The Barnwell people. (Barnwell, S.C.) 1884-1925, January 11, 1917, Image 2
* . ‘
OIKNANY’S POSITION
^ T*
jDESHYNSUHi STATESMAN AN-
^ SWEKS AlilEI KEPLT
MAKE SOME COMPAKISONS
Wvrmm tjffuimi uf IMr
imrUiHMtt <sf <JftUM Oi*<»
<>mi mi iut^rrUnr Uy WAt«L«mi—
Muvnul* l>w«IJb H*A£immo 0 Mm*
tad Or»iii A0 • Wv*m
TL* berujdLB impt—BtO* #f tiAt *i*
MKiU'i foyly tg tL« yfvpuMkU
•f U*« <>elr«LJ poiM»f» vim rvfivcivtf
1 B.mC*r 1L ft •U.lftLUVUt iu«4ft Co ttft
•vibiH/fflclaJ OvftrftMM Nvvft If^ury
By Jjr ii tt-LL. ujJlll, w Lo noUi fixft
Ul/o of tJUft yoiu was <Urvotor of tJU^
iVtftliJfftuOft CftOft-rttuftL'M of tkft
a*ftx iorttlgh offic* TAiift •ommexit
va# cot os Ui# offlvAa.1 Utft of
tC« iLuleule • fvyly, ft# tLuj Lftjr ou^y
CJUft fft<*<VO fttfpyiivd Aty U*9 A4*
IAC. M
ft-yinf a uvv KAniM bund. M
Ay Co MmU KftCAn—
Aft tft U>« fra# ftftlftCftnor of «ba8
aauofui. Dr. Hanmutoc ftfti<3
**Thlft idva, too, lift# foucd ft vary
* tracer tfi ufttratioo d urine the war
Only a (of v-ovAl* «iap»o<] s1do«
a Shadier JPttgHftb luimnUrr termod
tbft ouiftfortuiM of tb« Kojumaiiittitft
piainiy a ‘geoftft Uluudor • ; t^y tliift
‘Oiuiidrr ft •vboW ofttioc ha#
drftfte^d iotit ft groat ftar by all ftortc
of dark suaebinations
’ And tiion iook at Oreor^ Therr
tbr bnlriit* has oor.upiod thr ^orta.
/ajJroad*. «-abi!t and liOHtft) atfttiona
and tho mLvit districts ot 'thft coun-
try, all again** the law of naUons
Tt.ore the Entente has simply taboo
via* K needed and by bioebade and
hiUiger has foroed the Greeks to aur^
render those things the An
ient* vae udhbie to take "
Aft to JHritiaL bropooel.
“What about the reproach .that
trermany >c the decialv* veek ^ of
iaiJy de<:llged the J-irmsh
irroposft] of a confereoee and tb us
made var unavoidableT >#
To this Dr Haisinsnn sepUed
“The proposal for a conference
vae made July 26 by Grey The
meaninc of it vae that the delegates
of France, Jialy and ^iermany should
^ja»et vith' Grey in conferenee and
try to find a vay out of a difficult
aituallon. 1 The first condition inak-
ing the holder of suet a conference
possible should have been that the
iiiiftin>n rubliiin rtarlare its-
THt WAR IASI YEAR
w S ^ /
>. •. *' • •
1917 SEES ALUEB PtMKESS
SAYS flHiTAKY EXPEH
GERMAN LOSSES HEAVY
hev Tori
Writer IWievee
Allies Have Dues Fever bokbere
mmd A* Mvery btreofle of the
pat into thlft effort. Bat tb*
battle of the Harae wm the deatb of
fii ww hopes for a weatcra victory,
the batUft of Vardas vas the inter
ment . Defeat was comp lot* And
in every eenee, moral. poliUeal. in
me&‘ and material. It vas but littie
•hort of dlftftftirous
•v It is AlffAcnlt to fig ere net profit
and lues of Verdun Data are in-
___ under
armtTio um, itaoriot. u**
of Mrritorr, U»* b*Un«* *• ■ uu
against the Teutonic Allies •
In addition to these veil defined
batUes and campaign#, there bate
been numerous engage 11 ** 01 *' * D botu
France and Russia of much less im
porUnce; but, because- they have
been practically unceasing, fb* wtai
additions to the casualty lists of both
belligerents have been considerable
compiote and eatimatea be baaed - „ , ^
only on past performance We can belligerents,have beon considerable^ jf the knteute rep y t^Freafcfl
see a poaiiiee result in territory I The figure of ftiO.OOO for both sldea n^llm^n s note ia.Jb to meet his pro-
whkrb ahanged hands *Thia “ 1 -« Mt^aara.k^i r«r «.n e^iv occaiiioii fnr
\r
about ^16 square miles As to loss
of men by the Germans and French,
the former loss vas certainly much
greater. Solid reasoning is behind
this assumption. ,
German artillery vas not so effec-
•W All l*>ovt bave^ n re *t French As a matter of fact,
the French artillery has proved itself
in the latter days of tne war far su
perior The preparation vas not
thorough, as vas shown by the fre
quency sritb vbicb German Infantry
attacks were throve back after. the
artillery preparation vak conBidered
complete The inevitable result vas
severe loss in men.
Considering the length of the bat
tle and the character of the fighting.
R is not exaggeration to place the
Agettcyv - Fan*/- Aaa hsaa rr^
ee»ved In lierlio
Iji ilaminoun, vho collaborated
in the inupo/tant work of the foreign
offh* las* montii, said that consid
•laUou by (jtnuunMy and her aJhws
of s poa<ye of ter Cs’ed bat;k aa far a«
October A< mat time the Intention
wa« euterts)ne<J 0/ making an hon
ats,i aiid *ln<*ie aitempt to prevent
further useless bloodshed lieing
asked as to li ft genftfal Impress.on
ei os ted by the Knteole /cpiy, he
said
]f J am to expieM an opinion in
a few woids, it is tills instead of
taking piM e aiound a pea* * table,
me kntentes deliberations took
place on s Judges chair Appaient
ly the hn’enne forgot nothing Ibat
could pobfcibly influent* nestmls
ftgttinut uft
“TL* point of the accusation,
however, to which tbe largest »pa<>e
U allotted In thft kntente note is
‘the martyrdom of ilftlgium' one
must speak beforehand regarding
'neutral jsnd loyal Relgism' and this
iielgiuin had aeafted to eiiat long be
fere tbe war.
“1 do not want V) apeak about thft
doryineiits which we found In Hriift
••Is and which have been published.
They can be read by averybody 1
enly wlub to •lugie out ou« point
which up to now baa not bean auffl
elwitly considered -the report made
by Hsron Grelndl, Jialgium mlulatar
at flerllu, dated Jiecember 32, Jill
Knteutft's PUft.
“Tblft clear sighted statesman
then explained forcibly that already
at that time the Kntenle was In
spited by nothing but the one
thought of encircling Germany from
the north. A a proof of this H&ron
Giejndl quoted th# outcry In I'arla
and London a shart time before
when the Hutch plan to fortify
Flushing had hecosuft knows Heron
AfftlndJ then said:
“ ‘Thft reaiH/n why .they wished
(hal tha ttchaldt remain vltheut d*
fans# vas not concealed Jn this
they admitted their psrpose to be
able to transport an JCngllab garri
son to Antwerp without hindrance,
thus creatine In Belgium a basis for
operations in the direction ef the
Duvet Rhine sed Westphalia/
PlftA (itangMl.
“Heron Gielndl reported that the
plan was then changed In auch a
Biaaner (bat tha kngluih auilllary
army was not to he landed on the
Belgian coast, hut In the adjointug
French ports This same plan of aip
■nglish landing In order to threalen
lie/many was equally hinted at §s
Imminent by Ltiid Itot/eils during
tha last Moroccan dials
“In such circumstances II biosI
aerlainly would have been an easy
thing for Belgium, after the German
quasiioii In 19 14 (whether Belgium
would permit the passage of German
troops) to take bar arialea hark tu
Ant warp and then 1st the Get mans,
eitde/ protaat, ataish through tha
sou u try
/1luw little aasii aetloa would
bavs violated the spirit of existing
sondittons may be emleratoud If one
recalls the sw rat clauses of tha irae
lies lit INTI In then, eertaln agine
■imita from former tlisea ware main
tallied which reservs as wall to Kng
land as to Germany, tha right to ot
eepy a Belgian fortrese'. In I IN / a
gieal Lngllsli newai/aper if I am
not inlklakr.it, It las Tha Htandard
still derleied that smployinapl on
the pail nf tin many of the right of
way jh/owgh hrlglmu could not be
taken ms in vlolalloa of Belglau.nea
train v 'V ‘ . .
l*i'lM4'l|ial of Nlmcti nlity.
At llti.i [munt I hu tiit,ei Vlewer said
“In addition to thin Ihn question
ef the principle of neutrality plays a
laig«t part In lh«^ «»nnw«i of the Kli
trnln What IittpoHailca. nuilt iia at
t/lhuted to I It Im principle In tha
present situ«tion
Iq hts lepiy 1 »ti vw tor Haiumauu
Sinphttat/.ed every wold tte ftatd
“Ni» nalloti/' tlerlared Herr Ham
iltann, “is heller tilde to uudei st/tinl
the pituclple than the Hannan, for
no tiimd civilised nattoii has suffer
ed no mu* h, liaa heuu forced to
atruggle h/» greatly hecause of being
supp/eanetl and dlainembei mi by
nel^hholing nu'o*,
“liitiually no titugle great nation
hns lean to h *r troiu tha application
of thin piin t,de of nutloiiallttea than
the tieiinun Gernmny would ahao
lutely ooiibt*mt f thU principle of na
Uohullt imt wi/ei'urrted out Hi Fg>pt,
imlla, Mnrtno, Intland. by the coun
try In power not to apeak of Bus
, ala n net loioti ties.
Itrut vlly IVaatad.
“Oennauy tma been brutally tieat
ad for centuries by her nolghbori,
despite thiH piiuctple of natlonalt-
YTen Vet in I‘>Nti exuot-ly fifty years
ago, Hiut la, tu Hie Nikoluburg i»ea«e
(closing the war between Bniasta
and Austria) js clause was Inserted
upon ttie demand of Napoleon 111,
wYtlcb left open for the Houthern
German Matey jha ooRcltfaton of a
aa pa rat a sonfedaraUoa. v Tha lead
tttt-
r-r* d tor.»r rwSSrfSoto coDMsf
toatioLiS with the AustroTTungaMan
amhaaeador lu 8t. . Fet^raburg
< Ft;t/rograd^ ; aa having been tinder
the most favorable aoeplces.
“The fellowing day Grey agreed
to the German proposal that direct
underetanding between Vienna and
bt. I'l-tertburg would result In quick
er and better acjLioji. Tbua Grey on
July 2t5 telegraphed to Got'en
(British ambafetador at BeiyJip) r—
**'But as long a» there is a pr/>s-
pect of a direct exchange of v:ews
between Auetr/a ahd Russia J should
suspend- every other suggestion, a$ I
entirely agree that it is the most
prefe/ahle metT/od -of all/
Read Uae Klue Roolt.
can only adv<ae every one to
There has never been a period of
the var when it baa appeared more
iniereeuug or more prolitabie to lake
atock, as it vere, of the various ‘bel
ligerents than now Germany is at
tb* -height of her power and accom-
piikbmeDt* She has reached out
and taken eJI that la within the pot>
albility of conqueet. She Lad fail
ures during the year, but * rowued its
close with a brilliant success
Oh tnis basis she "has sent out a
peace call, enlisting In the support of
this effort practically all neutral
vers. There Is a cexiftdn eiieerrniee
:ior peace, a certain Jieru&ftjaixMAt* 1
cobfeT-
ence leading to a peace discus*.on
that is. apt to make neutral power*;
suspicious as to whether all is as well
1th Germany as her victories would
indicate From-a German viewpoint,
therefore, a study of present condi-
uons a* compared with those of a
year ago may prove interesting.
German lonees at between 600,000
and 7 00,0(/0 men _ French Iob#** on
this basis vere between 4 00,00b and
600,000 men * This leaves a balance
against the Germains of 200,000 men,
and In their favor of 110-. square
xnilea gf useleaa-ierrttoyT
r^ffensTeea
at Verdun, delivered in the last days
of 1916, Increased the percentage
against the Germans, taking from
them every point on the ecet hank of
the Meuae possessing any military
value, and inflicting casualties num
bering at Meast Tb,000 more men,
while themselves suffering almost
Inrxmsiderable Josses
Tike aval event of importance was
would probably not be an eiar;-''’'*
tion. There is also the JiusaJau cam
palm In the Far Fast. *r*lu the
Turkish positions in the GvucasuETV
gion and in Northern Mesopotamia
This campaign has produced some
individual instances of great bril
liancy and promise Nothing, is known
in detail as to the resulting casual
ties. although the territory occupied
by the Russians has been consider
able in *botb theatres. Considering
only tbe casualty lists of the year,
then, we may make up a comparative
table aomewhatvtt#'follows:
German Verdun
operations . .
French Verdun
operations , <
Julian opera
tions
Russian opera
tions ... v .1,700,001
Somme battle . . 600,009
Roumanian cam
Ifnlerite.
476.900
16.090
190.900
1,000,000
900,000
;"fff^ro9^TtrYYr^
Misceialneous*. / 200,000 ^ 200,000
ToUls
The Allies, during the last year*"
bavft had no strikingly brilliant the ^iwerUn a#^ Germany cannot afford to
yip —Rj-Tthhe ' aTTre-ntlno, foliow<rd by the; Italian
counter offensive and, later, by the
offensive in the Carso region, by
which they occupied Goriria and
gained a foothold oh* the Carto Pia-
toau. These combined opern-tions
cost the Austrians at least 300,000
men, the Italians probably at least as
many.
But tha ~ Italia**,- In titwfr coujaxer
move In Trentino, took back almost
all ground they Lad lost ap'ihe re
sult of the Austrian effaj%* andr~nr
addition, gained valuahle territory
on the isonzo fronts Here, again,
.the- balancer artirbrujttF' fllglitT is
against the Central powers.
_ Wldle Gie JjLAtiian campaign was at
;auae mast ba found a eoaaidftrabift ^ bring victory to the Fntente without-* i** height, tUb Jiim^ians, under Bruni-
ciaim to a year s success ’ 'I bey Jaave
rather plugged their way, not brip
liantly, but with consistent effort,
tending to wear down the Germans
rather than to defeat them.
But they have given nO sign of
discouragement, no indkation that
they ere in the .slightest degree
doubtful of the outcome, although
“1 . . | ,
rftad tha ICngilffr LUi^ b^.} realizing tTIgr before the eud* *pmea
wants to be Informed about ‘hese they will probably suffer defeats in
matters But to my mind It seems
to bft altogether wrong to look for
tha real cause* of the war lu the
events during the last weeks of July,
subsidiary field*.
American crlttcis, when Koumania
entered the war, foresaw a speedy
defeat for the Central jrojrers They
J9J4, Then, perhaps, the last iirr-'Thad“bi>en confident ihst the vtupen-
pulaft for war wa« given, but the real I dous re*osr«>?ft would eventually
/loyed
lltar^
irpaaft
time back.
“Am** U/ft Asglo French treaty of
1904 a complete literatsre had
sprung up In France, In which open
ly and U/udly the conquest of AI
eas e !»rra]ne was. dlscuased and
everything said in order to suggest
B> the French the Idea of Germany's
Inferiority The . Futente’s note
points out that at the laat peace con
ference Germany treated the proposi
tion to disarm with distrust. Hut
Germany knew then pertinently that
the proposition was mainly directed
against her eilfttence.
JUisftls's PH^psrathm.
“Rusftla, after th* economic regu
lation that followed the war with
Japan, had worked with Increasing
zeal for th# prepareduaas of her
army. When Germany employed
the surplus of her youth for mtllta.
service Franc*, la order to su
ue, Ifitrodijcftd a three y*ar service,
thus sapping her eepllal of fllal na
tional fercee. /
“Jill fuohtha before the beginning
of the war the French military ip*
eiallsts published opealy, discussions
regarding the rSeftona. for hiIIlone
end billions, of French money
streaming Into Russia and the condi
tions under which France had loan
ed this fnoney France had asked in
return for her loans tha eonatruc-
HojEkof strategical rallroada in Rua-
aia
“In this lllerstura It was explain
ed. with all tha circumstance#,.that
not Warsaw but Grodno- and Kovno
would be the has# tot Kusalaa de
ployinent because from there the
Briissien Briny corps in Koeuigsherg
and Allensteln could most’quick ly
he relied up end tt/ua the road to
Rerlln could he opened.
“In August, 1914, the attempt
was made at leant to make things go
thle way And to day they want to
persuade the nations of the world
(bid Germany prepared herself, not
for protection against an aggressive
coalition bat lu ordar to-annihilate
Franc*.
t'<*aiqu«ftC ef HonatsuiUftople
“The same poople who premleed
to liusela the conquest and posses
alou of Constantinople dare to assert
that Germany has aggressive Inleu
Hone, of couTee Hie coneueet of
Conetantluople, which was an
nounced by Trepoff (ihe Uusalau
(rremler) le the Duma, IS passed lu
silence lu Ike Knlmile note, Just as
they, In a discussion -of diplomatic
evanta In July, 1914, elegantly slid
over the declaive event -that
brusque lutarvuiiGon in all atteiuiits
at medietlon by the Bunaian iiioblll
sal Ion, which -was even rapeatediy
dtsauadad by the kiixlisk ambossa
dor at Ht Reterelurg*'
“Ho yoe think that under theae
circumstances the moral liidlgnAUou
In tha tone ,of the hluteuta note Is
stnreie/' was asked.
“Moah certainly 1 do/' replied
director Hammutm. “1 am of tho
on me opinion as (ieinard Hkmw and
cdKsblor the sincerity of this moral
UidittHatiou s» a new instance of the
pn»vl»teim.il harmopy between the
interests and moral ami political
Ideas of ICligieiul. We know tills
moral indlgiiAU^hv from history.
“When the Prussians and Aus
trtaus marched into Huhleswtg Hol-
stetn, tn order to assist Their coun
trymen and fight on the siuiaof the
Hchteewtg Holstein irredenlst^vfor
the hulependnitce K of the Gerubui
rare, then lA/rd I'/ilmeriTon an
l.i/rd Hhaftabury In the lower and
upper houses manifested the same
moral indignation They also Im
mediately found tha sama sincere
words as 'outrage/ ‘violence, ‘most
cowardly/ and ‘trlghtful atrocities/
< hklwanl Grey's Indignation.
“Hlnc/ya was air Kdward Grey’s
tndtgnanou whan on July 29. Iff4,
ha reeelvatl from the German chan
tailor nta sucgeatloil tbit Germany.
If BniUeh neutrality ware guaran-
Roumanla, but becauea of the excel
lent strategical position of Kou-
maula, once she entered the war, its
speedy dose w&s regarded at aRhost
certain', liui Jhmjtianla has been de
fda/Uvl, and they now deciai’e t)*at G
Entente «an not win, Uusl Use ptfwl
Usey con U«#pe to do is to Unr
war into a draws
And yet *we Wud tbe AlKee acorn-
Ing tbe Genian peocF propoenle,
elating clearly/and unmistakably that
peace under tf/e prurient conditions is
impossible, end threatening, in the
•vent of peaca/io impose upon Ger
many. termeywhich only a victorious
outcome tbe war could warrant.
To bxrgin this inventory of ^ the
yearkfighting It Is necessary to men-
llop briefly what each eide has done,
^dd at what cost The latter we can
only estimate On the whole, how
ever, It Is believed that the estimates
are conservative and will bear invest
tlgatlon on the baals of sound rea
soning.
The year 1916 closed with the bal
ance sheet strongly agalnct the
Allies. The Gallipoli venture had
just been abandoned, Serbia had just
been conquered, while the Allies had
stood by and looked on without the
power, apparently, to make an offen
sive move In any direction/ i
All laurels went to the Central
powers It was generally under
stood, was widely advertised by tbe
Allied press, that a gigantic offense
woe being planned that would begin
as soon as conditions of grounds in
tbe spring would permit. Bat G*r-
maay sel/Avl time by the forelock
and, Iwvfore Ui* Allioe could tire an
opening gua» hfok the inlLUtUve
and launched a terrifying and <i«vaa-
UMLing atUu k at Vervlun.
A great stock of Germany’s best
teed, would enter into an obligation
not to aspire to territorial extension
at France’s cost. At that time also
Grey declared this proposal as mo#t
shameful."
“And the reproaches that the Ger
man peace offer contained nothing
tangible/' was suggested.
The tangible point," said Itr.
Ilsmrnann, “was that Germany de
clared her readiness te communicate
her peace conditions in conference
with her adveruarlea. Th* Kntente
lias declined this proponal. To ui#
It* Heoms ,evhh*nt that the Kntente,
when doing this, felt seriously con
cerned and greatly depressed on ac
count of the Irnpresslqn this refusal
of the Gorman peace offer must
make on the neutral World.
“Thl* Is clearly indicated by the
tone of the Entente note It is
a< tly as If the NntehtVi were in a
tain HeiiH# *fraid 'f.o- listen Id the
cimdltion* of the t’entral powers.
Are those men who gave to the En
tente note its particular tone, per
haps afraid that thone conditions of
the Central powers are . much too
sennHile and moderajte for th/on be
fore their natidim, who long for
j/eace, to undertake the reHpoiisibil-
Ity of dmliniug these individual con
tfitlonsT,
“At all events our adverHarlos
would’ have acted more .frankly M
they had flatly and plainly said:
'We will wait hecause we still hope
that we need not negotiate, but can
dictate the terms of peace/ In order
to avoid thin awkward avowal th*/
Kntente now taken the attitude of
the Judge of the world!
“Hut all that the Kntente obtains
by this proceeding is that itn guilt
fi/r the continuation of the war un-
Htakahly In the eyes of the whole
woVld 1*' not- 7 dlniintoihoU but in
cream
hat will the Central poyvers
reply to Muanote?" was asked. *
Hr. Hammnwji answered/ .“I am
no moreen offRqrkJ do not kfit/w the
offfclijLl peace planN But I do know
what every German, what every uiti-
xen in the countrTfis allied wltYi us
feel# at thla hour, however -to such
overhearing Utiguage there need be
so dlsouaelon." N.
loff, striuk against U/c Austrians in
\ oiJjyniM N<Aiiing like Uiia blow
bad bc*-n witmessed up to this time
xe caustom front. Tho AuRtrlans
mpled up under It completely, and
the Germans, from the poTthern part
of the line, were compelled to hurry
south to their beleaguered ally.
Jn a very short time, compara
tively, the Russians had captured the
enormous total of 480,000 prisoners,
bad reconquered almost all of Vol-
hynla, had taken all of, Bukowlna,
and had advanced their line in Gali
cia many miles until they were at
the gates of Lemberg.
Tbe fighting spread up a'ong the
Stokbod, in fact up as far as Bartin-
ovltcbl north of the Plnsk marshes,
but gradually died -out. J^ocses on
both sides were terrific.. In this and
subsequent operations the Kuesians
inuah baye^ lotrt » mttltOli finen But
the. Central powers again suffered
more heavily. *
The capture of so many prisoners
indicates a loss of at least a million
and a half, to which must be added
the German loss In ’ the * fighting
along the Htokhod, which would add
another 200,000 to the total. The
Austrian loss in territory was also
very great and has almost .counter
balanced in square miles the Rou
manian territory occupied by the
Dormans, Austrians, and Bulgarians.
The fl^hUng on the Somme, which
began on July J, waft the great and
only material effort of G»e t western
Alliev during the year. Here, ’ y all
odds, was the best example shown of
the possibilities of modern urtlljery.
The German artiljery lire at Verdun
was not comparable to it In volume,
accuracy, or In that co-ordination
between artillery and Infantry which
enable* the offense to minimize its
own losses while inflicting the maxi
mum loss on the defense, i
In the first days of the offedse,
the Alllee* losses were undoubtedly
greater than those of the Germans.
As the attack proceeded, however,
two things IxM’ftine noticeable. The
firs^ wom the fact that the number of
prlmmere captured in each attack
grew larger, ami the ftocond wom that,
while In the Anti day* the advance
was meoMnn*] in yards, later it was
measured in mileft. This kIiowb cer
tainly a decline In the effectiveness
of tbs German defense and a loss of
morale.
The Intensity of the Allies' artil
lery preparation was maintained
throughout and, as the Germans
went back, their field works afford
ed less protection. The disparity in
losses consequently decreased and
the balance shifted to the other side.
ho that when the last blows were de
livered Gorman losses were greater
than those of the Allies. This la
shown by the number of prisoners
captured and by the relation, estab
lished by a study of the German cas
ualty lists of the flrsUtwo years of
the war, between the number of
prisoners and tho total casualties.
In tho Somme fighting alone, ex
cluding the isolated actions about
Verdun, the German losses in prison
ers. were .7T>,000 men, making the
total casualty lists about 650,000
men. German authorities claim that
the Allied losses were about t>50,000 v
This Is a conservative estimate of the
losses of the battle of the Somme
and, If it errs at all, does so in favor
of tha Germans. The gain in terri
tory was not largo, only about 125
square miles. But it lias all been
held. - >
Finally, we come to the Rouman
ian campaign. The entrance of the
Roumanian army addfcd considerably
to tho available resources of the
Allies. Tills addition has, however,
been decreased not a little by the
Roumanian defeats.
It it probable that tbit venture b«s
eost the Roumanlana at least 250*-
ooo men. It la also probable that
the Central power* have not achieved
their eucceae with a loee »f fjwer
. *3,625,000 2,890,000
— J ', ". V %
•The balance is thus fteen tu be de
cidedly against tbe Ontral powers.
Rut this discrepancy 5 even greater
than the figures make It appear. The
relative losses, comparing the losses
to lotaj jeaources la man power, are
actually much greater than those
WILSON PUNS NEW Aim
TO BELLKQDENT NATIONS
jf Reply ot tb* AI Baft le I’afai
Frew Id e* l Will Klacidate Pi
tiuii in &cuad Note.
pgsai for an early occasion for an
avowal ot terms, tbe president will
got fol tba-iiegotiatioa* drop but will
cachange man tor man, or apything
like it • ’ ' >
As to territory occupied,.consider
ing only/ihe Kuropean theatres, the
situaGdn is about a standoff. The
efforts of Germany have been*much
f^re spectacular and much more
widely advertire.d.
It La not Belgium, Serbia, or Rott-
mania, however, that will exert the
great influence. In the military Bf d*
tlement of the war. These afe pure
ly Incidental and must be looked
upon as" subsidiary fields. Tbe Ger-
jnaana- la Roumama-.—for example,
have used at the outside 200,000 of
their own troops for this purpose.
Is it possible that such an insignL
fleant nuipber~of- men as 'his can
bring a decision which up to the
present time over twenty time# that
number have been unable to effec ?
Brit logical that the Central powers
can attain victory with only 5 ppr,,
cent, of their forces?
It 7has* been considered probable
from the moment that the Germans
fixed the west as the scene of their
greatest activity the* if decision
came, it must come on tbe western
front.
But a golden opportunity opened
In the east to cut Germany off from
her Moslem ally, break the alliance,
and defeat the constituent parts in
detail. This was the meaning of the
Roumanian thrust . This thriiMt was
skilfully parried and the situation
was restored to its previous condition
with the exception, of course, that
Germany wm freed OtThe danger of
anything further threatening from
Roumanian Hourcr*.
- This made it inevitable that the
war must be decided, If at all, on tbe
western front. If the Germans are
defeated In the west, the eastern sit
uation will be solved. The Teutonic
alliance will fall like a house of
cards. The present map of Eastern
Europe, were It to be the guiding
element In a discussion of the pres
ent situatioiC-would show Germany
the complete^ victor^. \But the map Is.
after all, a poor guide In such a case
as this. : . ,
Space does not permit a detailed
analysis of conditions and probabili
ties on each of the various fronts.
An opportunity for this may, per
haps, be afforded In subsequent arti
cles. But there are conditions af
fecting other than the element of
numbers to which I have just re
ferred.
■ There Is, first, the general eco
nomic condition. The Allies are much
make at least one more move.
/If another communication is sent 4 ,
position of the president as it is felt
that as a result of comment abroad
and )n the Lulled blates and in the*
debate in the ftenate more or less
contusion bos arisen as to just what
he intended. ,
ITetfident Wilson’s chief hope in
the ultimate success of the negotia
tions Is known t* lie in his sugges
tion that a means be >ound tor main
taining peace in the future. If an
agreement on that point can be
reached the president is sold to feel
It would constitute the “guarantee
fur the future," demanded by the
▲ Bley. It was fenerally indicated
tbav the president has no present in
tention of asking Col. E. M.. House
te go to Europe qn a peace mlssipn.
The president has never publicly
indicated w.4Ungn*«* to act
mmwsh f^r exi±*n^W~T&mri&'
crelly between the belligerents, and
it is known thftt he would prefer that
it be done publicly, American diplo
mats and other sources of Confiden
tial information have been looking
into that point. The negotiations
will be of a highly confidential char
acter, it is said.
President Wilson’s friends say he
Is unconcerned over efforts to~ con
nect his .note .wiili -llifi. German peace
proposals. Feeling that his sole ob
ject in sending the note was to learn
just where each side stands, he is
known to believe tkat in the en<
Allies as well as tbe Central pj
realize that his move was not
ed against either.
_ PREMIERS ¥ SESSION
better off In this respect. Exactly.! .'“TVi “,'- lr ‘.' k KJU . In,? .watfuila
what the food situation Js In Ger- °f strategy and o« .
many we do not know. We do know
that there has been more or less
trouble from this sources." It may be
much graver than most of us think.
First,, it* must be agreed that Ger
many and the Allies are destroying
as absolutely as by emptying in mid
ocean available assets of the nations.
The destruction is complete. There
Is no salvage. There is plenty of
money in Germany, it is said; there
must be, since Germany is living on
herself. She is In the position of &
bear which, during the period of hi
bernation, lives on its own fat.
To draw a more exact parallel, let
us suppose an Island cut off from all
the rest of the world, -in that island
there is, say, 11,000 in money, what
ever the medium of exchange may
be, and the same amount of wealth
in^other forms. Suppose that of this
money $100 bfe -expended for an
equal amount of another form of
wealth, and that,this be destroyed.
It cann<H be replaced, of course,
because, being isolated* there is no
one with whom to barter, ^here
still remains $1,000 in money, but
only $900 of wealth in other forms.
Continue this process . and the
amount of money existing will be
many times the value of the things
to be bought.
If, while this is ioing^on, laboy he
employed at a fixed rate of pay per
day, the time will soon come when
the day’s wage will buy nothing.
This is somewhat the situation which
existed in the South during the lat
ter days of the civil war when the
purchasing power of Confederate
4 money fell to the point where many
thousand , dollars were required to
buy a pair of boots. This is the con
dition which. Germany is facing and
its effect on tRe masrf of the civilian
population may readily be imagined.
There are certain kinds of proper
ty which have totally, or almost
totally, disappeared from Germany
since the war began* and this .proper
ty 14 absolutely necessary for the
continuation of the existing situa
tion. Among these may be mention-
Allied StatCNiuen Hold Very Impor-
' - ‘ ’ 0 # 'V
Lant Conference at-Rome.
» / .
The conference of the Entente
statesmen, including Premiers Lloyd-
George, Briand,*and Boselli, was In
almost continual session Saturday,
according to a Havas dispatch from
Rome. Premier Boselli presided at
the meeting^ w hich was the first of a
number at which tY^e general situa
tion will be discussed by representa
tives of Great Britain, France, Italy
and Russia. In honor of the event
the Italian government declared the
day a holiday.
.g>
Just how bad the situation is we do ^
not know, but there is a serious
shortage of these necessities.
,The next element in. the existing
situation is the relative shell pro- •
duction of the Central Empires as
compared with that of the Entente.
The situation a year ago is well
known. Germany’s superiority then
is recognized. But tha-AUies have
turned their , entire manufacturing
energies toward war materials. -
England is producting at a rate
that is almost inconceivable.* The
neutral markets of the world are
shipping enormous quantiles to the
Continent. Japan has’ been turned
into a mighty arsenal, manufactur
ing entirely for Russia.
The result has been shown in re
cent fighting, when the Germans in
th© west were entirely unable • to,
match the artillery fire of the Allies,
either in the number, of guns used,
the volume of metal thrown, or the
effectiveness of the individual shell.
The German artillery fire at Verdun
was, as 1 have stated, far inferior
to that of the Allies on the Somme.
The German artillery fire on the
Somme was inferior to that at Ver
dun. .
<>u the whole, then, there has
berii' a steady decline in the Teutonic
fighting paraphernalia during
and an equally Htcady rise of
the Allies. The Entente, aftj
war in the west settled down!
trenches, has been working
theory of attrition..
EgL-. ,
Ik; . - _ >
than 160,000 m*B. Hut at least ed cotton, rubber, copper, and tat*, reasonable
r j , * •. • • • ’ • * ^ ^ ! *
. v * ! v . .
* «» • : . 1 \\ | — >
military genius. At'the same time,
when sufficient resources are behind
such a plan, the result is inevitable
If the war lasts long enough. It is-
simply a'question of arithmetic to
tell which side must win eventually.
There, is, finally, the question of
the quality of the men left to do the '
fighting. Kitchener’s first hundred
thousand have long since passed.
From them have sprung the 5,000,-
000 men whom England now has un
der arms. These were an unknown
quantity until the battle of the
Somme. There they received their
baptism of fire and we have seen the
result. . .
Once he knows the game, there is
no. better fighting man in Europe
than the British Tommy. And he
knows the game now/ lie has learn
ed it on the battlefield, the‘only
place that can. give the necessary ed
ucation. Although the great major
ity of these men are in reserve sta
tions, a great proportion of them
took pdrt in the battle of the Somme
at some ,time~or otherr"
The Germafis, on the other hand,
have but few men in reserve stations.
Demands on them have been such
that have had to keep practically all
of their men in the field. These
men have had their faith in victory
shaken, their courage to some degree
sapped. Look at the two French
thrusts at Verdun and note the
shortness of the attacks and the
number of prisoners taken. A year
before such a thing would have been
impossible. The Germans ' would
never have surrendered in such num
bers and so rapidly.
The quality of the German trocp*
Is rapidly deteriorating. They
lost confidence' In the impregi
of their defense system. The]
seen, the British and French fTtma
grind into powder their carefully
constructed <jft$enses just as their
own guns did the defenses of Lieg*
and Namur.
Will they man these trenches then
with the same spirit of confidmc*
which marked their conduct a year
ago? Possibly, but It does z»t seem
r