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* . ‘ OIKNANY’S POSITION ^ T* jDESHYNSUHi STATESMAN AN- ^ SWEKS AlilEI KEPLT MAKE SOME COMPAKISONS Wvrmm tjffuimi uf IMr imrUiHMtt <sf <JftUM Oi*<» <>mi mi iut^rrUnr Uy WAt«L«mi— Muvnul* l>w«IJb H*A£immo 0 Mm* tad Or»iii A0 • Wv*m TL* berujdLB impt—BtO* #f tiAt *i* MKiU'i foyly tg tL« yfvpuMkU •f U*« <>elr«LJ poiM»f» vim rvfivcivtf 1 B.mC*r 1L ft •U.lftLUVUt iu«4ft Co ttft •vibiH/fflclaJ OvftrftMM Nvvft If^ury By Jjr ii tt-LL. ujJlll, w Lo noUi fixft Ul/o of tJUft yoiu was <Urvotor of tJU^ iVtftliJfftuOft CftOft-rttuftL'M of tkft a*ftx iorttlgh offic* TAiift •ommexit va# cot os Ui# offlvAa.1 Utft of tC« iLuleule • fvyly, ft# tLuj Lftjr ou^y CJUft fft<*<VO fttfpyiivd Aty U*9 A4* IAC. M ft-yinf a uvv KAniM bund. M Ay Co MmU KftCAn— Aft tft U>« fra# ftftlftCftnor of «ba8 aauofui. Dr. Hanmutoc ftfti<3 **Thlft idva, too, lift# foucd ft vary * tracer tfi ufttratioo d urine the war Only a (of v-ovAl* «iap»o<] s1do« a Shadier JPttgHftb luimnUrr termod tbft ouiftfortuiM of tb« Kojumaiiittitft piainiy a ‘geoftft Uluudor • ; t^y tliift ‘Oiuiidrr ft •vboW ofttioc ha# drftfte^d iotit ft groat ftar by all ftortc of dark suaebinations ’ And tiion iook at Oreor^ Therr tbr bnlriit* has oor.upiod thr ^orta. /ajJroad*. «-abi!t and liOHtft) atfttiona and tho mLvit districts ot 'thft coun- try, all again** the law of naUons Tt.ore the Entente has simply taboo via* K needed and by bioebade and hiUiger has foroed the Greeks to aur^ render those things the An ient* vae udhbie to take " Aft to JHritiaL bropooel. “What about the reproach .that trermany >c the decialv* veek ^ of iaiJy de<:llged the J-irmsh irroposft] of a confereoee and tb us made var unavoidableT ># To this Dr Haisinsnn sepUed “The proposal for a conference vae made July 26 by Grey The meaninc of it vae that the delegates of France, Jialy and ^iermany should ^ja»et vith' Grey in conferenee and try to find a vay out of a difficult aituallon. 1 The first condition inak- ing the holder of suet a conference possible should have been that the iiiiftin>n rubliiin rtarlare its- THt WAR IASI YEAR w S ^ / >. •. *' • • 1917 SEES ALUEB PtMKESS SAYS flHiTAKY EXPEH GERMAN LOSSES HEAVY hev Tori Writer IWievee Allies Have Dues Fever bokbere mmd A* Mvery btreofle of the pat into thlft effort. Bat tb* battle of the Harae wm the deatb of fii ww hopes for a weatcra victory, the batUft of Vardas vas the inter ment . Defeat was comp lot* And in every eenee, moral. poliUeal. in me&‘ and material. It vas but littie •hort of dlftftftirous •v It is AlffAcnlt to fig ere net profit and lues of Verdun Data are in- ___ under armtTio um, itaoriot. u** of Mrritorr, U»* b*Un«* *• ■ uu against the Teutonic Allies • In addition to these veil defined batUes and campaign#, there bate been numerous engage 11 ** 01 *' * D botu France and Russia of much less im porUnce; but, because- they have been practically unceasing, fb* wtai additions to the casualty lists of both belligerents have been considerable compiote and eatimatea be baaed - „ , ^ only on past performance We can belligerents,have beon considerable^ jf the knteute rep y t^Freafcfl see a poaiiiee result in territory I The figure of ftiO.OOO for both sldea n^llm^n s note ia.Jb to meet his pro- whkrb ahanged hands *Thia “ 1 -« Mt^aara.k^i r«r «.n e^iv occaiiioii fnr \r about ^16 square miles As to loss of men by the Germans and French, the former loss vas certainly much greater. Solid reasoning is behind this assumption. , German artillery vas not so effec- •W All l*>ovt bave^ n re *t French As a matter of fact, the French artillery has proved itself in the latter days of tne war far su perior The preparation vas not thorough, as vas shown by the fre quency sritb vbicb German Infantry attacks were throve back after. the artillery preparation vak conBidered complete The inevitable result vas severe loss in men. Considering the length of the bat tle and the character of the fighting. R is not exaggeration to place the Agettcyv - Fan*/- Aaa hsaa rr^ ee»ved In lierlio Iji ilaminoun, vho collaborated in the inupo/tant work of the foreign offh* las* montii, said that consid •laUou by (jtnuunMy and her aJhws of s poa<ye of ter Cs’ed bat;k aa far a« October A< mat time the Intention wa« euterts)ne<J 0/ making an hon ats,i aiid *ln<*ie aitempt to prevent further useless bloodshed lieing asked as to li ft genftfal Impress.on ei os ted by the Knteole /cpiy, he said ]f J am to expieM an opinion in a few woids, it is tills instead of taking piM e aiound a pea* * table, me kntentes deliberations took place on s Judges chair Appaient ly the hn’enne forgot nothing Ibat could pobfcibly influent* nestmls ftgttinut uft “TL* point of the accusation, however, to which tbe largest »pa<>e U allotted In thft kntente note is ‘the martyrdom of ilftlgium' one must speak beforehand regarding 'neutral jsnd loyal Relgism' and this iielgiuin had aeafted to eiiat long be fere tbe war. “1 do not want V) apeak about thft doryineiits which we found In Hriift ••Is and which have been published. They can be read by averybody 1 enly wlub to •lugie out ou« point which up to now baa not bean auffl elwitly considered -the report made by Hsron Grelndl, Jialgium mlulatar at flerllu, dated Jiecember 32, Jill Knteutft's PUft. “Tblft clear sighted statesman then explained forcibly that already at that time the Kntenle was In spited by nothing but the one thought of encircling Germany from the north. A a proof of this H&ron Giejndl quoted th# outcry In I'arla and London a shart time before when the Hutch plan to fortify Flushing had hecosuft knows Heron AfftlndJ then said: “ ‘Thft reaiH/n why .they wished (hal tha ttchaldt remain vltheut d* fans# vas not concealed Jn this they admitted their psrpose to be able to transport an JCngllab garri son to Antwerp without hindrance, thus creatine In Belgium a basis for operations in the direction ef the Duvet Rhine sed Westphalia/ PlftA (itangMl. “Heron Gielndl reported that the plan was then changed In auch a Biaaner (bat tha kngluih auilllary army was not to he landed on the Belgian coast, hut In the adjointug French ports This same plan of aip ■nglish landing In order to threalen lie/many was equally hinted at §s Imminent by Ltiid Itot/eils during tha last Moroccan dials “In such circumstances II biosI aerlainly would have been an easy thing for Belgium, after the German quasiioii In 19 14 (whether Belgium would permit the passage of German troops) to take bar arialea hark tu Ant warp and then 1st the Get mans, eitde/ protaat, ataish through tha sou u try /1luw little aasii aetloa would bavs violated the spirit of existing sondittons may be emleratoud If one recalls the sw rat clauses of tha irae lies lit INTI In then, eertaln agine ■imita from former tlisea ware main tallied which reservs as wall to Kng land as to Germany, tha right to ot eepy a Belgian fortrese'. In I IN / a gieal Lngllsli newai/aper if I am not inlklakr.it, It las Tha Htandard still derleied that smployinapl on the pail nf tin many of the right of way jh/owgh hrlglmu could not be taken ms in vlolalloa of Belglau.nea train v 'V ‘ . . l*i'lM4'l|ial of Nlmcti nlity. At llti.i [munt I hu tiit,ei Vlewer said “In addition to thin Ihn question ef the principle of neutrality plays a laig«t part In lh«^ «»nnw«i of the Kli trnln What IittpoHailca. nuilt iia at t/lhuted to I It Im principle In tha present situ«tion Iq hts lepiy 1 »ti vw tor Haiumauu Sinphttat/.ed every wold tte ftatd “Ni» nalloti/' tlerlared Herr Ham iltann, “is heller tilde to uudei st/tinl the pituclple than the Hannan, for no tiimd civilised nattoii has suffer ed no mu* h, liaa heuu forced to atruggle h/» greatly hecause of being supp/eanetl and dlainembei mi by nel^hholing nu'o*, “liitiually no titugle great nation hns lean to h *r troiu tha application of thin piin t,de of nutloiiallttea than the tieiinun Gernmny would ahao lutely ooiibt*mt f thU principle of na Uohullt imt wi/ei'urrted out Hi Fg>pt, imlla, Mnrtno, Intland. by the coun try In power not to apeak of Bus , ala n net loioti ties. Itrut vlly IVaatad. “Oennauy tma been brutally tieat ad for centuries by her nolghbori, despite thiH piiuctple of natlonalt- YTen Vet in I‘>Nti exuot-ly fifty years ago, Hiut la, tu Hie Nikoluburg i»ea«e (closing the war between Bniasta and Austria) js clause was Inserted upon ttie demand of Napoleon 111, wYtlcb left open for the Houthern German Matey jha ooRcltfaton of a aa pa rat a sonfedaraUoa. v Tha lead tttt- r-r* d tor.»r rwSSrfSoto coDMsf toatioLiS with the AustroTTungaMan amhaaeador lu 8t. . Fet^raburg < Ft;t/rograd^ ; aa having been tinder the most favorable aoeplces. “The fellowing day Grey agreed to the German proposal that direct underetanding between Vienna and bt. I'l-tertburg would result In quick er and better acjLioji. Tbua Grey on July 2t5 telegraphed to Got'en (British ambafetador at BeiyJip) r— **'But as long a» there is a pr/>s- pect of a direct exchange of v:ews between Auetr/a ahd Russia J should suspend- every other suggestion, a$ I entirely agree that it is the most prefe/ahle metT/od -of all/ Read Uae Klue Roolt. can only adv<ae every one to There has never been a period of the var when it baa appeared more iniereeuug or more prolitabie to lake atock, as it vere, of the various ‘bel ligerents than now Germany is at tb* -height of her power and accom- piikbmeDt* She has reached out and taken eJI that la within the pot> albility of conqueet. She Lad fail ures during the year, but * rowued its close with a brilliant success Oh tnis basis she "has sent out a peace call, enlisting In the support of this effort practically all neutral vers. There Is a cexiftdn eiieerrniee :ior peace, a certain Jieru&ftjaixMAt* 1 cobfeT- ence leading to a peace discus*.on that is. apt to make neutral power*; suspicious as to whether all is as well 1th Germany as her victories would indicate From-a German viewpoint, therefore, a study of present condi- uons a* compared with those of a year ago may prove interesting. German lonees at between 600,000 and 7 00,0(/0 men _ French Iob#** on this basis vere between 4 00,00b and 600,000 men * This leaves a balance against the Germains of 200,000 men, and In their favor of 110-. square xnilea gf useleaa-ierrttoyT r^ffensTeea at Verdun, delivered in the last days of 1916, Increased the percentage against the Germans, taking from them every point on the ecet hank of the Meuae possessing any military value, and inflicting casualties num bering at Meast Tb,000 more men, while themselves suffering almost Inrxmsiderable Josses Tike aval event of importance was would probably not be an eiar;-''’'* tion. There is also the JiusaJau cam palm In the Far Fast. *r*lu the Turkish positions in the GvucasuETV gion and in Northern Mesopotamia This campaign has produced some individual instances of great bril liancy and promise Nothing, is known in detail as to the resulting casual ties. although the territory occupied by the Russians has been consider able in *botb theatres. Considering only tbe casualty lists of the year, then, we may make up a comparative table aomewhatvtt#'follows: German Verdun operations . . French Verdun operations , < Julian opera tions Russian opera tions ... v .1,700,001 Somme battle . . 600,009 Roumanian cam Ifnlerite. 476.900 16.090 190.900 1,000,000 900,000 ;"fff^ro9^TtrYYr^ Misceialneous*. / 200,000 ^ 200,000 ToUls The Allies, during the last year*" bavft had no strikingly brilliant the ^iwerUn a#^ Germany cannot afford to yip —Rj-Tthhe ' aTTre-ntlno, foliow<rd by the; Italian counter offensive and, later, by the offensive in the Carso region, by which they occupied Goriria and gained a foothold oh* the Carto Pia- toau. These combined opern-tions cost the Austrians at least 300,000 men, the Italians probably at least as many. But tha ~ Italia**,- In titwfr coujaxer move In Trentino, took back almost all ground they Lad lost ap'ihe re sult of the Austrian effaj%* andr~nr addition, gained valuahle territory on the isonzo fronts Here, again, .the- balancer artirbrujttF' fllglitT is against the Central powers. _ Wldle Gie JjLAtiian campaign was at ;auae mast ba found a eoaaidftrabift ^ bring victory to the Fntente without-* i** height, tUb Jiim^ians, under Bruni- ciaim to a year s success ’ 'I bey Jaave rather plugged their way, not brip liantly, but with consistent effort, tending to wear down the Germans rather than to defeat them. But they have given nO sign of discouragement, no indkation that they ere in the .slightest degree doubtful of the outcome, although “1 . . | , rftad tha ICngilffr LUi^ b^.} realizing tTIgr before the eud* *pmea wants to be Informed about ‘hese they will probably suffer defeats in matters But to my mind It seems to bft altogether wrong to look for tha real cause* of the war lu the events during the last weeks of July, subsidiary field*. American crlttcis, when Koumania entered the war, foresaw a speedy defeat for the Central jrojrers They J9J4, Then, perhaps, the last iirr-'Thad“bi>en confident ihst the vtupen- pulaft for war wa« given, but the real I dous re*osr«>?ft would eventually /loyed lltar^ irpaaft time back. “Am** U/ft Asglo French treaty of 1904 a complete literatsre had sprung up In France, In which open ly and U/udly the conquest of AI eas e !»rra]ne was. dlscuased and everything said in order to suggest B> the French the Idea of Germany's Inferiority The . Futente’s note points out that at the laat peace con ference Germany treated the proposi tion to disarm with distrust. Hut Germany knew then pertinently that the proposition was mainly directed against her eilfttence. JUisftls's PH^psrathm. “Rusftla, after th* economic regu lation that followed the war with Japan, had worked with Increasing zeal for th# prepareduaas of her army. When Germany employed the surplus of her youth for mtllta. service Franc*, la order to su ue, Ifitrodijcftd a three y*ar service, thus sapping her eepllal of fllal na tional fercee. / “Jill fuohtha before the beginning of the war the French military ip* eiallsts published opealy, discussions regarding the rSeftona. for hiIIlone end billions, of French money streaming Into Russia and the condi tions under which France had loan ed this fnoney France had asked in return for her loans tha eonatruc- HojEkof strategical rallroada in Rua- aia “In this lllerstura It was explain ed. with all tha circumstance#,.that not Warsaw but Grodno- and Kovno would be the has# tot Kusalaa de ployinent because from there the Briissien Briny corps in Koeuigsherg and Allensteln could most’quick ly he relied up end tt/ua the road to Rerlln could he opened. “In August, 1914, the attempt was made at leant to make things go thle way And to day they want to persuade the nations of the world (bid Germany prepared herself, not for protection against an aggressive coalition bat lu ordar to-annihilate Franc*. t'<*aiqu«ftC ef HonatsuiUftople “The same poople who premleed to liusela the conquest and posses alou of Constantinople dare to assert that Germany has aggressive Inleu Hone, of couTee Hie coneueet of Conetantluople, which was an nounced by Trepoff (ihe Uusalau (rremler) le the Duma, IS passed lu silence lu Ike Knlmile note, Just as they, In a discussion -of diplomatic evanta In July, 1914, elegantly slid over the declaive event -that brusque lutarvuiiGon in all atteiuiits at medietlon by the Bunaian iiioblll sal Ion, which -was even rapeatediy dtsauadad by the kiixlisk ambossa dor at Ht Reterelurg*' “Ho yoe think that under theae circumstances the moral liidlgnAUou In tha tone ,of the hluteuta note Is stnreie/' was asked. “Moah certainly 1 do/' replied director Hammutm. “1 am of tho on me opinion as (ieinard Hkmw and cdKsblor the sincerity of this moral UidittHatiou s» a new instance of the pn»vl»teim.il harmopy between the interests and moral ami political Ideas of ICligieiul. We know tills moral indlgiiAU^hv from history. “When the Prussians and Aus trtaus marched into Huhleswtg Hol- stetn, tn order to assist Their coun trymen and fight on the siuiaof the Hchteewtg Holstein irredenlst^vfor the hulependnitce K of the Gerubui rare, then lA/rd I'/ilmeriTon an l.i/rd Hhaftabury In the lower and upper houses manifested the same moral indignation They also Im mediately found tha sama sincere words as 'outrage/ ‘violence, ‘most cowardly/ and ‘trlghtful atrocities/ < hklwanl Grey's Indignation. “Hlnc/ya was air Kdward Grey’s tndtgnanou whan on July 29. Iff4, ha reeelvatl from the German chan tailor nta sucgeatloil tbit Germany. If BniUeh neutrality ware guaran- Roumanla, but becauea of the excel lent strategical position of Kou- maula, once she entered the war, its speedy dose w&s regarded at aRhost certain', liui Jhmjtianla has been de fda/Uvl, and they now deciai’e t)*at G Entente «an not win, Uusl Use ptfwl Usey con U«#pe to do is to Unr war into a draws And yet *we Wud tbe AlKee acorn- Ing tbe Genian peocF propoenle, elating clearly/and unmistakably that peace under tf/e prurient conditions is impossible, end threatening, in the •vent of peaca/io impose upon Ger many. termeywhich only a victorious outcome tbe war could warrant. To bxrgin this inventory of ^ the yearkfighting It Is necessary to men- llop briefly what each eide has done, ^dd at what cost The latter we can only estimate On the whole, how ever, It Is believed that the estimates are conservative and will bear invest tlgatlon on the baals of sound rea soning. The year 1916 closed with the bal ance sheet strongly agalnct the Allies. The Gallipoli venture had just been abandoned, Serbia had just been conquered, while the Allies had stood by and looked on without the power, apparently, to make an offen sive move In any direction/ i All laurels went to the Central powers It was generally under stood, was widely advertised by tbe Allied press, that a gigantic offense woe being planned that would begin as soon as conditions of grounds in tbe spring would permit. Bat G*r- maay sel/Avl time by the forelock and, Iwvfore Ui* Allioe could tire an opening gua» hfok the inlLUtUve and launched a terrifying and <i«vaa- UMLing atUu k at Vervlun. A great stock of Germany’s best teed, would enter into an obligation not to aspire to territorial extension at France’s cost. At that time also Grey declared this proposal as mo#t shameful." “And the reproaches that the Ger man peace offer contained nothing tangible/' was suggested. The tangible point," said Itr. Ilsmrnann, “was that Germany de clared her readiness te communicate her peace conditions in conference with her adveruarlea. Th* Kntente lias declined this proponal. To ui# It* Heoms ,evhh*nt that the Kntente, when doing this, felt seriously con cerned and greatly depressed on ac count of the Irnpresslqn this refusal of the Gorman peace offer must make on the neutral World. “Thl* Is clearly indicated by the tone of the Entente note It is a< tly as If the NntehtVi were in a tain HeiiH# *fraid 'f.o- listen Id the cimdltion* of the t’entral powers. Are those men who gave to the En tente note its particular tone, per haps afraid that thone conditions of the Central powers are . much too sennHile and moderajte for th/on be fore their natidim, who long for j/eace, to undertake the reHpoiisibil- Ity of dmliniug these individual con tfitlonsT, “At all events our adverHarlos would’ have acted more .frankly M they had flatly and plainly said: 'We will wait hecause we still hope that we need not negotiate, but can dictate the terms of peace/ In order to avoid thin awkward avowal th*/ Kntente now taken the attitude of the Judge of the world! “Hut all that the Kntente obtains by this proceeding is that itn guilt fi/r the continuation of the war un- Htakahly In the eyes of the whole woVld 1*' not- 7 dlniintoihoU but in cream hat will the Central poyvers reply to Muanote?" was asked. * Hr. Hammnwji answered/ .“I am no moreen offRqrkJ do not kfit/w the offfclijLl peace planN But I do know what every German, what every uiti- xen in the countrTfis allied wltYi us feel# at thla hour, however -to such overhearing Utiguage there need be so dlsouaelon." N. loff, striuk against U/c Austrians in \ oiJjyniM N<Aiiing like Uiia blow bad bc*-n witmessed up to this time xe caustom front. Tho AuRtrlans mpled up under It completely, and the Germans, from the poTthern part of the line, were compelled to hurry south to their beleaguered ally. Jn a very short time, compara tively, the Russians had captured the enormous total of 480,000 prisoners, bad reconquered almost all of Vol- hynla, had taken all of, Bukowlna, and had advanced their line in Gali cia many miles until they were at the gates of Lemberg. Tbe fighting spread up a'ong the Stokbod, in fact up as far as Bartin- ovltcbl north of the Plnsk marshes, but gradually died -out. J^ocses on both sides were terrific.. In this and subsequent operations the Kuesians inuah baye^ lotrt » mttltOli finen But the. Central powers again suffered more heavily. * The capture of so many prisoners indicates a loss of at least a million and a half, to which must be added the German loss In ’ the * fighting along the Htokhod, which would add another 200,000 to the total. The Austrian loss in territory was also very great and has almost .counter balanced in square miles the Rou manian territory occupied by the Dormans, Austrians, and Bulgarians. The fl^hUng on the Somme, which began on July J, waft the great and only material effort of G»e t western Alliev during the year. Here, ’ y all odds, was the best example shown of the possibilities of modern urtlljery. The German artiljery lire at Verdun was not comparable to it In volume, accuracy, or In that co-ordination between artillery and Infantry which enable* the offense to minimize its own losses while inflicting the maxi mum loss on the defense, i In the first days of the offedse, the Alllee* losses were undoubtedly greater than those of the Germans. As the attack proceeded, however, two things IxM’ftine noticeable. The firs^ wom the fact that the number of prlmmere captured in each attack grew larger, ami the ftocond wom that, while In the Anti day* the advance was meoMnn*] in yards, later it was measured in mileft. This kIiowb cer tainly a decline In the effectiveness of tbs German defense and a loss of morale. The Intensity of the Allies' artil lery preparation was maintained throughout and, as the Germans went back, their field works afford ed less protection. The disparity in losses consequently decreased and the balance shifted to the other side. ho that when the last blows were de livered Gorman losses were greater than those of the Allies. This la shown by the number of prisoners captured and by the relation, estab lished by a study of the German cas ualty lists of the flrsUtwo years of the war, between the number of prisoners and tho total casualties. In tho Somme fighting alone, ex cluding the isolated actions about Verdun, the German losses in prison ers. were .7T>,000 men, making the total casualty lists about 650,000 men. German authorities claim that the Allied losses were about t>50,000 v This Is a conservative estimate of the losses of the battle of the Somme and, If it errs at all, does so in favor of tha Germans. The gain in terri tory was not largo, only about 125 square miles. But it lias all been held. - > Finally, we come to the Rouman ian campaign. The entrance of the Roumanian army addfcd considerably to tho available resources of the Allies. Tills addition has, however, been decreased not a little by the Roumanian defeats. It it probable that tbit venture b«s eost the Roumanlana at least 250*- ooo men. It la also probable that the Central power* have not achieved their eucceae with a loee »f fjwer . *3,625,000 2,890,000 — J ', ". V % •The balance is thus fteen tu be de cidedly against tbe Ontral powers. Rut this discrepancy 5 even greater than the figures make It appear. The relative losses, comparing the losses to lotaj jeaources la man power, are actually much greater than those WILSON PUNS NEW Aim TO BELLKQDENT NATIONS jf Reply ot tb* AI Baft le I’afai Frew Id e* l Will Klacidate Pi tiuii in &cuad Note. pgsai for an early occasion for an avowal ot terms, tbe president will got fol tba-iiegotiatioa* drop but will cachange man tor man, or apything like it • ’ ' > As to territory occupied,.consider ing only/ihe Kuropean theatres, the situaGdn is about a standoff. The efforts of Germany have been*much f^re spectacular and much more widely advertire.d. It La not Belgium, Serbia, or Rott- mania, however, that will exert the great influence. In the military Bf d* tlement of the war. These afe pure ly Incidental and must be looked upon as" subsidiary fields. Tbe Ger- jnaana- la Roumama-.—for example, have used at the outside 200,000 of their own troops for this purpose. Is it possible that such an insignL fleant nuipber~of- men as 'his can bring a decision which up to the present time over twenty time# that number have been unable to effec ? Brit logical that the Central powers can attain victory with only 5 ppr,, cent, of their forces? It 7has* been considered probable from the moment that the Germans fixed the west as the scene of their greatest activity the* if decision came, it must come on tbe western front. But a golden opportunity opened In the east to cut Germany off from her Moslem ally, break the alliance, and defeat the constituent parts in detail. This was the meaning of the Roumanian thrust . This thriiMt was skilfully parried and the situation was restored to its previous condition with the exception, of course, that Germany wm freed OtThe danger of anything further threatening from Roumanian Hourcr*. - This made it inevitable that the war must be decided, If at all, on tbe western front. If the Germans are defeated In the west, the eastern sit uation will be solved. The Teutonic alliance will fall like a house of cards. The present map of Eastern Europe, were It to be the guiding element In a discussion of the pres ent situatioiC-would show Germany the complete^ victor^. \But the map Is. after all, a poor guide In such a case as this. : . , Space does not permit a detailed analysis of conditions and probabili ties on each of the various fronts. An opportunity for this may, per haps, be afforded In subsequent arti cles. But there are conditions af fecting other than the element of numbers to which I have just re ferred. ■ There Is, first, the general eco nomic condition. The Allies are much make at least one more move. /If another communication is sent 4 , position of the president as it is felt that as a result of comment abroad and )n the Lulled blates and in the* debate in the ftenate more or less contusion bos arisen as to just what he intended. , ITetfident Wilson’s chief hope in the ultimate success of the negotia tions Is known t* lie in his sugges tion that a means be >ound tor main taining peace in the future. If an agreement on that point can be reached the president is sold to feel It would constitute the “guarantee fur the future," demanded by the ▲ Bley. It was fenerally indicated tbav the president has no present in tention of asking Col. E. M.. House te go to Europe qn a peace mlssipn. The president has never publicly indicated w.4Ungn*«* to act mmwsh f^r exi±*n^W~T&mri&' crelly between the belligerents, and it is known thftt he would prefer that it be done publicly, American diplo mats and other sources of Confiden tial information have been looking into that point. The negotiations will be of a highly confidential char acter, it is said. President Wilson’s friends say he Is unconcerned over efforts to~ con nect his .note .wiili -llifi. German peace proposals. Feeling that his sole ob ject in sending the note was to learn just where each side stands, he is known to believe tkat in the en< Allies as well as tbe Central pj realize that his move was not ed against either. _ PREMIERS ¥ SESSION better off In this respect. Exactly.! .'“TVi “,'- lr ‘.' k KJU . In,? .watfuila what the food situation Js In Ger- °f strategy and o« . many we do not know. We do know that there has been more or less trouble from this sources." It may be much graver than most of us think. First,, it* must be agreed that Ger many and the Allies are destroying as absolutely as by emptying in mid ocean available assets of the nations. The destruction is complete. There Is no salvage. There is plenty of money in Germany, it is said; there must be, since Germany is living on herself. She is In the position of & bear which, during the period of hi bernation, lives on its own fat. To draw a more exact parallel, let us suppose an Island cut off from all the rest of the world, -in that island there is, say, 11,000 in money, what ever the medium of exchange may be, and the same amount of wealth in^other forms. Suppose that of this money $100 bfe -expended for an equal amount of another form of wealth, and that,this be destroyed. It cann<H be replaced, of course, because, being isolated* there is no one with whom to barter, ^here still remains $1,000 in money, but only $900 of wealth in other forms. Continue this process . and the amount of money existing will be many times the value of the things to be bought. If, while this is ioing^on, laboy he employed at a fixed rate of pay per day, the time will soon come when the day’s wage will buy nothing. This is somewhat the situation which existed in the South during the lat ter days of the civil war when the purchasing power of Confederate 4 money fell to the point where many thousand , dollars were required to buy a pair of boots. This is the con dition which. Germany is facing and its effect on tRe masrf of the civilian population may readily be imagined. There are certain kinds of proper ty which have totally, or almost totally, disappeared from Germany since the war began* and this .proper ty 14 absolutely necessary for the continuation of the existing situa tion. Among these may be mention- Allied StatCNiuen Hold Very Impor- ' - ‘ ’ 0 # 'V Lant Conference at-Rome. » / . The conference of the Entente statesmen, including Premiers Lloyd- George, Briand,*and Boselli, was In almost continual session Saturday, according to a Havas dispatch from Rome. Premier Boselli presided at the meeting^ w hich was the first of a number at which tY^e general situa tion will be discussed by representa tives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia. In honor of the event the Italian government declared the day a holiday. .g> Just how bad the situation is we do ^ not know, but there is a serious shortage of these necessities. ,The next element in. the existing situation is the relative shell pro- • duction of the Central Empires as compared with that of the Entente. The situation a year ago is well known. Germany’s superiority then is recognized. But tha-AUies have turned their , entire manufacturing energies toward war materials. - England is producting at a rate that is almost inconceivable.* The neutral markets of the world are shipping enormous quantiles to the Continent. Japan has’ been turned into a mighty arsenal, manufactur ing entirely for Russia. The result has been shown in re cent fighting, when the Germans in th© west were entirely unable • to, match the artillery fire of the Allies, either in the number, of guns used, the volume of metal thrown, or the effectiveness of the individual shell. The German artillery fire at Verdun was, as 1 have stated, far inferior to that of the Allies on the Somme. The German artillery fire on the Somme was inferior to that at Ver dun. . <>u the whole, then, there has berii' a steady decline in the Teutonic fighting paraphernalia during and an equally Htcady rise of the Allies. The Entente, aftj war in the west settled down! trenches, has been working theory of attrition.. EgL-. , Ik; . - _ > than 160,000 m*B. Hut at least ed cotton, rubber, copper, and tat*, reasonable r j , * •. • • • ’ • * ^ ^ ! * . v * ! v . . * «» • : . 1 \\ | — > military genius. At'the same time, when sufficient resources are behind such a plan, the result is inevitable If the war lasts long enough. It is- simply a'question of arithmetic to tell which side must win eventually. There, is, finally, the question of the quality of the men left to do the ' fighting. Kitchener’s first hundred thousand have long since passed. From them have sprung the 5,000,- 000 men whom England now has un der arms. These were an unknown quantity until the battle of the Somme. There they received their baptism of fire and we have seen the result. . . Once he knows the game, there is no. better fighting man in Europe than the British Tommy. And he knows the game now/ lie has learn ed it on the battlefield, the‘only place that can. give the necessary ed ucation. Although the great major ity of these men are in reserve sta tions, a great proportion of them took pdrt in the battle of the Somme at some ,time~or otherr" The Germafis, on the other hand, have but few men in reserve stations. Demands on them have been such that have had to keep practically all of their men in the field. These men have had their faith in victory shaken, their courage to some degree sapped. Look at the two French thrusts at Verdun and note the shortness of the attacks and the number of prisoners taken. A year before such a thing would have been impossible. The Germans ' would never have surrendered in such num bers and so rapidly. The quality of the German trocp* Is rapidly deteriorating. They lost confidence' In the impregi of their defense system. The] seen, the British and French fTtma grind into powder their carefully constructed <jft$enses just as their own guns did the defenses of Lieg* and Namur. Will they man these trenches then with the same spirit of confidmc* which marked their conduct a year ago? Possibly, but It does z»t seem r