The ledger. [volume] (Gaffney City, S.C.) 1896-1907, April 14, 1898, Image 3
THE LEDGER: GAFFNEY, 8. C., APRIL 14, 1898.
5
ipiNLEY SENDS IN
HIS CUBAN MESSAGE
President Asks Permission of
Congress to Use Force In
Restoring Peace.
SAYS TIME IS AT HAND
TO END THE STRUGGLE
II* Wunta Discretionary Powers \ este«l
In Him—KevlewsTrouble and Argues
Against Recognition—Catastrophe to
Maine Cited as Proof That SpaluCau't
Huard Interests ol This Country.
MESSAGE IN BRIEF.
Washington, April 12.—The presi
dent's message was sent to con
gress at noon along with consular re
ports. The information that Spain has
proclaimed a cessation of hostilities on
the island did not have the effect of
materially changing the president’s
message as originally prepared, except
that it furnished important evidence in
support of his contention that discre
tionary power in some measure should
be given to the president in the use of
force to compel peace.
In his message the president strongly
opposes recognition of belligerency as
inexpedient. He also opposes the recog
nition of the independence of Cuba at
this time, but favors the granting of
authority for such use of armed forces
of the United States as he may deem
necessary to put an end to hostilities
and to secure a stable government in
Cuba. He also asks for an appropria
tion to be used for the relief of such of
the people as are still in need.
The message shows that Spain her
self first suggested to this govern
ment the desirability of an armistice
and signified in advance her assent and
asked that the United States use its
good offices to secure a like assent from
the insurgents. This request was denied.
The Maine incident figures quite
prominently in the message and the
president argues that the wreck of
our battleship in Havana harbor shows
conclusively that Spain is not able to
guarantee to the United States and the
other nations that security to their
vessels which they have a j-ight to
demand. The message shows, how
ever, that Spain, so far as can be done,
without specific action by the cortes, has
disavowed any connection with the
wrecking of the, Maine and has ex
pressed her deep regret and sorrow tliat
the appalling disaster should have oc
curred in a port within her jurisdiction.
The only feature of the message which
yH is thought will encounter any serious
/ opposition in congress, is that giving
the president a measure of discretionary
authority in the use of force. It is be
lieved, however, a majority of the com
mittees of the two houses, to which the
message was referred, will support
the president’s view, and the opinion is
gaining ground in administration cir
cles that a more conservative sentiment
has been developed than seemed proba
ble a week ago, and the expectation is
that when put to the test of a vote, the
president’s recommendations will re
ceive the support of a majority of both
houses of congress.
MESSAGE IX FULL.
Washington, April 11.—The presi
dent today sent the following message
to the United States congress:
Obedient to that precept of the consti
tution which commands the president
to give from time to time to the con
gress intormation of the state of union
and to recommend to their considera
tion such measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient, it becomes my
duty now to address your body with re
gard to the grave crisis that has arisen
in the relations of the United States
to Spain by reason of the warfare that
for more than three years has raged in
the neighboring island of Cuba. I do
so because of the intimate connection of
the Cuban question with the state of
©uv&wn union and the grave relation
to the course which it is now incumbent
upon the nation to adopt must needs
bear to the traditional policy of our gov
ernment if it is to accord with the pre
cepts laid down by the founders of the
republic and religiously observed by
succeeding administrations to the pres
ent day.
The present revolution is but the suc
cessor of other similar insurrections
which have occurred in Cuba against
the dominion of Spain, extending over
a period of nearly half a century, each
of which, during its progress, has sub
jected the United States to great effort
and expense in according its neutrality
laws, causcd^enormouB losses to Ameri
can trade and commerce, caused circu
lation, annoyance and disturbance
among our citizens and by the exercise
of cruel, barbarous and uncivilized prac
tices of warfare shocked the sensibilities
and offended the humane sympathies of
our people.
Review of the Revolt.
Since the present revolution began in
Febmarv, 1895, this country has seen
the fertile domain at our threshold rav
aged by fire and sword in the course of
a struggle unequalled in the history of
the island and rarely parelleled us to
the number of combatants and the
bitterness of the contest by any revolu
tion of modern times where a depend
ent people, striving to be free, have
been opposed by the power of the sover
eign state. Our people have beheld a
once prosperous community reduced to
comparative want, its lucrative com
merce virtually paralyzed, its excep>-
tional productiveness diminished, its
fields laid waste, its mills in ruins and
its pieoplo perishing by tens of thousands
from hunger and destitution.
Wolhave found ourselves constrained,
in tlnHobservanc* of that strict neutral
ity yvlfich our laws onioins .what the
law of nations commands, to police oar
own waters and watoh onr own seaports
to prevent any unlawful act in aid ox
the Cubans. Our trad* has suffered,
the capital invested by our citizens in
Cuba has baan largely lost, and the tem-
C r and forbearance of our people have
en so sorely tried as to beget a peril
ous nnrest among our own citizens,
which has inevitably found its expres
sion from time to time in the national
legislature, so that issues wholly exter
nal to our own body politic eugross at
tention and stand in the way of that
close de.vtA^i to domestic advancement
that becomes a wit contained common
wealth whose piriinal maxim has been
the avoidance of all foreign entangle
ments.
All this must needs awaken, and has
indeed aroused the utmost concern on
the piart of this government, as well
during my predecessor’s term as in my
own.
In April, 1896, the evils from which
our country suffered through the Cuban
war became so onerous that my prede
cessor made an effort to bring about a
pieace through the mediation of this
government m any way that might tend
to an honorable adjustment of the con
test between Spain and her revolted
colony, on the basis of some effective
scheme of self government for Cuba
under the flag and sovereignty of Spiain.
It failed, through the refusal of the
Sjvanish government then in power to
consider any form of mediation, or in
deed of any plan of settlement which
did not begin with the actual submis
sion of the insurgents to the mother
country, and then only on such terms as
Spain herself might see fit to grant.
The war continued unabated. The re
sistance of the insurgents was in no
wise diminished.
War of Extermination.
The efforts of Sp)ain were increased
by the dispiatches of fresh levies of Cuba
and by the addition to the horrors of
the strife of a new and inhuman phase
happily unprecedented in the history of
civilized Christian pieoples. The policy
of devastation and concentration inau
gurated by the captaiu general Oct. 1,
1896, in the province of Pinar del Rio
was thence extended to embrace all of
the islands to which the powor of the
Spanish arms was able to reach by oc
cupation or by military operation.
The peasantry, including the dwell
ers in the open agricultural interior,
were driven into garrison towns or iso
lated places held by the troops. The
razing movement in the provinces of all
kinds were inaugurated. Fields wore
laid waste, dwellings unroofed and fired,
mills destroyed and in short everything
that could desolate the land and render
it unfit for human habitation or support
was condemned by order of one of the
contending parties and executed by all
the powers at their disposal.
Hy the time the present administra
tion took effect, a year ago, a recoucen-
tration—socalled—had been made ef
fective over the better part of the four
central or westeru provinces, Santa
Clara, Matanzas, Havana and Pinar dol
Rio. The agricultural population, to
the estimated number of 800,000 or
more, was herded within the towns and
their immediate vicinity, deprived fam
ilies of support, rendered destitute of
shelter, left poorly clad and exposed to
the most unsanitary conditions. The
scarcity of food increased with devasta
tion of the population areas and the de
struction and want became misery and
starvation. Month by month the death
rate increased in an alarming ratio.
The Mortality Great.
By March, 1897, according to conserv
ative estimates from official Spanish
sources, the mortality among the recon-
centra dos from starvation and the dis
eases thereto incident exceeded 50 per-
centum of their total number. Practi
cal relief was accorded to the destitute.
The overburdened towns, already suf
fering from the general dearth, could
give no aid. Socalled “zones of culti
vation,” established within the imme
diate area effective military control
about the cities and fortified camps,
proved illusory as a remedy for the suf
fering. The unfortunates, being for the
most part women and children with
aged and helpless men, enfeebled by dis
ease and hunger, could not have tilled
the soil, without tools, seed or shelter,
for their own support or for the supply
of the cities. Reconcentration, adopted
avowedly as a war measure in order to
cut off the resources of the insurgents,
worked its predestined result. As I
said in my message of last December, it
was not civilized warfare;, it was exter
mination. The only peace it could be
get was that of the wilderness and the
grave.
Meanwhile the military situation in
the island had undergone a noticeable
change. The extraordinary, activity
that characterized the second year of
the war, when the insurgents invaded
even the hitherto unharmed fields of
Pinar del Rio and carried havoc and de
struction up to the walls of the city of
Havana itself, had relapsed into, a
(Jogged struggle in the central and east
ern provinces. The Spanish arms re
gained a measure of control in Pinar del
Rio and parts of Havana, but, under the
existing conditions of the rural coun
try, without immediate improvement of
i their productive situation. Even thus
E artially restricted the revolutionists
eld their own and their conquest and
submission, put forward by Spain as the
essential and sole basis of peace, seemed
as far distant as at the outset.
In this state of affairs, my adminis
tration found itself confronted with the
grave problem of its duty. My message
of last December reviewed the situation
and narrated the steps taken with a
view to relieving its acuteness and open
ing the way to some form of honorable
settlement. The assassination of the
prime minister, Canovas, led to a change
of government in Spain. The former
administration, pledged to subjugation
without concession, gave place to that
of a more liberal party, committed long
in advance to a policy of reform involv
ing the wider principle of home rule in
Cuba and Porto Rico. The overtures of
this government, to be through its new
envoy, General Woodford, and looking
to an immediate and effective ameliora
tion of the conditions of the island, al
though not accepted to the extent of ad
mitted mediation in any shape, were
mot by assurances that home rule, in an
advanced phase, would be forthwith of
fered to Cuba, without waiting for the
war to end, and that more humane
methods should thenceforth prevail in
. the conduct of hostilities. Coinciden
tally with these declarations, the new
government of Spain continued and
completed the policy already began by
its predecessor, of testifying friendly re
gard for this nation by releasing Amer
ican citizens held under one (marge or
another oonnected with the insurrection,
i generously
ed with the
■o that by the end of November not a
single person entitled in any way to our
national protection remaiuod in a Span
ish prison.
Aided by American*.
While these negotiations were in pro
gress, the increasing destitution of the
unfortunate recoucentrados and the
alarming mortality among them claimed
earnest attention. The success which
had attended the limited measure of re
lief extended to the suffering American
citizens among tb^ by the judicious
expenditure, through the cousular agen
cies, of the hioney appropriated expressly
for their succor by the joint resolution
approved May, 14, 1897, prompted
the humane extension of a similar
scheme of aid to the great body of suf
ferers. A suggestion to this end was
acquiesced in by the Spanish authori
ties. On Dec. 24, last, I caused to be
issued au appeal to the people, inviting
contributions in money or in kind for
the succor of. the starving sufferers in
Culm, following this on Jan. 8 by a
similar public announcement of the
formation of a central Cuban relief com
mittee with headquarters in New York
city, composed of three members repre
senting the National Red Cross and the
religious aud business elements of the
community. The efforts of that com
mittee have been untiring and accom
plished much good. Arrangements for
free transportation to Havana have
greatly aided the charitable work. The
president of the American Red Cross
and the representatives of other con
tributory organizations have
visited Cuba, and co-operate
consul general aud the local authorities
to make effective distribution of the re
lief collected through the efforts of the
central committee.
Nearly |200,000 in money and supplies
had already reached the sufferers aud
more is forthcoming. The supplies are
admitted duty free, and transportation
to the interior has been arranged so that
the relief, at first necessarily confinpd
to Havana aud the larger oiu&s, )s hbVv
extended through most if not'all the
towns where suffering exists. Thou
sands of lives have already been saved.
The necessity for a change in the condi
tion of the reconcentrados is tecog-
nized by the Spanish government.
Within a few days, the orders of Gen
eral Weyler have been revoked, the
reconcentrados are, it is said, to be per
mitted to return to their homes, and
aided to resume their self supporting
pursuits of peace; public works have
been ordered to give them employment
and a sum of 1600,000 has been appro
priated for their relief.
The war in Cuba is of such nature
that short of subjugation or extermina
tion a final military victory for either
side seems impracticable. The alterna
tive lies in the physical exhaustion of
the one or of the other party or perhaps
of both—a condition which in effect
ended the ten years’ war by the truce of
Sanjon. The prospect of such a protec.
tion and conclusion of the present strife
is a contingency hardly to be contem
plated with equanimity by the civilized
world, and least of all by the United
States, affected and injured os we are,
deeply and intimately by its very ex
istence.
Efforts to End War.
Realizing this, it appeared to be my
duty in a spirit of true friendliness no
less to Spain than to the Cubans, who
have so much to lose by the prolonga
tion of the struggle, to bring about an
immediate termination of the war. To
this end I submitted, on March 20, as a
result of much presentation and cor
respondence through the United States
minister at Madrid, propositions to the
Spanish govenment looking to an armis
tice until Oct. 1 for the negotiation of
S eace with the gecd offices of the presi-
ent. In addition I asked the immedi
ate revocation of the order to roroneen-
tration, so as to permit the people to re
turn to their farms and the needy to be
relieved with provisions and supplies
from the United States, co-operating
with the Spanish authorities, so as to
afford full relief.
The reply of the Spanish cabinet was
received on the night of Mar:h81. It
offers, as the means to bring about peace
in Cuba, to confide the preparation
thereof to the insular parliament inas
much as the concurrence of that body
would be necessary to reach a final re
sult, it being, however, understood that
the powers reserved by the constitution
to the central government are not less
ened or diminished. As the Cuban par
liament does not meet until May 4, next,
the Spanish government would not ob
ject for its part to accept at once a sus
pension of hostilities if asked for ny the
insurgents from the general-in-chief, to
whom it would pertain in such case, to
determine the duration aud conditions
of the armistice.
The proiiositions submitted by Gen
eral Woodford and the reply of the
Spanish government were both in the
form of brief memoranda, the texts of
which are before me, and are substan
tially in the language above given.
The action of the Cuban parliament
in the matter of “preparing” peace and
the manner of its doing so are not ex
plained in the Spanish memorandum;
but from General Woodford’s prelimi
nary reports of preliminary discussions
proceeding, the final conference, it is
understood the Spanish government
stands ready to give the insular govern
ment full power to negotiate peace with
the insurgents—whether direct or indi
rectly—it does not appear. With this
last overture in the direction of peace
and its disappointing reception by Spain,
the executive was brought to the end of
his effort
The Lust Resort.
In my annual message of December
last I said:
"Of the untried measures these re
main only: Recognition of the insnr-
genfs as belligerents; recognition of the
independence of Cuba; neutral inter
vention to end the war ..imposing a
rational compromise between the con
testants and intervention in favor of
one or the other party. I speak not of
forcible annexation, for that cannot be
thought of. That, by our code of mor
ality, would be criminal aggression. ”
Thereupon I reviewed these alterna
tives in the light of President Grant’s
measured words, uttered in 1875, when,
after seven year's of sanguinary, de
structive and cruel and cruel hostilities
in Cuba, he reached the conclusion that
the recognition of the indendenoe of
Cuba was impracticable and indefensi
ble; and that the recognition of bellig
erence was not warranted by the facta
according to the tests of public law. I
commented especially upon the latter
aspect of the question, pointing out the
inconveniences and positive dangers of
a recognition of belligerence, which.
*7
ell
while adding to the already onorous har
dens of neu relity within our own juris
diction, could not in any way extend
our influence of effective offices in the
territory of hostilities. Nothing has
since occurred to change my view on
this regard, aud I recognize fully now
as then that the issuance of a proclama
tion of neutrality, by which process the
socalled recognition of belligerence is
published, could, of itself and unat
tended by other action, accomplish noth
ing toward the one end for which we
labor, the instant pacification of Cuba
and the cessation of the misery that
afflicts the island.
Turning to the question of recognizing
at this time the independence of the
present insurgent government in Cuba,
we find safe precedents in onr histoi
from an early day. They are we
sonuned up in President Jackson’s mes
sage to congress Dec. 21, 1886, ou the
subject of the recognition of the inde
pendence of Texas. He said.
„ “In all the contests that have arisen
ont of France, oat of the disputes in re
lation to the crowns of Portugal and
Spain, out of the separation of the
American possessions of both from the
European governments, and out of the
numerous and constantly occurring
struggles for dominion iu Spanish Amer
ica, so wisely consistent with our just
principles, has been the action of our
government that we have, under the
most critical circumstances, avoided all
ceusure and encountered no other evil
than that produced by a transient es
trangement of good will in those against
whom we have been by force of evi
dence compelled to decide.
As to Recognition.
“It has thus made known to the world
that the un form policy and practice of
the United States to avoid all interfer
ence in disputes which merely relate to
the internal government of other na
tions, and eventually recognize the au
thority of the prevailing party without
Reference to our particular interests
and views, or to the merits of the origi
nal controversy.
“But on this as on every trying occa
sion. safety is to be found in a rigid ad
herence to principle.
“In the contest between Spain and
the revolted colonies we stood aloof,
and waited not only until the ability of
the new states to protect themselves
was fully established, but until the dan
ger of their being again subjugated had
entirely passed away. Then, and not
until then, were they recognized. Such
was our course in regard to Mexico her
self.
“It is true that with regard to Texas
the civil authority of Mexico has been
expelled, its invading army defeated,
the chief of the republic himself cap
tured, and all present power to control
the newly organized government of
Texas annihilated within its confines.
But, on the other hand, there is, in ap
pearance, at least, an immense disparity
of physical force on the side of Texas.
The Mexican republic, under another
executive is rallying its forces under a
new leader, and menacing a fresh inva
sion to recover its lost dominion.
“Upon the issue of this threatened
invasion the independence of Texas
may be considered as suspended, and
were there nothing peculiar in the rela
tive situation of the United States aud
Texas even acknowledgement of its in
dependence at such a crisis could
scarcely be regarded as consistent with
that prudent reserve with which we
have hitherto held ourselves bound to
treat all similar questions.”
Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded
to consider the risk there might be im
puted to the United States motives of
selfish interest in view of the former
claim on our part to the territory of
Texas and of the avowed purpose of the
Texans in seeking recognition of inde
pendence as an incident to the incorpo
ration of Texas iu the Union, conclud
ing thus:
Andrew Jackson Quoted.
“Prudence therefore seems to dictate
that we should stand aloof and maintain
our present attitude if not until Mexico
itself or one of the great foreign powers
shall recognize the independence of the
new government, at least until the lapse
of time and the course of events shall
have proved beyond cavil or dispute the
ability of the people of that country to
maintain their separate sovereignty and
to uphold the government instituted by
them. Neither of the contending par
ties can justly complain of this course.
By pursuing it we are but carrying out
the long established policy of our gov
ernment, a policy which has secured to
us respect and influence abroad and in
spired confidence at home.”
These are the words of the resolute
and patriotic Jackso^. They are evi
dence that the United States, in addi
tion to the test imposed by public law
os to the condition of the recognition of
independence by a neutral state to-wit:
That the revolted state “shall constitute
in fact a body politic, having a govern
ment in substance as well as in name,
possessed of the elements of stability”
and forming do facto, if left to itself, a
state among the nations, reasonably ca
pable of discharging the duties of a state,
lias imposed for its own governance in
dealing with cases like these the further
condition that recognition of indepen
dence of that statehood is not due to a
revolted dependency under the danger
of its beir g subjugated by the parent
state is entirely passed away.
This extreme test was iu fact applied
in the case of Texas. In the congress to
whom President Jackson referred the
question as one “probably leading to
war” and therefore a proper subject for
a “previous understanding with that
body by whom war can alone be declared
and by whom all the provisions for sus
taining its perils must be furnished,”
left the matter of the recognition of
Texas to the discretion of the executive,
providing merely for the sending of a
diplomatic agent when the president
should b© satisfied that the republic of
Texas “has become an independent
state.” It was so recognized by Presi
dent Van Buren, who commissioned a
charge d’affaires March 7, 1837, after
Mexico abandoned the attempt to recon
quer the Texan Territory and when
there was at the time no “bona fide”
contest goir g on between the insurgent
province and its former sovereign.
I said in my message of last Decem
ber:
“It is to be seriously considered
whether the Cuban insurrection pos
sesses beyond dispute the attributes of
statehood, which alone can demand the
recognition of belligerency in its favor. ”
Recognizing a State.
The saxno requirement mast certainly
be no less seriously considered when the
graver issue of recognizing independence
is in question, for no less positive test
can be applied to the greater act than to
the lesser; while on the other hand the
influence and consequences of the strug
gle upon the internal policy of the recog
nizing state, which form important
factors where the recognition of bellig
erency is concerned, are secondary, if
not rightly eliminable factors, when the
real question is whether the community
claiming recognition is or ia not inde
pendent beyond per adventure.
Nor from the standpoint of experience
do I think it would be wise or prudent
for this government to recognize, at the
present time, the independence of the
socalled Cuban republic. Such recog
nition is not necessary in order to en
able the United States to intervene aud
pacify the island. To commit this coun
try now to the recognition of any par
ticular government iu Cuba might sub
ject us to embarrassing conditions of
International obligations towards the
organization so recognized. In case of
intervention our conduct would be sub
ject to the approval or disapproval of
such government. Wo would be re
quired to submit to its direction and to
assume to it the mere relation of a
friendly ally. When it shall appear
hereafter that there is within the island
a government capable of performmg the
duties aud discharging the functions of
a separate nation, aud having a* a mat
ter of fact the proper torms and attri
butes of nationality, such government
can be promptly aud readily recognized,
and the relations and interests of the
United States with such nation ad
justed.
There remains two alternative forms
of intervention to end the war: Either
as an impartial nation by imposing a
national compromise between the con
testants, or os the active ally of one
party or the other.
As to the first, it is not to be forgot
ten that during the last few months, the
relation of the United States has vir
tually been one of friendly intervention
m many ways, each note of itself conclu
sive, but all tending to the exertion of a
potential influence toward an ultimate
pacific result just and honorable to all
interests concerned. The spirit of all
our acts hitherto has been an earnest,
unselfish desire for peace and prosperity
in Cuba, untarnished by differences be
tween the United States and Spain and
unstained by the blood of American cit-
zens.
The forcible intervention of the United
States as a neutral, to step the war ac
cording to the large dictates of human
ity and following many historical prece
dents where neighboring states have in
terfered to check the hopeless sacrifices
of life by internecine conflicts beyond
their borders, is justifiable ou rational
grounds. It involves, however, hostile
constraint upon both the parties to the
contest, as well as to enforce a truce as
to guide the eventual settlement.
Grounds For Intervention.
The grounds for such intervention
may bo briefly summarized as follows:
First, iu the cause of humanity aud
to put an end to the barbarities, blood
shed, starvation and horrible miseries
now existing there, and which the par
ties to the conflict arc either unable or
unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no
answer to say this all in another coun
try, belonging to another nation and is
therefore none of cur business. It is
especially our duty, tor it is right at our
doors.
Second, we owe it to our citizens in
Cuba to afford them that protection and
indefinitely for life and property which
no government there can or will afford,
and to that end to terminate the condi
tions that deprive them of legal protec
tion.
Third, the right to intervene may bo
justified by the very serious injury to
commerce, trade and business of our
people aud by the wanton destruction of
property and devastation of the island.
Fourth, and which is of the utmost
importance for the present condition of
affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to
our peace, and entails upon this govern
ment enormous expense. With such a
conflict waged for years in au island so
near us and with which our people have
such trade and business relations—when
the lives aud liberty of our citizens are
in constant danger aud their projK-riy
destroyed and themselves ruined—where
our trading vessels are liable to seizure
and are seized at our very door, by war
ships of a foreign nation, the expeditious
of filibustering that we are powerless to
repress altogether and the irritating
questions and the entanglements thn-
arising—all these and others that I need
not mention, with the resulting strained
relations, are a constant menace to our
peace and compel us to keep on a semi-
war footing with a nation with which
we arc at peace.
The tlalne Disaster.
These elements of clangor and disor
der already pointed out have been
strikingly illustrated by a tragic event,
which has deeply and justly moved the
American people. I have already trans
mitted to congress the report of the na
val court of inquiry ou the destruction
of the battleship Maine in the harbor of
Havana during the night of Feb. 15.
The destruction of that noble vessel has
filled the national heart with inex
pressible horror. Two hundred and
fifty-eight brave sailors and marines and
two officers of our navy, reposing in the
fancied security of a friendly harbor,
have been hurled to death, grief and
want brought to their homes and sorrow
to the nation. The naval court of in
quiry, which, it is needless to say, com
mands the unqualified confidence of the
government, was unanimous in its con
clusion that the destruction of the Maine
was caused by an exterior explosion,
that of a submarine mine. It did not
assume to place the responsibility. That
remains to bo fixed.
In any event the destruction of the
Maine by whatever exterior cause is a
patent and impressive proof of a state oi
things in Cuba that is intolerable. That
condition is thus shown to be such that
the Spanish government cannot assure
safety and security to a vessel of the
American navy in the harbor of Havana
on a mission of peace, and rightfully
there.
Further referring in this connection
to recent diplomatic correspondence, n
dispatch from our minister to Spain ol
the twenty-sixth nit., contained the
statement that the Spanish ministerfor
foreign affairs assured him positively
that Spain will do all that the highes;
honor aud justice require in the matter
of the Maino. The reply of the thirty-
first nit. also contained un expression of
the readinese of Spain to submit to ar
bitration all the differences which can
arise in this matter which is subse
qucntly explained by the note of the
Spanish minister at Washington of the
tenth iust as follows:
“As to the question of fact which
springs from the diversity of views be
tween the report of the American and
Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the
fact be ascertained by an impartial in
vestigation by experts whose decision
Spain accepts in advance. ”
To this I have made no reply.
Grant on Intervention.
President Grant, in 1875, after dis
cussing the phases of the contest as it
then appeared and its hopeless aud ap
parent indefinite prolongation, said: “In
such event, I am of the opinion that
other nations will bo compelled to as
sume the responsibility which devolves
upon them, aud to seriously consider
the only remaining measures possible,
mediation and intervention. Owing,
perhaps, to the large expanse of w ater
separating the island from the penin
sula, parties appear to have within
themselves no depository of common
confidence, to suggest wisdom when
passion and excitement have their sway
and to assume the part of peacemaker.
In this view, in the earlier days of the
contest, the good offices of the United
States as a mediator were tendered in
good faith, without any selfish purposes
in the interest of humanity and in sin
cere friendship for both parties, but
were at the time declined by Spain with
the declaration nevertheless that at a
future time they would be indispensa
ble. No indication has been received
a Christian, peace-loving
realized. If it fails it will be only
another justification for our contem
plated action.
William McKixlxv.