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- - - u - We will dling to the Pillars of the Temple of our Liberties, anid if it wlte will Perish amidst the Rus";fr, -- ." VOLUME XL %C - :; j . V-0 -..... U ;1. ED. EVERY W EDNESDAY. 11 WM. F. DURISOE ED I'OR & PRO-PRIE T OR. - NEW TERMS. TwODoL.AUs dIud FIFTVCESTs. perannum, d paid'irtidva'nce --$3 if not paid within six onnthsfroin the date of subscriptinn, and if not tiaid before the expiration of the year; All subscriptions will be continned, unless otherwise ordered before the expira ion of the year.; but no paper will be dis continned:nnila'l arrearages are paid, un b t-as atlhe option of the Publisher. Any person procuring five responasble Subscri bers, 'ha1 receive the paper for one year, gratis. .A DvERTSMENTS conspicuonsy inserted at75 cents per square. (12 lines. or. .s.) .for the firstinsertion..and 37.1 for each ootinuance. Those. published monthly or quarterly, will be charge $1 per square. Advertisements not having the iumber of insertions narked on thein; will becontinrfed uutfl uidered ont and chad iiccordinglv. Com:nnmiiciions, post paid, will be prompt ly and strictly attended to. From the Pcdlctoa Messenger. FIonT lIuL., Nuv: 1846. Gcntlnrcn- am in the receipt of s our. tute of the 14th ult., in which -you express a desite to have n.y views in re lation to the proposed change in our State Constitution, in reference to the election of the President and Vice Pres, ident. In compliance with your requst, I heirewith enclose a communi icatin, in which they are briefly sketched.-To have done full justice, in reference to the mary.anid important questions in -vtolved inothe subject, would have made my commnntunicatiion too prolix. I have, given if the present shape, rather than that of a formal letter in re-ply to ymtor note, because it left nie at liberty to arrange my views its confot m -ity to the order, which the subject re quired.. With great respect l an &c &c &c. J. C. CALI UN. Messrs. James L. Orr, William Sloan, A. Evins, and F. W. Synimes. It would seem from the public prints, that a lage majority of those, who are disposed to change the preset modo of *mppointing electors of President and Vice sidish of lieU it d'"Sta'te, are in favour of a genet al ticket,.in lieu of the present mode of appointing them by the Legislature. They rest their opposiy iqtg in the latter, and siipport of the formner, on the broad principle, that all power belongs to the People; slat they should exercise it directly, without the interveition of any ir;ttrttdiate agency, whenever they can properiy do so, and that whenever they can so exercise it, it would be an act of usurpation on the1 'art of the Government to withhold it. From this they conclude, that the power of appuitting electors, should be given to the people directil; and that the mode of appointing should be, to elect them by. a. genet al ticket. Those, on the contrary, who are opposed to the proposed change, or the mode proposed to be substitutWl, in ieh of the present, admit the: principle; but deny, that it would give the appointment to the pt o ple to elect them by a general tiker; tri that, if it would, they could prupe; ly exercise it in this case, fThe difference then, betwecn them Is reduced to' two qtlestions; Would the adoption of the geneial ticket give ihe power to the~ people in t eality to appoint -electorst And, if it would, is this a case, in wisch it could be properly exercised? On their detcisionm, it is manilest, the propriety-of adoptinig the gener al ticket musst, depend.. If it should appear on i~tv'stigatibn, that it would not in fora2 only, but in trtikh give the power dire'ct ly to the people, and thae. tbey might exerfcise it, wvithout distur'bing, injurious lyaffectinlg'the stiate, in its federal or interior relations,- thtan it might with propriety be adopted. But if the con trary 'should appear, in either of the cases, then it could not. Thus far, there can be no difference of opinion. As ono of the.people, tiaking the pro fundest- interest. in whatevor may touch the liberty or prosperity of state, I have investigated these important questions with -the greatest -'ca'r and deliberation, forehe'gUidancei of my own co-a se, and hiave'come to -thiet onclosion adv'e-rse to *ihe general ticket in reference to both questions. The investigation has made adee p impression on tne, that so far (i:om 'giving the powver to the people, it would be the most effectual way that, could . be devised of divesting them oftio and trans Sfez ring it to party managets and cliques, and that'if it were possible to overcome ithat ob'jection, i- ought not still to~ be Sadopted, because it would deeply distprt -andi ihjur ously affect the stato in its fed etal and tinenior relations, It now re ains, i.;cnipiance winh 3 our request state thse reasons, which have brough we to theseiconclusions, which I shail - ex rioceed tbodivitl:out- further re, narks. The first and rndaln nbietinn in general ticket is, that where many are to elect many, especially over a large extehi of country, it does not in fact, constitute an election, but is a mere delusion, un, deserving the name. The reason is, in the first place, that it is impossible for the great body of the voters to be guided by their individual knowledge in selec ting the candidates, either from personal acquaintance or teputation, which is indispensiblet to -that exercise of judg ment in making a selection necessary to constitute an election. And in thr,next admitting it to be possible, and. that the mass of voters could be guided by their individual choice in making the selec tion,- the 'scattering of the votes would be so great that the result, as to who would have the plurality of votes, would be a mere accident, and no indication of the 'voice of the state. Take our own State for illustration. It is entitled at present to appoint wrne electors; and its present number of legal voters may be estimated without pretending to ipreci sion, at 50,000, scatteid over a surlfce say of 150 miles. In an election by a general ticket, each voter votes for, the whole number to be elected. Now, I hold it to be impossible with .-1 the in telligence of our people for the great mass of them, to form a ticket from their own, knowledge, either personally or by reputation, of nine persons, to be electors, duly distributed over its various parts, who may be fairly considered sep arately as representing the voice of the several portions, in which they may reside, or jointly, the voice of the whole states Indeed, I might take a far more restricted position, and affirm with trut th, not only, that the great mass of voters have not - the knwledge to make out such a ticket for themselves, but that even the most intelligent and best in, formed, would be a loss t, do it. But waiving this difficuhy, and admit ting, that they have sufficient intelligences to makr- om each a satisfactory ticket for himself, the othet objection, nut less difficult would remain to be sur mounted, that is the scatterirug would be so gi rat, that the result, as to who might receive a plurality of votes and he elected, would bei mere.1ccidei ,ird noi~idication of the voice of the state. The diversity of opinion to the qualification and stita bleness, would be as great, almost, as the number-of voters. Few tickets would have the same names on them, and tie great body of the state, would be disay pointed and dissatisfied with the resn't. It would be imponible for seicii a state of things long to continue. The first conseq.wanee would he for a fet promi nent and influential individuais. to enter into a secret concert, to control the election, which need not be very ex tensive, when tie scattering would be so great. The next wotrd be, for others to anter into like concert to defeat them; and ftnally these would grow out of this state of ttiings t wo p.arties, with all the usu el par ty machinery, of caucus, con venotins, cliques and manarge-is to con trol the election. The whole would he put into activ= operation every four Serars, on the approach of the Presiden idential election, and each party would make out a full ticket by what would be called a state convention, rend every voter, wvhether lie approve of it or not would hrave to vote for one or the other, or to thtrow away his v'ote on a ticker, formed without conrcert, and which would have rio chance of succe-s. It is thus, by thre operation of causes growing out of the very natnre of a geti eral ticket, it would, if it shoultd be adoptcd, enrd in delusion. -Instead -if giving the eh-crion, directly to the peo ple, as its supporters assume, it would divest them of it, and- place it under thre control of intermediate and irresponsi ble cliques and political managers, as certainly as it is adopred. That ever has and must be its result, rand that by laws, as uriform .arid certain in the moral world, as gravitation is in the physical But setting aside this objection, and -assuming that the great mass of the vo ters of the state are sufficiently intellIi gent and wvell informed, each to form a ticket for himself, and thrat their votes could always be sufficiently concentra ted, wvithrout the .intervention of party machinery, to secure a majority of thre votes for the nine elector s, there wvould still remain an insurable reason against adopting ii; because, as stated, it would disturb and injuriously affect the state, both in its federal and interior relations, To benmore explicit, it would'nut be just. or fair. regardineg the state in it federal relations, between its two grea divisions, the upper and the lower coun try; and that regarded in its interior re lations, it would be calculated to disturl and endanger tire compromise, as estab lished by the constitution between threm as I shall next proceed to show. Before entering on the discussion this-nortion oftesubiject, it will b proper to premise, that our state is divi, r ded by a well defined line, into two great t portions or divisions, which aire strongly t distinguished by their geographical fea- g tures; the character of their productions g and population; and the origin'of their e inhabitants and manner of settlement. I Of these, one extends from the sea- li coast to the falls of the great rivers, and a' is called the lower country; and the b other-extends thence to the mountains, b and is called the upper country. . . s+ They constitute not only the two a great geographical, but also the two great political divisions of the state, on which b its political fat-rick rests, b Passing over the other features, which o distinguish them, there are two which n frou their important bearing or the o poiu's under consideration, require par- c ticular notice; I.refer to the great excess ti of the slave population of the one com- al pared with the other, and the difference it ire the origin of their inhabitants and ai manner of settlement. They both have oi had great influence in forining and mod ifying its constitution and laws, and fd placing the two divisions in the political ta relations, ti. which they stand to each t: other, as will appear in the sequel. With le these remarks I shall now proceed to to make good the position, that the adop- si tion of a general ticket would not be In fair or just between then regarding 1he p state in its federal relations. N The federal constitution, in reference c< to Presidential elections provides, that i; "each state shall appoint, in such man- cc ncr, as the Legislature thereof may pi direct a number equal to the whole num- lit ber of Senators and Representatives, to a which the State may beentitled-in Con- , gress;" It also provides that the "Rep- ar resentatives shall be apportioned among se the several states of the Union accor- lit ding to theit respective numbets, hich p shall be determined by adding to the w whole number of free persons, including be those bound to serve for a term of years cc and excluding Indians not taxed, thiee it. fifths of all other per sons." tie It follows from these provisions, that s the federal numbers of the s1av'.hld states, and' consequentl. wright in the House of Repres nta ad the electoral College, and through w them, n the federal Government, de- in pend., more or less, on their respective L si-ve population. That of this state, ry depr-uds more on it than any other, be- m cause shte has the greatest number in pruportion of that description of popu- ' Istuon. It; ede(tni iunhee Iby the ies' th ent census I' 463,582 :f wl:ichi the li ee a po;pul io : emak"-, 267.360; and its w slave population 196.222.-ins aggro- I : gate f. d'eral number, divided betwe'i the lower and the tupper 'nun'ry would r give to the former 246.180. and to the al latter 217,402, and a correspo::d excess w to the lower over the upper in the weight ui of the state in the h ederal government. d But their respective weight is very une, p qually affected by their slate population e in consequence of its very onequal die- j tribution between the to divisions. Of s, the 190.222, which the slave population p adds to the fedeealweight of the state, o the upper division adds but 66,408, tI while the lower, adds 129,814, being , more than 2 to one on the part of the n latter, The case is the reverse in refe- ti rance to the number (246,180) wvhich fr the free population adds. Of that the u lowern division adds but 116,366, against a, 10994, whtich the upper adds. Thtese t esimates are throughout absed on dis' i tricts; aell lying ib the poe tiont of the state t below~ the falls of the rivets, wholly or j principally are included in the lower di vision, and those above, en like manner, in the upper. Nowv as the voters consist entirely ofb the free populatione, and as the number of voters in the respective divisions is pobably very nearly in propoirtion to their respective free population, it is nanifest, should the genereal ticket b a adopted, that the upper division,, which gives the state less weighlt in the federal gocrnmeent thtan the lower, would haver decidedly the power of controlling- the 1 appointment of electors, in consequence. of having a decided majority of voters. I That a mode of appointing, whiche would lend to sued a result, wvould be neither fair nor just towards the lower 1 division, no one who has any regard to: equity justice will deny. If I do not< greatly mistake, the upper coumtry-has- I too deep a .sense of b->th to. wishr it,-rven if it had and should tempt to exercise it,t te lower teas too much spirit to acqcui es~e ire it. But thanks to the justice and wisdom of our state Conventioni,neither of the divisions has thte powerito encroach. on the just rights of the other. It 'has secured to each the power to .protect itself; so that. neither can oppress or injure the other, should it desire it. If, then, one or the other, should stiffer by,. the acts of the government of the state,. ' the fault will be Its own,-4tn want of .nsulcinr intellionen to nirand'c ts. ights and,itk injrest, or sufficient spirit o defend them.! To show how this has teen done, aed iow the adoption-ofthe 'rneral ticket , old disturb and end an er the comproso by which it has been ffetted,; temaits ;next to- be discussed. ts discnssion.will. require a brief pre minary sketclk of the origin and settle, sent of the state, as far as they have a earing on estaWishing the compromise etween the two divisions, with the cau es whichtled to it, and its chat acter nd the efect ontthe politics of the state. Our state was first settled on the coast y emigrants principally fior England, ut with net inconsiderable intermixture f Hugenors from France. As the for ir were for the-mbst part of the church F England.,the-tier of counties (now iled Districts) settled by them along te coast wtere livided into Parishes; nd they were niade' the foundation of te politicaloTeatization of the colony, nd, since the Revolution, of that portion the state. The porton o the state along the hls of the rivers end back to the- moun ins had a very e-ditierent otigin atid tlement. Its settlement- commenced ng after, at a period, but little anterior the war of the Rtevoltion, and con. ted principally-f emigrants who fol wed the course f .the mountains, from ennsylvania. Maryland, Virginia ana orth Carolina.--Tley had very little nnction, or intercourse for a long e with the old settlement on the ast; and the while region, they occu ed remained alnut without any po ical division or organization until but short period before the revolution. It s, indeed, very imperfectly organised id slightly connected with the original ttlemett, and possessed very little pos ical powet until the adoption of the esent consitutioa in 1790; although its hite population, even'then, . outnum ted the original' seglement on the ast. its adoptiph greatly enlarged olioitical power,and .much more in ately-united divisions;. but it hich as that had Bwer of atpp6int g the Governor Ad Judges, ga:ve it ti mtrol over the Executive and J udicia ,and, of course, the wiole (Jova n ct. It was impossible, with the. inot es.ing >piulation, wealth and irat.Ilg.. ce if e other portion o' the stare, hat suet: stave of things should lung contiinie ithout leading to discontent and cu.e The former goon shewe'd itsrtf and a ntlict comteted wohinii a few years let the adoption of the Contstittlaon, hici continued with increasing violutce atil 1807, when the agitation and discr er had sn increased. that sensible and triotic men on both sides, became tisfied that the conflict mrust he closed. was accordingly terminated, not by a irreder on either side, but by a com intmise, which placed the two parties u grounds of perfect political equality; to only way by which such conflitts er can be satisfactorily and perna nity adjusted. The composition of te senate, as it stood, consisting of oiie -om each election District, remained disturbed, which left thinold original ,tleent on thte coast ib' jiaissessiiu of b contt-ol of that branch of the Logis ttare, by reason of its-Parish represen tton.-Tu givre an etjual control in the louse of Representattives to the more ewly settled portion in the intesior, vas a more difficult tasK. it was howv ver "accomplished by alloifilg to that ranch-ot the Legislature 124 members, f which 62 were :signed tojhe white ouhio,.and 62 to taxation. , A cen us was directed to be taken . every ten ears, and an estituase tobe made of the gg egate amount of taxes paid by each lecion -District for the-periodeof -ten recedingycears. T(he number of Rlep, esetatives allowed to each 'district to eapportioned to the two weith the pro -iso that each district shouild -have a ast~one, and it theire shoulde a .defi :iency in the numabers one to be added to he districts having the nreatest fractions, imiii the whole should be 124. By this omploy arran~gemfenit, not onlf an equai ontrol was secured to the .mire regcent y settled, portion of the state- -in :the louse of Riepresentatives, iut' en e.e ul provision made against 3unequal indl oppressive taxes, by making taxahior in element in the:Repiesentation of the (ouse, its effect would -be -to:increasi the number of lRepresentatives from thit portion of the state undely taxed, just ii proportion to the excess of its taxes, em' thereby increase in tlie same iroportioi its weight in the House, under the liox apportioment.. These- just anad wis' paovisions, by requiring the concert ant joint consent oif the two portions .of th. state a n acing laws- nhacod an gunnnd of perfect.- equality in the .,gi-egiawr*; andasu it retained the power of -electing the Governor and J udges, in everyile partment of the government. Eacia having thus a negative on the other, on all the acts of the government, possesses the power of protecting itself against the injustice and oppression of the other. Thus the govet ument, ceased to be the exclusivre organ of 'ote portion of the state not by becoming like, organ of the other, but the concurrent and -the joint organ of both, and thereby the true and faithful Representative of the whole This fortunate compromise termibated the conflict, which had solongdivided and agitated the state. So completely did it close it, that from its adoption until this time, a period of almost forty years, all local divisions and parties growing out of them,41iave entirely ceased. The upper and Itwer country are no longer named for political discord and agitation, and the state has been blessed with an unanimity ofeentiment and freedom from parties, al together without example to any other member of the union. Nor has its.effcct been less happy, in reference to her fede eral, than her internal relations.-To it, she owes, in a great measure, her weight and high character and standing in the union, which, as inconsiderable as she is in extent of territory and population, places her on a level in influence, with the largest and most populous of its members. Destroy this just and ss ise compromiser by giving to either. an undue preponde rance in the government of.the state, and~tl this would be reversed. Discord, disiraction, parties and factions, with all their machinery and deenoraliaing conse quences, would follow, and sink ftrr far below the level she now occupies. That the general ticket would give such undue preponderance and in the end destroy this hapy aompromise, I shall next proceed I have already shown, that it' would give an undue and unfair preponderance to the , upper division of the state, in its .federal relations. But it has been said, it would be restricted to them, without ex tending its iufluence to tie government of the state and giving either of its great po iitical - diviions undue preponderance on . Tiloiihtamkeithis assertion over t.tL!utrthInih ti absorbing charae t a""ydotd irg-Tt'fuIOre =ous:a 0never it acquires a prepbndetilce, be it ever so small, it will slowly and imper ceptibly commence the process of absorp tion, nid continue it until it absurbs the whole power, unloss efficient measures he taken in time to counteract it: In this case there are several circutstances, wthit- would greatly Increase add accele rare this proess, which I shull now pro cet:d to show. Its adoption would introduce the princi. ple cf taking tlet genie of the state. as a whole. by the mete ntumnerical majority. without regard to its two areat natural and politicat divisions, and the coolltcting in 'erests growing out of them,-a prideiple heretofore utterly unknovn to the state. either iu its federal or interior relations, or in any of the political changes through n hich it has passed. But, of all the forms of power in a popular govornmat, it is by far the most absorbing in it& character and difficult to counteract, It is Indeed but the absolute end despotic furri of pop utar gdl'erniient, just as much so as the ntasolute and despotic power of one amarn or a few, is of the monarchical and aristef eiatical. Now, all experience shows, that there is a conuaant and strong tendency in all constitutional goveinmients to their ahb solute-and despotic form' and innone more so, than in popular constitutional govern ments like that of this st ate, resting on the piiciple of the cotncurrent majority, as all such governments,--Indeed, nothing short of a high .legree of intelligence and con stant vigilaazce catn conteract this tcnden rcy, as the history of all stuch governmients proves. Our own both federal and state, already give strong illications ofit. so mutdeh so. that it lias become a fixed opinion ini a large portian of the union, that the mere numerical 'majority of the wvhole, has the absolute and iudefeasible right to govern. But,- as absorbling as this power is of itself, the nature of the dieetionms itd cdn nextion with which, it would be introduded would greatly increase its force. Of all our elections, whether .of. the federal or state governments, tfie Presidential excites tby far the greattest interest, atid exerts the greatest influence over the public mind, because it ,greatly exceeds all others in importance. Such . Being the case, the place of electors is sought by citizens of influence and dittinction, bioth on account of its promineoce 'and thme influence it is. calculatcd togive with the President and his administration, int the distribution of' the honors and:6mtlumients of the federal government, should the candidate voted for succeed in beitng elected, These eonsiderations. could not fail to induwee those, who aspire to so promineni and desirable. a station to court popular favor and especially that of the divisioni of thc state, which might larve the greatest number of votes and contrtof ovet tire olec tion, and that, in too many cases even at tle sacrifrce of their own, should they happen to reside in the othes: 'This would increase the preponderance of that division to a degree, that wottld be strongly felt in the Legislation of the state nd the election of the governor and other prominent offi Icers, to the increase of its influence, and decrease of'the influence of the other, is a' then annpr-nrannion. But as strong as in the tendaency-of:d numerical -majority of itself7 to absorb> po*et, ltihout feference to:the. frntoft taking it, and as much as it: wouldsbe i* creased, :in conaequence. of its conoecdot with thef fres'tiential election, its. increaser from the form of that election, should it be by general ticket, would .exceed both o( the others combined. - its vast inerease. from this sourcs would be derived fromta consequence, which, as already shown, would follow ias adoption., that is that is would introduce the caucus systemt. with. all its train of party managers. with thei. cliques and machinery. The system once introduced, although for the :particular purpose of nominating electors, would not be stow in exteatding its jurisdiction-far beyond, broiging under it the nominatiott of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Senators in Congress, Judges and allotber officersa elected by the Legislature. -Bat just lb the same proportion, that it might. extend its jurisdiction, would the power ' of the numerical majority, of which it is but the exponent. be extended. When to this it is added, that the tasons assigned. for appointing electors by a general tieket equally apply to the election of the Gov eruor, and Lieu:enant Governor and Judges, in the same manner, it is nottd; be doubted, that, if it should be adopted for the one, it would be oimnately for ther others. Indeed, it is already urgedtha' the two first should be so elected.-By the. time that is done, the compromise. which, places the two divisions.of.tbe stpt.idbD." relation of perfect political equality; will have been uterly destroyed and the pow ers of the state and government ceaeinra=. ted itfthat, which has the greatest humber of voters. It.would An eitire and disasi. trous political revolution. Instead.; of ahd present excellent constitutional govern ment, which makes ours, in its true mean= ing, a Republic,'or commonwelath, that i: the government of the whole, we would - have an absoilnte and despotic democracy -the goterntI ent of one portion of the state over the other-the one that.hasathet greatest number of votes, over that. which the fewest.. No greater curse could befal the.atate, including both. divisions-the nius which would acquire .the powers attd tt,aiher which *ould lobe it: t nItfdo corpt the one and debase the other.:. .; But we are told, in order to induce sto take a step so fatal, that all oibel.btate of the union haveadopted the gSne'raltikme' for. the .a intment of electosAlsAI a, t tharsn t1euaase b ntr1iatip y% r~ that its adopti6n was c''ir the isult- ofuh- . biased and deliberate preference..lt -wi* not so originally. I have not at bands-the means of ascertaining.the mode adopted, at first by the several states. but unless i greatly asitake, I. do not err in asserting. that the great majority appointed their electors. either by Districts or their Legis latures, and hew indeed by general ticket That all since except this state, have adop= ed it, is attributable, partly, to the violent party struggles, growing out-of the Presi identiat election. and partly to that ten dency of all popular governmenis to con cettrate powe. in toe llandis of the merd numerical majority. as alhbady explained. in these stru ;fles, uno state after another, of those that had adopted the district sys: torn, resorted. in their eager desire for vic trsty, to the general ticket; in oider to cori eentrate their power; while the states, which. ;at first, appointed by iheir Legies I:,tnres gradually yielded to the tendency inwards the numerical majority. That this s'ate has been able to resist success fully the operation ol such powerful caused is attributable to the superiority of her- - Coustitutidti: Long mdy ii enable her to continue her successful resistance, ad inutead of following the evil example of others, may it he her patriotism and pride to bian example to them, even if it shouilr? remaic,.to be as it now is, a solitary one. With thosei weighty anal 't6 my mind overwhelming reasons-against the addy-. tion of the general jicket, I would here close the discussiot!;as far azs- regards .in. as being wholly out of the questit, was~ it not for the .deep convietton I havo, si ho thei disastrous 'consequences' totie statel whidli would follow,' should l1.e utntrttunately adopted. Under its inflar ence, I feel it to he a duty, in Ieplyings td~ 4our ulote, to omit no mateuill tessoal hagairst it. There-'still remaitto one suchr 'with -which I shall close this poitionsftthd discussion of the subject. 'Those whbo suppoir a gbneral' aieket seein to me. with all' due 'deferenke,"tir rest its adoption'on) a series of unfoiifadet' asumptions. Thej assume, ih' the firef pla'ce, that the federal Consiirtiidau vendtg the appoinitment of electofs int tle pedaie. But such is not the fact. On' ahe-contiat$' it expressively provided, that etan 'kt~e shall appo'i.nt itg eloa'errs, wvith drsithe'r, restrictions, except that the mnainer shatW be as directed by its Legislature. and'iiint no Seniot, ur'l1.epresenta'tive; or persona tioldinag an oflee of irasut, or profgt niider the Uited State's sha-ie 60 n elector. 'Ii is, then, clear, the assumptios,' that thda federal Constitution gives the npyiinteni~ to the people. rests oni abother aisuiitiNtt that the peoplo-are the state, it is'iitdetfJ true they are, regatded 'in their org'add charncter, as constiattiigabody pijti. [an thatosense, the p~eople.ate the stateand, the state thepeople,- bit.-ao-.ther.. Ja ia* not, hsowovet, in thai aense, Abat the .d vocates of the general sicks .'Uea n.' Qn the contrary, they' evidently apply itto the people, in their unorganized character as-mere individuals;-a sedise, in wbieb the people are never called the state, fops theastate the .people. 1 say . evidently, because theefect of adopting it wouldie, tosiva the annointmnent to a-mt~eamalcap.