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THE LEDGER: GAFFNEY, 8. C., APRIL 14, 1898. 5 ipiNLEY SENDS IN HIS CUBAN MESSAGE President Asks Permission of Congress to Use Force In Restoring Peace. SAYS TIME IS AT HAND TO END THE STRUGGLE II* Wunta Discretionary Powers \ este«l In Him—KevlewsTrouble and Argues Against Recognition—Catastrophe to Maine Cited as Proof That SpaluCau't Huard Interests ol This Country. MESSAGE IN BRIEF. Washington, April 12.—The presi dent's message was sent to con gress at noon along with consular re ports. The information that Spain has proclaimed a cessation of hostilities on the island did not have the effect of materially changing the president’s message as originally prepared, except that it furnished important evidence in support of his contention that discre tionary power in some measure should be given to the president in the use of force to compel peace. In his message the president strongly opposes recognition of belligerency as inexpedient. He also opposes the recog nition of the independence of Cuba at this time, but favors the granting of authority for such use of armed forces of the United States as he may deem necessary to put an end to hostilities and to secure a stable government in Cuba. He also asks for an appropria tion to be used for the relief of such of the people as are still in need. The message shows that Spain her self first suggested to this govern ment the desirability of an armistice and signified in advance her assent and asked that the United States use its good offices to secure a like assent from the insurgents. This request was denied. The Maine incident figures quite prominently in the message and the president argues that the wreck of our battleship in Havana harbor shows conclusively that Spain is not able to guarantee to the United States and the other nations that security to their vessels which they have a j-ight to demand. The message shows, how ever, that Spain, so far as can be done, without specific action by the cortes, has disavowed any connection with the wrecking of the, Maine and has ex pressed her deep regret and sorrow tliat the appalling disaster should have oc curred in a port within her jurisdiction. The only feature of the message which yH is thought will encounter any serious / opposition in congress, is that giving the president a measure of discretionary authority in the use of force. It is be lieved, however, a majority of the com mittees of the two houses, to which the message was referred, will support the president’s view, and the opinion is gaining ground in administration cir cles that a more conservative sentiment has been developed than seemed proba ble a week ago, and the expectation is that when put to the test of a vote, the president’s recommendations will re ceive the support of a majority of both houses of congress. MESSAGE IX FULL. Washington, April 11.—The presi dent today sent the following message to the United States congress: Obedient to that precept of the consti tution which commands the president to give from time to time to the con gress intormation of the state of union and to recommend to their considera tion such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, it becomes my duty now to address your body with re gard to the grave crisis that has arisen in the relations of the United States to Spain by reason of the warfare that for more than three years has raged in the neighboring island of Cuba. I do so because of the intimate connection of the Cuban question with the state of ©uv&wn union and the grave relation to the course which it is now incumbent upon the nation to adopt must needs bear to the traditional policy of our gov ernment if it is to accord with the pre cepts laid down by the founders of the republic and religiously observed by succeeding administrations to the pres ent day. The present revolution is but the suc cessor of other similar insurrections which have occurred in Cuba against the dominion of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century, each of which, during its progress, has sub jected the United States to great effort and expense in according its neutrality laws, causcd^enormouB losses to Ameri can trade and commerce, caused circu lation, annoyance and disturbance among our citizens and by the exercise of cruel, barbarous and uncivilized prac tices of warfare shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people. Review of the Revolt. Since the present revolution began in Febmarv, 1895, this country has seen the fertile domain at our threshold rav aged by fire and sword in the course of a struggle unequalled in the history of the island and rarely parelleled us to the number of combatants and the bitterness of the contest by any revolu tion of modern times where a depend ent people, striving to be free, have been opposed by the power of the sover eign state. Our people have beheld a once prosperous community reduced to comparative want, its lucrative com merce virtually paralyzed, its excep>- tional productiveness diminished, its fields laid waste, its mills in ruins and its pieoplo perishing by tens of thousands from hunger and destitution. Wolhave found ourselves constrained, in tlnHobservanc* of that strict neutral ity yvlfich our laws onioins .what the law of nations commands, to police oar own waters and watoh onr own seaports to prevent any unlawful act in aid ox the Cubans. Our trad* has suffered, the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba has baan largely lost, and the tem- C r and forbearance of our people have en so sorely tried as to beget a peril ous nnrest among our own citizens, which has inevitably found its expres sion from time to time in the national legislature, so that issues wholly exter nal to our own body politic eugross at tention and stand in the way of that close de.vtA^i to domestic advancement that becomes a wit contained common wealth whose piriinal maxim has been the avoidance of all foreign entangle ments. All this must needs awaken, and has indeed aroused the utmost concern on the piart of this government, as well during my predecessor’s term as in my own. In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered through the Cuban war became so onerous that my prede cessor made an effort to bring about a pieace through the mediation of this government m any way that might tend to an honorable adjustment of the con test between Spain and her revolted colony, on the basis of some effective scheme of self government for Cuba under the flag and sovereignty of Spiain. It failed, through the refusal of the Sjvanish government then in power to consider any form of mediation, or in deed of any plan of settlement which did not begin with the actual submis sion of the insurgents to the mother country, and then only on such terms as Spain herself might see fit to grant. The war continued unabated. The re sistance of the insurgents was in no wise diminished. War of Extermination. The efforts of Sp)ain were increased by the dispiatches of fresh levies of Cuba and by the addition to the horrors of the strife of a new and inhuman phase happily unprecedented in the history of civilized Christian pieoples. The policy of devastation and concentration inau gurated by the captaiu general Oct. 1, 1896, in the province of Pinar del Rio was thence extended to embrace all of the islands to which the powor of the Spanish arms was able to reach by oc cupation or by military operation. The peasantry, including the dwell ers in the open agricultural interior, were driven into garrison towns or iso lated places held by the troops. The razing movement in the provinces of all kinds were inaugurated. Fields wore laid waste, dwellings unroofed and fired, mills destroyed and in short everything that could desolate the land and render it unfit for human habitation or support was condemned by order of one of the contending parties and executed by all the powers at their disposal. Hy the time the present administra tion took effect, a year ago, a recoucen- tration—socalled—had been made ef fective over the better part of the four central or westeru provinces, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana and Pinar dol Rio. The agricultural population, to the estimated number of 800,000 or more, was herded within the towns and their immediate vicinity, deprived fam ilies of support, rendered destitute of shelter, left poorly clad and exposed to the most unsanitary conditions. The scarcity of food increased with devasta tion of the population areas and the de struction and want became misery and starvation. Month by month the death rate increased in an alarming ratio. The Mortality Great. By March, 1897, according to conserv ative estimates from official Spanish sources, the mortality among the recon- centra dos from starvation and the dis eases thereto incident exceeded 50 per- centum of their total number. Practi cal relief was accorded to the destitute. The overburdened towns, already suf fering from the general dearth, could give no aid. Socalled “zones of culti vation,” established within the imme diate area effective military control about the cities and fortified camps, proved illusory as a remedy for the suf fering. The unfortunates, being for the most part women and children with aged and helpless men, enfeebled by dis ease and hunger, could not have tilled the soil, without tools, seed or shelter, for their own support or for the supply of the cities. Reconcentration, adopted avowedly as a war measure in order to cut off the resources of the insurgents, worked its predestined result. As I said in my message of last December, it was not civilized warfare;, it was exter mination. The only peace it could be get was that of the wilderness and the grave. Meanwhile the military situation in the island had undergone a noticeable change. The extraordinary, activity that characterized the second year of the war, when the insurgents invaded even the hitherto unharmed fields of Pinar del Rio and carried havoc and de struction up to the walls of the city of Havana itself, had relapsed into, a (Jogged struggle in the central and east ern provinces. The Spanish arms re gained a measure of control in Pinar del Rio and parts of Havana, but, under the existing conditions of the rural coun try, without immediate improvement of i their productive situation. Even thus E artially restricted the revolutionists eld their own and their conquest and submission, put forward by Spain as the essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far distant as at the outset. In this state of affairs, my adminis tration found itself confronted with the grave problem of its duty. My message of last December reviewed the situation and narrated the steps taken with a view to relieving its acuteness and open ing the way to some form of honorable settlement. The assassination of the prime minister, Canovas, led to a change of government in Spain. The former administration, pledged to subjugation without concession, gave place to that of a more liberal party, committed long in advance to a policy of reform involv ing the wider principle of home rule in Cuba and Porto Rico. The overtures of this government, to be through its new envoy, General Woodford, and looking to an immediate and effective ameliora tion of the conditions of the island, al though not accepted to the extent of ad mitted mediation in any shape, were mot by assurances that home rule, in an advanced phase, would be forthwith of fered to Cuba, without waiting for the war to end, and that more humane methods should thenceforth prevail in . the conduct of hostilities. Coinciden tally with these declarations, the new government of Spain continued and completed the policy already began by its predecessor, of testifying friendly re gard for this nation by releasing Amer ican citizens held under one (marge or another oonnected with the insurrection, i generously ed with the ■o that by the end of November not a single person entitled in any way to our national protection remaiuod in a Span ish prison. Aided by American*. While these negotiations were in pro gress, the increasing destitution of the unfortunate recoucentrados and the alarming mortality among them claimed earnest attention. The success which had attended the limited measure of re lief extended to the suffering American citizens among tb^ by the judicious expenditure, through the cousular agen cies, of the hioney appropriated expressly for their succor by the joint resolution approved May, 14, 1897, prompted the humane extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body of suf ferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the Spanish authori ties. On Dec. 24, last, I caused to be issued au appeal to the people, inviting contributions in money or in kind for the succor of. the starving sufferers in Culm, following this on Jan. 8 by a similar public announcement of the formation of a central Cuban relief com mittee with headquarters in New York city, composed of three members repre senting the National Red Cross and the religious aud business elements of the community. The efforts of that com mittee have been untiring and accom plished much good. Arrangements for free transportation to Havana have greatly aided the charitable work. The president of the American Red Cross and the representatives of other con tributory organizations have visited Cuba, and co-operate consul general aud the local authorities to make effective distribution of the re lief collected through the efforts of the central committee. Nearly |200,000 in money and supplies had already reached the sufferers aud more is forthcoming. The supplies are admitted duty free, and transportation to the interior has been arranged so that the relief, at first necessarily confinpd to Havana aud the larger oiu&s, )s hbVv extended through most if not'all the towns where suffering exists. Thou sands of lives have already been saved. The necessity for a change in the condi tion of the reconcentrados is tecog- nized by the Spanish government. Within a few days, the orders of Gen eral Weyler have been revoked, the reconcentrados are, it is said, to be per mitted to return to their homes, and aided to resume their self supporting pursuits of peace; public works have been ordered to give them employment and a sum of 1600,000 has been appro priated for their relief. The war in Cuba is of such nature that short of subjugation or extermina tion a final military victory for either side seems impracticable. The alterna tive lies in the physical exhaustion of the one or of the other party or perhaps of both—a condition which in effect ended the ten years’ war by the truce of Sanjon. The prospect of such a protec. tion and conclusion of the present strife is a contingency hardly to be contem plated with equanimity by the civilized world, and least of all by the United States, affected and injured os we are, deeply and intimately by its very ex istence. Efforts to End War. Realizing this, it appeared to be my duty in a spirit of true friendliness no less to Spain than to the Cubans, who have so much to lose by the prolonga tion of the struggle, to bring about an immediate termination of the war. To this end I submitted, on March 20, as a result of much presentation and cor respondence through the United States minister at Madrid, propositions to the Spanish govenment looking to an armis tice until Oct. 1 for the negotiation of S eace with the gecd offices of the presi- ent. In addition I asked the immedi ate revocation of the order to roroneen- tration, so as to permit the people to re turn to their farms and the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States, co-operating with the Spanish authorities, so as to afford full relief. The reply of the Spanish cabinet was received on the night of Mar:h81. It offers, as the means to bring about peace in Cuba, to confide the preparation thereof to the insular parliament inas much as the concurrence of that body would be necessary to reach a final re sult, it being, however, understood that the powers reserved by the constitution to the central government are not less ened or diminished. As the Cuban par liament does not meet until May 4, next, the Spanish government would not ob ject for its part to accept at once a sus pension of hostilities if asked for ny the insurgents from the general-in-chief, to whom it would pertain in such case, to determine the duration aud conditions of the armistice. The proiiositions submitted by Gen eral Woodford and the reply of the Spanish government were both in the form of brief memoranda, the texts of which are before me, and are substan tially in the language above given. The action of the Cuban parliament in the matter of “preparing” peace and the manner of its doing so are not ex plained in the Spanish memorandum; but from General Woodford’s prelimi nary reports of preliminary discussions proceeding, the final conference, it is understood the Spanish government stands ready to give the insular govern ment full power to negotiate peace with the insurgents—whether direct or indi rectly—it does not appear. With this last overture in the direction of peace and its disappointing reception by Spain, the executive was brought to the end of his effort The Lust Resort. In my annual message of December last I said: "Of the untried measures these re main only: Recognition of the insnr- genfs as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral inter vention to end the war ..imposing a rational compromise between the con testants and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code of mor ality, would be criminal aggression. ” Thereupon I reviewed these alterna tives in the light of President Grant’s measured words, uttered in 1875, when, after seven year's of sanguinary, de structive and cruel and cruel hostilities in Cuba, he reached the conclusion that the recognition of the indendenoe of Cuba was impracticable and indefensi ble; and that the recognition of bellig erence was not warranted by the facta according to the tests of public law. I commented especially upon the latter aspect of the question, pointing out the inconveniences and positive dangers of a recognition of belligerence, which. *7 ell while adding to the already onorous har dens of neu relity within our own juris diction, could not in any way extend our influence of effective offices in the territory of hostilities. Nothing has since occurred to change my view on this regard, aud I recognize fully now as then that the issuance of a proclama tion of neutrality, by which process the socalled recognition of belligerence is published, could, of itself and unat tended by other action, accomplish noth ing toward the one end for which we labor, the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicts the island. Turning to the question of recognizing at this time the independence of the present insurgent government in Cuba, we find safe precedents in onr histoi from an early day. They are we sonuned up in President Jackson’s mes sage to congress Dec. 21, 1886, ou the subject of the recognition of the inde pendence of Texas. He said. „ “In all the contests that have arisen ont of France, oat of the disputes in re lation to the crowns of Portugal and Spain, out of the separation of the American possessions of both from the European governments, and out of the numerous and constantly occurring struggles for dominion iu Spanish Amer ica, so wisely consistent with our just principles, has been the action of our government that we have, under the most critical circumstances, avoided all ceusure and encountered no other evil than that produced by a transient es trangement of good will in those against whom we have been by force of evi dence compelled to decide. As to Recognition. “It has thus made known to the world that the un form policy and practice of the United States to avoid all interfer ence in disputes which merely relate to the internal government of other na tions, and eventually recognize the au thority of the prevailing party without Reference to our particular interests and views, or to the merits of the origi nal controversy. “But on this as on every trying occa sion. safety is to be found in a rigid ad herence to principle. “In the contest between Spain and the revolted colonies we stood aloof, and waited not only until the ability of the new states to protect themselves was fully established, but until the dan ger of their being again subjugated had entirely passed away. Then, and not until then, were they recognized. Such was our course in regard to Mexico her self. “It is true that with regard to Texas the civil authority of Mexico has been expelled, its invading army defeated, the chief of the republic himself cap tured, and all present power to control the newly organized government of Texas annihilated within its confines. But, on the other hand, there is, in ap pearance, at least, an immense disparity of physical force on the side of Texas. The Mexican republic, under another executive is rallying its forces under a new leader, and menacing a fresh inva sion to recover its lost dominion. “Upon the issue of this threatened invasion the independence of Texas may be considered as suspended, and were there nothing peculiar in the rela tive situation of the United States aud Texas even acknowledgement of its in dependence at such a crisis could scarcely be regarded as consistent with that prudent reserve with which we have hitherto held ourselves bound to treat all similar questions.” Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to consider the risk there might be im puted to the United States motives of selfish interest in view of the former claim on our part to the territory of Texas and of the avowed purpose of the Texans in seeking recognition of inde pendence as an incident to the incorpo ration of Texas iu the Union, conclud ing thus: Andrew Jackson Quoted. “Prudence therefore seems to dictate that we should stand aloof and maintain our present attitude if not until Mexico itself or one of the great foreign powers shall recognize the independence of the new government, at least until the lapse of time and the course of events shall have proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate sovereignty and to uphold the government instituted by them. Neither of the contending par ties can justly complain of this course. By pursuing it we are but carrying out the long established policy of our gov ernment, a policy which has secured to us respect and influence abroad and in spired confidence at home.” These are the words of the resolute and patriotic Jackso^. They are evi dence that the United States, in addi tion to the test imposed by public law os to the condition of the recognition of independence by a neutral state to-wit: That the revolted state “shall constitute in fact a body politic, having a govern ment in substance as well as in name, possessed of the elements of stability” and forming do facto, if left to itself, a state among the nations, reasonably ca pable of discharging the duties of a state, lias imposed for its own governance in dealing with cases like these the further condition that recognition of indepen dence of that statehood is not due to a revolted dependency under the danger of its beir g subjugated by the parent state is entirely passed away. This extreme test was iu fact applied in the case of Texas. In the congress to whom President Jackson referred the question as one “probably leading to war” and therefore a proper subject for a “previous understanding with that body by whom war can alone be declared and by whom all the provisions for sus taining its perils must be furnished,” left the matter of the recognition of Texas to the discretion of the executive, providing merely for the sending of a diplomatic agent when the president should b© satisfied that the republic of Texas “has become an independent state.” It was so recognized by Presi dent Van Buren, who commissioned a charge d’affaires March 7, 1837, after Mexico abandoned the attempt to recon quer the Texan Territory and when there was at the time no “bona fide” contest goir g on between the insurgent province and its former sovereign. I said in my message of last Decem ber: “It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection pos sesses beyond dispute the attributes of statehood, which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor. ” Recognizing a State. The saxno requirement mast certainly be no less seriously considered when the graver issue of recognizing independence is in question, for no less positive test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser; while on the other hand the influence and consequences of the strug gle upon the internal policy of the recog nizing state, which form important factors where the recognition of bellig erency is concerned, are secondary, if not rightly eliminable factors, when the real question is whether the community claiming recognition is or ia not inde pendent beyond per adventure. Nor from the standpoint of experience do I think it would be wise or prudent for this government to recognize, at the present time, the independence of the socalled Cuban republic. Such recog nition is not necessary in order to en able the United States to intervene aud pacify the island. To commit this coun try now to the recognition of any par ticular government iu Cuba might sub ject us to embarrassing conditions of International obligations towards the organization so recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be sub ject to the approval or disapproval of such government. Wo would be re quired to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally. When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a government capable of performmg the duties aud discharging the functions of a separate nation, aud having a* a mat ter of fact the proper torms and attri butes of nationality, such government can be promptly aud readily recognized, and the relations and interests of the United States with such nation ad justed. There remains two alternative forms of intervention to end the war: Either as an impartial nation by imposing a national compromise between the con testants, or os the active ally of one party or the other. As to the first, it is not to be forgot ten that during the last few months, the relation of the United States has vir tually been one of friendly intervention m many ways, each note of itself conclu sive, but all tending to the exertion of a potential influence toward an ultimate pacific result just and honorable to all interests concerned. The spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earnest, unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba, untarnished by differences be tween the United States and Spain and unstained by the blood of American cit- zens. The forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral, to step the war ac cording to the large dictates of human ity and following many historical prece dents where neighboring states have in terfered to check the hopeless sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their borders, is justifiable ou rational grounds. It involves, however, hostile constraint upon both the parties to the contest, as well as to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual settlement. Grounds For Intervention. The grounds for such intervention may bo briefly summarized as follows: First, iu the cause of humanity aud to put an end to the barbarities, blood shed, starvation and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the par ties to the conflict arc either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this all in another coun try, belonging to another nation and is therefore none of cur business. It is especially our duty, tor it is right at our doors. Second, we owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indefinitely for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the condi tions that deprive them of legal protec tion. Third, the right to intervene may bo justified by the very serious injury to commerce, trade and business of our people aud by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island. Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance for the present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this govern ment enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in au island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business relations—when the lives aud liberty of our citizens are in constant danger aud their projK-riy destroyed and themselves ruined—where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door, by war ships of a foreign nation, the expeditious of filibustering that we are powerless to repress altogether and the irritating questions and the entanglements thn- arising—all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace and compel us to keep on a semi- war footing with a nation with which we arc at peace. The tlalne Disaster. These elements of clangor and disor der already pointed out have been strikingly illustrated by a tragic event, which has deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already trans mitted to congress the report of the na val court of inquiry ou the destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana during the night of Feb. 15. The destruction of that noble vessel has filled the national heart with inex pressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and marines and two officers of our navy, reposing in the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death, grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the nation. The naval court of in quiry, which, it is needless to say, com mands the unqualified confidence of the government, was unanimous in its con clusion that the destruction of the Maine was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That remains to bo fixed. In any event the destruction of the Maine by whatever exterior cause is a patent and impressive proof of a state oi things in Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish government cannot assure safety and security to a vessel of the American navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there. Further referring in this connection to recent diplomatic correspondence, n dispatch from our minister to Spain ol the twenty-sixth nit., contained the statement that the Spanish ministerfor foreign affairs assured him positively that Spain will do all that the highes; honor aud justice require in the matter of the Maino. The reply of the thirty- first nit. also contained un expression of the readinese of Spain to submit to ar bitration all the differences which can arise in this matter which is subse qucntly explained by the note of the Spanish minister at Washington of the tenth iust as follows: “As to the question of fact which springs from the diversity of views be tween the report of the American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the fact be ascertained by an impartial in vestigation by experts whose decision Spain accepts in advance. ” To this I have made no reply. Grant on Intervention. President Grant, in 1875, after dis cussing the phases of the contest as it then appeared and its hopeless aud ap parent indefinite prolongation, said: “In such event, I am of the opinion that other nations will bo compelled to as sume the responsibility which devolves upon them, aud to seriously consider the only remaining measures possible, mediation and intervention. Owing, perhaps, to the large expanse of w ater separating the island from the penin sula, parties appear to have within themselves no depository of common confidence, to suggest wisdom when passion and excitement have their sway and to assume the part of peacemaker. In this view, in the earlier days of the contest, the good offices of the United States as a mediator were tendered in good faith, without any selfish purposes in the interest of humanity and in sin cere friendship for both parties, but were at the time declined by Spain with the declaration nevertheless that at a future time they would be indispensa ble. No indication has been received a Christian, peace-loving realized. If it fails it will be only another justification for our contem plated action. William McKixlxv.