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THE! CAMDEN JO( R\ tL [NEW SERIES.] VOL. II. CAMDEN, SOUTH CAROLINA, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 1811. NO. 10. PRESIDENT HARRISON'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS. Called from a retirement which I had supposed was to continue for the residue of my life, to fill the Chief Executive office of this great and free nation, I appear <*?ll f,\ tdlfA thfi Deiuru yuvi, igiiuw-v>h.i?>gij9, w oaihs which the Constitution prescribes, < as a necessary qualification for the per- I formance of its duties. And in obedience i to a custom coeval with our Government, 1 and what |I believe to be your expecta- I tions, I proceed to present to you a sum- < mary of the principles which will govern 1 me, in the discharge of the duties which { I shall be called upon to perform. i It was a remark of a Roman Consul, ' in an early period of that celebrated Re- .< Dubllc. that a most striking contrast was s observable in the conduct of candidates j1 for offices of power and trust, before and j I after obtaining them?thev seldom carry- < ingout in the latter case the pledges and j< promises made in the former. However 1 much the world may have improved, in < many respects, in the lapse of upwards of 1 two thousand years since the remark was I made bv the virtuous and indignant Ro- s man, I fear that a strict examination of s the annals of some of the modern elcc- I tivc Governments, would developc simi- t lar instances of violated confidence. Although the fiat of the people has t gone forth, proclaiming me the Chief Ma- j 5 gistrate of this glorious Union, nothing t upon their part remaining to be done, it c may be though* that a motive may exist : a to keep up the delusion under which they: I may be supposed to have acted in rcla- h tion to my principles and opinions; and jii perhaps there may be some in this assem- t bly who have come here either prepared j1 to condemn those I shall now deliver, or,1 Ii approving them, to doubt the sincerity: t with which they are uttered. But thei v t* 1 _ I !_ lapse of a few months win connrm or uis- j 11 pel their fears. The outline of principles] v to govern, and measures to he adopted, by t< an Administration not yet begun, will soon tl be exchanged f>r immutable history; and s I shall stand, cither exonerated by my b countrymen, or classed with the mass of e those who promised that they might de- c ceive, and flattered with the intention to p betray. j t! However strong may be my present j 1j purpose to realize the expectations of a r magnanimous and confiding people, 1 too lc well understand the infirmities of human tl nature, and the dangerous temptations to tl which I shall be exposed, from the mag- A nilude of the power which it has been the n ! >? nnanlii tr? rnmmit tfl mV is hands, not to place my chief confidence tl upon the aid of that Almighty Power o which has hitherto protected me, and ena- ft bled me to bring to favorable issues other if important, but still greatly inferior trusts, tl heretofore confided to me by my country, o The broad foundation upon which our n Constitution rests, being the people?<a ir breath of theirs having made, as a breath nr can unmake, change, or modify it?it can be assigned to none of the great divisions d of Government but to that of Democra-lti cy. If such is its theory', those who arc g called upon to administer it must recog-j Is nisc, as its leading principle, the duty of ju shaping their measures so as to produce j e the greatest good to the greatest number, g But, with these broad admissions, if we t< would compare the sovereignty acknow- ir lodged to exist in the mass of our people is with the power claimed by other sovc- w reignties, even by those which have been o considered most purely Democratic, we o shall find a most essential difference. All ri others lay claim to power limited only by their own will. The majority of our citi- S zens, on the contrary, possess a sovereign- C ty with an amount of power precisely si equal to that which has been granted to a them by the parties to the national com- h pact, and nothing beyond. We admit of n no Government by Divine right?belicv- tj ing that, so far as power is concerned, the c bencficient Creator has made no distinc- \ tion amongst men, that all are upon an I equality, and that the only legitimate right n to govern is an express grant of |yower t thr? rr.ovornpd Thn Pnnstilution of t """* e?? ? ? "v : -- the United States is the instrument con- v taining this grant of power to the several v departments composing the Government, t On an examination of that instrument, it r will be found to contain declarations of I power granted, and of power withheld. J The latter is also susceptible of division, c into power which the majority had the f right to .grant, but which they did not think r proper to intrust to their agents, and that t which they could not nave graiuua, noi t being possessed by themselves. In other i words, there are certain rights possessed < by each individual American citizen, i which, in his compact with the others, he I has never surrendered. Some of them, | indeed, he is unable to surrender, being, ] in the language of our system, unalienable. The boasted privilege of a Roman citizen was to him a shield only against a petty provincial ruler, whilst the proud domo crat of Athens could console himself under a sentence of death, for a supposed violation of the national faith, which no one understood, and which at times was the subject of the mockery of all, or of banishment from his home, his family, and his country, with or without an alledged cause; that it was the act, not of a single tyrant, or hated aristocracy, but of his assembled countrymen. Far different is the power of our sovereignty. It can interfere with no one's faith, prescribe forms of worship for no one's observance, inflict 10 punishment but after well ascertained guilt, the result of investigation under i rules pi escribed by the Constitution itself. | These precious privileges, and those < scarcely less important, of giving expres- < sion to his thoughts and opinions, either by < writing or speaking, unrestrained but by ' l-ir> liokilitv fnr ininrv tr* r?thr?rc anH thnf 5 )f a full participation in all the advantages which flow from the Government, the acknowledged property of all, the American citizen derives from no charter granted by 11s fellow man. He claims them because ic is himself a man, fashioned by the :ame Almighty hand as the rest of his ipecies, and entitled to a full share of the ilessings with which he has endowed hem. Notwithstanding the limited sovereignv possessed by the people of the United States, and the restricted grant of power o the Government which they have adoptid, enough has been given to accomplish ill the objects for which it was created, t has been found powerful in war, and litherto, justice has been administered, an utimatc union effected, domestic tranquiliy preserved, and personal liberty secured o the citizen. As was to be expected, lowever, from the defect of language, and he necessarily sententious manner in vhich the Constitution is written, disputes ave arisen as to the amount of power vhich it has actually granted, or was insmled to grant. This is more particularly lie case in relation to that part of the intrumcnt which treats of the legislative iraneh. And not only as regards the exrcise of powers claimed under a general ^ lausc, giving that body the authority to c ?ass all laws necessary to carry into effect f llr? cnopifio^ n^ivoi-s Kill in I'olatinn frt iho ll itter also. It is, however, consolatory to ? cflect, that ntost of thcJ instances of al- * ;ged departure from the letter or spirit of ic Constitution, have ultimately received ^ 10 sanction of a majority of the people. * tnd the fact, that many of our statesmen, c lost distinguished for talent and patriot- * ;m, have been, at one time or other of I1 icir political career, on both sides of each 11 f the most warmly disputed questions!, irces upon us the inference that the errors, a ' errors there were, arc attributable to P le intrinsic difficulty, in many instances, t! f ascertaining the intentions of the fra- P lers of the Constitution, rather thdn the f lflucnco of any sinister or unpatriotic J( HHIVOV But the great danger to otfr institutions 0 ocs not appear to me to be in a usurpa- ^ on, by the Government, of power not P ranted by the people, but by the accumu- 11 it ion, in one of the departments, of that 0 finch was assigned to the others. Limit- b d as arte the powers which have been ^ ranted, still enough have been granted v t constitute a despotism, if concentrated g l one of the departments. This danger a i greatly heightened, as it has been al- F l ays observable that men are less jealous v f encroachments of one department upn another, than upon their own reserved 1 ights. e When the Constitution of the United t hates first came from the hands of the a Convention which formed it, many of the f tcrnest republicans of the day were ) lartned at the extent of the power which g ad been granted to the Federal Govern- ? fient, and more particularly of that por- ^ ion which had been assigned to the Exe- 1 utive branch. There were in it features 1 vhich appeared not to be in harmony with * heir ideas of a simple representative' De- c nncracy, or Republic. And knowing the s endency of power to increase itself, par- ( icularly when exercised" by a single ir?dfi- e ridual, predictions were made that, at no c cry remote period,the government would 1 erminate in virtual monarchy. It would * tot become me to say that the fears of ( liese patriots have been already realized. 1 But, as I sincerely believe, that the ten- < lency of measures, and of men's opinions, ' or some years past, has been in that di- 5 ection, it is, I conceive, strictly proper I hat I should take this occasion to repeat 1 he assurances I have heretofore given of 1 nv determination to arrest ihe progress ' >f that tendency, if it really exists, and < restore the Government to its pristine j Kr>n!th nnri wirrAr no far as this can be ef- ' fccted by any legitimate exercise of the ' power placed in my hands. I proceed to state, in as summary a manner as I can, my opinion of the sources of the evils which have been so extensively cornpltpqcd of, and the correctives which may be applied. Some of the former are unquestionably to be found in the defects of the Constitution;, others, in my judgment, are attributable to a misconstruction of some of its provisions. Of the former is the eligibility of the same I individual to a second term of the Presi- I dcncy. The sagacious mind of Mr. Jef- { ferson early saw and lamented this error, I and attempts have been made, hitherto < without success, to apply the amendatory 1 power of the States to its correction. < As, however, one mode of correction is s in the power of every President, and con- ( sequently in mino, it would be useless, and c perhaps invidious, to enumerate the evils i of which, in the opinion of our fellow- r citizens, this error of the sages who fram- s cd the Constitution may nave been the r source, and the bitter fruits which we are 1 still to gather from it, if it continues to c iisfigure our system. It may be obscrv- s ;d, however, as a general remark, that t Republics can commit no greater error ^ ban to adopt or continue anv feature in t heir systems of government which may ^ De calculated to create the Jove of power, f n the bosoms of those to whom necessity a )bJiges them to commit the management d )f their affairs. And, surely, nothing is b nore likely to produce such a state of ^ nind than the long continuance of an of- g ice of high trust.' Nothing can be more f corrupting, nothing more destructive of t ill those noble feelings which belong to v he character of a devoted republican pa- F riot. When 1 his corrupting passion once e akes possession of the human mind, like r he love of gold, it becomes insatiable It a s the never-dying worm in his bosom, r jrows with his growth, and strengthens I vith the declining years of its victim. If g his is true, it is the part of wisdom for a a Republic to limit the service of that offi- v cer, at least, to whom she has intrusted u he management of her foreign relations, ( he execution of her laws, and the com- c nand of her armies and navies, to a peiod so short as to present his forgetting ti hat he is the accountable agent, not the b irincipal?*thc servant, not the mdster.? t< Jntil an amendment of the Constitution :an be effected, public opinion may se- ji :ure thd desired object. I give mv aid to ti t, by renewing the pledge heretofore n fiven, that, under no circnmstanccs, will tl Conse'nt to seiVe a second tei'n1. 9 But if there ia danger to public liberty c rom the acknowledged defects of the f Constitution, in the want of limit to the g ontinuancc of the Executive power in F he same hands, there is, I apprehend, not I nuch less from a misconstruction of that o rcstrument, as it regards the powers ac- n ually given. I cannot conceive that, by t t fair construction^ any or either of its a provisions would be found to constitute p he President a part of the legislative ^ ower'.- It cartriot be claimed from the n power to recommend, since, although en- c oined as a duty upon him, it is a privilege h tfiieh he holds in common with every P thcr citizen. And although there may o ic something more of confidence in the h propriety of the' measures recommended f< i the one case than in the other, in the t< bligations of ultimate decisions there can n m no difference. In the language of the t< Constitution, "all the legislative powers" P vhich it grants "are vested in the Con- h ;ress of the United States." It would be p i solecism in language to say that any d ortion of theso is not included in the p vhole^ I It may be said, indeed, that the Consti- tl ution has given to the Executive the pow- tl tr to annul the acts of the legislative' e >ody, by refusing to them his assent.- So; t' i similar power has necessarily resulted \ b i'om that instrument to the Judiciary; and; p ret the Judiciary form's itct part of the Le- o ;islature. There is, it is true, this differ- ii :nce between these grants of power.? c rhc Executive can put his negative upon t he afcts of the Legislature for other cause t ban that of want of conformity to the F Constitution, whilst the Judiciary can only i ( feclare void those which violate that in- F itrument. But the decision of the Judi- j v ;iary is final in such a case, whereas, in g :very instance where the veto of the Ex- t icutive is applied it may be overcome by 1 * - ? * - C l_.iL IT %. i vote ot two-iniras 01 uuin nouses ui ? Congress. The negative upon the acts I )f the Legislative by the Executive an- a hority, and that in the hands of one in- p lividual, would seem to be an incongruity f n our system. Like some others of a g similar character, however, it appears to y )Q highly expedient; and if used only J ?vith the forbearance, and in the spirit d which was intended by its authors, it may I ie productive of great good, and be found e )ne of the best safeguards to the Union, i \i the period of the formation of the c Constitution, the principle does not appear f to have enjoyed much tavor in the State t Governments. It existed but in two; and [ in one of these there was a plural Exeer.utive. If we would search for the mo- * tives which operated upon the purely pa triotic and enlightened assembly which I framed the Constitution; for the adoption of a provision so apparently repugnant to the leading Democratic principle that the majority should govern, we must reject the idea that they anticipated from it any benefit to the ordinary course of legislation. They knew too well the high decree of intelligence which existed among ;he people, and the enlightened character )f the State Legislatures, not to have the Idlest confidence that the two bodies sleeted by them would be worthy repre.entatives of such constituents, and, of sourse, that they would require no aid in sonceiving and maturing the measures ,vhich the circumstances of the country night require; and it is preposterous to mppose that a thought coiild for a monent have been entertained that the President, placed at the capital, in the :cntre of the country, could better undcrtand the wants and wishes of the people han their own immediate representatives, yiiu spenu a pan 01 every year amuiig hem, living with them, often laboring vith them, and bound to them by the tri>le tie of interest, duty, and affection. To issist or control Congress, then, in its orlinary legislation, could not, I conceive, ( lave been the motive for conferring the eto power on the President This ar- : [ument acquires additional force from the act of its never having been thus used by he first six Presidents; and two of them j fere members of the convention, one i (residing over its deliberations, and the ther having a larger share in consumnatirtg the labors of that augtist body than j iny other persom But if bills were never i etilrned to Congress by either of the i 'residents above referred to* Upon the < ;round of their being inexpedient, or not i s well adapted as they might bo to the vant.s of the people, the vetu was applied ipon that of want of conformity to the : Constitution, or because errors had been ommitted from a too hasty enactment. I There is another ground for the ddop- < ion of the veto principle, which had proiably more influence in recommending it o the Convention than any othen I re- < ?r tn thp CPPiirilv whi/?Vi it iritfoa (a (hp ^i I.V ?>IIW wwvui tbj if Hivii ll> gliug IV mv jst arid equitable action of the Legisla- I ure upon all parts of the Union. It could i lot but have occurred to the Convention j hat, in a country so extensive, embracing o great a variety of soil and climate, ancf, ( onsequently, of products, and which, rom the same causes, must eVer eihibit a ;reat difference in the amount of the lopulation of its various sections, calling r a great diversity in the employments if the people, that the legislation of the najority might not always justly regard lie rights and interests of the minority? .nd that acts of this character might be lasscd, under an express grant by tnc vords of the Constitution, and, therefore, lot within the competency of the judiiary to declare void; that, however enghtened and patriotic they might suprose, from past experience, the members f Congress might be, and however largey partaking in the general of the liberal < selings of the paople, it was impossible d expect that bodies so constituted should ot sometimes be controlled by local in3rests and sectional feelings.- It was proer, therefore, to provide some umpire, rom whose situation and mode of apointment more independence and freeom from such influences might b'd dxiccted. Such a one was afforded by the Executive Department, constituted by fie' Constitution. A person elected to hat high office, having hir constituents in very section, State, and subdivision of he Union, must consider himself bodnd y the most solerrtrf sanctions tor guard, ( rotect, and defend the rights of all, and if every portion, great or small, from the \ njustice and oppression of the rest. I :onsider the veto power, therefore,- given < iv tho (jmvstitntioii to the Executive of i he United States solely as a conservative I >ower, to be used only, 1st, to protect the Constitution from violation; 2dly, thepeo- ; >le from the effects of hasty legislation, o vhcre their will has been probably disre- i ;arded or not well understood; and, 3d!y, o prevent the effects of combinations vioative of the right of the minorities. In eferencc to the second of these objects, may observe, that I consider it the right ind^privilege of the people to decide dis?uted points of the Constitution, arising rom the general grant of power to Congress to carry into effect the powers cx?resslv given. And I believe, with Mr. tfuHisnn "that raneated recognitions, un 1UU.UV., - . ?(' - a Icr varied circumstances, in nets of the legislative,Executive,and Judicial branchis of the Government, accompanied by ndications in different modes of the con:urrence of the general will of the nation, is affording to the President sufficient atihority for his considering such disputed joints as settled." Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of Government. It would be an object more iiighly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise nature could be ascertained, a fair exhibit made of the operations of each of its Departments, of tho powers which they respectively claim and exercise, of the collisions which have occurred between them, or between the whole Government and those of the States, or either of them. We could then compare, our actual condition, after fifty years' trial of our system, with what it was in the commencement of its operations, and ascertain whether the predictions of the patriots who opposed its adoption, or the confident hopes of its advocates, have been best realized. The great dread of the former seems to have been, that tlje reserved powers of the States Would be absorbed by those of the Federal Govern-., ment, and a consolidated poWdr established, leaving to the States the shadow, only, of that independent action for iyhich they had so zealously contended, and on the preservation of which they relied" as the last hope of liberty. Without denying that the result to which they looked with so much apprehension is in the way: of being realized* it is obvious that they did not clearly see the mode of its accomplishment. The General Government ha& seized upon none of the reserved rights'of; the States, A* far as any open -vtaHare may have gone, the State authoritieadiaVe amply maintained their rights. TV a casual observer, our system presents no ap-' pearance of discord between the different members which compose it, liven thb addition of many new ones has prdtfpfi'&i no jarring, They move in their retentive orbits iri perfect harmony vvith tfta, central head, and with each other,- But there is still an under current at work* by which, if not seasonably checked* the wor9t apprehensions of odr anti-Federal, patriots Will De realized. Ana noi oniy will the State authorities be overshadowed, by the great increase of power in the Executive Department of the General Go*, vernment, but the character of th4t( Government, if not in its designation*, be essentially and radically changed. 'Th* state of things has been in- part effected by causes inherent in the Constitution* 4ttd in part by the never-failing tendency ofi political power to increase- itself. By' making the President the sole distributor of all the patronage of the Govertliflent,'1 the framers of the Constitution do hot ttp-: pear to have anticipated qt hoW short period it would become a Formidable instrument to control the free orteftftfoos of the State Governments. Of (riding 'importance at first, it had, early iri Mr. Jefferson's administration, become so powerful as to create great alarm in the mind of that patriot* from the potent influence it might exert in controlling the freedom of the elective franchise. If such could have, then been the effects of its influence, how L ?-A mucn greater mussi uc uic uaugei ?u. mm, time, quadrupled in amount, as it certainly is, and more completely under the control of the Executive will, than their construction of their powere allowed, or the forbearing characters of fill the early Presidents permitted thenrt <0 make? But it not by the extent o>f ftfi patronage alorie that the Executive Eteptetrtment has become dangerous1, but by the use which it appears may be made of the appointing power, to bring under its control" the whole revenue of the country. The Constitution has declared it to tie the daty of the President to see that the laws are executed, and it makes him the Commanderin-Chief of the armies firid navy of tho United States. If the opinion of the most approved writers Upon that species of mixed Government, Which, in modern Europe, is termed ntandrcAi/, in contradistinction to despotism, is correct, there was wanting no other addition to the power* of our Chief Magistrate to stamp, a monarchical character on our Government, 1 * 4Uo finnnooa OUl IIIC UOIJUUl vi IIIC puviH/ uuiuikvo. , And to me it appears strange, indeed, that any one should doubt that the entire control Which the President possesses over the officers who have the custody of the public money, by the power of remptal with or without cause, docs, for all mischievous purposes at least, virtually subject the treasure also to his disposed. * The first Roman Emperor, in his, attempt, to seize the sacred treasure, silenced the Opposition of1 the officer to whose charge ft had been committed, by a significant allusion to his sword. By a selection of political instruments for the care of thepubl; "'nnotr 1 mfarpnno trt their COIWUS 1iu iii'/iivj j u iviviwiiuv w - _ n sions by a President, would be quite as effectual an argument as that of Csesar to the Roman knight. I am not insensible of the great difficulty that exists in devising a proper plan for the safe keeping and disbursement of the public revenues, and I know the importance which has been attached bv men of great abilities and patriotism to the divorce, as it is called, of the Treasury from the banking institutions. It is not the divorce which is complained of, but the unhallowed union of tho * - -\ *