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ORNKKAL FKKNHIMJ'H MTOKV OK AMKKICAN OK'KRATION* (Continued f?n? another ?>?**?> allied artnlea were to be employ*! to ? converging action. It should hi* that a It lough Ibis funeral offensive waa fully out .. tftn?^f at th# conference no one preaent expressed the opinion that tha final victory could t*? won In IW18. la fart. II waa ??? 11?-v< it i.> (he Menw-Argonna attack could not he pushed mnch be yond ftfonftiucoii before the ? ! rival of winter would torn a cea*atlon of op eration a. The choice t?etween tha two ?ectora, that east or the Alsne. Including tha Argonne forem. or the Champagne eector, waa left to me. In my opinion. bo ojher n I lied troopa had the morale or the offensive spirit to overcome aocceaafnlly the dlfilcultlee to be met to the frleuae-Argonne aector, and oor plana and InatalIn tlona had been pre? pared for an expansion of operatlona to that direction. Ho the Meuae-Ar gonne front waa choaen. The entire aector of 190 kilometer# of front ex tending from I*ort-8ur-8ellle. eaet of Che lioaelle, west to Include the Ar gon ne foreat. waa accordingly placed ?nder my command. Including all Wench division# then In that Kooe. Ite find American array wa? to pro ceed with the 8t. Mlhlel operation, after which the operation between tha Mouse and the western edge of tha Argonne foreat was to be prepared and lannehed not later than Septem ber 25. On the night of September 11 tha troops of the first army were deployed to position. On the aouthern foce of the salient was the first corpa. Ma jor General Liggett commanding, with the eighty-second, ninetieth, fifth and aecond divisions In ? line, extending from the Moselle westward. On Its left wns the fourth corps. MaJ. Gen. Joseph T. Dlckmnn com manding. with the eighty-ninth, forty aecond and first dlvMons. the left of this corps helng opposite Montsec. These two.army corpa were to deliver the principal attack, the line pivoting on the center division of the first corps. The first division on the left of tfe^L fourth corps, waa charged with the double mission of covering Its own flank while advancing some twenty kilometers due north toward the heart of the salient, where It was to make contact with the troopa of the fifth corp8< On the western face of the salient lay the fifth corps. MaJ. Gon. George H. Cameron commanding, with the twenty-sixth division, fifteenth French Colonial division and the fourth dl vision in line, from Moullly west to Le* Kpargea and north to Wantron villa. ,Of these three divisions the twenty^aixth alone was to make a deep advisee directed southward to ward Vigneuitv*. The French division waa to make a short progression to the edge of the heights In order to cover the left of the twenty-f?lxth. The fourth division was not to ad vance. In the center between our fourth and fifth army corps, was the fWcoud French Colonlul corps. MaJ. Gen. K. J. Blondlat commanding, covering a front of 40 kilometers with three small French divisions. These troops were to follow up the retirement of the en emy from the tip of the salient. ? -At dawn on Sept. 12, after four hours of violent artillery fire of preparation, and accompanied by Kmall tanks, the Infantry of the first and fourth corps advanced. The Infantry of the fifth corps commenced its advance at 8 a. m. The ofterailoo waa earrled out with entire precision. Just after daylight on Sept. 13 elements of the first and fwenty-slxth divisions made a Junction near 1 Inttonchnfel. and Y'lgneulle*. eighteen kilometers northeast of St. Mlhlel. The rapidity with which our divisions advanced overwhelmed the enemy and all objectives wen* reached by the afternoon of Sept. 18. We cap tured nearly 10.000 prisoners. 44:1 guns and large stores of material and sup plies. The energy and swiftness with which the operation wns carried out enabled us to smother opposition to aurb an extent thai we eulferad Ha# than 7,000 casus it?? durltnc tke e< t?al period of tbe ipim*. : Tba material reetflts ** tba victory achieved were very Important. An A inert ran army w#? an accowplUbed fact, and the epwiiy hi4 fWl Its power. No form of propaganda could come the depressing effect on the morale of the enemy of tbla deunm ?traflou of our ability to organise a large American forre and drive It auo> censfully through hla defenaea. II gava our tr?K>|?? Implicit confidence In their *u|MTtorlty and ralaed their morale to the highest pitch. For the first tlma wire entanglements ceased to be re garded a* InipaaatWa harrlera and o(?n-warfare training. which hart been ho urgently lMl|tpd upon, proved to ba the correct doctrine. Our dlvlalona concluded the attack with aueb small losses and IP sueb high aplrlta that without the usual rem they were Im mediately available for employment to heavy fighting In a new theater of op eratlona. The atrengtb of tbe flrat army In thta battle totaled approxi mately 600.000 men. of whom about TO,000 were French. ? Immovable Since 1t14. The Meuse-Argoune front had been practically stabilised in September. 1914, and. except for minor fluctuation* during the German attacks on Verdun In 1910 and the French counter offen afva In AugttSt, 1917,' remained un changed until the American advance la 1018. The net result of the four years' struggle on this ground waa a German defensive system of unusual depth an0 atrengtb and a wide tone of utter dev astation. Itself a serious obstacle t? idfenalve operatlona. The strategical Importance of riiU portion of the line was aecond tc ?one on the weatern front. All sup oiiex and evacuations of *.h* fifrmsd armies In northern France were fls> petdent upon two gieat railway sys tems?one In the north, passing through Liege, while the other In the south, with Ilne3 coming from Luxemburg. Thlonvllle and Mete, had as Its vital section the line Carlgnan-Sedan-Mex leres. No other Important lines wera available to the. enemy, as the moun tainous masses of the Ardennes mada the cpnstructlon of east and west lines throiigh that region Impracticable. Begin Vlctorloua Advance. On the night of September 26 tbe nine divisions to lead In the attack were deployed between the Meuae river and the western edge of the Ar gonne forest. On the right was the Third corps, Major General Bullord commanding, with the Thirty-third, Eightieth and Fourth divisions In line; next came the Fifth corps. Major Gen eral Cameron commanding, with the Seventy-ninth, Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first divisions; on the left waa the First corps. Major General Liggett commanding, with the Thirty-fifth, Twenty-eighth and Seventy-seventh di vision. IChcU cdrps had one division In reserve antT the army held three divi sions as a general reserve. About 2.700 * guns, 189 small tanks. 142 manned by Americans, and 821 alr> plnnes, C04 manned by Americans, ward concentrated to snpport the at tack of tbe infantry. We thuu had a superiority In guns and nvlatlon, and the enemy had no tanks. Following three hours of violent ar tillery fire of preparation the Infan try advanced at 5:30 a. in. on Septem ber 20. accompanied by tanks. Dur ing the first two days of the attack, be fore the enemy was able to bring up his reserves, our troops made steady progress through the network of the defenses. Montfaucon was held tena ciously by tbe enemy and was hot cap tured until ikmhi <>f th*? MH-onil day. Tbe attack continued without In terruption, meeting six new divisions which the enemy threw Into first line before September 29. He developed a powerful machlue gun defense sup ported by heavy artillery ? fire, and made frequent counter-attacks with fresh troops, particularly on the front of the Twenty-eighth and Thirty fifth divisions. These divisions had tnkcu Varennes, Cheppy, Baulny and Charpentry, and the line was within two kilometers of Apremont. We were no longer engaged In a maneuver for HERE'S A TRIUMFirt FOR PROHIBITION How It Has Furr.i3b.ed the World With a Val uab e Beverage. Whi.o tiif fc in s of prohil.Uion ?***!** working to the etui that alcohol h'.iou ft bo banished from the I' S. thvre wan on t'?rrrrtn?sv+hh?i: ..>;>???ftlon a?in different !ln? from nth'-r Mdo In t!:?? questi< n l or st**>n >f.r> this man labors'! in i'!;:rfi,c, 10 r? ; r-'netu-n of an id fa 'm had < ?>n? ?? i v < d, that lager luc.- had nr vrr in the j ant been prc?i friy ri;:i?'? ?. When war !i:.-.c : r<? i?:' <_>n I .i!>.n a fart t h'* man ??;?< 1 >1 ><?? road> with lh<- perfectIon ?>i hi> d<*~. notice brewer* he.an the. n.aUIh^ 01* .. now unfermentt d ' near I e *r," a rrude .in 1 ??.*?, uniic?i'.ii;'_u ^.ro-IuCl. ?> 1.1ch nevettiH- esa sod i;. lar;* i? i-sn? i sea ovwh^re. Od .Jury \'K of th:s venr, :iif I rt go. ern merit i*s?rd :??!'?- * ? r ( to Lit is man. fnr a row ,iiin (>. ! r?*w ing and 1 n shiny I e? r wl.h-h hi* < la ma should ha\r? Leon in \or.rs a?o to make Te<.?r a jerfe<t!> Ideal beverage for vcr> body and in tact superior to any i*nov>n drink for a I the family. A erfc-4* cm pfa-ul wa* Ui*u ?r- *vd in (Jh'eago. which proved per fect in wo;kl?g deLa'l. Immediately the Golden Grain Juice Company, of Minneapolis, contracted for this pat Int plant, which the h.td in working ?rder o?t. jr.th. at a c<.?t of I3SO.OOO. ; This new product, known as MIN N'KIIAHA. rale and special (light and '-i-.-rk', hack fifty years In brew ?h-t+i?tu ;ii" fnd rich?brew of tha : oUl . nus'tr . Modern beer contained I U'i( iir11 <? naiU'v, being made mostly ! (<>i n. . e . ra'r.s, i..-a s. ct . The i new ; atri:t brow U made of only bar ' ley and !io; ?; it is thoroly fermented U'I ace! for four months. It fa thus ri? t'5 >n !'.(;p*tive prcp^rtic and high I ilavor j J u.st i.ti'tiic fi.lei iUK and pasleuri7.a lion, the ; atr:-1 proce.ss Is Introduced, j which by vacuum, and without boll -nt. r niir\ 3 ?h; Jr;h wines > alcohol) ?;>if rot rt>?' wliit if t'? low wines uol ??>.<; t;.-\vor?. T.,*:e ilonp would not c>m)<| n??t d-t ??<?,. that ?he alio!. ?' was ah?ent It pro-, cd to J?e ctbilaiating. howr\er bfC:Ui?e of th<* *11>l ? and cat bonic ~r.a. The ( hicago scientist h?H proved that alcohol was not no.cessary in beer, that in fact it ww a detriment, and so prohibition had a use it was ? tifvw dwajgned- Lu. lux _it_ perfected brewing t? a i olnt ne- ??r dre.imed of before. __ Minnehaha. rare jnd Mt<Hcial, wilt be shipped to any part i ,e United States by the Colde.n Grain Juice Co? Minneapolis, U. 8. A.?Advertisement tb? pinching eut of N ??UrMl. but were nn>??rtly oMtuiniiiHL geu?M ?I?y spenfc lo#. to ? direct frout*! attack mtrriif. IfcgftV* portions fully by a determined cne>ny, J At ft:80 a. m.. <>ctot??r 4. the gco er*J attack was The enemy division* <h? the fruttt fnH? Kromaiai Woevjre to tl?e Arg??nne had Increased from ton In llr?t Una to sixteen. and Included eoiue of Ida beat dlvlalons, The fighting ?ni and only small advances w ere realized. except by the flrat division on the right of the Flrat corps. On the 7th tlw First corps. with (be I Ktghty-eecood division addtd. launched a Mroui attack toward Coruay, to draw attention from the movement eaat of the Meuse and at the aame time outflank the German position In the Argonne. The following day the Seventeenth French corps, lfajor Gen eral Olaudel commanding, Initiated Ita attack eaat of the Meuae against the exact point on which the German armies moat pivot In order to with draw from northern Franc*. The troopa encountered elaborate fortifi cations and stubborn resistance, but by nightfall bed realised an advance of si* kilometers to ? Una well within the Bole de Conseuvoye, and Includ ing the villages of . Beauroopt and Haumont. Fee Fought Stubbornly. Gontlnuoua flgl)M?g was maintained aldng our entire battle front, with es pecial aucceae on the extreme left, where the capture of the greater pert of the Argonne foroat was completed. The enemy contested every foot of ground on our front. In . order to make more rapid retirements far ther weat and withdraw hla forces from oorthern Franee before the Inter ruption of hla railroad communica tions through Sedan. We were confronted at thla time by an Insufficiency of replacement to build up exhauated dlvlslona. We atlll had two divisions with the British and two with the French. A review of the ?Itnatlon: American and allied, espe cially as to our own resources In men for the next two months, convinced me that the nttock of the First army and the allied armies farther west should be pushed to the limit But If the First army was to continue Its aggressive tactics, our divisions their with the French must be recalled and replacements must be obtained by breaking up newly arrived divisions. In discussing the withdrawal of our divisions from the French with Mar shal Foeh and General Petaln on Oc tober 10 the former expressed hla ap preciation of the fact that the First army was striking the pivot of the1 German withdrawal, and nlso held the view that the allied attack should continue. General Petaln agreed that the American divisions with the French were essential to us If we were to maintain our bottle agalnat the German pivot. The French were, however, straining every nerve to keep up their attacks, and before those di visions with the French had been re leased It became necessary for ua to sendMhe Thirty-seventh and^Nlnety 5rst divisions from the First army to naslst the Sixth French army in Flao First Army of 1,000,000. At this (line the First army wmi holding r front of more than 120 kilo meters; Its strength exceeded 1.000. 000 tfici*: It *wns engaged In the mosj desperate bottle of our history. an< the burden of conmand was ?oo heavy for a sllngle commander and staff. Therefore on October 12 that portion of our front exteudlng from Port-sur Sellle. east of the Moselle, to Fresnes en-Woevre. southeast of Verdun, was transferred to the newly constituted Second army with Lieut. Oen. Robert L. Bullard In command, under whom It began preparations for the exten sion of operations to the east in the direction of Brley and Metx. On Oc tober 16 the command of the First army was transferred to Lieut. Geo. Hunter Liggett, and my advance head quarters was established at Llgny-en* Barrols. from which the command ot the group of American armies was ex ercised. Summarizing the material results which had been attained by the First army by the end of October, we had met an Increaslpg number of Ger many's best divisions, rising from 20 In line and reserve bn September 20 to 31 on October 81; the enemy's elab orately prepared positions. Including the Hlndenburg line. In our front had been broken; the almost Impassable Argonne forest was In our hands; an advance of 21 kilometers had been of fected; 18.000 prisoners, 870 cannon, 1.000 machine guns and a mass of ma terial captured; and the great railway artery, tfy-oyg^ Qarlgnnn to Sedan was now seriously threatened. On the morning of November 1 three array corps were In line between tho Mouse river and the Bnis do Ronr gogne. Preceded by two hours of vio lent artillery preparation the Infantry advanced, closely followed by "accom panying guns." ? By nightfall the Fifth corps. In the center, had realized an advance of al most nine kilometers, to the Bols de la Folle, and had completed the cap ture of the heights of Banico- rt, while the Third corps, on the right hnr* captured Aincrevllle and Ande vonne. Our troops had broken through the enemy's last defense, captured his artillery positions and had precipi tated a retreat of the German force* about to be Isolated In the forest north of Grandpre. The following day the advaqce con tinued toward Sedan with Increasing swiftness. Munitions. - Our entry Into the war found its with few of the auxiliaries necessary for Its condnct In the modern sense. The task of the ordnance department my] m MC lu sui*?lyiiiig trtuierj win *P?rtiny difficult. Iu order to dmK wr wquln OMti as rapidly as poesltys eeptsd the offer of tha Weocfti govei u Bleat to tVpWpft Wlthjlhe urllltrry equipment of T&'s. 155 mm. howltaers ?nd 130 O. ft P. guns from their own factories for 80 divisions. Tito wis dom of this course was fully detaoo F it rated by I be Oct that although we soon began the manufacture of those claaaea of guna at boffie thera ware oo tuna of American manufacture of the calibers mentioned on our froat at the date of tha armistice. Tbe only guna of these types pro duced at home whlcfa reached ftaace before tbe cesaatioc of boatllitles ware 100 T5 mm. guns.' ? ^ In addition 24 8-Inch howltaers from the Unltod Statea reached our front and were to use w^en the arotstlee was signed. Eight 14-Inch naval gun* of American manufacture wars sat up on railroad mounts, snd most of these u were successfully employed oa tbe Meuse-Argoons front under the ? stu dent direction of Admiral Plunkett af tbe nsry. . ;.v.; Ns Jake. Tbe Nickel and tbe Dime were dls ruwdu* the IMIsr Hill. "lie ui?y be bigger than we are, but ac are better than he is," satd tbe Nickel. In whahi way?" asked the Dime. CI gpPPby, wew go to Church oftener tbau he doee, don't we?*'' replied., tbe Nickel. Aviation. to aviation we were entirely de I upon our alllea. Had hiw again the French government came to our aid until ear own prof ram could be eat voder way. Wt^iou! going la to ? complete dltcuaatoQ of aviation ma terial It frill be sufficient to atate that It waa with great difficulty that we ob tained equipment even for training. Aa for up-to-date combat planea, the development at bdme was alow and we h?d to rely upon the French, who provided ua with a total of 2.670 pur ault. observation and ooiublng ma* cblnea. The 8rat airplane received from home arrived In May. and altogether we nvctved IJ79 plane* of the De iiavllund tyi*e. The 0rat American NQuadrun completely equipped by American production, including air planea crossed the Oerman Hnea on Auguat 7. l?ia Aa to our aviators, many of whom trained with onr allien. It can be aald that they hod no supe rlora In daring and lo lighting ability. During the hnttlea of St. Mihlel and Ueuse-Argunne onr aviator* excelled all others. They have left a record of courageous de?da that will ever re main a brilliant page In the annata of our army. , Tanks Made Fine Record. In the matter of tanks we were compelled to rely upon both the French and the. Kngtlah. Here, bow " ?? Head the long list of want ado found iu another place in tfcis paper - . _____?: * erer. ?r? wm km* furtuuat? for n**oo that Mr allla* barely h*? flclent tank* fe meet thetr M senlt. While our tank corps ?.?j *ted opportunity, Us Ana per*onn?| eponded gallantly on every and ahowod courage of the htgheat Tho chemical warfare Mrvlce rep*, tented toother entirely now d?part*M to this war, Whether or not cm *tg be employed In fnture wore It % ?2 ter of coujectnra, but the effect U* deadly to the anprepaied ttait we cm never afford to segtoct the quet% The general health of our ana)? ooder condition* strange and adv?* lo many way* to our American expiri. eoce and mode of life wee marvel**, ly food. Of all death* lu the Annff. can expeditionary force* (to 8ept?* ber L 1910). totaling 81.141. there killed in action 35.550; died of woo** received In battl*. I5.I3Q; offer wound* and Injuries. &.60t; at* dtr of dlaeaaee. 24.7M. . *srre fV. ; < v ? -v. ? I . C. F. Sowel DEHTIOT (Office Ortr Brmce'i CAMDEN, S. C. The . .. ??'?? ?? - VviO m$x-i 4 hMm fl hat h.vpr ' a. ?, <> ;iw Men Who Appreciate Superlative Values Prefer The Brunswick In every great tire factory, the? chicf question is: "How much can we give for -the money?" And the; product depends on the policy aOop|td. Every man who has become ac quainted with Brunswick Tires knows that Brunswick standards are again evident. This famous con cern ?noted as a leader in every line it entered since 1845?has once more proved that its policy is right. A perfect tireis simply a matter of knowledge and standards and"' skill. No secrets nor patents pre vent making an ideal tire. But standards come first. For la tire making there is vast room for skimping, tor subtle economies, for hidden shortcomings. Makers with out the highest standards don't build high-grade tires. The Brunswick organization of tire makers includes a brilliant staff of technical experts. Not a man among them lias spent less 20 years in handling rubber. Each is a master of his craft And the new ideas they bring to the attention of Brunswick direc tors receive sincere consideration. Every proved betterment adopted unanimously. The Brunswick Tire is a combi l nation of acknowledged featufes? plus Brunswick standards of manu* . facture. The result is a super-tire, of which you have never known fore. The kind of a tire you wiB gladljr join in welcoming. Yet Brunswicks cost no than like-type tires. Try ONE Brunswick. Weproofcj ise a surprise. And we feel that you will want ALL wicks. Then good tires will have 4 meaning to you. THE BRUNSWICK-BAUte-COLLENDER CO. 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