Edgefield advertiser. (Edgefield, S.C.) 1836-current, November 25, 1846, Image 1
- - - u -
We will dling to the Pillars of the Temple of our Liberties, anid if it wlte will Perish amidst the Rus";fr, -- ."
VOLUME XL %C - :; j . V-0 -.....
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From the Pcdlctoa Messenger.
FIonT lIuL., Nuv: 1846.
Gcntlnrcn- am in the receipt of
s our. tute of the 14th ult., in which -you
express a desite to have n.y views in re
lation to the proposed change in our
State Constitution, in reference to the
election of the President and Vice Pres,
ident. In compliance with your requst,
I heirewith enclose a communi icatin, in
which they are briefly sketched.-To
have done full justice, in reference to
the mary.anid important questions in
-vtolved inothe subject, would have made
my commnntunicatiion too prolix.
I have, given if the present shape,
rather than that of a formal letter in
re-ply to ymtor note, because it left nie at
liberty to arrange my views its confot m
-ity to the order, which the subject re
quired..
With great respect
l an &c &c &c.
J. C. CALI UN.
Messrs. James L. Orr, William Sloan,
A. Evins, and F. W. Synimes.
It would seem from the public prints,
that a lage majority of those, who are
disposed to change the preset modo of
*mppointing electors of President and Vice
sidish of lieU it d'"Sta'te, are in
favour of a genet al ticket,.in lieu of the
present mode of appointing them by the
Legislature. They rest their opposiy
iqtg in the latter, and siipport of the
formner, on the broad principle, that all
power belongs to the People; slat they
should exercise it directly, without the
interveition of any ir;ttrttdiate agency,
whenever they can properiy do so, and
that whenever they can so exercise it,
it would be an act of usurpation on the1
'art of the Government to withhold it.
From this they conclude, that the
power of appuitting electors, should be
given to the people directil; and that
the mode of appointing should be, to elect
them by. a. genet al ticket. Those, on
the contrary, who are opposed to the
proposed change, or the mode proposed
to be substitutWl, in ieh of the present,
admit the: principle; but deny, that it
would give the appointment to the pt o
ple to elect them by a general tiker; tri
that, if it would, they could prupe; ly
exercise it in this case,
fThe difference then, betwecn them Is
reduced to' two qtlestions; Would the
adoption of the geneial ticket give ihe
power to the~ people in t eality to appoint
-electorst And, if it would, is this a case,
in wisch it could be properly exercised?
On their detcisionm, it is manilest, the
propriety-of adoptinig the gener al ticket
musst, depend.. If it should appear on
i~tv'stigatibn, that it would not in fora2
only, but in trtikh give the power dire'ct
ly to the people, and thae. tbey might
exerfcise it, wvithout distur'bing, injurious
lyaffectinlg'the stiate, in its federal or
interior relations,- thtan it might with
propriety be adopted. But if the con
trary 'should appear, in either of the
cases, then it could not. Thus far, there
can be no difference of opinion.
As ono of the.people, tiaking the pro
fundest- interest. in whatevor may touch
the liberty or prosperity of state, I have
investigated these important questions
with -the greatest -'ca'r and deliberation,
forehe'gUidancei of my own co-a se, and
hiave'come to -thiet onclosion adv'e-rse to
*ihe general ticket in reference to both
questions. The investigation has made
adee p impression on tne, that so far (i:om
'giving the powver to the people, it would
be the most effectual way that, could . be
devised of divesting them oftio and trans
Sfez ring it to party managets and cliques,
and that'if it were possible to overcome
ithat ob'jection, i- ought not still to~ be
Sadopted, because it would deeply distprt
-andi ihjur ously affect the stato in its fed
etal and tinenior relations, It now re
ains, i.;cnipiance winh 3 our request
state thse reasons, which have brough
we to theseiconclusions, which I shail
- ex rioceed tbodivitl:out- further re,
narks.
The first and rndaln nbietinn in
general ticket is, that where many are to
elect many, especially over a large extehi
of country, it does not in fact, constitute
an election, but is a mere delusion, un,
deserving the name. The reason is, in
the first place, that it is impossible for
the great body of the voters to be guided
by their individual knowledge in selec
ting the candidates, either from personal
acquaintance or teputation, which is
indispensiblet to -that exercise of judg
ment in making a selection necessary to
constitute an election. And in thr,next
admitting it to be possible, and. that the
mass of voters could be guided by their
individual choice in making the selec
tion,- the 'scattering of the votes would
be so great that the result, as to who
would have the plurality of votes, would
be a mere accident, and no indication of
the 'voice of the state. Take our own
State for illustration. It is entitled at
present to appoint wrne electors; and its
present number of legal voters may be
estimated without pretending to ipreci
sion, at 50,000, scatteid over a surlfce
say of 150 miles. In an election by a
general ticket, each voter votes for, the
whole number to be elected. Now, I
hold it to be impossible with .-1 the in
telligence of our people for the great
mass of them, to form a ticket from
their own, knowledge, either personally
or by reputation, of nine persons, to be
electors, duly distributed over its various
parts, who may be fairly considered sep
arately as representing the voice of the
several portions, in which they may
reside, or jointly, the voice of the whole
states Indeed, I might take a far more
restricted position, and affirm with trut th,
not only, that the great mass of voters
have not - the knwledge to make out
such a ticket for themselves, but that
even the most intelligent and best in,
formed, would be a loss t, do it.
But waiving this difficuhy, and admit
ting, that they have sufficient intelligences
to makr- om each a satisfactory ticket
for himself, the othet objection, nut less
difficult would remain to be sur mounted,
that is the scatterirug would be so gi rat,
that the result, as to who might receive a
plurality of votes and he elected, would
bei mere.1ccidei ,ird noi~idication of
the voice of the state. The diversity of
opinion to the qualification and stita
bleness, would be as great, almost, as
the number-of voters. Few tickets would
have the same names on them, and tie
great body of the state, would be disay
pointed and dissatisfied with the resn't.
It would be imponible for seicii a state
of things long to continue. The first
conseq.wanee would he for a fet promi
nent and influential individuais. to enter
into a secret concert, to control the
election, which need not be very ex
tensive, when tie scattering would be so
great. The next wotrd be, for others
to anter into like concert to defeat them;
and ftnally these would grow out of this
state of ttiings t wo p.arties, with all the
usu el par ty machinery, of caucus, con
venotins, cliques and manarge-is to con
trol the election. The whole would he
put into activ= operation every four
Serars, on the approach of the Presiden
idential election, and each party would
make out a full ticket by what would be
called a state convention, rend every
voter, wvhether lie approve of it or not
would hrave to vote for one or the other,
or to thtrow away his v'ote on a ticker,
formed without conrcert, and which
would have rio chance of succe-s.
It is thus, by thre operation of causes
growing out of the very natnre of a geti
eral ticket, it would, if it shoultd be
adoptcd, enrd in delusion. -Instead -if
giving the eh-crion, directly to the peo
ple, as its supporters assume, it would
divest them of it, and- place it under thre
control of intermediate and irresponsi
ble cliques and political managers, as
certainly as it is adopred. That ever
has and must be its result, rand that by
laws, as uriform .arid certain in the
moral world, as gravitation is in the
physical
But setting aside this objection, and
-assuming that the great mass of the vo
ters of the state are sufficiently intellIi
gent and wvell informed, each to form a
ticket for himself, and thrat their votes
could always be sufficiently concentra
ted, wvithrout the .intervention of party
machinery, to secure a majority of thre
votes for the nine elector s, there wvould
still remain an insurable reason against
adopting ii; because, as stated, it would
disturb and injuriously affect the state,
both in its federal and interior relations,
To benmore explicit, it would'nut be
just. or fair. regardineg the state in it
federal relations, between its two grea
divisions, the upper and the lower coun
try; and that regarded in its interior re
lations, it would be calculated to disturl
and endanger tire compromise, as estab
lished by the constitution between threm
as I shall next proceed to show.
Before entering on the discussion
this-nortion oftesubiject, it will b
proper to premise, that our state is divi, r
ded by a well defined line, into two great t
portions or divisions, which aire strongly t
distinguished by their geographical fea- g
tures; the character of their productions g
and population; and the origin'of their e
inhabitants and manner of settlement. I
Of these, one extends from the sea- li
coast to the falls of the great rivers, and a'
is called the lower country; and the b
other-extends thence to the mountains, b
and is called the upper country. . . s+
They constitute not only the two a
great geographical, but also the two great
political divisions of the state, on which b
its political fat-rick rests, b
Passing over the other features, which o
distinguish them, there are two which n
frou their important bearing or the o
poiu's under consideration, require par- c
ticular notice; I.refer to the great excess ti
of the slave population of the one com- al
pared with the other, and the difference it
ire the origin of their inhabitants and ai
manner of settlement. They both have oi
had great influence in forining and mod
ifying its constitution and laws, and fd
placing the two divisions in the political ta
relations, ti. which they stand to each t:
other, as will appear in the sequel. With le
these remarks I shall now proceed to to
make good the position, that the adop- si
tion of a general ticket would not be In
fair or just between then regarding 1he p
state in its federal relations. N
The federal constitution, in reference c<
to Presidential elections provides, that i;
"each state shall appoint, in such man- cc
ncr, as the Legislature thereof may pi
direct a number equal to the whole num- lit
ber of Senators and Representatives, to a
which the State may beentitled-in Con- ,
gress;" It also provides that the "Rep- ar
resentatives shall be apportioned among se
the several states of the Union accor- lit
ding to theit respective numbets, hich p
shall be determined by adding to the w
whole number of free persons, including be
those bound to serve for a term of years cc
and excluding Indians not taxed, thiee it.
fifths of all other per sons." tie
It follows from these provisions, that s
the federal numbers of the s1av'.hld
states, and' consequentl.
wright in the House of Repres nta
ad the electoral College, and through w
them, n the federal Government, de- in
pend., more or less, on their respective L
si-ve population. That of this state, ry
depr-uds more on it than any other, be- m
cause shte has the greatest number in
pruportion of that description of popu- '
Istuon. It; ede(tni iunhee Iby the ies' th
ent census I' 463,582 :f wl:ichi the li ee a
po;pul io : emak"-, 267.360; and its w
slave population 196.222.-ins aggro- I :
gate f. d'eral number, divided betwe'i
the lower and the tupper 'nun'ry would r
give to the former 246.180. and to the al
latter 217,402, and a correspo::d excess w
to the lower over the upper in the weight ui
of the state in the h ederal government. d
But their respective weight is very une, p
qually affected by their slate population e
in consequence of its very onequal die- j
tribution between the to divisions. Of s,
the 190.222, which the slave population p
adds to the fedeealweight of the state, o
the upper division adds but 66,408, tI
while the lower, adds 129,814, being ,
more than 2 to one on the part of the n
latter, The case is the reverse in refe- ti
rance to the number (246,180) wvhich fr
the free population adds. Of that the u
lowern division adds but 116,366, against a,
10994, whtich the upper adds. Thtese t
esimates are throughout absed on dis' i
tricts; aell lying ib the poe tiont of the state t
below~ the falls of the rivets, wholly or j
principally are included in the lower di
vision, and those above, en like manner,
in the upper.
Nowv as the voters consist entirely ofb
the free populatione, and as the number
of voters in the respective divisions is
pobably very nearly in propoirtion to
their respective free population, it is
nanifest, should the genereal ticket b a
adopted, that the upper division,, which
gives the state less weighlt in the federal
gocrnmeent thtan the lower, would haver
decidedly the power of controlling- the 1
appointment of electors, in consequence.
of having a decided majority of voters. I
That a mode of appointing, whiche
would lend to sued a result, wvould be
neither fair nor just towards the lower 1
division, no one who has any regard to:
equity justice will deny. If I do not<
greatly mistake, the upper coumtry-has- I
too deep a .sense of b->th to. wishr it,-rven
if it had and should tempt to exercise it,t
te lower teas too much spirit to acqcui
es~e ire it. But thanks to the justice and
wisdom of our state Conventioni,neither
of the divisions has thte powerito encroach.
on the just rights of the other. It 'has
secured to each the power to .protect
itself; so that. neither can oppress or
injure the other, should it desire it. If,
then, one or the other, should stiffer by,.
the acts of the government of the state,.
' the fault will be Its own,-4tn want of
.nsulcinr intellionen to nirand'c ts.
ights and,itk injrest, or sufficient spirit
o defend them.! To show how this has
teen done, aed iow the adoption-ofthe
'rneral ticket , old disturb and end an
er the comproso by which it has been
ffetted,; temaits ;next to- be discussed.
ts discnssion.will. require a brief pre
minary sketclk of the origin and settle,
sent of the state, as far as they have a
earing on estaWishing the compromise
etween the two divisions, with the cau
es whichtled to it, and its chat acter
nd the efect ontthe politics of the state.
Our state was first settled on the coast
y emigrants principally fior England,
ut with net inconsiderable intermixture
f Hugenors from France. As the for
ir were for the-mbst part of the church
F England.,the-tier of counties (now
iled Districts) settled by them along
te coast wtere livided into Parishes;
nd they were niade' the foundation of
te politicaloTeatization of the colony,
nd, since the Revolution, of that portion
the state.
The porton o the state along the
hls of the rivers end back to the- moun
ins had a very e-ditierent otigin atid
tlement. Its settlement- commenced
ng after, at a period, but little anterior
the war of the Rtevoltion, and con.
ted principally-f emigrants who fol
wed the course f .the mountains, from
ennsylvania. Maryland, Virginia ana
orth Carolina.--Tley had very little
nnction, or intercourse for a long
e with the old settlement on the
ast; and the while region, they occu
ed remained alnut without any po
ical division or organization until but
short period before the revolution. It
s, indeed, very imperfectly organised
id slightly connected with the original
ttlemett, and possessed very little pos
ical powet until the adoption of the
esent consitutioa in 1790; although its
hite population, even'then, . outnum
ted the original' seglement on the
ast. its adoptiph greatly enlarged
olioitical power,and .much more in
ately-united divisions;. but it
hich as that had Bwer of atpp6int
g the Governor Ad Judges, ga:ve it ti
mtrol over the Executive and J udicia
,and, of course, the wiole (Jova n
ct.
It was impossible, with the. inot es.ing
>piulation, wealth and irat.Ilg.. ce if
e other portion o' the stare, hat suet:
stave of things should lung contiinie
ithout leading to discontent and cu.e
The former goon shewe'd itsrtf and a
ntlict comteted wohinii a few years
let the adoption of the Contstittlaon,
hici continued with increasing violutce
atil 1807, when the agitation and discr
er had sn increased. that sensible and
triotic men on both sides, became
tisfied that the conflict mrust he closed.
was accordingly terminated, not by a
irreder on either side, but by a com
intmise, which placed the two parties
u grounds of perfect political equality;
to only way by which such conflitts
er can be satisfactorily and perna
nity adjusted. The composition of
te senate, as it stood, consisting of oiie
-om each election District, remained
disturbed, which left thinold original
,tleent on thte coast ib' jiaissessiiu of
b contt-ol of that branch of the Logis
ttare, by reason of its-Parish represen
tton.-Tu givre an etjual control in the
louse of Representattives to the more
ewly settled portion in the intesior,
vas a more difficult tasK. it was howv
ver "accomplished by alloifilg to that
ranch-ot the Legislature 124 members,
f which 62 were :signed tojhe white
ouhio,.and 62 to taxation. , A cen
us was directed to be taken . every ten
ears, and an estituase tobe made of the
gg egate amount of taxes paid by each
lecion -District for the-periodeof -ten
recedingycears. T(he number of Rlep,
esetatives allowed to each 'district to
eapportioned to the two weith the pro
-iso that each district shouild -have a
ast~one, and it theire shoulde a .defi
:iency in the numabers one to be added to
he districts having the nreatest fractions,
imiii the whole should be 124. By this
omploy arran~gemfenit, not onlf an equai
ontrol was secured to the .mire regcent
y settled, portion of the state- -in :the
louse of Riepresentatives, iut' en e.e
ul provision made against 3unequal
indl oppressive taxes, by making taxahior
in element in the:Repiesentation of the
(ouse, its effect would -be -to:increasi
the number of lRepresentatives from thit
portion of the state undely taxed, just ii
proportion to the excess of its taxes, em'
thereby increase in tlie same iroportioi
its weight in the House, under the liox
apportioment.. These- just anad wis'
paovisions, by requiring the concert ant
joint consent oif the two portions .of th.
state a n acing laws- nhacod an gunnnd
of perfect.- equality in the .,gi-egiawr*;
andasu it retained the power of -electing
the Governor and J udges, in everyile
partment of the government. Eacia
having thus a negative on the other, on
all the acts of the government, possesses
the power of protecting itself against the
injustice and oppression of the other.
Thus the govet ument, ceased to be the
exclusivre organ of 'ote portion of the
state not by becoming like, organ of the
other, but the concurrent and -the joint
organ of both, and thereby the true and
faithful Representative of the whole
This fortunate compromise termibated
the conflict, which had solongdivided and
agitated the state. So completely did it
close it, that from its adoption until this
time, a period of almost forty years, all
local divisions and parties growing out of
them,41iave entirely ceased. The upper
and Itwer country are no longer named
for political discord and agitation, and the
state has been blessed with an unanimity
ofeentiment and freedom from parties, al
together without example to any other
member of the union. Nor has its.effcct
been less happy, in reference to her fede
eral, than her internal relations.-To it,
she owes, in a great measure, her weight
and high character and standing in the
union, which, as inconsiderable as she is
in extent of territory and population, places
her on a level in influence, with the largest
and most populous of its members.
Destroy this just and ss ise compromiser
by giving to either. an undue preponde
rance in the government of.the state,
and~tl this would be reversed. Discord,
disiraction, parties and factions, with all
their machinery and deenoraliaing conse
quences, would follow, and sink ftrr far
below the level she now occupies. That
the general ticket would give such undue
preponderance and in the end destroy this
hapy aompromise, I shall next proceed
I have already shown, that it' would
give an undue and unfair preponderance
to the , upper division of the state, in its
.federal relations. But it has been said,
it would be restricted to them, without ex
tending its iufluence to tie government of
the state and giving either of its great po
iitical - diviions undue preponderance on
. Tiloiihtamkeithis assertion over
t.tL!utrthInih ti absorbing charae
t a""ydotd irg-Tt'fuIOre =ous:a
0never it acquires a prepbndetilce, be
it ever so small, it will slowly and imper
ceptibly commence the process of absorp
tion, nid continue it until it absurbs the
whole power, unloss efficient measures he
taken in time to counteract it: In this
case there are several circutstances,
wthit- would greatly Increase add accele
rare this proess, which I shull now pro
cet:d to show.
Its adoption would introduce the princi.
ple cf taking tlet genie of the state. as a
whole. by the mete ntumnerical majority.
without regard to its two areat natural and
politicat divisions, and the coolltcting in
'erests growing out of them,-a prideiple
heretofore utterly unknovn to the state.
either iu its federal or interior relations, or
in any of the political changes through
n hich it has passed. But, of all the forms
of power in a popular govornmat, it is
by far the most absorbing in it& character
and difficult to counteract, It is Indeed
but the absolute end despotic furri of pop
utar gdl'erniient, just as much so as the
ntasolute and despotic power of one amarn
or a few, is of the monarchical and aristef
eiatical. Now, all experience shows, that
there is a conuaant and strong tendency in
all constitutional goveinmients to their ahb
solute-and despotic form' and innone more
so, than in popular constitutional govern
ments like that of this st ate, resting on the
piiciple of the cotncurrent majority, as all
such governments,--Indeed, nothing short
of a high .legree of intelligence and con
stant vigilaazce catn conteract this tcnden
rcy, as the history of all stuch governmients
proves. Our own both federal and state,
already give strong illications ofit. so mutdeh
so. that it lias become a fixed opinion ini a
large portian of the union, that the mere
numerical 'majority of the wvhole, has the
absolute and iudefeasible right to govern.
But,- as absorbling as this power is of
itself, the nature of the dieetionms itd cdn
nextion with which, it would be introduded
would greatly increase its force. Of all
our elections, whether .of. the federal or
state governments, tfie Presidential excites
tby far the greattest interest, atid exerts the
greatest influence over the public mind,
because it ,greatly exceeds all others in
importance. Such . Being the case, the
place of electors is sought by citizens of
influence and dittinction, bioth on account
of its promineoce 'and thme influence it is.
calculatcd togive with the President and
his administration, int the distribution of'
the honors and:6mtlumients of the federal
government, should the candidate voted
for succeed in beitng elected,
These eonsiderations. could not fail to
induwee those, who aspire to so promineni
and desirable. a station to court popular
favor and especially that of the divisioni of
thc state, which might larve the greatest
number of votes and contrtof ovet tire olec
tion, and that, in too many cases even at
tle sacrifrce of their own, should they
happen to reside in the othes: 'This would
increase the preponderance of that division
to a degree, that wottld be strongly felt in
the Legislation of the state nd the election
of the governor and other prominent offi
Icers, to the increase of its influence, and
decrease of'the influence of the other, is
a' then annpr-nrannion.
But as strong as in the tendaency-of:d
numerical -majority of itself7 to absorb>
po*et, ltihout feference to:the. frntoft
taking it, and as much as it: wouldsbe i*
creased, :in conaequence. of its conoecdot
with thef fres'tiential election, its. increaser
from the form of that election, should it be
by general ticket, would .exceed both o(
the others combined. - its vast inerease.
from this sourcs would be derived fromta
consequence, which, as already shown,
would follow ias adoption., that is that is
would introduce the caucus systemt. with.
all its train of party managers. with thei.
cliques and machinery. The system once
introduced, although for the :particular
purpose of nominating electors, would not
be stow in exteatding its jurisdiction-far
beyond, broiging under it the nominatiott
of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
Senators in Congress, Judges and allotber
officersa elected by the Legislature. -Bat
just lb the same proportion, that it might.
extend its jurisdiction, would the power '
of the numerical majority, of which it is
but the exponent. be extended. When to
this it is added, that the tasons assigned.
for appointing electors by a general tieket
equally apply to the election of the Gov
eruor, and Lieu:enant Governor and
Judges, in the same manner, it is nottd;
be doubted, that, if it should be adopted
for the one, it would be oimnately for ther
others. Indeed, it is already urgedtha'
the two first should be so elected.-By the.
time that is done, the compromise. which,
places the two divisions.of.tbe stpt.idbD."
relation of perfect political equality; will
have been uterly destroyed and the pow
ers of the state and government ceaeinra=.
ted itfthat, which has the greatest humber
of voters. It.would An eitire and disasi.
trous political revolution. Instead.; of ahd
present excellent constitutional govern
ment, which makes ours, in its true mean=
ing, a Republic,'or commonwelath, that i:
the government of the whole, we would -
have an absoilnte and despotic democracy
-the goterntI ent of one portion of the
state over the other-the one that.hasathet
greatest number of votes, over that. which
the fewest.. No greater curse could befal
the.atate, including both. divisions-the
nius which would acquire .the powers attd
tt,aiher which *ould lobe it: t nItfdo
corpt the one and debase the other.:. .;
But we are told, in order to induce sto
take a step so fatal, that all oibel.btate
of the union haveadopted the gSne'raltikme'
for. the .a intment of electosAlsAI a, t
tharsn t1euaase b ntr1iatip y% r~
that its adopti6n was c''ir the isult- ofuh- .
biased and deliberate preference..lt -wi*
not so originally. I have not at bands-the
means of ascertaining.the mode adopted,
at first by the several states. but unless i
greatly asitake, I. do not err in asserting.
that the great majority appointed their
electors. either by Districts or their Legis
latures, and hew indeed by general ticket
That all since except this state, have adop=
ed it, is attributable, partly, to the violent
party struggles, growing out-of the Presi
identiat election. and partly to that ten
dency of all popular governmenis to con
cettrate powe. in toe llandis of the merd
numerical majority. as alhbady explained.
in these stru ;fles, uno state after another,
of those that had adopted the district sys:
torn, resorted. in their eager desire for vic
trsty, to the general ticket; in oider to cori
eentrate their power; while the states,
which. ;at first, appointed by iheir Legies
I:,tnres gradually yielded to the tendency
inwards the numerical majority. That
this s'ate has been able to resist success
fully the operation ol such powerful caused
is attributable to the superiority of her- -
Coustitutidti: Long mdy ii enable her to
continue her successful resistance, ad
inutead of following the evil example of
others, may it he her patriotism and pride
to bian example to them, even if it shouilr?
remaic,.to be as it now is, a solitary one.
With thosei weighty anal 't6 my mind
overwhelming reasons-against the addy-.
tion of the general jicket, I would here
close the discussiot!;as far azs- regards .in.
as being wholly out of the questit, was~
it not for the .deep convietton I havo, si
ho thei disastrous 'consequences' totie
statel whidli would follow,' should l1.e
utntrttunately adopted. Under its inflar
ence, I feel it to he a duty, in Ieplyings td~
4our ulote, to omit no mateuill tessoal
hagairst it. There-'still remaitto one suchr
'with -which I shall close this poitionsftthd
discussion of the subject.
'Those whbo suppoir a gbneral' aieket
seein to me. with all' due 'deferenke,"tir
rest its adoption'on) a series of unfoiifadet'
asumptions. Thej assume, ih' the firef
pla'ce, that the federal Consiirtiidau vendtg
the appoinitment of electofs int tle pedaie.
But such is not the fact. On' ahe-contiat$'
it expressively provided, that etan 'kt~e
shall appo'i.nt itg eloa'errs, wvith drsithe'r,
restrictions, except that the mnainer shatW
be as directed by its Legislature. and'iiint
no Seniot, ur'l1.epresenta'tive; or persona
tioldinag an oflee of irasut, or profgt niider
the Uited State's sha-ie 60 n elector. 'Ii
is, then, clear, the assumptios,' that thda
federal Constitution gives the npyiinteni~
to the people. rests oni abother aisuiitiNtt
that the peoplo-are the state, it is'iitdetfJ
true they are, regatded 'in their org'add
charncter, as constiattiigabody pijti.
[an thatosense, the p~eople.ate the stateand,
the state thepeople,- bit.-ao-.ther.. Ja ia*
not, hsowovet, in thai aense, Abat the .d
vocates of the general sicks .'Uea n.' Qn
the contrary, they' evidently apply itto
the people, in their unorganized character
as-mere individuals;-a sedise, in wbieb
the people are never called the state, fops
theastate the .people. 1 say . evidently,
because theefect of adopting it wouldie,
tosiva the annointmnent to a-mt~eamalcap.