University of South Carolina Libraries
and the enemy'a large army in sight of lirrpi itt Sf eT ?His ?hole ?oroe imagery 1itU<iPTer. l?e? jftar, ot- ^Clel tot? yeA ha de^rnitaadMJgm ,Mift?fogo byipwrol thn^ menta, whioh have rendered him BO re? nowned, When all his plans were ma?, trjed. he sent an order to Jackson to move rapidly from the vaiiejj B*?? vu th? 26th of Jane, began that seriee ot bat? tiest whioh so much expedited McClel? lan's celebrated "change of base," and ?ant his shattered columns cowering to the shelter ol the gup-boats on the lower James. ; General "Lee's whole !o?rq? ai that time, inolnding Jaokson'8, Ma? gruder's, Hager's and. Holmes'-in fact, the whole for co in and around Rich? mond, did not exceed .80,000 effective men, il it reached that figure; and this, was the largest army he ever command? ed. McClellan's force, on the 20th of Jane, was 105,825 for duty, by his own ?tatemeot; yet in his letters, before the battle, he states that he was largely out? numbered, and in one letter he pats oar force at 200,000 men. Here is what he says in his report of the 4th of August, 1868: "Th?. report of the 'secret service corps,' herewith forwardedf and dated the 26th of Jane. (1862.) shows the esti? mated strength of the enemy, at the time of the evacuation of Yorktown, to haye been from 100,000 to 120,000. The same report pats his numbers, on the 26th of: Jane, (186"",,) at; about 180,000, and the specific. information obtained regarding their .organisation warrants the belief that .this estimate did not ex? ceed his actual strength." We have all beard . a good deal abont spies in Biohmond daring the war. I am inclined to think that there were some people very much humbugged by that secret service corps; and McClel? lan's statement is. a complete vindication of all who were in the departments at feat time. : .,, After McClellan had established him? self .on his now "base," he began to be again haunted with the idea of vastly superior numbers opposed to. him, and he begged earnestly for re-inforooments. Hal leek, the Commander-in-Chief at Washington, made a visit to him about this time, apd after his return, in a letter to him?, dated the 6th of August, 1862, given in McClellan's report, He Lieck says: "You snd your officers, at oar inter? view, estimated the enemy's forces in and around Biohmond at 200,000 men. Since then yon and others report that they have received and are receiving large reinforcements from the Sooth. General Pope's army, covering Washing? ton, is only about 40,000. Your effect? ive force is only about 90.000." At that time a new commander had appeared in Virginia, North of the Ba? rndon, in the person of Major-General John Pope, noted for his veracious pro? clivities, and his otter contempt for "re? bel" soldiers, of whom he had never seen anything bat their backs. With ''headquarters in the saddle," and an entire disregard for advantage of posi? tion and lines of retreat, whioh latter he left to take care of themselves, he only wanted to find ont where the "rebela were, so that he might go at them in? continently, and lie caine, "conquering and to conqaer." With three divisions, Jackson quietly moved np to Gordon? ville. The first effeot of Pope's appear? ance was terrific. To say nothing of the onslaught on the pigs, poultry and dai? ries of the conntry, there was great con? sternation and dismay at Biohmond, ac? cording to the following despatch, sent by Halleck to MoOlellau, on the 31st of Joly. Halleck says: ''General Pope ogain telegraphs that the enemy ia reported tobe evacuating Biohmond, and falling baok on Danville and Ly nobb arg." This was while McClellan was trem? bling at Harrison's Landing at tho dread phantom of 200,000 men at Richmond, with more arriving from Beauregard and Bragg, whioh haunted his imagination. Jackson soon began to show Pope some things he had never looked upon before. The battle of Oedar Ban or Slaughter's Mountain occurred on the 9th of August, and Pope began to see some remarkable sights. The evacuation of the "new base" at Harrison's Landing, whioh Mc? Clellan had assumed with so mach abil? ity, waa hastened. In a despatch from McClellan to Halleck, dated the 14th of August, there ooaars this notable pas? sage: "I don't like Jackson's movements; he will soddenly appear where least ex? pected." It was a way General Jackson had, ol disturbing people with his eccentricities. General Lee now tamed his attention to the doughty oommander, whose head* smartere were in the saddle, and to whose aid McClellan was hastening his army. Stewart commenced his pranks around Pope's headquarters; and while the lat? ter, on the line of the Bappahasnock, was steadily looking to the front for thc "rebels," in otter oblivion of any possi? ble line of retreat, Jackson suddenly ap? peared in his rear on that line, thus call lng his attention to it; and then ensued that succession of engagements known as "Second Man a ssas." Any of the survivors of Gregg's bri gade, who may be here, may, perhaps, be interested and entertained by thc following extraots from Pope's report, Ho says: "Siegel attaoked the enemy abont day light on the morning of the 29th, a mile or two East of Groveton, where he wai soon joined by the divisions of Hooker and Kearney. Jaokson fell back severa! miles, bat was so closely pressed bj theso forces that he waa compelled tc make a stand, and to make the best de fence possible." And after mentioning an order tc Porter to ont off Jackson's retreat, ht says: "About half-past 5 o'olook, (P. M Sunday,) when General Porter shouli have been coming into notion, in oom plisnoe with this order, I directed Gene sale Heintzel man and Reno to attack tlx enemy. The attack was made with grea gallantry, and tho whole of the left of "tnereneitt/.'wJii rtwablssHMicrV tturt?ds'hrg centre, and oar own forcea, after a sharp oonfliot of an hour and a half, occupied the M?ot bat?e. ?Jhed?ac) of the, enemy gua our hands. In thisiattaok, Grover'* bi ?gado ol Hooker's di v i$on waa particularly* disUoguishecV by ande -J.J v_IL* -U-U.J,V?n,? ?T0 of tho'euomy'e lines, and penetrating to the third before it could be checked." Geo. Jackson, after breaking the rail road, and destroying the immense atores at hf anassas, whioh could not be removed, had moved to the old battle-field of Ma nasas/? to await the] nrr/ival of Gen. Lee. with Longstreet's force. Early on the morning of tho 29th of August, he bad taken position on the old noosed rail? road grade near that field, and there, with his 'three divisions, of less than 20,000 men, he had received and repulsed Pope's successive attacks. Tho last at? tack was made on a part of the line held by Gregg's and Tho mas'brigades. These two brigades, after a gallant resistance, and when their ammunition was ex? hausted, retired a very short distance to the rear, and were awaiting the advance of the enemy, determined to resist with the bayonet. My brigade then advanced past them, drove the enemy back and re? gained the position in the railroad cut whioh the enemy had occupied. This was the last attack on Jackson's lino that day, and is, I prosnme, the one so glow? ingly described by Pope. At the close of the day we held bor whole lino intact, with all oar dead and wounded in our hands-as they had remained all the time. Those brilliant and determined bayonet charges, so often mentioned by Federal commanders, were like the play of Hamlet, with the part of Hamlet left ont. No one ever saw or felt the bayo? nets, anlese some poor wounded soldier lying helpless on the field. All the fighting on onr side, on the 20th, was done by Jackson's command, except an affair, abont dnBk, between King's division, of MoDowell's corps, and the advance of Longstreet's command, whioh began to arrive between ll A. M. and 12 M. in the day, bat did not engage in the battle until Elie g made his od vanoe, ander the idea that Jackson was retreating; whioh wac a very great delu? sion. In a despatch dated 5.30 A. M., the 30th, Pope says: "We have lost not less than 8,000 men killed and wounded; but, from the appearance of the field, the enemy lost at least two to one. He stood strictly on the defensivo, and every as? sault was made by ourselves. The battle was fonght on the identical battle-field of Ball Ban, whioh greatly increased the enthusiasm of tho men. The news jost reaches me from the front that the enemy is retiring toward ths> mountains. I go forward at once to see. We have made great captures, but I am not able, yet, to form an idea of their extent." Daring the morning and forenoon, attacks were again made on Jackson's line, but Longstreet did not come into action nntil tho afternoon; when, by the combined attack, Pope's army was driven from the field and across Bull Bun, with terrible slaughter. . Pope says, in his report: "Every indication, during the night oi the 29th, and up to 10 o'clock on the morning of the 80th, pointed to the re? treat of the enemy from our front." Further on, in the same report, he nyc: "During the whole night of the 29th, and the morning of the 80th, the advance of the main army, under Lee, waa ar? riving on the field to reinforce Jackson, so that by 12 or 1 o'clook in the day we were confronted by forces greatly supe? rior to our own; and these foroes were being every moment largely inoreased bj fresh arrivals of the enemy in tho direc? tion of Thoroughfare Gap." General Loo's whole army, at second Ma nasaas, did not amount to 50,000 men. It wai oomposed of part of the army which had beer at Richmond during the seven daya, and al least two divisions, D. H. Hill's and MoLawa' bad not arrived-they had been left bobine to protect Richmond until the whole o McClellan's army got off. Pope's army hat been largely re-inforoed from McOlollan's, th? whole of which had landed at Alexandria, anc Vy a part of the troops of Burnside's oorps lately from North Carolina, under Reno, 8,(XX strong. At 9.45 P. M., on the 30th, Pope telegraphs to H ailee k: "The battle was most furious for boan without cessation, and the ioBses on botl sides very heavy. The enemy is badi: whipped, and we shall do well enough. Di notus uneasy. We shall hold onr own line.1 To this, Halleok replied : -'You Lavs done nobly. Don't yield ancthe inch, if you can avoid it, All reserves ar boing sent forward." Tot, after all of MoOlellan's troops ha< arrived to bis aid, and before another gui had boon fired, Pope telegraphed to Halleok from Centreville, at 10.45 A. M., 31st: "I should like t" know whether you fee S3oaro about Washington, should this arm; be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as i man will stand np to the work." rone's whole army waa noon hurled i oto tb fortifications around Washington, by th army wuioh bad beon BO badly whipped oi tho 30th, and Major-General John Pope disap pesred from tbe soene of aotion, in some ro spoofs, a wiser if not a bettor man. He wa sent on to tho far West to fight tho red mei of tho plains, and we heard no moro of bit dariug the war. Pope's or:sir.<tl torco c 40,000, Reno's 8,000, and MoOlellan's 90,0(K mada 138,000 men, whom General Loo's arm of IOBB than 50,000 had to deal with on thi occasion. AU of MoOlellan'B force was not u at the battle of 30th, but all was up by th battlo of the 1st of Beptembor, at Ox Hill o Chantilly. Yet this was another caso c suporior numbers on our sido. Tho crossing of the Potomao now followed and then tho capturo of Harper's Ferry, an tho battles of Mouth Mountain and Bharpt burg. When tho battlo began atSharpuburg, earl on tho morning of tho 17th of Beptembei General Lee's whole infantry forco on th field did not exceed 15,000. A. P. Hill's divi sion of Jackson's corps, Andoraon'B divisor with ono or two oxtra brigades temporaril attached to it, and MoLaw's diviaion, nil c whioh had participated in tho attack on Hai per'a Ferry, had not oomo up. With all tho carno up during tho day, our infantry fore did not exceed 23,000 mon- Cur cavalry wa not engaged, and a largo portion of our arti lory had not crossed tho river from Harper Ferry; and did not cross until at night, who the battlo was ovor. Our whole forco, of a arms, when tho whole wan up, did not uxeoe 30.000. MoOlellan's army, according to bia Bl atc meut, numberod 87,104 in action. Yot w f night him from day-broak until late in the ?afternoon. anrt,?4-iha.-eloaavof ; the iifcjw i held dor position. We" oontinued to hold it 1 the whole ot tbe next day, and Houlahan dio not dare to attack vu. i. In his roport, ho gives thia remarkable esti? mate of (Jouerai Lee's army. I road bia language: ... "An eetimato of the forcea nuder the Con? federate Gennral Led, made np by direction nf ann n ral lian ka. from i jformation obtained by tho examination of prlaoners, acnermro, ?pies, Ac, previous to the battle of Antietam, is SH follows: Gen. T. J. Jaokson'a corps, 21,778; Gen. James Longa treat'ee?r ps.23,812; Gen. D. H. Hill's second division, 18,546; Gen. J. E. B. 8tswart's cavalry, 6,400, Gen. Bah som's and Jenkins' brigades,'8,000; forty-six fegimeata not included iu above, 18,400; artil o ry ec li m a te tl at 100 gu ne, B.?OO; total, 97.?9 These estimates give the actual numbor of men pr?sent and flt for duty." You must recollect that McClellan was con? sidered the gentleman among the Federal or Uu in n commanders-and thia ia bte statement1 of (ho force opposed to him at Uharpsbnrg. There was a rumor that Banks WAH Jackson S commissary, and I suppose McClellan thought the commissary ought to know the strength of the corps, at least. Banks, however, was not with McClellan at Bharpsburg, and this estimate of bis, I presume, was mado while Ju uk ?on was figuring in Pope's rear, and Banks was one of the corpa commanders of the latter. Some allowance, therefore, must bo made for him, as he always saw with von largely magnifying glasses whoa "Stonewall Jackson" was about. There are sumo curions reflections whioh snggeat tnomseives in connection with Mc? Clellan's statement of his own forces. It mast bo remembered that tho troops nuder McClellan's command on the Potomac, and ia Maryland and Delaware, on thu lat of March, 18G2. numbered over 193.00O for dnty; tbe Ninth Corpa, (Burnside's,) numbering over 13.000 at Bharpsburg. had been brought from North and South Carolina; PremontV command from North-western Virginia, and Homo troops under Siegel, from Missouri, had also arrived aiuco the 1st of March; and very recently some troops had come from the West, under Cox, besides thu recruits from new levies that had beeu received What had reduced that immense foreo to 87,161 men, on the 17th of September, 1862? Bow was it the weak "rebel" government at Richmond had been enabled to invade tho enemy's country with an army of ovsr 97,000 mon, while the strong, "patriotic'' government at Washington had been ablo to rally, from all tho "loyal" North and Nurth-wust, to pre? servo "tho best government tho world ever saw," to defend the national capital, aud to {irotect tho "loyal" States against tho "rebel" tordos by which they worn threatened, only a little over 87,000 men? This is a little curi? ous, is it not? You may think it a little strange that Gun. Lee had le s than 30,000 moa at Sharpahurg. The who'o force for duty in tho Department of Northern Virginia, at the close of July 1862, wan 69,559. as shown hy the official ro? port ?ow on file in the Archivo ?nice al Wa? too. I oopv from a statement from the re.< ?rta given by a Northern writer-all Confederates hoing denied access to thom, Some troops had to be left at Richmond, al Drury's and Chaffiu's Bluff*, and at otho* point's-and one army had not beeu reinforced to any material extent-00,000 men, inclusive of D. H. Hill's and MoLawa' divisious, were thu utmost that could be carried into th? field. Thero had been tho battle of Cedai Hun, the fighting cn the Rapid an, the Beriet of battles at Second Manassas, Ox Hill, Har per's Ferry and South Mountain-all withou any reinforcements. Of course, coueiderabh loases had been eustatnod in all these battles but, ic addition to that, there waa a beavj falling off bom straggling caused by uttei exhaustion. Our army had been marching and flghtinj almost continually since the battle of Cedai Run. The men wure badly clothed and werai shod-our rations had given ont st seconi Manassas-in fact, some of the troops o Longstreet's corps came to that battle with out rations. From that time until we got int? Maryland our men had to live principally oi frosh beef and green corn, without salt o bread. That diet is better than non?, by i good deal, but it is a very weakening one ti march and fight on-as some of you, perhaps know. Tho consequenco of all thia was tba beforo we crossed tho Potomao many of ou men had entirely hr >kon down from exhaust ion and sore feet, while many had straggle* off for food. The loss from theta causes wa very heavy, and you can understand how los thau 60,000 men could very easily ho ruducci to loss than 30,000, iu a campaign of six week? in which many bloody battles had been fough against vary large odds. To show that I ar not out of tho way in my estimate, I will stat that tho samo reporta from which I hav quoted show only 52,609 men for duty in th whole department at the close of September after the stragglers bad all oom? un and man convalescents had returned to duty. Yo! must recollect that the troops under MoClel lan and Pope numbered, on the 6th of August 1862, according to Halleek's statement. 130 00 for duty; that Burnside had brought ove 13,000; that Cox's division had corns from th Weat since that time, and, besides, there wer the recruits and reinforcements received a Washington. If all that force had boon re dueed to 87,161, when it was BO well clothed shod and fed, it waa not unreasonable tba there should bo a falling oft of 30.0UU in Gee Lee's army, from tho casualties of hattie an tbe other causes mentioned. Oen. Lee, in hi report, said his strength wis under 40,00( but for obvious reasons he never disclosed hi weakness at any time. Notwithstanding it smallness, our little army accomplished wor ders at Bharpsburg. McClellan, in giving th reasons why he was not ablo to renew th battle on the 18th, in his report, eaye: "One division of Sumner's corps, and all c Hooker's corpa, on the right, had. after figbl ing most valiantly fer several hours, bec overpowered by Bambers, driven in great die order and muoh scattered, so that they wen for tho time, somewhat demoralized." To show how they were overpowered b numbers, let me tell you that, in tue mo rn in t Hooker's corps, 11.856 strong, had attaoke the position held by Jackson's command o the field, thon 1,000 strong, and D. H. Hill divieion of 8,000-in all 7,000 men. Mani field's corps, then 10,126 stro.g, then came t the assistance of Hooker; sud then Hood two brigades, of less than 1.500, and, latei my brigade, of leas than 1,000, wore brougt into the fight. Sumner's corps, 18,813 strong and Franklin's corps, 12.300 strong, wen about tho same time, brought to the assis ance of Hooker's and Mansfield's oorps; an McLaws' and Anderson's divisions, which ha arrivod from Harper's Fem, together wit t*o brigades under T. G. Walker, wont to th aid of our troops engaged with those fot corps. Thus less than 18.000 Confederate witn all that woro brought up, from first t last, encountered, on that part of the fielt 56,095 of tho enemy. I givo this statement t to the enomy's foreo engaged on that part < the field from McClellan's roport, and as t those engagod on our sido 'rom ruy person; knowledge and thooflh-ial reports of divisie commanders, which continu my recolleotiu and ostimate. But I have not given yon all McClellan sai on the subject of superior numbers. On ttl 27th of Soptemhor, ho wroto to llalleck as fe Iowa: "In tho last battles, tho enemy was m doubtedli' greatly superior to us in number and it wac only hy hard fighting (hat v gained (ho advantage wo did. As it was, tl result was at ono period very doubtful, an wo had all wo could do to win the day." Win tho day, indoodl Ho had not dared I rom-w tho attack on the lHih, and ho di not venturo to claim a victory till on tho 19( I when ho found dene nil Loo had recrossed ll Potomac, and then bo began to bread freely, and crow instily. Verily, my 'fiend our boys in rusty gray had a wonderful faeuli of magnifying and multiplying themselves : hattie; aud language could< not convey higher compliment to their prowess, than have given you. Su*rp*bai g was so dsfsit to ocr ?rrc4> AU bf MoOtellsn'e efforts to drive ns from the position had been baffled, with immense ?Unguter of his Troops- over 19,000 killed and wounded, according to his report. " .We ? waitod his attic*, ?ll tbs. next .day. bat he waa afraid to renew lt. In the mean time, re? inforcements were marching io hie assistance, wolli jitters wss se peSsiMhty of I re-i nfor ce? ments for Oonoral Leeland the latter bad the Potomao.immediately in his rear. Be, there? fore, very properly reorosaed that river, and McClellan did not follow bim to ronew tho battle. Borne persons are disposed to consider this campaign into Maryland a failure; bnt that was npt the mao, la .& military .aspect* Wo did not rai ie Maryland as we boped, bat that was not because or any reverse to our army. The spirit of resistance had, in a great mea? sure, died out in that State. Tho love of eaao, money and the comforts of lifo had be? come stronger than the love of liberty. Many wished us suocees, provided it did not cost them any great sacrifice; but there were very fow who were disposed to join ns, even when wo first crossed the Potomac. Maryland, however, furnished many most gallant sol? diers, who cams South at the beginning of the war. lu a military point of view, this campaign .nus a great suceras, though it did not ac? complish all we deairod. When General Leo took command of the army, the enemy bad invested tho Confederate capital, and waa in sight of ita spirea; tho beleaguered city had beau relieved, thc enemy investing li driven oat of the State, aud the Confederate com. mander, at the oloae of tho campaign, stood proudly defiant on the extreme Northern bor? der ol the Confederacy, while his opponent had had his "baao" removed to tho Northern bank of the Potomao, at a point moro than 175 miles from the Confederate cspital, as the bird flies, and his army had been BO crippled that he was not able tn resume offensive ope? ration* for near two mouths. When bia army did move, General Leo was iu a position to interpone and inflict at Fredericksburg an? other aigual defeat on tho invading fonte. I might multiply the instances of tho at? tempts of our enemies to falsify the truth of Malory, iu order tu excuse their manifold failures, and to conceal the inferiority ol their troops in all tho elements of manhood, but I would become too tedious. Tho world canuot bu mado to believe that a population of 5,000,1)00 could produce more soldiers than one of 22,000,000, eapecially whou the latter lind all the world besides u> rooruit from Thia ia too much liku the old story of tho Irishman who captured five mun by surrounding them all at one time. Burnside waa a little doubtful which had the numbers at Frederickabarg, and he state* frankly: "It waa found to bu impossible to get ibu mon up to tho works. Tho ouumy'a lire waa too hot for thom." His forco auroa? tb. river at the battle was 100,000; ours was very considerably ?maller. Joe Hooker-"Fighting Joe," aa ho waa called-for a wonder, did not oiaim that wo bad thu odds against bini, when ho crossed the llappahaunock to Chancellorsville, and issued an order to bia troops, etatiug that be had tho "rebel army" just where hu wanted it, aud would proceed to cruah it-and tuuu went back, under compulaiou, and said, with a great flourish of trumpets, that the Army of the Potomac waa the custodian of its own honor; that it advauced when it pleaaod, fought whuii it pleased and retired when it pleased. Fighting Joe. however, said some? thing quite aa amusing as the old story about wuperior numbera, which I will give you. lu his testimony bofore the Committee on the Couduct of the War, he said: "Our artillery had always been superior to that of the r?bela, aa waa* also our infantry, except in dinoiDliuo, and that, for reasons not necessary to mention, never did equal Leo'a army. With a rank and file vastly infe? rior to our own, intellectually and physically, teat army ha*, by discipline alone, acquired a character for steadiness and efficiency unsur? passed, iu my judgment, in ancient or modern timen. We have not been able to rival it, nor baa there bjeu any approximation to it iu the other rubel armies." Hooker is manifestly of opinion that the successes of Leo'a army were duo to ita supe? rior discipline, not withstanding ita inferiority in numbers, and its vast inferiority, intellectu? ally ann physically, to bia own. Ho gives another opinion which ia not a little amusing, and may throw aomo light on tho subject, in tho narnu testimony, hu says : "Some of oar corps commanders, aud also officers of other rank, appoar to be nu willing to go into a light; in my judgment, there are not many who really Uko to tight." Thia waa aaid of tho army which waa thc custodian of ita own honor. It did not aeem to occur to Hooker, that, porhapa, there might be something in the oft quoted maxim of the great dramatic poet, who has aaid, .Thrice is be armed that hath bia quarrel just; "And ho bot naked, though looked up iu steel, "Whoae consol?nos with injustice ia corrupt? ed," to explain the difference in tho conduct of tho two annies. At Gettysburg, Meado, with an a* my of 100,000 at limit, waa outnumbered by oura, lesa iban 60,000 strong; and bo was very much relieved wben General Lee, after a drawn battle, determined to retiro because his ammunition waa drawing short. When Grant took command of all the armies, be determined to get rid of the bugbear of superior num? bers, and to have the odds on his aide, ao that he might deBtroy aa by tho more attrition of numbers, if nothing else. It was a very costly experiment to him, in that wonderful cam? paign, from the Kapidan to the James, where the military genius of General Lee, and the fighting capacity and endurance of hts army, were so coD*piououBly displayed-a campaign which, in my opinion, stands unsurpassed in the annals of warfare, for the marvelous ex? hibition of all tho oloments of the m .;at exalt? ed military genius, on the part of our com? mander, and the sublime courage and steadi? ness of bis little army, which waa leas than a third as strong aa the opposiug forco; bnt the history of that campaign has nover been writ? ten. With an army of vory near 200,000 men, with the reinforcements that were brought up, all of Grant'a plans wore thwarted ^nd de? feated by an army of leas than 50,00fnuen, io a contest continuing for nearly forty days, and extending over a diatance of eighty miloa; and ho waa finally, after a loss in battlo of considerably more mon than Goneral Leo had iu all, compelled to tako refuge on James Uiver, at a point to which hu could havo gone without tho less of a mau. Ho waa then corn polled to invoke to his aid, as au ally of bia ?rocosa of attrition, lingering starvation, hose two agencies slowly but surely did their work; aud when, at tho head of more thau 150,000 mon, superbly equipped and bounti? fully fed. bo received tho surrender of leaa ihan 8,000 worn and oniaciated Confederate soldiers with arma in their hands; and, in? cluding tho toamatora, extra-duty men, wounded and sick, camp followers and strag? glers, who afterwards carno in, 27,805 men hi all, wo can well imagine tho (culing* with which ho and bia principal ollicers looked each other in thu Taco, and asked, aa well they might: "Is thia thu army which baa au long baflied all our mighty efforts? * it waa but tho ghost bf tho Army of North? ern Virginia which they conquered. What a scene waa that, ut that hitherto quiet and un? known village, in tho interior of Virginia! Cn tim one hand, stands the very nnprep. s aoa.-iug form of Ulysses S. tirant, tho mere croaturu of accident, but the successful oom* munder now, ut the head nf a mighty boat, in all the "pride, pomp and circumstance of war"-I will not say glorious war wailing lo re?oive tho snrreinirr of bia great mit agonir t Cn thu other hand, approaches thu Htately and majestic form of hubert E. Lee, "Where every god did seem to set his seal, To give thu world assurance of a niau." Following bim ooma tba gaunt forma of lea? AMBjJOflUMB in. tattered gray. to. Uv do wu tho arma they had won in battle, and which they had borne ao long with honor. Aa they atack thoao arma, thoy caat their eyes upon their beloved commander, whoae heart ia breaking with a grier uonUerabl?. and they bnratinto uncontrollable.. tear?-those men whose, bold hearts had noverquailed amid ?ho deadly strife of tho battlefield, whatover Odds ?ere opposed io th=T. ;*?h"y ?*4re not dow conquered in battle, bat they lay down their arms, beoause toey scarce nave strength to carry them, and beoause they are weary and foot-sore, and cannot longer march. Obi it was a most piteous, moving eight_enough to make the angela weep. Where waa the glory of that victory? Had the leader of that immense host had the feelings of magna? nimity which ought te apimate all. true sol? diers, he would have marched his army to Washington, and demanded that full, com? plete and perfect poaoe, amnesty and protec? tion be granted to too men who had given such unmistakable evidence of devotion to truth, - honor and right. No man could look upon that scene at Appomattox Court House, and for a moment, iu his heart, believe that the followers of Robert E. Lee wero traitors or rebels. Cut, my comrades, the "victor" on that occasion had not the remotest conception of the true moaning of the word "magnanimity,1'much lesa of the sentiment. Talk of UrantV mag? nanimity on that occasion, in conceding the terms that he did to General Lee's demande! I scout the idea. General Lee went to that interview with tho firm resolve to out his way oat with the small remnant left, if terms were not granted him deemed honorable in war. Grant saw the blue mountains nut far off-ho had sad experience of what that little army waa capable-he was afraid General Lee might make his way into those mountains, ana then he wonld lose tho supreme glory of terminating the war by the surrender to him of his groat antagonist, and he granted the torrns, without winch ho could uot have pro? cured that surrender. Call you thia magna? nimity? But it is said he prevonted General Leu from being proseonted for treason. He had, then, fortunately for him, a mentor who forced the idea into bis dall brain, that his own honor ami glory were in some way con? nected with that matter, in maintaining invio? late tho parole granted Goneral Lee and bia soldiers, and he acted iu accordance with the suggestions made to him. That mentor has Bines gone, and what has been his course, as thu head of a powerful government, towards General Leo and his followers? Compared to what has been done to our people, it would have hoon mercy to havo hung all our lead? ers, civil and military, and then granted peace and amnosty to ino masses. Jeffreys, himself, could not have devised more exquisito torture and cruelty than has been inflicted on all our people. From that Hold at Appomattox, where the vast superiority of tho Southern man and soldier over the Northern was made so inam? ical to tho dullest comprehension, there went up a vow to degrade and humiliate into the very dost the race which bad proved itself so far above its conquerors in all tbs elements of genuine manhood. Death could not do it, for the slaughter of heroes could but make their virtues shine the brighter. Is it neces? sary for mo to specify the hellish devious which have boon adopted to oarry oat the firm resolve to break and cower the spirit of our people, or show bow they are now in con? stant operation? Let the state of things in your own State, down-trodden under the feet of your former slaves, and of their far worse coadjutors, the carpet baggern and native renegades, with martial law in existence in many quarters, tell the talel That great philosophic historian, Gibbon, tolls us, in speaking of the heathen Emperor of Rome, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, that "he was severe to himself, indulgent to the imperfections of others, just ana beneficent to all mankind. He regretted that Avidias Cassius, who excited a rebellion in Syria, had disappointed him, by a voluntary death, of tho pleasure of converting an onemy into a friend; and ho justified the sincerity of that sentiment hy moderating the zeal of the Se nato against the adherents of the traitor." Compare the sentiments and conduct of that heathen ruler, of a heathen '?people, with those of tho hoad of this J ree, enlightened, Christian republic, and his Senate and follow? ers, and what must bo the judgment? Aa, at Appomattox, the vast inferiority of Grant to Gen. i.eo, as a military commander, was made most manifest, so, at tho hoad of a powerful nation, his utter deficiency in all the clements of that true grandeur of soul, so conspicuously displayed in retirement by his groat antagonist, has boen most signally de uionst rated-th'fcarecr ol tho two, reapective iy, thus furnishing another illustration of the tact, that "Pigmies are pigmies still, though perch'd on Alps. And pyramids aro pyramids in vales." We are sometimes told that we must turn our hacks upon the past, forget all our che? rished traditions, ideas and principles, and fall in with the progressive spirit of the age, sinning moans to a regenerated and re-invi? gorated Union-that we submitted oar cause to tho arbitrament of arms, and tho decision was against us-and that tho highest law which eau exist is that established by force of arms. That tho red-handed conqueror, with hia foot upon the necks of his victims, or the armed robber on tho highway should assert such monstrous doctrine as this is not to be wondered at; bat when it comes from the man who, whilo struggling for the right, has been compelled to yield to tho force of arm? in an unequal contest, the mantle-I had almost said of charity, but will say-of oblivion should bo allowed to fall over the weakness that cannot resist the temptations or adversity. I fear there are too many prone to adopt tho maxims of a prudence which, as Barke says, whoo carried too far, degenerates into a "rep? tile virtue." My comrades, much leese language has been used, by friond as well as foo, upon this sub? ject of submitting our rights to the arbitra? ment of arms; but, in no sense can the South? ern Statea be said to have submitted their right to withdraw from the Union to any suoh arbitrament. They exercised that right which was theirs, and tendered a peaceable settle? ment of all tho questions growing ont of their withdrawal. A war of invasion and coercion was most unjustly and ruthlessly waged against them, and they resorted to arms to defend their rights, their country, their homes, thoir all against the sword, robbery and fire, combined, all of which weroemployed hy tho spoiler. The result of the war settled no question of right, but merely rurniabed an? other instance of tho fact that in this world truth and justice do not always prevail, and that might ia often moro powerful than right. When the captive Jews sat down by the rivera of Babylon and wept for the desolation of their land, their spoilers required of them mirth and a song, but thoy Iring their harp? upon the willows; and tho Psalmist baa pat into their months these words: "How shall wo sing the Lord's Bong in a strange land? "If 1 forget thoo, O, Jerusalem, Ut my right hand forget her cunning. "It I do not remember thoo, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth " Can wo he loss faithful than thej? No! weean never turn our backs upon tho past,unless wu turn them upon the gravea and memories ot Lee, Sydney Johnston, Stonewall Jackson, Gregg ami all our bravo comrades who tell upon thu field of honor and i glory. We eau never forgot, until wo consent to nungin and amalgamate our race and blood with that of our former slaves in a universal miscegenation, so aa utterly to degrado our? selves to tho lovel to which our foes aro seek? ing to reduce us. We must and will uresorvo, groon and fresh, i tho memories of our dead heroes, while tho I noble and true women of the South will con timm, from year to year, lo strew Howers on j their graves, and teach their fair daughters to I perpetuate the pious custom; and wo will ad ?how to all ? g ea, that we were not unworthy to ibo the BoIdWs'ot-?nr.great'loadera, let De rear a monumoni/ or monomania,- io Uiei?, toslSy'fo^a^ tm o to them in life, did not abandon them in death. Snob monuments Are. ?otneooMary toperpetnateitfceh? fame,'for that'U raa wide as tho bounds bf civilization, and will be se enduring as..tho mountains, abd bille,?nd piaie.i, and vaiioye, aud rivera Ot'iu?u Onu well beloved South. It is to onreelvoo, that we owe the duty of furnishing an, enrlnrlng witness or our nudity io our u?ui? sud tb? memory of oar. great leaders. ., Myoomrades, might and wrong oauuot.al? ways prevail-a Just and righteous Godru?es -above and over all; and however gloomy and dara everything may now appear around os, 1 have a firm and abiding faith that the time is corni o g wb?n it will be a higher and more hono rabio title for a man to ba able to say: "My aneeaior wore tho gray, and fought in the same great struggle for right to which Robert E. Loo. Sydney Johnston and Stone? wall Jackson devoted th em nelves " than to be able to claim descent from one who fought at Ko ii COOT al lo a, or came over with William the Conqueror. Jj .. Let us, therefore, foster and extend our fra? ternal associations and perpetuate them; and iet every uooiederate soldier jealously guard his reputation and honor as such, so as to transmit the rion heritage to his posterity un? impaired, taking to himself as a guido, in lt? full and highest import, the advioeof Polonius to his son: *'-to thine ownaelf bs tree; ?nd itmnet follow as night tb ed ty; Thoa oanst not be false to any man." COLUMBIA. S. C. Thursday Morning, November 16,1871. General Early's Address? We present this morning to oar read? ers the address of General Early before the ?oath Carolina Survivors' Associa? tion. It was delivered in this city on tho 10th instant, and received with ap? plause by a large and appreciative audi? ence of both sexes. Goo. Early, when the late war ended, was a lieutenant general in the groat, the immortal Army of Northern Virginia. During the war he fought with conspicuous gallantry, handled his troops with marked ability, and endured with great fortitude the hardships of the war. He was, further? more, eminent for truth, courage and independence. And, to orown it all, he enjoyed the confidence of General Lee. With euch a record, General Early esme to Colombia to address the survivors of the war in this State. He was entitled to a warm reception. He received it. But this is not all. His utterances are entitled to special consideration. Gen. Early's record shows him a man of ac? tion as well as words. We submit, there? fore, that his address may well be pe? rused with care, and that his suggestions and propositions should be carefully weighed. It will be found a valuable paper-full not only of fine thoughts and manly sentiments, but full also of those facts and figures, derived from the roo ord, which better than mero asser? tions will establish the olaims of our sol? diers to thoir full measure of fame. I ft is meet that the light of troth be thrown upon tho history of the late war. This is a duty - re owe to the dead. It is meet that we vindicate our past aud cherish in our heart of hearts all that is valuable in it. This is not only a mournful plea? sure. It is also a useful thing. For, proud and eeoure as respeots their past, a people become thereby strengthened for the duties of the present and the possibilities of the future. As one reads the vindication by Gen. Early of the ac? tions and the motives of our dead sol? diers, he must be more or lees than a man if he does not find his soul moved to sympathy in behalf of a cause so bravely fought for, and in behalf of the men who for that cause so gallantly died. We commend Gen. Early's address alike to the friends and foes of the "conquered banner." At the same time, we trust that upon our own people it will have the effect of stimulating them to action in the present and for the future. For ourselves, we have no suggestions of de? spair or despondency. We feel hopeful. We may look mournfully into the past, but not too long should we linger by the graves of buried hopes and dead aspira? tions. If the "Lost Cause" could speak to tho living, wonld it not bid us to take counsel of our hopes, and not of our doubts? Faithful to tho memory of the dead, we must also, heart within and God overhead, act in tho living present. THANKSGIVING..-If President Grant, aptly remarks the Savannah Republican, wishes tho people of the South to ob? serve his 30th November appointment, ho must give them something to be grate? ful for. It is not fit to proclaim thanks? giving when the occasion demands fast? ing and prayer. Thia suggestion of thanks and striking down the libertiesof the people with military cohorts as con? temporaneous events, and from the same source, are rather calculated to shook honest mon, and in a meaner that eau hardly be considered devotional. If, in thu meantime, the President should re? call his troops and throw open the doors o? his South Carolina bastiles, the peo plo of the South will bo enabled to re? spect his proclamation without hypo? crisy. . ?s .?-> Ccu. McClellan declines io eu????u Tweed.