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DEVOTED TO SOUTHIERN IHS DEMOCRACY, NEWSNRGT, LITERATURE, AGRICUIEIISI1C ~iTl W AVILLIAM LEWIS, JOHN S. RICHARDSON, J., PROPIETORS. ' (lg-((fl giis-NN iN AUVANCE TSUMERVILLE, S. C., JULY 26, 1854. NO. 39. THE SUMTER BANNER, is PUtLISIED Every Wednesday Morning BY Lewis & Richardson. TERYMS, TWO DOLLARS in advance, Two Dollars sand Fifty Cents at the expiration of six months ,or Three Dollars at the end of the year. No paper discontinued until all arrearage are rAID, unless at the option of the Proprietor. Advertisements inserted at SEVENTY FI .Cents per square, (12 lines or less,) for the first, and half that sum for each subsequtnt insertion, (Official advertisements the same each time). SW The number of insertions to be marked on aH Advertisemnents or they will be published until ordered to be distontinued, and charged accordin y. ? ONE DOLLAR r square fora single insertion. Quarterly and Monthly Advertise manta will be charged the sanie as a single in sertion. and semi-monthly the same as new ones Remarks of Hon. W. W. Boyce, OF' 8OUTH CAROLINA. In the House of Representatives, U. 'S., June 27, on the bill making appro. priation to carry into effect the Mexi 'can Treaty. . ir. Boyce said: Mr. Chairman This is a subject of great importance in two points in view. First. in re 'erence to the power of the House over the subject of appropriations 'reqi'red by treaties; and second, in Vegard to the expediency of passing the appropriation bill for ten millions of ,dollars, ndA before the committee. The first qtestion is-What degree of 'disc'retion has this House the Right to ekdreiss, When a bill conies here ask hik hh uprdpri tion to carry out a treaty? I have no 'doubt but that the Ihouse has a right to exercise a full discretiotn, a free and entire discretion 'f the subject. I hAve no doubt but that We Art at liberty, if we think prdper, to rjaett the bill-, and to refuse the apprdpriatt. Mr. Chairrnan, it Hlias lcn well said thAt ours Is a government of checks and t balane-". It, ,vhole organization u *.. h. The -o df Itenrdidtitati vas represents' pl'u i, -- resents ihe States; the President rep resents both the people and the States. By one ftorni of election, he is elected by the people. in 'the event df a choice not being made at first, he is dIected by the States. Therefore, I say, our whole bolitical system is one of checks and balances. In construing the Consti tution, we are not to constrne it as a part cf the whole. We Are to look at all the clauses, to put them all to. gether, and if possible, endeavor to 'diaw a harmonious conclusion. Let us do that in this instance. In the first plate, we find in the Constitution, with regard to the House of Repre sentatives, two important provisions; that no revenue bill shall originate except in the House of Representa tives, thereby giving to the represent atives of the people the full, absolute and entire power to place all pecu niary burdens on the people. Then, again, it is provided that no money shall be drawn from the treasury but In consequence of an appreciation to 6e made by law, to the passage of Which the action of the House of Rep. i'sentatives, iP, of course, necessary. therefore, Wo money can be taken, HrAt, froth the people; but by the ac tidh 3r the House; and secondly, no moriqg An be drawn from the treasury but by tl hk tikactiol bf the House. If there is aliy principle in the Con stituitioni more important than another, .more charadeistic of the whole tenor -of our government; more essentially .American, it is the great principle that the representatives of the people are to act on all subjects involving the raising of money or the appropriation of money. I take it, then, that this is the great principle which is impress ed on the Constitution. And, if we ~c~amine that instrument by the light ,of hi'tory, wo see the imnportan;ce of ~this principle. Our ancestors derived it f'rom Eng~land, It was the princi >li \vhich securad the liberty of the 'n glish people. It was the great princi ple which they had streggled for eon taries--the right of the commons to deeide upon tihe pecuniary burdens of, the people, and whether they should give money to the king or niot. 'We, UIerive that great principle from the history of England; and it is the same l'or which our lfathiers struggled in the American .reolution. It is the prin. Niple on vthiceh the revolution was buccessfully earried out, and on which its battles iad beent fought--the right Jif the representatives of the people to tax in the first instance, and to appro nt the :noney from thte treasury. . itliut it, liberty cannot exwist; 'There ore it is the ftrndamnental principle of oiur governmert;- and we ate bound to bonstroe tihe CXinstitution d~o as that, ls pritreiple shitll at any rate have its full th~ree; HIowevetI any othW pri'nei ~ e tinay s'lfe-r disregardl, this principle mist have~ ellicacy. Lott us now chlT ?trueQ the Conastitution 6: that light Nofi atibji(11 egrd teitue trea6t C igm' ing power. The President and Senate are authorized to make treaties. Well, cannot these two powers stand together? Undoubtedly they can. When the President and Senate mak< treaties which do not require the legis. lative action of the House, and are not prohibited by the Constitution, they are the law of the land; but any trea ties which they make involving ap propriations of money require the legislative action of the House, and cannot be operative and in full force until the House passes the necessary appropriation. Suppose, Mr. Chairman, that we transpose these difTerent clauses of the Constitution. Suppose we put this clause which restricts an) other body than the House of Representatives from raising money in the first instance, and that clause which requires appropria. tion bills to be passed through both Houses. Suppose, I say, we put these clauses together, alongside the clause giving the treaty making power to the President and Senate, how will it read then? " iHe, (the President) shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-th'rds of the senators pre sent concur," " but"-use either con junction, or neither--" all bills for raising revenne shall originate in the House of Representatives;" " No mon= ey shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriation made by law." Certainly it the clauses stood in this juxtaposition in the Con stitution, thu coitruction i contend for would be conclusive; but the eflct of the various clauses of the Constitution are in no degree dependent upon their local position in the Coistitution, nor are they in any degree aTeeted by it. To all intents and purposes the money clauses I have just referred to are as iflicacious where they now stand as if they had a local position ini immediate connexion with the tredly power elaure. The President, with the Sen:Me, two. nut. trenu . out wht re any' moy *o be drawn from the treasi hhi fr that purpose originates in the house of Representatives, and no mon cy can be drawn from the treasury but by appropriation made by a law in which both houses must concur. It' both clauses of the Constitution which govern this matter stood togeth. er, side by side, there would be no doubt about this question. If these clauses *ere in juxtaposition, there would be to room for doubt. There is no locality in the Constitu tion. (inc clause has as much force as another, as ihr as construction is concerned. I take it, then, that there is no doubt that this 1louse has the right to pass and act freely upon money bills which come before it for its action, whether thtt money is to carry out a treaty or not. In construing the Constitution, I think it is proper, that we should endeavor to throw around it every possible security in rrgluitidn to the expenditure of the publi iioney. It we secure the public mouacy against belitg wasted, we a'comoplish a great resdlt. The comurtwf ion which I comtend for does :aca nptilish that pur pose, as far as it can la done. If trea ties are the law of that land, and obli gatory upon the hloitse without its actiorg~ We have tio discretion, be t must mnake the Appmopriation from the pub lic treasiiy; and the President and Sen. ate may determnine how much shall be exlided in thdt way, and for what puirposes. Wec are, therefore, hiound to givt thdt construction to the Constitution which Will s~eUre the money of the people; and the construction I contend ed for is tlie one bi-st adampted to ac comirodate that object. " Again, de should so construe the Constitution ts to be in harmony with the genius of our instituftions. T1he whole genius ofonr institutions lboks to the fact that the money oft the pee pie shall not be expended but, by the con sent of the repr esentatives of' the peo. ple. That faet, has been alluded ti by every One who has written upon the Constitution and laws of England, as the great safe-guard of' the Englisi people, and they maintain the doctrine that the cornmmons, who are the repro. sentatives of thme people, have a right to pass upon all questions involving the expenditure of the money of' th< people. And that is the spirit of oui institutions, It cannot he stupposes that we have fallen b'ehind Eniglanid it that respect, and that wo aro placec in a less favorable position thanm thn people of Enmgland occupy. I beg leave here to read a few lines from the celebrated work of' De Lorma oW~ the constitution' 6' Engh-dn I, who colisiderhtig th'e powers o'f th'e I [k.use of' Ctmmoi's, says: "* In' rea'didg the fon'ego'ing endferm tion' of' th-e po'we'rs With'Which' the lao: of Hnghuird Irntve rn'tr a'stod the king, w ate sit ii koss (o recodefit thtend wit the idea of a monarchy which, we are told, is limited. The king not only unites in himself all the branches of the executive power; he not only dis poses, without control, of the whole military power in the State, but he is, moreover, it seems, the master of the law itself, since he calls up and dismis es at his will the legislative bodies. We find him, therefore, at first sight, invested with all the prerogatives that ever were clamned by the most abso lute monarchs, and we are at a loss to find that liberty which the English seem so confident they posess. " But the representatives of the people still have-that is saying enough-they still have in their hands, now that the Constitution is fully es tablished, the same powerful weapon which has enabled thei r ancestors to es tablish it. It is still from their liber ality alone that the king can obtain subsidies; and in these days, when everything is rated by pecuniary esti mation ; in these days, when gold is become the great moving-spring of af inirs, it may be safely affirmed that he who depends on the will of other men with regard to so important an article, is, whatever his power may be in oth er respects, in a state of real depen dence." * * * * * * "The King of England, therefore, has the prerogative of commanding armies and eqzuiping fleets ; but, with out the concurrence of his Parliament, he cannot maintain them. Ile can bes tow places and employments; but, without his Parliameut, lie cannot pay the salaries attending on them. le can declare war ; but, without his Par liament; It is impossible for him to carry it on. In a word, the royal pre rogative, destitute as it is of the pow er of imposing taxes, is like a vait body, which cannot of itself accompl ish it' motions ; or, if you will; it is like a ship, completely equiypod, but from which the Parliament can, att pleasure, draw oif the water and leave it aground, and also set it again afloat by granting subsidies." Sr ha-.t infr,.s l i' Ofae ELtgiis tt,'*e rm l h ;e repre. sentative to dtcraine the pecuniary burdens that shall be imposed upon the people. And shall it be said that the representatives of the American people have less power than the com mons of England ? Certainly not. I cons:der, then, this right of the house of Representatives to pass upon all money bills as the corner stone of this Constitution, and the great safeguard of our liberties ; and I for one will nev er consent to abandon it. I cannot agree with the opinions on this subject expressed by the gentleman from Ala bama, [Mir. Philips.] I know that some of the ablest writers upon con stitutional law have held different doe trines-federal doctrines which were promulgated by the earlier fhthers of the federnl schol--That this House have no right to pronounce upon :tp propriations required by a treaty that the trety.making power is abso lute and unlimited ; and that, after a treaty has been ratified, this IHouse is under an absolute and peremptory ob ligation to make the appropriations re quired. That is, I think the doctrine set forth by the gentleman from Ala bana. But, sit-, I hold that the Ilouse has a peifect, full and free discretion ? that we are to do as we think best ac cording to our- honiest judgemtents ; not that we are wontonuly to reject a tr-eaty appropriation without a siiicient cause, but that we have the right to exercise it sound discretion as to whether we will past or r-eject it. Why, sir, what was the practice of' the J3ritish govern ment at the ti~tne our .;titutioni was formmted ? for the pinre I' o that governntent. at that time isi ol much imnportmnice ini giving the 2roper iulterpretationi and meaning to our t.OW?' 'onst itution in r-eference to this a.:tja-- because it was from that sou ri' -ir ancestors, ini a gi-cat degree, derived their ideas of government. It was from thiat source thaey dr-ew the very life blood of our institutions. Now, sir, what was the practice in England at the time of the f'o.-mation of our Constitution ? According to Plackstone and other elementary wri ters, the king is invested with the ab~ solute right to mnaket treaties. But, in point of fact, all monetary proposi tions, or propositions aiTeeting is any way the internal regulatioins of thie country, embraced in treaties, had to be stubmitted to the hiousc of Corn. moons. WVell, sir, our ancestors, ini fianing our- Constitution, could not have been governedl, in a great degree, in fraing~i the treaty-making power, by the pra~e ticei thenj in existenice in Enigland, a~nd wvhiebi s utill in existence there. With the practi'ee then existing, that all prFop ositionis involving the appropriation of money must be submitted to the Ifouse of Commnons, is it to be suppos - ed that our ani'eestors were ignorant of thn't practite ? Or, supposing thx~m 3| to be acqua'inted with it, is it to be Ssunnosed thov weta bilind to its forcM Sir, when they, in imitation of the practice in England, constituted the President and two-thirds of the Senate the treaty making power, and when that practice gave to the house of Commons the right to refuse appro priations if they thought proper, it cannot be supposed that the founders of our institutions would endow our House of Representatives with less power, or with less authority, than was given to the British House of Con mons-a body which nominally had a very large constituency, but which really had a very small one. - I must conclude, then, from these circumstan. ces, if from none other, that the true interpretation of'the Constitution is to give to this blouse the power for which I have contended. I cannot conceive that our fathers, in forming our insti tutions, would have given to this House fewer rights and privileges than 'as given to the corresponding body in England, but I must conclude that while they gave to the President and Senate the power of niakirig treaties, they gave to this house the lglit to grant or refuse appropriations. Again, Mr. Chairman, the Constitu tion says, in one clause, that Congress shall have bower to pass all laws nec essary and proper to carry into eflect the expressly enumerated powers coi ferred on any departnicnt: It does not say that they shall pass such laws, but that they shall have power to do so. Well, that meets this particular case. Tfi ti-btty making .ower is conferred on two dehpitrtn' ;nts of this government. It co s expressly under this clause of th. -titution. This clause of the fItutior. the grants to Congres- r; -' neludes this Hduse, the power to p .4:ueh laws as may bb necessar' -t ,i-4er. It does not say that the:z '' s such law<, but that "they shall hav power" so to do. This imlipes discrction. They firo at liberty to pass these laws or not, its they think proper. If thry have any discretion on the subjects they must have a full discretion. M' ean.et have a half diserdtioi. .; h a thing is mentapiysical - inipduic. . cannot draw a line of :36 Jegrees and 30 minutes, or any other line, through a discretion. It must be an entire dis crotion, or no discretion. It is an un limited discretion. A reasonable dis cretion, I grant you--one to be exer cised under a just sense of the respon sibility weighing on this House. It is an unlimited, but ration:il discretion; and It Is for that discretion I iowi con tend. There is another clause of the Con. stitution which it seems to ile is full of meaning on this subject. It is the clause which has been just alluded to by the gentleman from Maine who pieceded nie in this debate, that all appropriations for the supiort of the army must be ronewed every two years. So jealous wore our ancestors of a standing arniv, or permanent military estabIlshmet, that they re quired appropriations for the support of the army should pass before the people every two years, which was the limit of the term of the members of the House of Representatives; so that every time the representatives of the people conie fresh from the people, with the ideas and instincts of the peo. ple, they should have the right to pass on the subject as to whethei- the army should hac binger continued or not. If' we were to admit this~ unlimited p'ow. er in the Presiderit and Senate td pass treaties, and we were bound to make the applropriations, what would become of this great power- by which our ances tots intended to preserve their liber ties, uand to put it out of the power of any ambitious general or chieftain, at any future time to have a standing army. If youi perluit this absoldte power, contended for by the gentle maun fi-om New York, the President, and Senute may entei- into the treaty stipulations w ith some foreign nations, and engamge to give subsidies oi- keep up standing u'rmies for any length of time, and this great clause, intended to secure thme I!berties of the country, would lbe nugatory. I cannot consent to any construction of the Constitution which would lead to such disastrous conseqluences. Again. may not this House refuse to make appropriation, wvhich havo been commenced by a previous Congress? Suppose laws were passed by a previ. ouis Congress by which it wais enacted that certain aplpropriations should be made for certain wvorks, oray partienlar purpose, has not every llouse of Representatives, as it comes here, the right to determine whether it shall carmry cut those appropriations or not? Undoubtedly they have. Th'le law reqijirinig them to do so is the law oi'th'e h'd. 't'rea'ties can be no more at the utmost than the laws of the land; but the law of' Congress is -no't irrevocably binding on another. One Congross may enact that there shal1 be appropriations, but the next Congress may refuse to mnake: these approptiation1s, though exiled for by the President, House of Representa- 1 tives, and the Senate, how rbuch more have we the right to refuse to make I appropriations under a treaty ratified, by the Senate and President? I think j this view of the subject is conclusive, e for even admitting treaties to be laws in reference to all the subjects of which c they dispose, yet this House would not v even then be absolutely bound to t make treaty appropriations. But I t cannot and do not admit that treaties s are laws whore they under:ake to h provide for the payment of money.- a They are not fully operstire and j< efficacious on this point until they v have been affirmatively acted upon by v the House. t) I would beg leave to call the atten- p tion of the Committee to. this inipor- n tant fhet, that the fi-trietions upon the so powdrs df the Government contained h in the Constitution, are restrictions dn ti the legislative powers of the Govern- H ment, not on the tredty.making power. t< The Constitution, dr Ipsidtice, pre- w scribes that Congress shall pass rid bill la of attainder; and that no preference tr shall be given td t1e porti ofdnn State ei over those of another, and that no laws ni shall be passed concerning the ostab. t lishment of religion. All these great tl piririciples odfib'ett which are embo. fa died in the Constitution, are, in form; H restrictions only upon the lhgislatlie ti powers of the Goverdment, They are a not restrictions tpon the treaty-making d< power. What follows, their ds d bati- th sequence ? If the Legislative authori- ei ty granted to this louse to lay takes in and pass ipprdpriation bills is no re n striction upon the treatg~making'ower in much less vduld the b~ttdptibris td the bi legislative authority of this House be of any restriction on the treaty niaking It: power. And thus kidd Woul4 drrive at at this monstrous result, that the tIba. a ty-making powe.r Map an tnliniitbd df pdiil-r; mhdi the Ptesideilt add the Sean- w ate might do what they. thought pro- pi per, without being Udund by the lirhi- vi titidins of lie Constituti'dn. It Is im- ti pt-=4 thi.. . nui a unstruction of in tL 't'tu i.h-n "nd be. saund. And: in ' :a, wvo must admit Wliist I'ace il been cuitsidiiig'tdr, idt the legislative of powers granted to this I~ouse oVer the vt purse dre limitdtions on the treaty- bj making power- if I was surprised to hgar the gentle- m mdn lrdni New York [Mir. Smith] give fo the treaty-making power so broad a th eodistruotion as he did ; but his conclu- lii sion is etitirelf at variatice Wi th his ti argunient. After assuming that trea- hr ties place ds under t riioral necessity El to vote the iioney they reddire, he re tells ds he Will not vdte for this appro- sd priation. It is contended by some a that the Ccinstitutioti imnpuitts a peculiar th sanctity dud vigor to treaties, it-hen it pa declares they shall be thb suprene us law of thd land. But in what sense tr< does the Constittitioit say that? Su. co preme over what ! Not over Congress, fri and not oyer the House of Representa- re tives; but thb shall be supreme-I be mean in the last instance, when they m become laws-supreme over State cs laws and constitutions. '1 hat is the Sc rieaning of the word "supreme," in sir this connectidn. For idstance; after fu this treaty shalt have been passed upon th favorably by this IIor!se; if it is so fa. th vorably passed upon, it is to beconie tli the supreme law of the land in refer. th once to State laws and State constitu. w tioni. The word "suprerme" as it is er found in this bonnection in the Con. cil stitutidri, is not intenddd to riioan that ti< the treaty-making power shall be su- le rtorri over tihe legislative power; and or that the action of the Senate arid Pre- es sident, rdpn the subjects of a treaty, sh shall be supreme bver this House, where it concerhs anf tnattet over p1 w+hich this flotise has legislatite dis. ci cretion. No such thing. Suppose thd je ground con tefided for by the honorable gentlemarn fromn New York is correct, ti tbat treatties dre supreme, arid that we tI are bound to execute them under all ti circumstances, what limit wo~uld there le be to the powet of the Presideht dird irl the Setiato in making ti-edtles ? They hi would have a charte blanche to do tc whatever they might think proper to se do; there would be no barrier to their is discretion ; and where there is no link w to discretion there is no liberty. t The objects of free constitutions is at to throwv around governments the bar- el riots of laws and restr-airits. I think ti there- is danger that this treaty rnaking ar power may be carried too far.- It, is Ii the tendency of pow~er constazitly to ir increase ; it is coritinually stealing from ti the many to the few. The tendency e: of this treaty-making power is to ab- b sorb all other powers, imnd it behooves a us, the representatives of the pedple, n to see that it dos not trensgress be. si yond its proper limits. Tlake (N6 inr 1 startee ot this treaty. If' this treaty- a making power ban appropfiato money, e and we are bound to carry out their a will, what limit will there b'6 to the tl treaty-mtdaking power? Non~e, nionS U whatever. F'or there is no legislative g power ini all the grant, of this Consti- e tutionm so closely hedued~ in. so arffid. e y protected, as the money power. 'hat is exprhssly confined to this louse. They drc the tribune of the eople. They stand beti'een the peo le and all pecunisfy appessidu, or xtravagance, or prodigality... If, therefore, the treaty.maldiig pow. r can invade this great principle, here is to stop ? We are it set, hen, without chart or rudder. I say, hen, that we ire bound to take our Land upon this point ; that the House as a right to exorcise a fait, rational, nd reasonable disertipud oli this sub .ct, and to say *liether ihey mill or rill not pass any appropriatidn bill -hich may be required to carry but le provisioris. of that treaty.. The over of the House oi ibis sdbject is ot Oil injurious .power, as has been Lid by somi; It may be said, as it as bcon aiid by sonid 'f the lernn pry writers on this subjeci, that it the ouse of Representatives iove it right pass upon the subject of treaties hichi come before them in their lcgis. tive capacity, the busins? of making oaties wduld be greiily perplexedI and itangled, that the Presidetit liid Sen o would be shdih ftlheistrength, and at the treaty-making power would iereby lodse riihch of its efficacy and rue. No such thing. The powtcf of the ouso in this regard is simply a nega. to pdwer.. The I-touse cannot initiate treaty. Nobody pretends that it can any diplomdtle act. It cannot take e first sttp in such d miatter. It may press ai opinion, but it edn do noth g in the way of action. The House ai pass regoltiine which may duce the President to make treaties, it it can do nothing in the way of ening negdtiatiddsl or closing them. Spoiter is simply a negative pover; d a mdst useful power it is. It is beautiful illustration of the workings the ccidtiurr6dt Majority principle on bich Mr. Calhoun constructed his ofound theory of Govetnruent: The r fact that the House of represbiit. -es have this negative power to re se to make appropriatidns, if they, the exereise of their best judgment, dk that the appropitions bught i. i bc wado, ~ y: 1ie .dsed as a ry powterful 1weaptn..dT riegotiatloii the President and Seinate, because, foreign governments require too uch money lit the. treaties we are rming with them, they niay say to em: "WO .irsclvea might be wil ig to accept your offer, and give you is imbint of money; but this treaty s to pass through the ordeal of the ouse of Representatives. The Rep. sentatives yf the, pbople have to be tisfied on the subject; and they ate little particular altout the money of a people. They might refdse ti, ss the appropriattiri bill to enable to comply with the tiii - f' the ,;ty}; and thus the treaty would be= me null and void." .So far then )m the power of the House of Rep: sehtatives to pass Upon this point ing idjurious, it is a power which ight be of the greitest benefit; is it ai be used by the President aid riate is a Joetc of drgurdeht to re at the demaids of a foreign power r an ethorbitaht sum of money in e negotiation of d ,trbatj. .Oi all ese accounts, then, I conclude that o Ilouse of. Representatatives, on e question of appripriating money uich is required b a teaty, lhds an tire na free dioc-etioni in'the eter ie of soiuid .Jidgmeit. The& .rb >t bound to approprliate ilanevi un is iri the exercise of d feiiponablfe digi etiori thf tiiinki that the best inter ta of the countr- reqdir6 thatt they ould; . , On this point;-! beg leuive to redld at ssage from M r. Madison, as emibra rig very fully .my viw on the sub at. Mr. Madisoji says i "lIIe came next to the fifth eonstrue :n, which left with the President atnd io Senate the poter of nlaiifg trea is; bilt required at the sanrto tinto the gishative sanctIon and ed-ojieration those tiisa Where the Coffstitution id given express and specific powers ithe Legislature: It was to be pre med, that irt all stich eUses the Leg lature would exercise its authority ith discretion, allowing due weight >the reasons Which led to the treaty, id to the circumetances of the exist ce of the treaty. Still, however, uis Hlouse, in its legislative capacity, iuat exerbise its reason; it rmust de borate-for deliberation is implied legislation. If it. must carry all eaties into effect, it would no longer cercise a legislative power, it would e the mere instrument of the will of nether department, and would have a will of its own. WVhere the Con itution contains a specifie and pe. smptory injunction on Congress to do particular act, Congress must, of aurite; do the act, Li'osause the Con. titution, wich is paramount over dit ne departments, has expressly taken way the legislative discretion of con. ress. The case is essentially~differ nt where the act of! one department 1! the atoyernnientL intnrfarcq~wlkh a power expressly 'tsttd in another, and ridwherc cxpressly taken away ; hero the Idttsi- pwer must be exer cised accdrding to its ndture ; and if it be a legislative poder, it must be ex ercised with.that deliberation and dis bret'd: which is 6ssuiitial to the iiaturo of Legislative power. I have said tlis hiich upon this, branch of ilie subject, hot so much be cause I corisidered it necessary Upon the prt-st'ht occasion, as liecausd I ( sired, fuJ one; to ptit upon record my' opinoiis of tha power of this Isouse dyer the apliropriation of money where it is required by treaty; and because I cannot thresee What umay occur hereaf ter, and I do not want to act blindfold. ed upon this subject. I will now, for a feW niorents, turn rily dttefition to the consideration ot the pattliciflir treaty Flow before us, did givu the feasbns which induce mc to votb for tlhd zippropriatioti. In the first place, the fact- that the trdty has beeii negotiated by the Pre sident, with the corsent of two-thirds of the Sdnate; is d strong rebdniiden datidn in favdr of the tredty. So far ds tli Predsident himself is concerned I have much respect fdr his judgment and great cdnfidente in the cdrredtness of fis pidrposts. I repeat, then, that the fdl tat it comes with the recom mendatioti of thb President; is An ar guntent-td rly mind in its favor. The tact that it has received the approba tiod bf twd-thirds of th6 Senate.-a body cdmposed of men as patriotik add intelligent as can be found in the bountry-after mature deliberations; anid the furthei fact that the treaty is f their own making, they having re fused td adopt the first treaty, which they rejected and sent back to Mexico. I say that these facts alford a strong trgument in its favor. But I do rict say I would yield my views to any such authority when they conie in conflict. I look tO the treaty itself in the next plade, and find enough in that instru ment to satisfy me that I ought to vote for the dppropriation. The first point I ncaice In it is, that it settles tho MAisilla Valley difficult 'There is no doubt that a serious ' dic exists between this country and Mexi ;o in regard to that territory. In run ling the boundary line between tho wo countries, according to the terms > the treaty of the Guadalupe Hidalgo, ur cornmissioncrs and surveyors did riot dgiree. Our Government contend id for one boundary, and Mexico for another. The American commission 3ra did agree with the Mexicatn comn nissionjrs in the first instance - . I have read with some degre f care he Mes bf those who understai'd this mubject, and I must confess the argu nezt, to my mind, is stronghly in favor ,f the American claim. And Iso look ipon it, not because it is the Armeri an argument, but because it is based ipon the rule which should have gov. rned the commissioners In settling the iuundary. But, sir, we do iot want o go to war with Mexied. I. would rath. r give up the Mesilla V1!ley than t6 go o war with that nation in her weak md distracted condition; maah rathet wduld I yield to her demands, unTrea.: onable though they may bb, thati t? so to war with her. I would stn1t mat at any time by all hon6able rnentis, b'ut if we must have it,' lMt Os cid to war with a nation f'roni which we miay win glory, with' d natio'n equally powterful with ouisolves, anmd not a wreak, distra~ted, cbhvulsed, and tot tering power le' Mexico. Sir; I am glad ot the byPortdiity to settle, by treaty, our' dificulties with itexico, ini a man1 honorable to both ' parties; which will satisfy thb dzmahtis of that nation without too great dost on our part. Further, I thminic we have galhud a:V important point in obtaining a release from our obligatiom&, on'account of the eleventih artioje of the treaty of Gua dalupe Hldalgo: I think, oin referrin.a to the language of that treatyg it wi be found that, there is strong~ ground tor giving it tlie dotmsruction which the Mexican governnient claim fo'r it. Hero is the lawguge : " An-r. 11. C6hsidering that a great part of the territories :iWhieh by the pydsomnt treaty dire to bei 6619rprefd1Mled for the futute within the l'iinits 6the United Statevi; is now' ou6tWy'd by 4it savage tribbs whor wil4meefts be under the excisive OddroMs sagov ernent 6f the Jnied. 8$~sand ' whoso liudurisons3 wtlmIi~fof Mexico would bu pro*iii mi te ex treme, It is sotm#1y- #gd44ast al subih incursiona:tilL biy if aiblyv he st~rained, Sy~ies~g'~~nehh Uuite4 States th ~be necessgry ;~ t o1 by i'. me an ae tiona fbr t1o ihell' e' Nio all in the sanWiW* i and~vlir dill. geinbe aid driergy, 's 10f14i 6SI tcur. afontswere-d i ltetiZ W ai '6tnetlhitted