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* yV A ===, ?, 0 VOL. IX. T1IE GREAT FIGHT OF THE YEAR. THE DISPCXSAItV LAW IN THE SUPHllMH COURT. The lVtitioiiH and Ai'KiunciitH of Disi infills lied Counsel?A Pull and I "roe Discussion ol* the liuw?An Kaely Decision is Promised. The Supremo Court of this State met on the 1 Htli inst., and heard the arguments for and agninst the conatitutionality of the dispensary act of 1S03. Associate Justleo Kugeno B. Gary appeared on the bench for tlie tirst time. Justices Melver and Pofie occupied their respective poj^/offi-, and there was a fair audiGncd^u interested spectators to hoar tho arguments in this Celebrated and most important case. When tho J usticcs camo in and tho court was called to order, Mr. G. W. Croft of Aiken arose and bCgan roadin^tlie record of tiic case, including the decision of Circuit Judge Aklrich, in the case lie fore tho court, the case of " tho State ex relatione J . V. George and G. T. Holley vs Tho City Council of tho City of* Aiken," involving the constitutionality of the dispensary law ofl893. This occupied much time. Mr. J. P Kennedy ihayan of Charleston arose then and called attention to tho Molchers' case, which came up from Charleston a few days ago. Uo ? proceeded to read the pleadings in the case. This was tho petition for an in* junction to restrain Commissioner fraxler frontpaging any warrants and the State Tri\.^?or from paying out any money upoWiuch warrants. Attorney General Buchanan said that from his view of Slate's rights, it had strong objections to this order, but in order to let tiie case come before the court on its merits, the State wished to present the following answer : The State of South Carolina. In the Supreme Court. Theodore Melchers and F. W. Jepson, Complainants, Petitioners, vs. W. T. C. Bates, Treasurer of the State of South Carolina, and I). 11. Traxler, Defendants. W. '1'. C. Bates and I). H. Traxler, upon whom lias been served a rule requiring them to show cause why the writ of injunction prayed for by the petitioners herein should not he granted, respectfully make return to said rule, anil for causes show : 1. That tho respondent, W. T. C. Bates, is the dulv elected and niiRlifinil Treasurer of the State of South Carolina and the respondent, 1). II. Traxlor, is Stuto Commissioner duly appointed ututor the act of the General Assembly of the said State, entitled li An aict to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage within this State, except as herein provided" and continue in said ollieo under the provisions of an act of the said General Assembly entitled " An aet to declare the law in reference to, and further regulate the use, sale, consumption, transportation and disposition of alcoholic liquids or liquors within the State of South Carolina and to police the same" approved December 22rd, 1803, and now in force in this State. 2. That the acts of respondents, both those done and performed, and those to he done and performed, complained of and objected to by petitioners herein, are each and all required of respondents by the said last mentioned act, and have been performed and will be performed by them and each of them, m the faithful discharge of their sworn duties, as officers of the State as aforesaid. 3. That they deny the unconstitutionality, invalidity and nullity of said acts, in tho particulars specified in the petition heroin, or in any other particular; and, on tho contrary, allege that tho said acts wore passed by the General Assembly in tho legitimate exorcise of its constitutional power of legislation and with the purpose and in tho sincere desire to minify tho evils of the sale of liquor within the borders of this Stato. 4. They deny that petitioners, or those united with them, have sulTered injuries or are about to suil'er injuries from tho o[)Qf? I/ton of tlio said act of 1803: and, '.<oli h/contrary, allege that the operation of tlio said not has conferred and will continue to con for groat benefits upon them, and upon all the law abiding citizens of the State, in tho way of rescuing the people, and especially its youth, from tho corrupting and demoralizing iniluencos of the liquor saloon. That petitioners complain its taxpayers but that, on their own showing, tlio moneys, tho disbursement of which they seek to restrain, aro not tho proceeds of taxation but derived from tho sale of liquors by the State. 5. The respondents further answering the rule herein, allego that the writ of ihjunction prayed for should not issue for that petitioners allege no special irreparable injuries to tlioinsolves beyond thoso suffered by tho people at largo, nor do they allego in what respect they have been or aro likoly ' yfiyJnjured by the operation of the s^vjf^b. G. Tho?ospt>pdents further answering tho rulo herein alleged, that the writ of injunction prayed for should not issue for that, they aro officers of tho State and should not, at tho inetance of private citizens, bo restrained in tho discharge of their public and otlicial duties, on tho alloged ground of tho unconstitutionality of tho law requiring their action. The respondents having made full roturns to the rulo horoln, pray that the same may bo discharged with costs. O. W. HuciiANAN, Att'y Gon. IJoyd liuowx, Hospond'tg Att'y. Mr. iiuchanon Maid u might and would become necessary to attack the deeinioii-utf this court in tho case of McCnVjCofrvs. Grown, and )io would ask porimasion of the court to attack that decision. Tho Chief Justicosaid that tiio court was perfectly willing to grant such a requost. It was the rulo to take an order in such matters, but tho court wished to hoar everything that could fro said. If any of the attorneys wish* / Od to attack the o rev joys decisions of this court, ho wftiii'd theni to foe) free to do so. Tho court wanted tho argument to go on ad infinitum, so long as it could hear every point on the constitutionality discussed. Mr. Bryan, at this junoturo, roso and said that Mr. Smith, who wa* associated with him. wished to niako an argument, but had boon called to TonM',1 x- ; '- f *' , ;; 1108800, uiul wishoil the permission of | the court to file a written argument. ! Mr. Bryan asked this permission and requested tlio Chief Justice to tlx a time limit for tho filing of this argument. There was some discussion as to how much time should lie allowed. The Chief Justice finally allowed ten days, but took occasion to say that there were questions involved in the Aiken case that were not involved in tho injunction easo: that in tho latter it was simply a question of tho constitutionality of the law. 11 was possible that the court could within a few daysreach a conclusion on the first named ease, and ho wished it understood that t he privilege granted Mr. Smith wo lid not intorforo with the decision hi tho first ease. Tho Attorney General announced that they would file their printed briefs and arguments. Argument Against the Dispensary. Mr. G. W. Croft, of Aiken, who represented tho city council, opened the argument against the constitutionality of the dispensary law with a detailed htatemont of tho ease from Aiken, fie then argued tho law points invdlvod in the leading feature of tho easo?tho question of stare decisis : Before discussing tho points raised we shall contend that, the questions involved in this appeal are not now ; they have been already repeatedly decided by this Court, true within a short poriod?but nevertheless by a number of decisions?commencing with McCollougb Vs Brown, followed by Burringer vs tho city council of Florence and ox parte Branson, and by the State vs O'Bontiall. We maintain that the points now raised are settled, und under the doctrine of stare decisis should not be disturbed. The doctrino upon that subject is thus stuted by New York Courts: "The decisions of this Court, while unreversed always form the absolute law of tho Court, and enter with very decided efi'eot into the Douy 01 precedents. Thoy must from tho vory naturoof tho legal system bo tho Bumo to tho soionco of law as a convincing series of experiments is to any other brunch of inductive philosophy. They are upon bo in# promulgated immediately relied upon as to their character, either as conlirmiug an old or forming1 a now principle of action which perhaps is at once applied to a thousand of cases." He cited other authorities on this lino, all the way from Cobloy to the Ohio Courts, lie insisted that a reading of the Act of 18i?2 and that of 18!K1 will make it manifest that there is no diiTerenco whatever between the scope, design and purpose of the two Acts. The Act of 1892 provides that the keeping and sale of spirituous, malt and vinous liqucrg in the State shall bo regulated and Conducted oidy as jiruviuou m saui ivct. it provides for the appointment of a State commissioner, State board of control, county boards of control, county dispensers, the purchase of the liquors by the State and its distribution among the county dispensaries, and the division of the profits between the State, county and the municipalities and fixes the maximum profit. Then it directs tho manner of making application to purchase tho liquors and prescribes the penalties for violating the terms of the Act. The Act of 1893 shows in its very title that it is the same schome as tho Act of 1892, indeed it rests upon tho Act of 1892, and its apparent object is to make complete the law already existing, for it is entitled, ,l An Act to declare the law in reference to and further regulate the use, sale, consumption, transportation and distribution of alcoholic liquid or liquors within the State of South Carolina, and to police tho same," and its terms are in substance identically tho samo as tho Act of 1892. Tt provides for tho monopoly of tho liquor business by tho State, tho division of tho profits between the State, county and municipalities, penalties for tho violation of tho Act. Tho only practicable difTorcnco between tho two Acts is that by the? Act of 1892 the State profit was limited not to oxcooil 50 per cent., whilo under tho Act of 1899 the prollt is unlimited and is left it seems to tho judgment of tho Stato board of control. Tho two Acts being practically tho samo wo contend that the principles announced in tho case of McCollough vb Brown et al, apply with the same force and effect to the issue now under discussion. Ho then took up tho relator's exceptions. lie grouped these undor two heads : That a municipal corporation cannot sot up tho plea that tho Dispensary Act was in violation of tho Stato and Federal Constitutions! This is an amazing proposition. Tho ' verv statement of it is remit/mint. - T "O """ " W reason. To say that a corporation or its officers, who arc attempting to carry out its ordinances from which it derives pare of ita revonuo, will not bo allowed to protect itself by the Constitution of the State when it* rights are invaded ia so utterly untenable that it needs no argument to refute such position. it must also bo borno in mind that the city council are not the actors? hut tho relators como ipto Court with the Disponsary Act and say that wo aro county disponsors under this Act, and that tho city of Aiken has passed an ordinance which conflicts with this Act. It cannot be said that tho city is not interested in having tho Act in question declared unconstitutional, for tho ordinance which tho Act comes in conflict with is a revenue ordinance, from which tho city derives a great part of its income. Tho reasoning in tho opinion of the Circuit Court upon this point seems to us unanswerable. gnd. The second and real ground of appeal by the relators is bccauso tho Circuit Judge decided tho Dispensary Act of I8i>3 was in violation of thetttato Constitution. The theory of tho relators in support of their position as to tho constitutionality of tho Dispensary Act is that said Act may be sustained upon two grounds: 1st. That tho legislature has supromo, ahsoluto and uncontrollable power to pass a law of any character whatever, unless such Act is expressly prohibited tyy tho Constitution. That thni'n urM t\i% K/.hin.r .fw. V >* ? t a fa 11 vrt in^ to the people bthor then thoso flamed In tho Constitution itflolf. 3nd. That tho dispensary law is merely tho proper exerciso of tho police power ovor tho liquor traljic. Tho lirni proposition is contradictory CONWAY, S. C ! to tho Constitution itsolf. Tho 1st I soctIon of Artlolo 1 of that instrumont i> bivicu inviarauon 01 rights, clearly meaning that these rights then belonged to the people and wore then oxprossod in solemn form. It does not state that it enumerated all of the rights of the peoulo, hut the language is such that it clearly intimates that , there wore other rights, for It says : i " All men are born free and equal, oni dowod by their Creator with certain ' inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending i their lives and liberties, of acquiring, i possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining their , safety and happiness." If there are no rights of the people except those specially named in the Constitution itself, why does that instrument, in speaking of the rights, use the word "among V" DoCs not the use of that word clearly show that the rights of the peoulo then existed and that the Constitution only proposed to name a part of those rights. To leuvo no doubt upon this subject, the -list section of the sumo article says: "The enumeration of rights in thisConslitution shall not bo construed to impair or deny others retained by the people, and all power not heroin delegated remain with the people." He cited a number of authorities on this line from various authorities and Courts. Ho concludes that it is thus seen upon the highest authority that the peoplo have other inalienable rights besides those which have been expressly declared in the Constitution. What are those rights V Ho says on tliin subject that it was nowhere stated with greater precision than by Chief Justice iMelvor in the ease of MoCollougli vs lJrown. Other strong authorities were given on this lino. It is next attempted to justify the Dispensary Act by holding that it is the exercise of tho polico power over the whiskey trallle. It is admitted that tho State may through proper legislation police the whiskey trallle. and may go to the extent of prohibiting tho sale of liquors within tho State but tho Legislature cannot under tho guise of exorcising its police power pass an unconstitutional law. Ho quoted Cooloy and others on tho police power and argued that the law proscribes no rules of good manners or i.i i. .. t ---' ; - * ..VM.1UU cisu iur r^xiuun^ tae intercourse of citizen with citizen. l)ut to the contrary it is u system of trade by which the liquor trallic is monopolized by the State, which deli lies bow the business shall be carried on and a division of the profits?with fines, penalties and forfeitures which are directed not to rogulato the intercourse of citizen with citizen -but to make secure the monopoly of the business in the hands of the State, that the profits from the trallic might be made larger. The Act does not prohibit the citizen from carrying on the liquor trallic because tho business is unlawful, but its penalties are declared simply for the purpose of deterring others from engaging in a legal trade which the State desires to monopolize. That the sale of liquor is a legitimate subject of commerce. See Chiof Justice Mclver's opinion in tho case of McCollough vs llrown ot al, page 401), and the ease cited. lie dealt with the monopoly question at some length and said among other points: Tho police power can only bo resorted to for tho government and control of the people of tho State, and cannot with any propriety bo appealed to for the purpose of controlling the action of the State itself, and as. tho State can nnlv m>\ 1 * ?j ..w ...ivu^u iks jtui/uwri/.uti 01ficers or agents tho police power cannot be resorted to for the purpose of controlling such oillcers and agents, If for no other rouson, because it is wholly unnecessary, as the State has ample means of controlling its own oUieials without resorting to the undefined, and therefore clangorous power known as the " police power." We find elsewhere that the Supreme Court of othor States in passing upon similar statutes as tho Dispensary Act have declared suoh Acts invasion of tho inalienable rights of the citizen, and therefore void. In tho case of Herman vs the Stato, 8 Ind. 545, tho Supreme Court in passing upon the constitutionality of an Act of tho legislature of Indiana, which provided that tho trade and business of manufacturing whiskey, ale, porter and boor, then carried on in that Stato, should cease except any person might manufacture the same and sell to the Govornmout, if tho Government should conoludo to buy of such person, but not otherwiso. On this line ho spoko for ten minutos at least. After going ovor the other main points in tho argument he took up tho exceptions of tho respondents and first discussed tho writ of prohibition. VIOLATES THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. The claim that tho Dispensary Act Violates Section 8 of Artielo 1, of tho Constitution of tho United StateH he argued on familiar grounds, and said that the Dispensary Act violates said amendmont of the Constitution of the United States, in that Section 21 authorizes searches of hotels, either in day or night time, without a warrant: Section 22 prohibits any suit for damages for soizuro and detention of any liquors under tho Act, thus shielding an officer for making soizuro that might turn out illegal. Section 24 allows all places to bo searched upon a warrant oithor in the day or night tlmo, thus permitting a citizen's residence to bo searched at any unreasonable hour. Section 21) permits the soizuro of tho citizen's property in tho hands of a COinmon carrier Jind t.n dnt.riin i? ?/! ?.. out warrant on suspicion merely for twenty-four hours. Soction 18 shields the ofllcor from all suits for dainago to persons or property in tho disohargoof any duty under the Act, thus placing tho ofllcor alxjvo tho law, andoncouraglng unlawful seizures and searches and giving froo lioonso for tho oppression of the cltiscn. Tho argument wfpj closed with a re* view of the Kodoral Issues and tho right of the city to license. Mr. Croft in his extemporaneous argument forcibly said that tho practical language of tho Legislature was that profit was to bo mado out of tho dispensary law. In an Act It was declared that tho profits from tho dispensary should go to pay tho debt of Clarondon County. Thoro could bo no doubt as fo the idea of tho act. Thoro is no contoption tht}j, tho iypt of }893 is THURSDAY, SEPTi , ditto rent from that of 1892. Tho only , dilToreneo is in tlio dates. Tho only possible reason for another decision i was tho change of tho Court, i At the conclusion of Mr. Croft's ur, gumont Chief Justice Molvor said that i he supposed that tho real object of the i case was to determine tho constitu, tionality of the Act of 18IKJ. He said : that there was a well defined principle of law. which was not generally known, i that a State Court (when a case indii roetly bringing up aquestion involving' tho validity of an not passed by the State Legislature ? a co-ordinate hrauoh of tho State Clovornineut?was presented) should evade deciding the i validity of the law, deciding the case on any minor point, that would servo the purpose of giving a decision. This wassaiu not to indicate any decision or ' opinion, but to call attention to two points in Mr. Croft's argument which i wore not connected with the constitutionality of the law. Mr. Croft will probably withdraw tho two points. Mr. Croft's argument was considered very able'by all who heard it. C'ol. It. \V. Itoyd for the State. Col. K. W. Boyd, who was connected with the oriiriiinl wnu >,?.vi from. Ho contined himself more than Col. Croft to his printocl argument. The ohiof point of his argument, aside from tho linos previously argued, was on tho question of stare decisis and on tliis lie was cspooially elaborate. He began the argument by claim-1 ing that the Dispensary Aet of 18b.'I is I not an amendment of the Dispensary j Aet of 1892. It is a distinct Act and repeals the former Act. Murdoch vs. City of Memphis, 20 Wall, ;*>20. It 's, however, in its principle, purpose and provisions, so identical with tho Act of 1892, that if McCullough ot al vs. Drown et al, supra, and tho cases that allirm it are sound, and should bo sustained, then tho Court must hold that the Act of 1893 violates tho provisions of the State Consititution and is null and void. Tho State authorities are not satisfied with those decisions, question their soundness and, in this appeal, seek to have the Court, for their satisfaction and tho satisfaction of the people, after a careful reconsideration, declare whether it is prepared to sustain them and establish in tin; jurisprudence of the State the constitutional doctrines therein announced. 1 have the most sincere and admiring respect f?.r the ability, learning, cool judgment and integrity of the distinguished jurists \ ho united in the opinion in McCullough vs. Drown, and I would not be here taking rm.r?. in t.Mw appeal if I did not honestly boliove that in that 0080, with the most earnest desire to bo right, they erred and gave their approval to a new and unallowable ground for the restriction of legislative onaetments by the judiciary which, if sustained, must seriously hinder In the future the prosperity and happiness of tho people of the State. it is always a serious matter to seek to have overruled tho decision of a court of last resort, it is obviously to the interest of the people that us little of uncertainly as possible should be attached to the law, and the doctrine of stare decisis, when properly understood und limited, has for its support sound and cogent considerations of right reason. Tho rule is founded on a rational presumption in favor of the correctness of a carefully considered judgment, by competent judges, and tho desire to avoid uncertainty in the law. but is imperative only in cases of reasonable doubt, and in which it is a matter of comparative indilTorence which view of the law is taken, and in eases in which, owing to long action by the people upon the law as declared, the reversal of tho decision would betoo injurious to bo compensated by a correction of the error. The mission of a Supremo Court is to declare correct law and not to perpetrate. error, and it will not do to permit the rule of stare decisis to preserve an error harmful to the pooplo in its operations. In Pratt vs Hrowa, II Wis, 632, tho Court said : " It is true that when a principle of law, doubtful in its character or uncertain in tho subject matter of its application, has been settled by a series of judicial decisions and acquioBCod in for a considerable time, ami important rights and interests have hoenmi established under such decision, courts will hesitate long before tltey will attempt to overturn tlio result so long established. So when it is apparently indifferent which of two or more rules is adopted, one of which shall have boon udopted by judicial sanction, it will be adhered to, though it may not, at the moment, appear to bo the preferable rule. Hut when a question arises involving important private or public rights, extending through all coming time, has been passed upon, on asinglo occasion, and which decision can in no just sense be said to have been acquiesced in, it is not only the right but the duty of the Court, when properly ealled upon, to ro-exainine the questions involved, and again subject them to judicial scrutiny. We are by no moans unmindful of tho salutary tendency of tho rule stare decisis, but at tho same time we cannot but be mindful of tho lessons furnished by our own consciousness, as woll as by judicial history, of tho liability to error, and tho advantages of review. We thoroforo enter upon tho discussion of the questions involved in this ease, not for the purpose of again reopening tho subjoot matter thereof to criticism or investigation, but for tho purpose of discharging our full duty in tho r* ' ? "'vu. Whatever tho forco of the rule whoro contracts and proporty titles are concerned, there is strong authority for saying that it has hut little application to decisions involving abstract constitutional questions. In Willis vs. Oweq, 43 Texas 41, tho court said ; " Tho questions to l?e considered in those oases have no application whatever to tho titlo or transfer of proporty or to matters of contract. They involve the construction and interpretation of tho organio law and presont for consideration tho structure of tho government, tho llmitators upon legislative and oxooutivo power, as safegards against tyranny and Oppression. Certainly it cannot ho seriously Insisted that questions of this character can ho disposed of by tho dootrino of sturo decisis." Ilo citos a great many authorities on this question, and concludes that If, therefore, McCullough vs. Brown is wrong in principle, tho rulo of stare decisis should not prevent its being WMPr ' '' . . V-' : MB till 20, 1894 overruled. In the consideration of 11 previous decision it is always a fortunate circumstance when, as in this ease, the previous decision lias heon recently promulgated ami sulllelout time has notelap. ed for it to beoonio a rule of notion, it is likewise a fortunate circumstance when, as in this case, tno personnel of the court has been so changed as to guarantee to the people a reconsideration uncontrolled by the unconseious bias arising from a deliberate opinion publicly expressed. Col. I toyd took up the grounds upon which the court In that ease found that the Dispensary Act of ISPll was violative of Suctions 1 and 1-4 of Article 1 of the State Constitution, and so unconstitutional, null and void, with the exception of it prohibition of the granting of spirituous license for the sale of liquors after Juno, IStt.'l. lie urged that the question as to the right of the State to ongago in a trade or business for the purpose of the gain has boon determined adversely to the right in Mauldin vs. City Council, .'13 S. C., I. where it was hold that thoeity council could own and run an electric light plant for the purpose of lighting the streets and public buildings, but that it Could not sell the light to individuals, the court saying: "As we understand it, all the powers give to thoeity government were for tin? sole, exclusive purpose of government, and not to outer into private business of an\ kind outI sidi of the scope of the city government." I fully appreciate the force of all this, and of the high intellectual ability, learning and logical power with which it is presented and supported ; hut 1 believe that it rests upon a theory of the provinces of tlio Sea to Legislature, and of thoState Judiciary which, while having support iu some ease from courts deserving high respect, and from dicta of eminent judges, is not iu accordance with the great current of judicial authority iu those United States, and is a distinct departure from what, throughout our jiiuiciiu History, Willi low ami very doubtful exceptions, lias boon regardod in effect that the State Government, like the National Government, as one of enumerated powers; that not all legislative power, with the except ion of such limitations, express or clearly implied, to he found in the constitutions, National anil State, is possessed by the Legislature, but that, outside of these limitations, the people have reserved to themselves legislative power. Thatithere are limitations of legislative power, outside of Constitutional limitations, derived from the nature of civil government. That the judiciary has the right ami the power to regard and enforce these last named restriction, ami to declare an Act of the Legislature in contlict with them null and void. That in judging of the constitutionality of enactments of the Legislature it is not confined to the question of the power of the Legislature, but can enter the domain of its discretion in the use of means and pass upon the necessity and propriety of means for the accomplishment of ends confessedly within its power. That in the case of a police purpose within the legislative power, where the Leglsla turw iuis cuuctcu a measure having substantial relation to the accomplishment of that purpose and clearly likely to accomplish-it, and where the Legislature has solemnly declared the measure enacted for the accomplishmontof that puposo, the judiciary can, with propriety, declare that the measure was not passed for that purpose, hut for one entirely dilTcront. Now 1 insist that the settled doctrine in this State and in the United States, as to these matters, has been hitherto as follows : 4* It is to he borne in mind that there is a broad diH'erence between the Constitution of the United States and the Constitutions of the States as regards the power which may he exercised under them. The Government of the United States is one of enumerated powers; the Governments of the States are possessed of all the general powers of legislation. When a law of Congress is assailed as void and null we look in the National Constitution to see if the grant of special powers is broad enough to embrace it; hut when a State law is attacked on the same ground it is presumably valid in any case, and this presumption is a conclusive ono, unless in the Constitution of the United States 01 of the State we are able to discover that it is prohibited. We look in the Constitution of the United States for grants of legislative power, hut in the Constitution of the State to ascertain if any limitations have been imposed unon the complete power with which the legislative department of the State was vested in its creation. Congress can pass no laws except such as the Constitution authorizes, either expressly or by clear implication; while the State Legislature has jurisdiction of all subjects which is not prohibited. The law making power of the State, it is said in one case, recognizes no restraints, and is bound by none, except such as are imposed by the Constitution. That instrument has boon aptly termed a legislative Act by the people themsolvos in their sovereign capacity, and is therefore the paramount law. Its object is not to grant legislative powers, hut to "confine and restrain it. Without the constitutional limitations the powor to make laws would Ihj absolute. . mm ? ? ? Lightning Stasistics.?A Register reporter usked the weather observer in Columbia if the government keeps any record of the destruction of life and property by lightning. lit! said: "The weather bureau gathers statistics from all available sources of the damage done bv liffhtninor and the report of Alex McAdio, who ha? the mutter in charge, it Ih learned that in tho United States, during May, 1894, 45 persons wore killed by lightning ; 84 persona were struck and severely injured ; 12 barns woro sot on firo, with an estimated loss of $35,000: 37 dwellings, 4 churches and 1 school houso were struck and damaged to a groater or less extent; 58 horses and 22 cows wore killed. " During Juno, 1894, 90 persons woro killed and 102 severely injured ; 09 barns were struck, with an estimated lo of $49.000! 40horiM. 310 ??"<i 15 sheep wore killed; NO dwelling wore btruck and mere or U;?h damaged: 23 ohurchos, 1 railroad do|M>t, 1 oil tank, 1 grain elevator and 0 mill* and factories wcro btruck, tho dainago in the cauo of the eight last named being not leva than $237,500." THE VERDIOT 01' A VETERAN. \VM. 11. MOUKISON o.\ Till'. NliW TAIIIIT LAW. A Kar Itclicr AltNiNiiru Than the Mills Hill li Will Hoi|? Iho People ami 111? I Democrath' l'ariy. i William li. Morrison, the famous 1 tar I IT reform leadei of past'Congresses. I has Injcn interviewed on the now tar ill I law. In viow of Colonel Morrison's < record on the tariff, his views uro of < value, and will ho road with Interest. I "After so much discussion," said! Colonel Morrison, " I could not expect It to add anything of interest to what lias j' been said on the subject. The hill : t does not give tis all that was promised, I or that our people expected, but it is so i much bettor than anything we have ' had in many years, and is such an ad- > vanco towards what we hoped for, that I ! am very glad we have obtained so ? much. A horizontal cut of 2T? per 1 cent, would mako the new law much 'I more satisfactory, and some of its ? schedules Imdlv nnnil >m,?h ? .,<! n.?4!<? ? lint, with a, Democratic majority ho t slight that a defection of two votes ^ turns the scale against us, and with ? many more than two ' Democratic pro- I tcctionists' in the body, we could hard- ti ly expect a much better Dill to go ^ through tlie Senate. A measure at <| once satisfactory and complete cannot ( bo driven through sueli a body l?y any c amount of good reasoning or scolding. ' I had several years' experience in a ' Democratic house, made up as the Sen- 1 ate is now. it. may bo a better law s could have been passed if the question t of tarilT taxation had becu kept at the front when wo came into power. Then n the question was red-hot." a " Will the bill passed be, for want of t a longer free list, lower rates, or for v any reason, considered an abandonment t of the principles of tariff reform?" v '' No. How could that be? The a rates are lower than in the Mills hill v ...i.i..i. ..? I-.I.... it.. . n iiuru wn? IIHIIMSeU l|V U1C ll.'lUOMUl I Iloinocratic convention in INKS. In the |> matter of free raw materials t^m hill hi is far in advance of any hill passed in li our histoiy by amy party. It puts lain- n her, wool, copper, salt, and many other a articles on the free list, which many si years ago I tried, but failed to do. It e cuts the tax of coal, iron and lead ore c< in two, and makes reductions in all N the schedules. l?'or illustration: On g iron and steel in alt forms for building, t'< on iron and steel rails and on pig iron, w one-third the tax is taken oil'. On c< woolen goods under the old law the cm tar ill was from (50 to 100 per cent.?an ti average tax of about $100 on $100 worth of imported goods. Under the now |> bill the rate is from to f>0?an aver- et age tax of about $lf> for importing $100 a worth. The reductions in other sched- h ules arc not so large, but they are eon- p siderable in all. si ''The number of articles on the free list could bo increased with great ad- h vantage. Kxcopt in time of war all of li our tariffs have left many articles un- s< taxed. Our earliest tariff legislation U gave some recognition to the principle a by drawback (refunding duties paid on II imported urticles, used in making other y articles for export.) free raw matter li also become more and more necessary C each succeeding year. Our manufuc- vi taring capacity in many industries is t< already far in advance of the wants of si our people. We must, have foroign ii markets to avoid enforced iuloness. T We cannot have foroign markets where ol we meet competitors selling goods fi made of untaxed materials while wo m tax such materials. All the general bills presented to Congress in recent v years by myself, and I think by others, . a proposed additions to the free list, hut ui the free raw material doctrine was fi first fully recognized and became a d pronounced principle of tariff reform tl about tifteon years ago,'during the Con- l? gressional service of Hon. Abrain S. ei tlewitt, who was its foremost and tl ablest champion." d " How will t.llrl IK. u/ I.ittr ..IV. . > ' ... wt..j ><v/ t? i?%r? aii\;i;b kju | iv Democratic party ?" | u " More wiih promised and oxpuctod ; in than I* provided for in the new bill, w and Homo disappointment follows, but tl I think this will be only temporary, ui What has been gained will be boned- tl eial to the country first and after- tl wards to the party. The income tax rt will be popular with those who do not ai pay it, and unpopular with those who tl do. It will eventually drop out ti or bo extended to all who have in- tl comes. When, in 1H7<?, I was advocat- hi ing my first turifT bill in Congress, I ei said : 1 Burdens of government should f> be borne in proportion to ability to bear tr them. Property should pay the taxes, tl lie who has much should pay much; tc be who has little should pay little; ai and he who has none, none.' There u] are a great many people in this country to-day who believe in what I then said. ' w "The sugar tax is unpopular. View- 11] ed from it partisan standpoint, it was tl shrewd In the Republican party to tl empty the treasury and turn over fis- |y Oftl utTuirs to the Democratic adminis- ,j| t.ration in a condition which made a C1 tax on sugar necessary to prevent ado- ej flciency and meet the obligations of },, the government. The House did not w ?i I* p/uiioiu miu UXlSbCU, 111141 TO* sistcd tho laying on of thin tux. Evon p] tho Senate hesitated?some of it? mombers opposing uny tax on sugar, others n, preferring the MeKlnluy law with CJi l>oth protection and bounty. There in could scarcely bo any question as to ti this necessity after tho letter of tho (;, secretary of the treasury, advising the j1( Senate that a tax on sugar was neces- <j sary to prevent deliolencies, and the tn letter of the President, advising mem- p| hers of tho House thut a tax on sugar m is in accord with tho Democratic plat- t,i form and Democratic principles, and c} that a tax on coal and iron ore is un- n( democratic and not necessary, thus G( confirming tho treasury statement that td rovonuo from sugar is indispensable. "A portion of tho Democratic press would make it appear that the I'rcsidont was with tho House for free sugar. Tills is not only hurtful to tho . party, but it is untrue. Tho lotters of , the President and Secretary of tho ^ Treasury show that tho adininlstratlon favors a revenue tax on sugar as a , | moasure of wise economy and good t) democracy." ?The strike of tho Scotch minors is tl over. The delegates to tho Minors' w Congress representing 57,000 men have 01 voted to ro.sumo work at tho old wages, p< providing tho omployors will grant si tho proposal made by tho board of con- tl ciliation to that offoot. si J A? NO t I'AUDONS AM) COMMt'TATIONH. l.ovcriior Tillman HcImTwo ('imviiis I'rct- ami Commutes lh? Hcntciico ol' Anoi hop. For the punt live yours, William Carpenter has boon known to the world is the " famous FdgoHe Id desperado." I lis crime, escape and capture arc 'amlliar to the public, ami It was ex)cctod that ho would hanir on hist Frilay, but t he death sentence has boon onnnuted by Govornor Tillman to Ife imprisonment in the penitentiary. There has net been a more noted use in the criminal history of South 'arolina in years than that of Carponit and Murroll. It was in 1880 that 'ronton Yonco was shot down in tho oad, his body bol n?r tilled with bulels. Carpenter and Murroll wore arObted for the crime and in November, were convicted of the murder and en to need to bo hunted. They managid to escape from the Kdtfefield jail. The public is familiar with the chase iftor thenl. They hid in swamps for lays at a time and eluded arrest for a rood while. Finally a posse captured durrell, but Carpenter tfot away. Nothing more was hoard of him until asl fall when ho was arrested iu Georgia for the crime of murder In that itate. Governor Tillman made a relUlsitlon for him, and after a lot of orrcspondence between the two Gov mors,'Carpenter was surrendered to ho authorities of this Statu and rough back hero. Ho was twain senencod to be handed and the tinal dato ot for tho oxocution was the I ith of His month. After Carpenter escaped Murrell's ttornoys petitioned Governor ltiehrdson for tho commutation of tho son* enooof tho hoy and tho (commutation Mis granted. One of those whosigncd l.e petition against Murrell's pardon vas Governor Tillman, who was then private citi/.on. It is not known now Hiy Governor Kiehardson eommuted ho sentence of Murroll, hut it is sup osod to have boon for the same reams that Governor Tillman spared tho fo of Carpenter- that tho jury was ot in favor of hanging tho two hoys ml, through a misunderstanding of a Latemont of Judg<? Norton, rocomondd them to mercy, thinking the roDiuinondatlon would save their lives, lurroll and C irpentor wore equally uilty. The chief ground for tho ummutation of Carpenter's sentence 'ith Governor Tillman was this rejtnmendation of the jury and the re* unmendatlou of Judge Norton who led tho case. Thero was an enormous hatch of pa* urn connected vvitli the petition for mimutution. These papers Included petition uguinst clemency, signed by undreds of people, together with u etition 'In fuvor of clomenoy also gned by hundreds. .J. Luther Trummell, of Croeonville, us been pardoned hy the Covornor. 1 181)2 Truininell killed Kugono Kobln>n, a waiter in Logon's restaurant in reenvillo. lie was tried in Fohrury, 181)8, the jury failing to agree, [o was tried again in duly of the same ear and convicted of manslaughter, i February of this your the Supreme ourt refused him a now trial, and lie oluntarily surrendered to the punimtiary authorities to serve out the -ntonce of four years which had been nposod on him. The petition for rummcU's pardon was signed hy nine f the jurors, hut Solicitor Ansel rowed to sign it. Judge Norton did ot, make any recommendation. IMeiusant Miller, colored, of Ahbeillo County was convicted of arson ud sentenced to lift* imprisonment, tid Is now pardoned. Thochief ground >r Miller's pardon wus an atlldavit, uly signed hy F. W. Knox, stating iut ho was present at the trial of Mil,> ...i ?... ?i ? < *1 .. vuuu biiu COIIV1001011 WUS POSCd ntiroly upon circumstantial evidence; nit ut tlio trial a measure was introuccd by ouo Sum Adams, u witness ?r tlio Statu, purporting to bo u raeosro of tlio defendant's truck : that tho tuusure was uftorwurds cornpurod ith ijlcjujunt Mlllor's tracks and that 10 inoiiHuro did not lit, but was very mob longer ; that t bo said Sum Adams lereupon cut off about two inches of 10 said measure so as to muko it corispond to what was known to be I'loas:it Miller's track ; that tho measure ins tampered was produced at the ial and sworn to bo the measure of 10 tracks seen around tho burned li'ding. Furthermore that the prosoitor tried to get him (Knock) to testi' that thoy woro Pleasant Miller's ticks, but that lie refused to do so ; iat neither the defendant nor his utirney knew these fact* at tlio trial id that be (Knox) was not called ion to testify for the defendant. ?A gird who deliberately marries ithout understanding the art of cookig is committing a well, the law of to land does not call it a crime, hut ic unwritten law of tho homo certaindoes constitute it a crime. Kspooily is this true of those in moderate rcumstunces, who cannot employ lioiont cooks. Burnt lingers, sour read, scorched roasts, leathery steaks, ishy-washy cotleo and disordered omaches are not conducive to the hapness that one imagines tho honeymoon lOuld be filled with. There are so any reasons, logical and phiiosophiil, wiiy cooking should bo included i tho accomplishments of young girls tut it is useless to enumerate them, ood cooking is the basis of happiness, uiltii and success in the home life, no may thoroughly understand art, usio, architecture, science and . i -- i-~ *? .<iuaw|Miy, no iaiuiuur with astronoy, mythology, tho mysteries of ovoluon, politics and literature, yet if tho lemistry of a loaf of bread has ooon 3glectcd the education is sadly inunpleto, so far as tho " houso moicr " is concerned. ?In a spoeoh at Hay City, Michigan, r. Kckols, tho Comptroller of thoCurincy, said : " I think that tho eouny is entering uj>on an era of prosporiTho advleos we rocoivo from tho trious banks in tho United States nil to confirm this viow, and if anyilng more were needed to prove it to fact alone that none of tho hanks is -duclng its circulation would seem to iow that, they oxj>eot an increase in 10 volume of business, otherwise they ould cut down their circulation in dor to escapo taxation as much as hssiblo. The country is like a very ck man and will recover slowly, but* 10 convalonco will bo none the los* ire and cortain."