State, for our present Constitution, with very slight modifications, would answer all our purposes. Our Executive, our Legislative, and onr Judicial depart ments are already organized and pro vided for. That our direct taxation would, at the outset, be increased, is ernment, upon our contemplated seces sion, implies a unanimity on the part of the South with the great Freesoil section of the country, which does not exist And oven supposing that the Congressional support of the South could be obtained for a war, in which every conceivable loss would be borne by the Southern slavcholding section, and any possible gain would result to the Northern Freesoil section, suppo sing such an incredible state of affairs, there is in every Southern State, as can Ik) demonstrated, a minority large enough and ready enough, to organize for effective action, and upon the first report of the cannonade of Charleston, to commit the whole South irrevocably to the issue of the struggle. The idea of a civil war on such a subject, con fined within the borders of a single State, is an impossibility. And sup posing the conquest of South Carolina achieved, her final disposition would be for the triumphant government a more insoluble problem than even the admis sion of California. Upon the merely military question of our capability of defenfe, we cannot enter. When a nation encounters the perils of war, it is not always, nor of ten, on a mere calculation of strategic advantages. Every such line of con duct rests partly upon moral and po- litical considerations, and the question w ith us is—for the advantages resulting from the secession of the State, are we willing to ran the risk of war? and what are the risks ? 1. Throughout the South there is a strong undisguised sympathy for our cause, not strong enough to force other States to act with us, ImU strong enough to prevent their acting against us. 2. 'Die question of war or peace is to he determined in Congress, by Southern votes—these votes, represent ing interests identical with ours, add already recorded with ours in protest against the course of the Northern sec tion of the country. 3. The moral certainty that a hos tile collision will inflame public opin ion, until the whole South bursts into one universal flame. 4. The demonstrable injury which a civil war would work upon the indus trial interests of the Northern manufac turing section of country. 5. The utter Constitutional j torpid ity into which the conquest of Caroli na—she refusing to resuinj her posi tion as a State—would place the Gov ernment 0. The militaiy probabilities of a prolonged contest. Taking these things into consideration, with flic additional The wealth of South Carolina is de- | Carolina—it is as cheap and more con certain; but it is equally certain that fact that from the nature of our staples the increase would not weigh heavily foreign powers interested in the regu- where it is in advance most decried, larity of our commerce, it may ho Itir- that ia, upon the commercial interests ly doubted whether the General Gov- of the State. And after all, if we eminent can hazard the consequences gravely aad manfully prefer indepen- of war. And at least it iinyr tie safely rived from her imports and exportc.- A large proportion, both of imports and exports, is neither produced nor consumed within the State borders; very much of the Cotton, for instance, shipped from Charlerton, i« grown in South ven ient for you to import through Carolina than New York, therefore, ou to import i New we will increase the tariff on your inu portations through Carolina, and thus make you bear all the burden of onr war on this seceded State. And is it dei*u t we must not too eagerly count the coot, and whine piteously, in mere anticipation of the self-denial we ex pect to practice. It is the inex orable law of nature, that there is no enjoyment that is not dearly bought hy endurance. So much for the supposition of a a war eonductod under ceu which mast hamper asserted that the circumi the none of those o whelming odds, those arda, which have immortrfartl the ly straggles of such repuMk* land and 8witzerh»d.%But if n e concluding year of the present ad^ ministration, offers now is not the timd, after our loud mid lofty words, to blench from danger.— We have challenged tlie future, and come in shape however questionable we must follow it. The sooner, tin t), the State determines on her plans, the better. Tbe time for half measure i ■ gone. Men either lielieve that the language of the State is an idle braga- docia, and our fair fanje is thus griev- iously wounded in the house of our friends, or else believing that there is sofU earnestness in our purpose, the public mind of the State is uneasy and restless, discontented with the present, uncertain of the future. This should be ended: we are called upon in some measure to contribute to its determina tion. If there is any strength in the rea soning submitted to your attention, tho secession of South Carolina from the Union within eighteen months is a ju dicious and honorable policy, consist ent with the character, the professions, the safety of the State. Without in truding upon the province of the State Convention, it is within the legitimate 1 duty of the Convention of Associations to aid in establishing that conviction— in bringing about that consummation. And wc close these remarks with the earnest hope that the Convention will, in its deliberation and action, icali/o the advice given by a great statesman, j on an occasion scarcely more sole n: “If ever there was a time that calls ou us for no vulgar conception of tilings and for exertions in no udgitr strain, it is the awful hour that jtnividence has now appointed to ibis nation. Every , little measure in a great ciror can, w id bring on no small ruiii. Nothing and be directed above the mark wv must aim at; everything below' it is ab- i solutely thrown away.” BEAUFORT, TuTmrRE. The Richmond Examiner coicludcB an able article ou the Cqiupnimise in the following strong language.; “ The people of thf North, by a vast majority, are detcrniipcd en the dow n fall of all the legal barriers w hich pro feet the institutions of tli< Southctn •States. That people hate ti», their clergy hate us, their leaders hate us, their children are bred up to accom plish our ruin. Of what account is a fugitive slave law to the South, when i from the necessity of the case it must be enforced among that people and by that people’s officers? TTiis reflection, from the firstdjymor of the proposed law, fiufficicnfrJLassured all men who were not determined to be deceived, that the whole affair was a swindle—a ' thimble-rig—a stool pigeon business.— i No man in the Congress which passed the compromise bills did not know that. I Yet the gain of this tiling of straw is i the excuse which they gave forwnrren- ! dering a territory which would have ' thrown the balance of power antirely I into Southern hands, and secured the I Union from all the storms which all tho fanatics of all the Bostons could raise in the next hundred years. “ As it stands, the face of the future is far different. Clouds, shadows, and darkness rest upon it. 'ITiese are, in deed,‘but the beginning of sorrows.’ How the South is to defend itself any more, we cannot tell. Every day in creases the preponderanco against us- Hemmed, in a limited, witn all the world against us, and a crusade preach ed for our overthrow, more fanatical, more powerful, and more fearless than that which 1’eter the Hermit stirred up a thousand years ago, we will secure our independence oniy through oceans of blood and fire. We may hojie that some fortunate interposition of events may belie the indication of the presqpt time; but that the facts now extant all point to a terrible future, can no more lie doubted than the existence of these facts is attributable to tire CongreM which compromised the Constitution. NAURU YS.^cillRED HABITS. Geecd mantained that nature was more potent than art, bile Dante as serted to the contrary. To prove this principle the great Italian bard referred to his cat, which, by repeated practice he had taught to hold a candle in its paws, while he supped or read. Cecco (Wired to •vilness the experiment, and came not unprepared for the purpose. While Dante's cat was performing its part, Cecco lifted the lid ofapot which he had filled with mice. The creature of art instantly showed tlie weakness of a talent merely acquaired and drops the candle, flew on the mice w ith instinctive propensity. Dante lumself disconcerted, and it was thqf. the advocate for the or- principle of native faculties had ’ his