The Camden chronicle. (Camden, S.C.) 1888-1981, January 16, 1920, Image 16
ORNKKAL FKKNHIMJ'H MTOKV
OK AMKKICAN OK'KRATION*
(Continued f?n? another ?>?**?>
allied artnlea were to be employ*! to
? converging action.
It should hi* that a It lough
Ibis funeral offensive waa fully out
.. tftn?^f at th# conference no one preaent
expressed the opinion that tha final
victory could t*? won In IW18. la fart.
II waa ??? 11?-v< it i.> (he Menw-Argonna
attack could not he pushed mnch be
yond ftfonftiucoii before the ? ! rival of
winter would torn a cea*atlon of op
eration a.
The choice t?etween tha two ?ectora,
that east or the Alsne. Including tha
Argonne forem. or the Champagne
eector, waa left to me. In my opinion.
bo ojher n I lied troopa had the morale
or the offensive spirit to overcome
aocceaafnlly the dlfilcultlee to be met
to the frleuae-Argonne aector, and oor
plana and InatalIn tlona had been pre?
pared for an expansion of operatlona
to that direction. Ho the Meuae-Ar
gonne front waa choaen. The entire
aector of 190 kilometer# of front ex
tending from I*ort-8ur-8ellle. eaet of
Che lioaelle, west to Include the Ar
gon ne foreat. waa accordingly placed
?nder my command. Including all
Wench division# then In that Kooe.
Ite find American array wa? to pro
ceed with the 8t. Mlhlel operation,
after which the operation between tha
Mouse and the western edge of tha
Argonne foreat was to be prepared
and lannehed not later than Septem
ber 25.
On the night of September 11 tha
troops of the first army were deployed
to position. On the aouthern foce of
the salient was the first corpa. Ma
jor General Liggett commanding, with
the eighty-second, ninetieth, fifth and
aecond divisions In ? line, extending
from the Moselle westward.
On Its left wns the fourth corps.
MaJ. Gen. Joseph T. Dlckmnn com
manding. with the eighty-ninth, forty
aecond and first dlvMons. the left of
this corps helng opposite Montsec.
These two.army corpa were to deliver
the principal attack, the line pivoting
on the center division of the first
corps. The first division on the left
of tfe^L fourth corps, waa charged with
the double mission of covering Its own
flank while advancing some twenty
kilometers due north toward the heart
of the salient, where It was to make
contact with the troopa of the fifth
corp8<
On the western face of the salient
lay the fifth corps. MaJ. Gon. George
H. Cameron commanding, with the
twenty-sixth division, fifteenth French
Colonial division and the fourth dl
vision in line, from Moullly west to
Le* Kpargea and north to Wantron
villa. ,Of these three divisions the
twenty^aixth alone was to make a
deep advisee directed southward to
ward Vigneuitv*. The French division
waa to make a short progression to
the edge of the heights In order to
cover the left of the twenty-f?lxth.
The fourth division was not to ad
vance.
In the center between our fourth
and fifth army corps, was the fWcoud
French Colonlul corps. MaJ. Gen. K. J.
Blondlat commanding, covering a front
of 40 kilometers with three small
French divisions. These troops were
to follow up the retirement of the en
emy from the tip of the salient.
? -At dawn on Sept. 12, after four hours
of violent artillery fire of preparation,
and accompanied by Kmall tanks, the
Infantry of the first and fourth corps
advanced. The Infantry of the fifth
corps commenced its advance at 8 a.
m. The ofterailoo waa earrled out with
entire precision. Just after daylight
on Sept. 13 elements of the first and
fwenty-slxth divisions made a Junction
near 1 Inttonchnfel. and Y'lgneulle*.
eighteen kilometers northeast of St.
Mlhlel. The rapidity with which our
divisions advanced overwhelmed the
enemy and all objectives wen* reached
by the afternoon of Sept. 18. We cap
tured nearly 10.000 prisoners. 44:1 guns
and large stores of material and sup
plies. The energy and swiftness with
which the operation wns carried out
enabled us to smother opposition to
aurb an extent thai we eulferad Ha#
than 7,000 casus it?? durltnc tke e< t?al
period of tbe ipim*.
: Tba material reetflts ** tba victory
achieved were very Important. An
A inert ran army w#? an accowplUbed
fact, and the epwiiy hi4 fWl Its power.
No form of propaganda could
come the depressing effect on the
morale of the enemy of tbla deunm
?traflou of our ability to organise a
large American forre and drive It auo>
censfully through hla defenaea. II gava
our tr?K>|?? Implicit confidence In their
*u|MTtorlty and ralaed their morale to
the highest pitch. For the first tlma
wire entanglements ceased to be re
garded a* InipaaatWa harrlera and
o(?n-warfare training. which hart been
ho urgently lMl|tpd upon, proved to ba
the correct doctrine. Our dlvlalona
concluded the attack with aueb small
losses and IP sueb high aplrlta that
without the usual rem they were Im
mediately available for employment to
heavy fighting In a new theater of op
eratlona. The atrengtb of tbe flrat
army In thta battle totaled approxi
mately 600.000 men. of whom about
TO,000 were French. ?
Immovable Since 1t14.
The Meuse-Argoune front had been
practically stabilised in September.
1914, and. except for minor fluctuation*
during the German attacks on Verdun
In 1910 and the French counter offen
afva In AugttSt, 1917,' remained un
changed until the American advance la
1018. The net result of the four years'
struggle on this ground waa a German
defensive system of unusual depth an0
atrengtb and a wide tone of utter dev
astation. Itself a serious obstacle t?
idfenalve operatlona.
The strategical Importance of riiU
portion of the line was aecond tc
?one on the weatern front. All sup
oiiex and evacuations of *.h* fifrmsd
armies In northern France were fls>
petdent upon two gieat railway sys
tems?one In the north, passing through
Liege, while the other In the south,
with Ilne3 coming from Luxemburg.
Thlonvllle and Mete, had as Its vital
section the line Carlgnan-Sedan-Mex
leres. No other Important lines wera
available to the. enemy, as the moun
tainous masses of the Ardennes mada
the cpnstructlon of east and west lines
throiigh that region Impracticable.
Begin Vlctorloua Advance.
On the night of September 26 tbe
nine divisions to lead In the attack
were deployed between the Meuae
river and the western edge of the Ar
gonne forest. On the right was the
Third corps, Major General Bullord
commanding, with the Thirty-third,
Eightieth and Fourth divisions In line;
next came the Fifth corps. Major Gen
eral Cameron commanding, with the
Seventy-ninth, Thirty-seventh and
Ninety-first divisions; on the left waa
the First corps. Major General Liggett
commanding, with the Thirty-fifth,
Twenty-eighth and Seventy-seventh di
vision. IChcU cdrps had one division In
reserve antT the army held three divi
sions as a general reserve. About
2.700 * guns, 189 small tanks. 142
manned by Americans, and 821 alr>
plnnes, C04 manned by Americans,
ward concentrated to snpport the at
tack of tbe infantry. We thuu had a
superiority In guns and nvlatlon, and
the enemy had no tanks.
Following three hours of violent ar
tillery fire of preparation the Infan
try advanced at 5:30 a. in. on Septem
ber 20. accompanied by tanks. Dur
ing the first two days of the attack, be
fore the enemy was able to bring up
his reserves, our troops made steady
progress through the network of the
defenses. Montfaucon was held tena
ciously by tbe enemy and was hot cap
tured until ikmhi <>f th*? MH-onil day.
Tbe attack continued without In
terruption, meeting six new divisions
which the enemy threw Into first line
before September 29. He developed
a powerful machlue gun defense sup
ported by heavy artillery ? fire, and
made frequent counter-attacks with
fresh troops, particularly on the
front of the Twenty-eighth and Thirty
fifth divisions. These divisions had
tnkcu Varennes, Cheppy, Baulny and
Charpentry, and the line was within
two kilometers of Apremont. We were
no longer engaged In a maneuver for
HERE'S A TRIUMFirt
FOR PROHIBITION
How It Has Furr.i3b.ed the World With a
Val uab e Beverage.
Whi.o tiif fc in s of prohil.Uion ?***!**
working to the etui that alcohol h'.iou ft
bo banished from the I' S. thvre wan
on t'?rrrrtn?sv+hh?i: ..>;>???ftlon a?in
different !ln? from nth'-r Mdo In t!:??
questi< n l or st**>n >f.r> this man
labors'! in i'!;:rfi,c, 10 r? ; r-'netu-n
of an id fa 'm had < ?>n? ?? i v < d, that
lager luc.- had nr vrr in the j ant been
prc?i friy ri;:i?'? ?.
When war !i:.-.c : r<? i?:' <_>n I .i!>.n
a fart t h'* man ??;?< 1 >1 ><?? road>
with lh<- perfectIon ?>i hi> d<*~. notice
brewer* he.an the. n.aUIh^ 01* .. now
unfermentt d ' near I e *r," a rrude .in
1 ??.*?, uniic?i'.ii;'_u ^.ro-IuCl. ?> 1.1ch
nevettiH- esa sod i;. lar;* i? i-sn? i sea
ovwh^re.
Od .Jury \'K of th:s venr, :iif I rt
go. ern merit i*s?rd :??!'?- * ? r ( to
Lit is man. fnr a row ,iiin (>. ! r?*w ing
and 1 n shiny I e? r wl.h-h hi* < la ma
should ha\r? Leon in \or.rs a?o to
make Te<.?r a jerfe<t!> Ideal beverage
for vcr> body and in tact superior to
any i*nov>n drink for a I the family.
A erfc-4* cm pfa-ul wa* Ui*u
?r- *vd in (Jh'eago. which proved per
fect in wo;kl?g deLa'l. Immediately
the Golden Grain Juice Company, of
Minneapolis, contracted for this pat
Int plant, which the h.td in working
?rder o?t. jr.th. at a c<.?t of I3SO.OOO.
; This new product, known as MIN
N'KIIAHA. rale and special (light and
'-i-.-rk', hack fifty years In brew
?h-t+i?tu ;ii" fnd rich?brew of tha
: oUl . nus'tr . Modern beer contained
I U'i( iir11 <? naiU'v, being made mostly
! (<>i n. . e . ra'r.s, i..-a s. ct . The
i new ; atri:t brow U made of only bar
' ley and !io; ?; it is thoroly fermented
U'I ace! for four months. It fa thus
ri? t'5 >n !'.(;p*tive prcp^rtic and high
I ilavor
j J u.st i.ti'tiic fi.lei iUK and pasleuri7.a
lion, the ; atr:-1 proce.ss Is Introduced,
j which by vacuum, and without boll
-nt. r niir\ 3 ?h; Jr;h wines > alcohol)
?;>if rot rt>?' wliit if t'? low wines
uol ??>.<; t;.-\vor?. T.,*:e ilonp would
not c>m)<| n??t d-t ??<?,. that ?he
alio!. ?' was ah?ent It pro-, cd to J?e
ctbilaiating. howr\er bfC:Ui?e of th<*
*11>l ? and cat bonic ~r.a.
The ( hicago scientist h?H proved
that alcohol was not no.cessary in
beer, that in fact it ww a detriment,
and so prohibition had a use it was
? tifvw dwajgned- Lu. lux _it_ perfected
brewing t? a i olnt ne- ??r dre.imed of
before. __
Minnehaha. rare jnd Mt<Hcial, wilt
be shipped to any part i ,e United
States by the Colde.n Grain Juice Co?
Minneapolis, U. 8. A.?Advertisement
tb? pinching eut of N ??UrMl. but were
nn>??rtly oMtuiniiiHL geu?M ?I?y spenfc
lo#. to ? direct frout*! attack
mtrriif. IfcgftV* portions fully
by a determined cne>ny, J
At ft:80 a. m.. <>ctot??r 4. the gco
er*J attack was The enemy
division* <h? the fruttt fnH? Kromaiai
Woevjre to tl?e Arg??nne had Increased
from ton In llr?t Una to sixteen. and
Included eoiue of Ida beat dlvlalons,
The fighting ?ni and only
small advances w ere realized. except
by the flrat division on the right of
the Flrat corps.
On the 7th tlw First corps. with (be
I Ktghty-eecood division addtd. launched
a Mroui attack toward Coruay, to
draw attention from the movement
eaat of the Meuse and at the aame
time outflank the German position In
the Argonne. The following day the
Seventeenth French corps, lfajor Gen
eral Olaudel commanding, Initiated Ita
attack eaat of the Meuae against the
exact point on which the German
armies moat pivot In order to with
draw from northern Franc*. The
troopa encountered elaborate fortifi
cations and stubborn resistance, but
by nightfall bed realised an advance
of si* kilometers to ? Una well within
the Bole de Conseuvoye, and Includ
ing the villages of . Beauroopt and
Haumont.
Fee Fought Stubbornly.
Gontlnuoua flgl)M?g was maintained
aldng our entire battle front, with es
pecial aucceae on the extreme left,
where the capture of the greater pert
of the Argonne foroat was completed.
The enemy contested every foot of
ground on our front. In . order
to make more rapid retirements far
ther weat and withdraw hla forces
from oorthern Franee before the Inter
ruption of hla railroad communica
tions through Sedan.
We were confronted at thla time
by an Insufficiency of replacement to
build up exhauated dlvlslona. We atlll
had two divisions with the British and
two with the French. A review of the
?Itnatlon: American and allied, espe
cially as to our own resources In men
for the next two months, convinced
me that the nttock of the First army
and the allied armies farther west
should be pushed to the limit But
If the First army was to continue Its
aggressive tactics, our divisions their
with the French must be recalled and
replacements must be obtained by
breaking up newly arrived divisions.
In discussing the withdrawal of our
divisions from the French with Mar
shal Foeh and General Petaln on Oc
tober 10 the former expressed hla ap
preciation of the fact that the First
army was striking the pivot of the1
German withdrawal, and nlso held the
view that the allied attack should
continue. General Petaln agreed that
the American divisions with the
French were essential to us If we
were to maintain our bottle agalnat
the German pivot. The French were,
however, straining every nerve to keep
up their attacks, and before those di
visions with the French had been re
leased It became necessary for ua to
sendMhe Thirty-seventh and^Nlnety
5rst divisions from the First army to
naslst the Sixth French army in Flao
First Army of 1,000,000.
At this (line the First army wmi
holding r front of more than 120 kilo
meters; Its strength exceeded 1.000.
000 tfici*: It *wns engaged In the mosj
desperate bottle of our history. an<
the burden of conmand was ?oo heavy
for a sllngle commander and staff.
Therefore on October 12 that portion
of our front exteudlng from Port-sur
Sellle. east of the Moselle, to Fresnes
en-Woevre. southeast of Verdun, was
transferred to the newly constituted
Second army with Lieut. Oen. Robert
L. Bullard In command, under whom
It began preparations for the exten
sion of operations to the east in the
direction of Brley and Metx. On Oc
tober 16 the command of the First
army was transferred to Lieut. Geo.
Hunter Liggett, and my advance head
quarters was established at Llgny-en*
Barrols. from which the command ot
the group of American armies was ex
ercised.
Summarizing the material results
which had been attained by the First
army by the end of October, we had
met an Increaslpg number of Ger
many's best divisions, rising from 20
In line and reserve bn September 20
to 31 on October 81; the enemy's elab
orately prepared positions. Including
the Hlndenburg line. In our front had
been broken; the almost Impassable
Argonne forest was In our hands; an
advance of 21 kilometers had been of
fected; 18.000 prisoners, 870 cannon,
1.000 machine guns and a mass of ma
terial captured; and the great railway
artery, tfy-oyg^ Qarlgnnn to Sedan was
now seriously threatened.
On the morning of November 1
three array corps were In line between
tho Mouse river and the Bnis do Ronr
gogne. Preceded by two hours of vio
lent artillery preparation the Infantry
advanced, closely followed by "accom
panying guns." ?
By nightfall the Fifth corps. In the
center, had realized an advance of al
most nine kilometers, to the Bols de
la Folle, and had completed the cap
ture of the heights of Banico- rt,
while the Third corps, on the right
hnr* captured Aincrevllle and Ande
vonne. Our troops had broken through
the enemy's last defense, captured his
artillery positions and had precipi
tated a retreat of the German force*
about to be Isolated In the forest
north of Grandpre.
The following day the advaqce con
tinued toward Sedan with Increasing
swiftness.
Munitions. -
Our entry Into the war found its
with few of the auxiliaries necessary
for Its condnct In the modern sense.
The task of the ordnance department
my]
m
MC
lu sui*?lyiiiig trtuierj win *P?rtiny
difficult. Iu order to dmK wr wquln
OMti as rapidly as poesltys
eeptsd the offer of tha Weocfti govei u
Bleat to tVpWpft Wlthjlhe urllltrry
equipment of T&'s. 155 mm. howltaers
?nd 130 O. ft P. guns from their own
factories for 80 divisions. Tito wis
dom of this course was fully detaoo
F it rated by I be Oct that although we
soon began the manufacture of those
claaaea of guna at boffie thera ware
oo tuna of American manufacture of
the calibers mentioned on our froat at
the date of tha armistice.
Tbe only guna of these types pro
duced at home whlcfa reached ftaace
before tbe cesaatioc of boatllitles ware
100 T5 mm. guns.' ? ^
In addition 24 8-Inch howltaers from
the Unltod Statea reached our front
and were to use w^en the arotstlee
was signed. Eight 14-Inch naval gun*
of American manufacture wars sat up
on railroad mounts, snd most of these
u were successfully employed oa tbe
Meuse-Argoons front under the ? stu
dent direction of Admiral Plunkett af
tbe nsry.
. ;.v.; Ns Jake.
Tbe Nickel and tbe Dime were dls
ruwdu* the IMIsr Hill.
"lie ui?y be bigger than we are, but
ac are better than he is," satd tbe
Nickel.
In whahi way?" asked the Dime.
CI
gpPPby, wew go to Church oftener
tbau he doee, don't we?*'' replied., tbe
Nickel.
Aviation.
to aviation we were entirely de
I upon our alllea. Had hiw
again the French government came to
our aid until ear own prof ram could
be eat voder way. Wt^iou! going la to
? complete dltcuaatoQ of aviation ma
terial It frill be sufficient to atate that
It waa with great difficulty that we ob
tained equipment even for training.
Aa for up-to-date combat planea, the
development at bdme was alow and
we h?d to rely upon the French, who
provided ua with a total of 2.670 pur
ault. observation and ooiublng ma*
cblnea.
The 8rat airplane received from
home arrived In May. and altogether
we nvctved IJ79 plane* of the De
iiavllund tyi*e. The 0rat American
NQuadrun completely equipped by
American production, including air
planea crossed the Oerman Hnea on
Auguat 7. l?ia Aa to our aviators,
many of whom trained with onr allien.
It can be aald that they hod no supe
rlora In daring and lo lighting ability.
During the hnttlea of St. Mihlel and
Ueuse-Argunne onr aviator* excelled
all others. They have left a record
of courageous de?da that will ever re
main a brilliant page In the annata of
our army. ,
Tanks Made Fine Record.
In the matter of tanks we were
compelled to rely upon both the
French and the. Kngtlah. Here, bow
" ??
Head the long list of want ado found
iu another place in tfcis paper
- . _____?: *
erer. ?r? wm km* furtuuat? for
n**oo that Mr allla* barely h*?
flclent tank* fe meet thetr M
senlt. While our tank corps ?.?j
*ted opportunity, Us Ana per*onn?|
eponded gallantly on every
and ahowod courage of the htgheat
Tho chemical warfare Mrvlce rep*,
tented toother entirely now d?part*M
to this war, Whether or not cm *tg
be employed In fnture wore It % ?2
ter of coujectnra, but the effect U*
deadly to the anprepaied ttait we cm
never afford to segtoct the quet%
The general health of our ana)?
ooder condition* strange and adv?*
lo many way* to our American expiri.
eoce and mode of life wee marvel**,
ly food. Of all death* lu the Annff.
can expeditionary force* (to 8ept?*
ber L 1910). totaling 81.141. there
killed in action 35.550; died of woo**
received In battl*. I5.I3Q; offer
wound* and Injuries. &.60t; at* dtr
of dlaeaaee. 24.7M.
. *srre
fV. ; < v ? -v. ? I
. C. F. Sowel
DEHTIOT
(Office Ortr Brmce'i
CAMDEN, S. C.
The
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m$x-i 4
hMm
fl hat h.vpr
' a. ?, <> ;iw
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