The Horry herald. (Conway, S.C.) 1886-1923, September 20, 1894, Image 1
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VOL. IX.
T1IE GREAT FIGHT OF THE YEAR.
THE DISPCXSAItV LAW IN THE
SUPHllMH COURT.
The lVtitioiiH and Ai'KiunciitH of Disi
infills lied Counsel?A Pull and
I "roe Discussion ol* the liuw?An
Kaely Decision is Promised.
The Supremo Court of this State met
on the 1 Htli inst., and heard the arguments
for and agninst the conatitutionality
of the dispensary act of 1S03.
Associate Justleo Kugeno B. Gary appeared
on the bench for tlie tirst time.
Justices Melver and Pofie occupied
their respective poj^/offi-, and there
was a fair audiGncd^u interested spectators
to hoar tho arguments in this
Celebrated and most important case.
When tho J usticcs camo in and tho
court was called to order, Mr. G. W.
Croft of Aiken arose and bCgan roadin^tlie
record of tiic case, including
the decision of Circuit Judge Aklrich,
in the case lie fore tho court, the case
of " tho State ex relatione J . V. George
and G. T. Holley vs Tho City Council
of tho City of* Aiken," involving the
constitutionality of the dispensary law
ofl893. This occupied much time.
Mr. J. P Kennedy ihayan of Charleston
arose then and called attention
to tho Molchers' case, which came up
from Charleston a few days ago. Uo
? proceeded to read the pleadings in the
case. This was tho petition for an in*
junction to restrain Commissioner
fraxler frontpaging any warrants and
the State Tri\.^?or from paying out
any money upoWiuch warrants.
Attorney General Buchanan said
that from his view of Slate's rights, it
had strong objections to this order, but
in order to let tiie case come before the
court on its merits, the State wished
to present the following answer :
The State of South Carolina. In the
Supreme Court. Theodore Melchers
and F. W. Jepson, Complainants,
Petitioners, vs. W. T. C. Bates,
Treasurer of the State of South Carolina,
and I). 11. Traxler, Defendants.
W. '1'. C. Bates and I). H. Traxler,
upon whom lias been served a rule requiring
them to show cause why the
writ of injunction prayed for by the
petitioners herein should not he granted,
respectfully make return to said
rule, anil for causes show :
1. That tho respondent, W. T. C.
Bates, is the dulv elected and niiRlifinil
Treasurer of the State of South Carolina
and the respondent, 1). II. Traxlor,
is Stuto Commissioner duly appointed
ututor the act of the General
Assembly of the said State, entitled
li An aict to prohibit the manufacture
and sale of intoxicating liquors as a
beverage within this State, except as
herein provided" and continue in said
ollieo under the provisions of an act of
the said General Assembly entitled
" An aet to declare the law in reference
to, and further regulate the use, sale,
consumption, transportation and disposition
of alcoholic liquids or liquors
within the State of South Carolina
and to police the same" approved December
22rd, 1803, and now in force in
this State.
2. That the acts of respondents, both
those done and performed, and those
to he done and performed, complained
of and objected to by petitioners herein,
are each and all required of respondents
by the said last mentioned act,
and have been performed and will be
performed by them and each of them,
m the faithful discharge of their sworn
duties, as officers of the State as aforesaid.
3. That they deny the unconstitutionality,
invalidity and nullity of said
acts, in tho particulars specified in the
petition heroin, or in any other particular;
and, on tho contrary, allege
that tho said acts wore passed by the
General Assembly in tho legitimate
exorcise of its constitutional power of
legislation and with the purpose and
in tho sincere desire to minify tho
evils of the sale of liquor within the
borders of this Stato.
4. They deny that petitioners, or
those united with them, have sulTered
injuries or are about to suil'er injuries
from tho o[)Qf? I/ton of tlio said act of
1803: and, '.<oli h/contrary, allege that
the operation of tlio said not has conferred
and will continue to con for groat
benefits upon them, and upon all the
law abiding citizens of the State, in tho
way of rescuing the people, and especially
its youth, from tho corrupting and
demoralizing iniluencos of the liquor
saloon. That petitioners complain its
taxpayers but that, on their own showing,
tlio moneys, tho disbursement of
which they seek to restrain, aro not
tho proceeds of taxation but derived
from tho sale of liquors by the State.
5. The respondents further answering
the rule herein, allego that the
writ of ihjunction prayed for should
not issue for that petitioners allege no
special irreparable injuries to tlioinsolves
beyond thoso suffered by tho
people at largo, nor do they allego in
what respect they have been or aro
likoly ' yfiyJnjured by the operation
of the s^vjf^b.
G. Tho?ospt>pdents further answering
tho rulo herein alleged, that the
writ of injunction prayed for should
not issue for that, they aro officers of
tho State and should not, at tho inetance
of private citizens, bo restrained
in tho discharge of their public and
otlicial duties, on tho alloged ground
of tho unconstitutionality of tho law
requiring their action.
The respondents having made full
roturns to the rulo horoln, pray that
the same may bo discharged with
costs.
O. W. HuciiANAN, Att'y Gon.
IJoyd liuowx, Hospond'tg Att'y.
Mr. iiuchanon Maid u might and
would become necessary to attack the
deeinioii-utf this court in tho case of
McCnVjCofrvs. Grown, and )io would
ask porimasion of the court to attack
that decision.
Tho Chief Justicosaid that tiio court
was perfectly willing to grant such a
requost. It was the rulo to take an order
in such matters, but tho court
wished to hoar everything that could
fro said. If any of the attorneys wish*
/ Od to attack the o rev joys decisions of
this court, ho wftiii'd theni to foe) free
to do so. Tho court wanted tho argument
to go on ad infinitum, so long as
it could hear every point on the constitutionality
discussed.
Mr. Bryan, at this junoturo, roso
and said that Mr. Smith, who wa* associated
with him. wished to niako an
argument, but had boon called to TonM',1
x- ; '- f *' , ;;
1108800, uiul wishoil the permission of
| the court to file a written argument.
! Mr. Bryan asked this permission and
requested tlio Chief Justice to tlx a
time limit for tho filing of this argument.
There was some discussion as to how
much time should lie allowed.
The Chief Justice finally allowed ten
days, but took occasion to say that
there were questions involved in the
Aiken case that were not involved in
tho injunction easo: that in tho latter
it was simply a question of tho constitutionality
of the law. 11 was possible
that the court could within a few daysreach
a conclusion on the first named
ease, and ho wished it understood that
t he privilege granted Mr. Smith wo lid
not intorforo with the decision hi tho
first ease.
Tho Attorney General announced
that they would file their printed
briefs and arguments.
Argument Against the Dispensary.
Mr. G. W. Croft, of Aiken, who represented
tho city council, opened the
argument against the constitutionality
of the dispensary law with a detailed
htatemont of tho ease from Aiken, fie
then argued tho law points invdlvod
in the leading feature of tho easo?tho
question of stare decisis :
Before discussing tho points raised
we shall contend that, the questions involved
in this appeal are not now ;
they have been already repeatedly decided
by this Court, true within a short
poriod?but nevertheless by a number
of decisions?commencing with McCollougb
Vs Brown, followed by Burringer
vs tho city council of Florence and
ox parte Branson, and by the State vs
O'Bontiall. We maintain that the
points now raised are settled, und under
the doctrine of stare decisis should
not be disturbed. The doctrino upon
that subject is thus stuted by New
York Courts: "The decisions of this
Court, while unreversed always form
the absolute law of tho Court, and enter
with very decided efi'eot into the
Douy 01 precedents. Thoy must from
tho vory naturoof tho legal system bo
tho Bumo to tho soionco of law as a
convincing series of experiments is to
any other brunch of inductive philosophy.
They are upon bo in# promulgated
immediately relied upon as to
their character, either as conlirmiug
an old or forming1 a now principle of
action which perhaps is at once applied
to a thousand of cases."
He cited other authorities on this
lino, all the way from Cobloy to the
Ohio Courts, lie insisted that a reading
of the Act of 18i?2 and that of 18!K1
will make it manifest that there is no
diiTerenco whatever between the scope,
design and purpose of the two Acts.
The Act of 1892 provides that the
keeping and sale of spirituous, malt
and vinous liqucrg in the State shall
bo regulated and Conducted oidy as
jiruviuou m saui ivct. it provides for
the appointment of a State commissioner,
State board of control, county
boards of control, county dispensers,
the purchase of the liquors by the
State and its distribution among the
county dispensaries, and the division of
the profits between the State, county
and the municipalities and fixes the
maximum profit. Then it directs tho
manner of making application to purchase
tho liquors and prescribes the
penalties for violating the terms of
the Act. The Act of 1893 shows in its
very title that it is the same schome
as tho Act of 1892, indeed it rests upon
tho Act of 1892, and its apparent object
is to make complete the law already
existing, for it is entitled, ,l An Act to
declare the law in reference to and
further regulate the use, sale, consumption,
transportation and distribution of
alcoholic liquid or liquors within the
State of South Carolina, and to police
tho same," and its terms are in substance
identically tho samo as tho Act
of 1892. Tt provides for tho monopoly
of tho liquor business by tho State, tho
division of tho profits between the
State, county and municipalities, penalties
for tho violation of tho Act. Tho
only practicable difTorcnco between
tho two Acts is that by the? Act of 1892
the State profit was limited not to oxcooil
50 per cent., whilo under tho Act
of 1899 the prollt is unlimited and is
left it seems to tho judgment of tho
Stato board of control. Tho two Acts
being practically tho samo wo contend
that the principles announced in tho
case of McCollough vb Brown et al, apply
with the same force and effect to
the issue now under discussion.
Ho then took up tho relator's exceptions.
lie grouped these undor two
heads :
That a municipal corporation cannot
sot up tho plea that tho Dispensary
Act was in violation of tho Stato and
Federal Constitutions!
This is an amazing proposition. Tho
' verv statement of it is remit/mint.
- T "O """ " W
reason. To say that a corporation or
its officers, who arc attempting to carry
out its ordinances from which it derives
pare of ita revonuo, will not bo
allowed to protect itself by the Constitution
of the State when it* rights are
invaded ia so utterly untenable that it
needs no argument to refute such position.
it must also bo borno in mind that
the city council are not the actors?
hut tho relators como ipto Court with
the Disponsary Act and say that wo
aro county disponsors under this Act,
and that tho city of Aiken has passed
an ordinance which conflicts with this
Act. It cannot be said that tho city is
not interested in having tho Act in
question declared unconstitutional, for
tho ordinance which tho Act comes in
conflict with is a revenue ordinance,
from which tho city derives a great
part of its income. Tho reasoning in
tho opinion of the Circuit Court upon
this point seems to us unanswerable.
gnd. The second and real ground of
appeal by the relators is bccauso tho
Circuit Judge decided tho Dispensary
Act of I8i>3 was in violation of thetttato
Constitution.
The theory of tho relators in support
of their position as to tho constitutionality
of tho Dispensary Act is that
said Act may be sustained upon two
grounds:
1st. That tho legislature has supromo,
ahsoluto and uncontrollable
power to pass a law of any character
whatever, unless such Act is expressly
prohibited tyy tho Constitution. That
thni'n urM t\i% K/.hin.r
.fw. V >* ? t a fa 11 vrt
in^ to the people bthor then thoso
flamed In tho Constitution itflolf.
3nd. That tho dispensary law is
merely tho proper exerciso of tho
police power ovor tho liquor traljic.
Tho lirni proposition is contradictory
CONWAY, S. C
! to tho Constitution itsolf. Tho 1st
I soctIon of Artlolo 1 of that instrumont
i> bivicu inviarauon 01 rights,
clearly meaning that these rights then
belonged to the people and wore then
oxprossod in solemn form. It does not
state that it enumerated all of the
rights of the peoulo, hut the language
is such that it clearly intimates that
, there wore other rights, for It says :
i " All men are born free and equal, oni
dowod by their Creator with certain
' inalienable rights, among which are
the rights of enjoying and defending
i their lives and liberties, of acquiring,
i possessing and protecting property,
and of seeking and obtaining their
, safety and happiness." If there are no
rights of the people except those specially
named in the Constitution itself,
why does that instrument, in speaking
of the rights, use the word "among V"
DoCs not the use of that word clearly
show that the rights of the peoulo then
existed and that the Constitution only
proposed to name a part of those rights.
To leuvo no doubt upon this subject,
the -list section of the sumo article
says: "The enumeration of rights in
thisConslitution shall not bo construed
to impair or deny others retained by
the people, and all power not heroin
delegated remain with the people."
He cited a number of authorities on
this line from various authorities and
Courts. Ho concludes that it is thus
seen upon the highest authority that
the peoplo have other inalienable
rights besides those which have been
expressly declared in the Constitution.
What are those rights V Ho says on
tliin subject that it was nowhere stated
with greater precision than by Chief
Justice iMelvor in the ease of MoCollougli
vs lJrown. Other strong authorities
were given on this lino.
It is next attempted to justify the
Dispensary Act by holding that it is
the exercise of tho polico power over
the whiskey trallle. It is admitted that
tho State may through proper legislation
police the whiskey trallle. and
may go to the extent of prohibiting
tho sale of liquors within tho State but
tho Legislature cannot under tho
guise of exorcising its police power
pass an unconstitutional law.
Ho quoted Cooloy and others on tho
police power and argued that the law
proscribes no rules of good manners or
i.i i. .. t ---' ; - *
..VM.1UU cisu iur r^xiuun^ tae intercourse
of citizen with citizen. l)ut to
the contrary it is u system of trade by
which the liquor trallic is monopolized
by the State, which deli lies bow the
business shall be carried on and a division
of the profits?with fines, penalties
and forfeitures which are directed
not to rogulato the intercourse of citizen
with citizen -but to make secure
the monopoly of the business in the
hands of the State, that the profits
from the trallic might be made larger.
The Act does not prohibit the citizen
from carrying on the liquor trallic because
tho business is unlawful, but its
penalties are declared simply for the
purpose of deterring others from engaging
in a legal trade which the
State desires to monopolize. That the
sale of liquor is a legitimate subject of
commerce. See Chiof Justice Mclver's
opinion in tho case of McCollough vs
llrown ot al, page 401), and the ease
cited.
lie dealt with the monopoly question
at some length and said among
other points:
Tho police power can only bo resorted
to for tho government and control
of the people of tho State, and cannot
with any propriety bo appealed to for
the purpose of controlling the action
of the State itself, and as. tho State
can nnlv m>\ 1 *
?j ..w ...ivu^u iks jtui/uwri/.uti 01ficers
or agents tho police power cannot
be resorted to for the purpose of
controlling such oillcers and agents, If
for no other rouson, because it is wholly
unnecessary, as the State has ample
means of controlling its own oUieials
without resorting to the undefined,
and therefore clangorous power known
as the " police power."
We find elsewhere that the Supreme
Court of othor States in passing upon
similar statutes as tho Dispensary Act
have declared suoh Acts invasion of
tho inalienable rights of the citizen,
and therefore void. In tho case of
Herman vs the Stato, 8 Ind. 545, tho
Supreme Court in passing upon the
constitutionality of an Act of tho legislature
of Indiana, which provided
that tho trade and business of manufacturing
whiskey, ale, porter and
boor, then carried on in that Stato,
should cease except any person might
manufacture the same and sell to the
Govornmout, if tho Government should
conoludo to buy of such person, but
not otherwiso.
On this line ho spoko for ten minutos
at least. After going ovor the other
main points in tho argument he took
up tho exceptions of tho respondents
and first discussed tho writ of prohibition.
VIOLATES THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The claim that tho Dispensary Act
Violates Section 8 of Artielo 1, of tho
Constitution of tho United StateH he
argued on familiar grounds, and said
that the Dispensary Act violates said
amendmont of the Constitution of the
United States, in that Section 21 authorizes
searches of hotels, either in
day or night time, without a warrant:
Section 22 prohibits any suit for
damages for soizuro and detention of
any liquors under tho Act, thus shielding
an officer for making soizuro that
might turn out illegal.
Section 24 allows all places to bo
searched upon a warrant oithor in the
day or night tlmo, thus permitting a
citizen's residence to bo searched at
any unreasonable hour.
Section 21) permits the soizuro of tho
citizen's property in tho hands of a
COinmon carrier Jind t.n dnt.riin i? ?/! ?..
out warrant on suspicion merely for
twenty-four hours.
Soction 18 shields the ofllcor from all
suits for dainago to persons or property
in tho disohargoof any duty under the
Act, thus placing tho ofllcor alxjvo tho
law, andoncouraglng unlawful seizures
and searches and giving froo lioonso
for tho oppression of the cltiscn.
Tho argument wfpj closed with a re*
view of the Kodoral Issues and tho
right of the city to license.
Mr. Croft in his extemporaneous argument
forcibly said that tho practical
language of tho Legislature was
that profit was to bo mado out of tho
dispensary law. In an Act It was declared
that tho profits from tho dispensary
should go to pay tho debt of
Clarondon County. Thoro could bo no
doubt as fo the idea of tho act. Thoro
is no contoption tht}j, tho iypt of }893 is
THURSDAY, SEPTi
, ditto rent from that of 1892. Tho only
, dilToreneo is in tlio dates. Tho only
possible reason for another decision
i was tho change of tho Court,
i At the conclusion of Mr. Croft's ur,
gumont Chief Justice Molvor said that
i he supposed that tho real object of the
i case was to determine tho constitu,
tionality of the Act of 18IKJ. He said
: that there was a well defined principle
of law. which was not generally known,
i that a State Court (when a case indii
roetly bringing up aquestion involving'
tho validity of an not passed by the
State Legislature ? a co-ordinate
hrauoh of tho State Clovornineut?was
presented) should evade deciding the
i validity of the law, deciding the case
on any minor point, that would servo
the purpose of giving a decision. This
wassaiu not to indicate any decision or
' opinion, but to call attention to two
points in Mr. Croft's argument which
i wore not connected with the constitutionality
of the law.
Mr. Croft will probably withdraw
tho two points. Mr. Croft's argument
was considered very able'by all who
heard it.
C'ol. It. \V. Itoyd for the State.
Col. K. W. Boyd, who was connected
with the oriiriiinl wnu >,?.vi
from. Ho contined himself more than
Col. Croft to his printocl argument.
The ohiof point of his argument, aside
from tho linos previously argued, was
on tho question of stare decisis and on
tliis lie was cspooially elaborate.
He began the argument by claim-1
ing that the Dispensary Aet of 18b.'I is I
not an amendment of the Dispensary j
Aet of 1892. It is a distinct Act and
repeals the former Act. Murdoch vs.
City of Memphis, 20 Wall, ;*>20. It 's,
however, in its principle, purpose and
provisions, so identical with tho Act
of 1892, that if McCullough ot al vs.
Drown et al, supra, and tho cases that
allirm it are sound, and should bo sustained,
then tho Court must hold that
the Act of 1893 violates tho provisions
of the State Consititution and is null
and void. Tho State authorities are
not satisfied with those decisions,
question their soundness and, in this
appeal, seek to have the Court, for their
satisfaction and tho satisfaction of the
people, after a careful reconsideration,
declare whether it is prepared to
sustain them and establish in tin; jurisprudence
of the State the constitutional
doctrines therein announced.
1 have the most sincere and admiring
respect f?.r the ability, learning, cool
judgment and integrity of the distinguished
jurists \ ho united in the
opinion in McCullough vs. Drown, and
I would not be here taking rm.r?. in t.Mw
appeal if I did not honestly boliove
that in that 0080, with the most
earnest desire to bo right, they erred
and gave their approval to a new and
unallowable ground for the restriction
of legislative onaetments by the judiciary
which, if sustained, must seriously
hinder In the future the prosperity
and happiness of tho people of the State.
it is always a serious matter to seek
to have overruled tho decision of a
court of last resort, it is obviously to
the interest of the people that us little
of uncertainly as possible should be
attached to the law, and the doctrine
of stare decisis, when properly understood
und limited, has for its support
sound and cogent considerations of
right reason. Tho rule is founded on
a rational presumption in favor of the
correctness of a carefully considered
judgment, by competent judges, and
tho desire to avoid uncertainty in the
law. but is imperative only in cases of
reasonable doubt, and in which it is a
matter of comparative indilTorence
which view of the law is taken, and in
eases in which, owing to long action
by the people upon the law as declared,
the reversal of tho decision would betoo
injurious to bo compensated by a
correction of the error.
The mission of a Supremo Court is
to declare correct law and not to perpetrate.
error, and it will not do to permit
the rule of stare decisis to preserve
an error harmful to the pooplo
in its operations. In Pratt vs Hrowa,
II Wis, 632, tho Court said : " It is
true that when a principle of law,
doubtful in its character or uncertain
in tho subject matter of its application,
has been settled by a series of
judicial decisions and acquioBCod in
for a considerable time, ami important
rights and interests have hoenmi
established under such decision, courts
will hesitate long before tltey will attempt
to overturn tlio result so long
established. So when it is apparently
indifferent which of two or more rules
is adopted, one of which shall have
boon udopted by judicial sanction, it
will be adhered to, though it may not,
at the moment, appear to bo the preferable
rule. Hut when a question
arises involving important private or
public rights, extending through all
coming time, has been passed upon, on
asinglo occasion, and which decision
can in no just sense be said to have
been acquiesced in, it is not only the
right but the duty of the Court, when
properly ealled upon, to ro-exainine
the questions involved, and again subject
them to judicial scrutiny. We are
by no moans unmindful of tho salutary
tendency of tho rule stare decisis, but
at tho same time we cannot but be
mindful of tho lessons furnished by our
own consciousness, as woll as by judicial
history, of tho liability to error,
and tho advantages of review. We
thoroforo enter upon tho discussion of
the questions involved in this ease,
not for the purpose of again reopening
tho subjoot matter thereof to criticism
or investigation, but for tho purpose
of discharging our full duty in tho
r* ' ? "'vu.
Whatever tho forco of the rule whoro
contracts and proporty titles are concerned,
there is strong authority for
saying that it has hut little application
to decisions involving abstract constitutional
questions. In Willis vs.
Oweq, 43 Texas 41, tho court said ;
" Tho questions to l?e considered in
those oases have no application whatever
to tho titlo or transfer of proporty
or to matters of contract. They involve
the construction and interpretation
of tho organio law and presont for
consideration tho structure of tho
government, tho llmitators upon legislative
and oxooutivo power, as safegards
against tyranny and Oppression.
Certainly it cannot ho seriously Insisted
that questions of this character can ho
disposed of by tho dootrino of sturo
decisis."
Ilo citos a great many authorities on
this question, and concludes that If,
therefore, McCullough vs. Brown is
wrong in principle, tho rulo of stare
decisis should not prevent its being
WMPr ' '' . . V-'
: MB till 20, 1894
overruled. In the consideration of 11
previous decision it is always a fortunate
circumstance when, as in this
ease, the previous decision lias heon
recently promulgated ami sulllelout
time has notelap. ed for it to beoonio a
rule of notion, it is likewise a fortunate
circumstance when, as in this
case, tno personnel of the court has
been so changed as to guarantee to the
people a reconsideration uncontrolled
by the unconseious bias arising from a
deliberate opinion publicly expressed.
Col. I toyd took up the grounds upon
which the court In that ease found
that the Dispensary Act of ISPll was
violative of Suctions 1 and 1-4 of Article
1 of the State Constitution, and so unconstitutional,
null and void, with the
exception of it prohibition of the granting
of spirituous license for the sale
of liquors after Juno, IStt.'l. lie urged
that the question as to the right of
the State to ongago in a trade or business
for the purpose of the gain has
boon determined adversely to the right
in Mauldin vs. City Council, .'13 S. C., I.
where it was hold that thoeity council
could own and run an electric light
plant for the purpose of lighting the
streets and public buildings, but that it
Could not sell the light to individuals,
the court saying: "As we understand it,
all the powers give to thoeity government
were for tin? sole, exclusive purpose
of government, and not to outer
into private business of an\ kind outI
sidi of the scope of the city government."
I fully appreciate the force of all
this, and of the high intellectual
ability, learning and logical power
with which it is presented and supported
; hut 1 believe that it rests upon a
theory of the provinces of tlio Sea to
Legislature, and of thoState Judiciary
which, while having support iu some
ease from courts deserving high
respect, and from dicta of eminent
judges, is not iu accordance with the
great current of judicial authority iu
those United States, and is a distinct
departure from what, throughout our
jiiuiciiu History, Willi low ami very
doubtful exceptions, lias boon regardod
in effect that the State Government,
like the National Government, as one
of enumerated powers; that not all
legislative power, with the except ion
of such limitations, express or clearly
implied, to he found in the constitutions,
National anil State, is possessed
by the Legislature, but that, outside of
these limitations, the people have reserved
to themselves legislative power.
Thatithere are limitations of legislative
power, outside of Constitutional
limitations, derived from the nature
of civil government. That the judiciary
has the right ami the power to regard
and enforce these last named restriction,
ami to declare an Act of the
Legislature in contlict with them null
and void. That in judging of the constitutionality
of enactments of the
Legislature it is not confined to the
question of the power of the Legislature,
but can enter the domain of its
discretion in the use of means and pass
upon the necessity and propriety of
means for the accomplishment of ends
confessedly within its power. That in
the case of a police purpose within the
legislative power, where the Leglsla
turw iuis cuuctcu a measure having
substantial relation to the accomplishment
of that purpose and clearly likely
to accomplish-it, and where the Legislature
has solemnly declared the measure
enacted for the accomplishmontof
that puposo, the judiciary can, with
propriety, declare that the measure
was not passed for that purpose, hut
for one entirely dilTcront.
Now 1 insist that the settled doctrine
in this State and in the United States,
as to these matters, has been hitherto
as follows : 4* It is to he borne in mind
that there is a broad diH'erence between
the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitutions of the
States as regards the power which may
he exercised under them. The Government
of the United States is one of enumerated
powers; the Governments of
the States are possessed of all the general
powers of legislation. When a
law of Congress is assailed as void and
null we look in the National Constitution
to see if the grant of special
powers is broad enough to embrace it;
hut when a State law is attacked on
the same ground it is presumably valid
in any case, and this presumption is a
conclusive ono, unless in the Constitution
of the United States 01 of the
State we are able to discover that it is
prohibited. We look in the Constitution
of the United States for grants of
legislative power, hut in the Constitution
of the State to ascertain if any
limitations have been imposed unon
the complete power with which the
legislative department of the State
was vested in its creation. Congress
can pass no laws except such as the
Constitution authorizes, either expressly
or by clear implication; while the
State Legislature has jurisdiction of
all subjects which is not prohibited.
The law making power of the State, it
is said in one case, recognizes no restraints,
and is bound by none, except
such as are imposed by the Constitution.
That instrument has boon aptly
termed a legislative Act by the people
themsolvos in their sovereign capacity,
and is therefore the paramount law.
Its object is not to grant legislative
powers, hut to "confine and restrain it.
Without the constitutional limitations
the powor to make laws would Ihj absolute.
. mm ? ? ? Lightning
Stasistics.?A Register
reporter usked the weather observer
in Columbia if the government keeps
any record of the destruction of life
and property by lightning. lit! said:
"The weather bureau gathers statistics
from all available sources of the
damage done bv liffhtninor and
the report of Alex McAdio, who ha?
the mutter in charge, it Ih learned that
in tho United States, during May,
1894, 45 persons wore killed by lightning
; 84 persona were struck and severely
injured ; 12 barns woro sot on
firo, with an estimated loss of $35,000:
37 dwellings, 4 churches and 1 school
houso were struck and damaged to a
groater or less extent; 58 horses and
22 cows wore killed.
" During Juno, 1894, 90 persons woro
killed and 102 severely injured ; 09
barns were struck, with an estimated
lo of $49.000! 40horiM. 310 ??"<i
15 sheep wore killed; NO dwelling
wore btruck and mere or U;?h damaged:
23 ohurchos, 1 railroad do|M>t, 1 oil
tank, 1 grain elevator and 0 mill* and
factories wcro btruck, tho dainago in
the cauo of the eight last named being
not leva than $237,500."
THE VERDIOT 01' A VETERAN.
\VM. 11. MOUKISON o.\ Till'. NliW
TAIIIIT LAW.
A Kar Itclicr AltNiNiiru Than the Mills
Hill li Will Hoi|? Iho People ami 111? I
Democrath' l'ariy. i
William li. Morrison, the famous 1
tar I IT reform leadei of past'Congresses. I
has Injcn interviewed on the now tar ill I
law. In viow of Colonel Morrison's <
record on the tariff, his views uro of <
value, and will ho road with Interest. I
"After so much discussion," said!
Colonel Morrison, " I could not expect It
to add anything of interest to what lias j'
been said on the subject. The hill : t
does not give tis all that was promised, I
or that our people expected, but it is so i
much bettor than anything we have '
had in many years, and is such an ad- >
vanco towards what we hoped for, that I
! am very glad we have obtained so ?
much. A horizontal cut of 2T? per 1
cent, would mako the new law much 'I
more satisfactory, and some of its ?
schedules Imdlv nnnil >m,?h ? .,<! n.?4!<? ?
lint, with a, Democratic majority ho t
slight that a defection of two votes ^
turns the scale against us, and with ?
many more than two ' Democratic pro- I
tcctionists' in the body, we could hard- ti
ly expect a much better Dill to go ^
through tlie Senate. A measure at <|
once satisfactory and complete cannot (
bo driven through sueli a body l?y any c
amount of good reasoning or scolding. '
I had several years' experience in a '
Democratic house, made up as the Sen- 1
ate is now. it. may bo a better law s
could have been passed if the question t
of tarilT taxation had becu kept at the
front when wo came into power. Then n
the question was red-hot." a
" Will the bill passed be, for want of t
a longer free list, lower rates, or for v
any reason, considered an abandonment t
of the principles of tariff reform?" v
'' No. How could that be? The a
rates are lower than in the Mills hill v
...i.i..i. ..? I-.I.... it.. .
n iiuru wn? IIHIIMSeU l|V U1C ll.'lUOMUl I
Iloinocratic convention in INKS. In the |>
matter of free raw materials t^m hill hi
is far in advance of any hill passed in li
our histoiy by amy party. It puts lain- n
her, wool, copper, salt, and many other a
articles on the free list, which many si
years ago I tried, but failed to do. It e
cuts the tax of coal, iron and lead ore c<
in two, and makes reductions in all N
the schedules. l?'or illustration: On g
iron and steel in alt forms for building, t'<
on iron and steel rails and on pig iron, w
one-third the tax is taken oil'. On c<
woolen goods under the old law the cm
tar ill was from (50 to 100 per cent.?an ti
average tax of about $100 on $100 worth
of imported goods. Under the now |>
bill the rate is from to f>0?an aver- et
age tax of about $lf> for importing $100 a
worth. The reductions in other sched- h
ules arc not so large, but they are eon- p
siderable in all. si
''The number of articles on the free
list could bo increased with great ad- h
vantage. Kxcopt in time of war all of li
our tariffs have left many articles un- s<
taxed. Our earliest tariff legislation U
gave some recognition to the principle a
by drawback (refunding duties paid on II
imported urticles, used in making other y
articles for export.) free raw matter li
also become more and more necessary C
each succeeding year. Our manufuc- vi
taring capacity in many industries is t<
already far in advance of the wants of si
our people. We must, have foroign ii
markets to avoid enforced iuloness. T
We cannot have foroign markets where ol
we meet competitors selling goods fi
made of untaxed materials while wo m
tax such materials. All the general
bills presented to Congress in recent v
years by myself, and I think by others, . a
proposed additions to the free list, hut ui
the free raw material doctrine was fi
first fully recognized and became a d
pronounced principle of tariff reform tl
about tifteon years ago,'during the Con- l?
gressional service of Hon. Abrain S. ei
tlewitt, who was its foremost and tl
ablest champion." d
" How will t.llrl IK. u/ I.ittr ..IV. . > '
... wt..j ><v/ t? i?%r? aii\;i;b kju | iv
Democratic party ?" | u
" More wiih promised and oxpuctod ; in
than I* provided for in the new bill, w
and Homo disappointment follows, but tl
I think this will be only temporary, ui
What has been gained will be boned- tl
eial to the country first and after- tl
wards to the party. The income tax rt
will be popular with those who do not ai
pay it, and unpopular with those who tl
do. It will eventually drop out ti
or bo extended to all who have in- tl
comes. When, in 1H7<?, I was advocat- hi
ing my first turifT bill in Congress, I ei
said : 1 Burdens of government should f>
be borne in proportion to ability to bear tr
them. Property should pay the taxes, tl
lie who has much should pay much; tc
be who has little should pay little; ai
and he who has none, none.' There u]
are a great many people in this country
to-day who believe in what I then
said. ' w
"The sugar tax is unpopular. View- 11]
ed from it partisan standpoint, it was tl
shrewd In the Republican party to tl
empty the treasury and turn over fis- |y
Oftl utTuirs to the Democratic adminis- ,j|
t.ration in a condition which made a C1
tax on sugar necessary to prevent ado- ej
flciency and meet the obligations of },,
the government. The House did not w
?i I*
p/uiioiu miu UXlSbCU, 111141 TO*
sistcd tho laying on of thin tux. Evon p]
tho Senate hesitated?some of it? mombers
opposing uny tax on sugar, others n,
preferring the MeKlnluy law with CJi
l>oth protection and bounty. There in
could scarcely bo any question as to ti
this necessity after tho letter of tho (;,
secretary of the treasury, advising the j1(
Senate that a tax on sugar was neces- <j
sary to prevent deliolencies, and the tn
letter of the President, advising mem- p|
hers of tho House thut a tax on sugar m
is in accord with tho Democratic plat- t,i
form and Democratic principles, and c}
that a tax on coal and iron ore is un- n(
democratic and not necessary, thus G(
confirming tho treasury statement that td
rovonuo from sugar is indispensable.
"A portion of tho Democratic press
would make it appear that the I'rcsidont
was with tho House for free sugar.
Tills is not only hurtful to tho .
party, but it is untrue. Tho lotters of ,
the President and Secretary of tho ^
Treasury show that tho adininlstratlon
favors a revenue tax on sugar as a , |
moasure of wise economy and good t)
democracy."
?The strike of tho Scotch minors is tl
over. The delegates to tho Minors' w
Congress representing 57,000 men have 01
voted to ro.sumo work at tho old wages, p<
providing tho omployors will grant si
tho proposal made by tho board of con- tl
ciliation to that offoot. si
J A? NO
t
I'AUDONS AM) COMMt'TATIONH.
l.ovcriior Tillman HcImTwo ('imviiis
I'rct- ami Commutes lh? Hcntciico
ol' Anoi hop.
For the punt live yours, William Carpenter
has boon known to the world
is the " famous FdgoHe Id desperado."
I lis crime, escape and capture arc
'amlliar to the public, ami It was ex)cctod
that ho would hanir on hist Frilay,
but t he death sentence has boon
onnnuted by Govornor Tillman to
Ife imprisonment in the penitentiary.
There has net been a more noted
use in the criminal history of South
'arolina in years than that of Carponit
and Murroll. It was in 1880 that
'ronton Yonco was shot down in tho
oad, his body bol n?r tilled with bulels.
Carpenter and Murroll wore arObted
for the crime and in November,
were convicted of the murder and
en to need to bo hunted. They managid
to escape from the Kdtfefield jail.
The public is familiar with the chase
iftor thenl. They hid in swamps for
lays at a time and eluded arrest for a
rood while. Finally a posse captured
durrell, but Carpenter tfot away.
Nothing more was hoard of him until
asl fall when ho was arrested iu Georgia
for the crime of murder In that
itate. Governor Tillman made a relUlsitlon
for him, and after a lot of
orrcspondence between the two Gov
mors,'Carpenter was surrendered to
ho authorities of this Statu and
rough back hero. Ho was twain senencod
to be handed and the tinal dato
ot for tho oxocution was the I ith of
His month.
After Carpenter escaped Murrell's
ttornoys petitioned Governor ltiehrdson
for tho commutation of tho son*
enooof tho hoy and tho (commutation
Mis granted. One of those whosigncd
l.e petition against Murrell's pardon
vas Governor Tillman, who was then
private citi/.on. It is not known now
Hiy Governor Kiehardson eommuted
ho sentence of Murroll, hut it is sup
osod to have boon for the same reams
that Governor Tillman spared tho
fo of Carpenter- that tho jury was
ot in favor of hanging tho two hoys
ml, through a misunderstanding of a
Latemont of Judg<? Norton, rocomondd
them to mercy, thinking the roDiuinondatlon
would save their lives,
lurroll and C irpentor wore equally
uilty. The chief ground for tho
ummutation of Carpenter's sentence
'ith Governor Tillman was this rejtnmendation
of the jury and the re*
unmendatlou of Judge Norton who
led tho case.
Thero was an enormous hatch of pa*
urn connected vvitli the petition for
mimutution. These papers Included
petition uguinst clemency, signed by
undreds of people, together with u
etition 'In fuvor of clomenoy also
gned by hundreds.
.J. Luther Trummell, of Croeonville,
us been pardoned hy the Covornor.
1 181)2 Truininell killed Kugono Kobln>n,
a waiter in Logon's restaurant in
reenvillo. lie was tried in Fohrury,
181)8, the jury failing to agree,
[o was tried again in duly of the same
ear and convicted of manslaughter,
i February of this your the Supreme
ourt refused him a now trial, and lie
oluntarily surrendered to the punimtiary
authorities to serve out the
-ntonce of four years which had been
nposod on him. The petition for
rummcU's pardon was signed hy nine
f the jurors, hut Solicitor Ansel rowed
to sign it. Judge Norton did
ot, make any recommendation.
IMeiusant Miller, colored, of Ahbeillo
County was convicted of arson
ud sentenced to lift* imprisonment,
tid Is now pardoned. Thochief ground
>r Miller's pardon wus an atlldavit,
uly signed hy F. W. Knox, stating
iut ho was present at the trial of Mil,>
...i ?... ?i ? < *1
.. vuuu biiu COIIV1001011 WUS POSCd
ntiroly upon circumstantial evidence;
nit ut tlio trial a measure was introuccd
by ouo Sum Adams, u witness
?r tlio Statu, purporting to bo u raeosro
of tlio defendant's truck : that tho
tuusure was uftorwurds cornpurod
ith ijlcjujunt Mlllor's tracks and that
10 inoiiHuro did not lit, but was very
mob longer ; that t bo said Sum Adams
lereupon cut off about two inches of
10 said measure so as to muko it corispond
to what was known to be I'loas:it
Miller's track ; that tho measure
ins tampered was produced at the
ial and sworn to bo the measure of
10 tracks seen around tho burned
li'ding. Furthermore that the prosoitor
tried to get him (Knock) to testi'
that thoy woro Pleasant Miller's
ticks, but that lie refused to do so ;
iat neither the defendant nor his utirney
knew these fact* at tlio trial
id that be (Knox) was not called
ion to testify for the defendant.
?A gird who deliberately marries
ithout understanding the art of cookig
is committing a well, the law of
to land does not call it a crime, hut
ic unwritten law of tho homo certaindoes
constitute it a crime. Kspooily
is this true of those in moderate
rcumstunces, who cannot employ
lioiont cooks. Burnt lingers, sour
read, scorched roasts, leathery steaks,
ishy-washy cotleo and disordered
omaches are not conducive to the hapness
that one imagines tho honeymoon
lOuld be filled with. There are so
any reasons, logical and phiiosophiil,
wiiy cooking should bo included
i tho accomplishments of young girls
tut it is useless to enumerate them,
ood cooking is the basis of happiness,
uiltii and success in the home life,
no may thoroughly understand art,
usio, architecture, science and
. i -- i-~ *?
.<iuaw|Miy, no iaiuiuur with astronoy,
mythology, tho mysteries of ovoluon,
politics and literature, yet if tho
lemistry of a loaf of bread has ooon
3glectcd the education is sadly inunpleto,
so far as tho " houso moicr
" is concerned.
?In a spoeoh at Hay City, Michigan,
r. Kckols, tho Comptroller of thoCurincy,
said : " I think that tho eouny
is entering uj>on an era of prosporiTho
advleos we rocoivo from tho
trious banks in tho United States
nil to confirm this viow, and if anyilng
more were needed to prove it
to fact alone that none of tho hanks is
-duclng its circulation would seem to
iow that, they oxj>eot an increase in
10 volume of business, otherwise they
ould cut down their circulation in
dor to escapo taxation as much as
hssiblo. The country is like a very
ck man and will recover slowly, but*
10 convalonco will bo none the los*
ire and cortain."