The daily phoenix. (Columbia, S.C.) 1865-1878, November 16, 1871, Image 2
and the enemy'a large army in sight of
lirrpi itt Sf eT ?His ?hole ?oroe
imagery 1itU<iPTer. l?e? jftar, ot- ^Clel
tot? yeA ha de^rnitaadMJgm ,Mift?fogo
byipwrol thn^
menta, whioh have rendered him BO re?
nowned, When all his plans were ma?,
trjed. he sent an order to Jackson to
move rapidly from the vaiiejj B*?? vu th?
26th of Jane, began that seriee ot bat?
tiest whioh so much expedited McClel?
lan's celebrated "change of base," and
?ant his shattered columns cowering to
the shelter ol the gup-boats on the
lower James. ; General "Lee's whole !o?rq?
ai that time, inolnding Jaokson'8, Ma?
gruder's, Hager's and. Holmes'-in fact,
the whole for co in and around Rich?
mond, did not exceed .80,000 effective
men, il it reached that figure; and this,
was the largest army he ever command?
ed. McClellan's force, on the 20th of
Jane, was 105,825 for duty, by his own
?tatemeot; yet in his letters, before the
battle, he states that he was largely out?
numbered, and in one letter he pats oar
force at 200,000 men. Here is what he
says in his report of the 4th of August,
1868:
"Th?. report of the 'secret service
corps,' herewith forwardedf and dated
the 26th of Jane. (1862.) shows the esti?
mated strength of the enemy, at the
time of the evacuation of Yorktown, to
haye been from 100,000 to 120,000. The
same report pats his numbers, on the
26th of: Jane, (186"",,) at; about 180,000,
and the specific. information obtained
regarding their .organisation warrants
the belief that .this estimate did not ex?
ceed his actual strength."
We have all beard . a good deal abont
spies in Biohmond daring the war. I
am inclined to think that there were
some people very much humbugged by
that secret service corps; and McClel?
lan's statement is. a complete vindication
of all who were in the departments at
feat time. : .,,
After McClellan had established him?
self .on his now "base," he began to be
again haunted with the idea of vastly
superior numbers opposed to. him, and
he begged earnestly for re-inforooments.
Hal leek, the Commander-in-Chief at
Washington, made a visit to him about
this time, apd after his return, in a letter
to him?, dated the 6th of August, 1862,
given in McClellan's report, He Lieck says:
"You snd your officers, at oar inter?
view, estimated the enemy's forces in
and around Biohmond at 200,000 men.
Since then yon and others report that
they have received and are receiving
large reinforcements from the Sooth.
General Pope's army, covering Washing?
ton, is only about 40,000. Your effect?
ive force is only about 90.000."
At that time a new commander had
appeared in Virginia, North of the Ba?
rndon, in the person of Major-General
John Pope, noted for his veracious pro?
clivities, and his otter contempt for "re?
bel" soldiers, of whom he had never
seen anything bat their backs. With
''headquarters in the saddle," and an
entire disregard for advantage of posi?
tion and lines of retreat, whioh latter he
left to take care of themselves, he only
wanted to find ont where the "rebela
were, so that he might go at them in?
continently, and lie caine, "conquering
and to conqaer." With three divisions,
Jackson quietly moved np to Gordon?
ville. The first effeot of Pope's appear?
ance was terrific. To say nothing of the
onslaught on the pigs, poultry and dai?
ries of the conntry, there was great con?
sternation and dismay at Biohmond, ac?
cording to the following despatch, sent
by Halleck to MoOlellau, on the 31st of
Joly. Halleck says:
''General Pope ogain telegraphs that
the enemy ia reported tobe evacuating
Biohmond, and falling baok on Danville
and Ly nobb arg."
This was while McClellan was trem?
bling at Harrison's Landing at tho dread
phantom of 200,000 men at Richmond,
with more arriving from Beauregard and
Bragg, whioh haunted his imagination.
Jackson soon began to show Pope some
things he had never looked upon before.
The battle of Oedar Ban or Slaughter's
Mountain occurred on the 9th of August,
and Pope began to see some remarkable
sights. The evacuation of the "new
base" at Harrison's Landing, whioh Mc?
Clellan had assumed with so mach abil?
ity, waa hastened. In a despatch from
McClellan to Halleck, dated the 14th of
August, there ooaars this notable pas?
sage:
"I don't like Jackson's movements;
he will soddenly appear where least ex?
pected."
It was a way General Jackson had, ol
disturbing people with his eccentricities.
General Lee now tamed his attention
to the doughty oommander, whose head*
smartere were in the saddle, and to whose
aid McClellan was hastening his army.
Stewart commenced his pranks around
Pope's headquarters; and while the lat?
ter, on the line of the Bappahasnock,
was steadily looking to the front for thc
"rebels," in otter oblivion of any possi?
ble line of retreat, Jackson suddenly ap?
peared in his rear on that line, thus call
lng his attention to it; and then ensued
that succession of engagements known
as "Second Man a ssas."
Any of the survivors of Gregg's bri
gade, who may be here, may, perhaps,
be interested and entertained by thc
following extraots from Pope's report,
Ho says:
"Siegel attaoked the enemy abont day
light on the morning of the 29th, a mile
or two East of Groveton, where he wai
soon joined by the divisions of Hooker
and Kearney. Jaokson fell back severa!
miles, bat was so closely pressed bj
theso forces that he waa compelled tc
make a stand, and to make the best de
fence possible."
And after mentioning an order tc
Porter to ont off Jackson's retreat, ht
says:
"About half-past 5 o'olook, (P. M
Sunday,) when General Porter shouli
have been coming into notion, in oom
plisnoe with this order, I directed Gene
sale Heintzel man and Reno to attack tlx
enemy. The attack was made with grea
gallantry, and tho whole of the left of
"tnereneitt/.'wJii rtwablssHMicrV tturt?ds'hrg
centre, and oar own forcea, after a sharp
oonfliot of an hour and a half, occupied
the M?ot bat?e. ?Jhed?ac) of the,
enemy gua our hands. In thisiattaok,
Grover'* bi ?gado ol Hooker's di v i$on
waa particularly* disUoguishecV by ande
-J.J v_IL* -U-U.J,V?n,? ?T0
of tho'euomy'e lines, and penetrating to
the third before it could be checked."
Geo. Jackson, after breaking the rail
road, and destroying the immense atores
at hf anassas, whioh could not be removed,
had moved to the old battle-field of Ma
nasas/? to await the] nrr/ival of Gen. Lee.
with Longstreet's force. Early on the
morning of tho 29th of August, he bad
taken position on the old noosed rail?
road grade near that field, and there,
with his 'three divisions, of less than
20,000 men, he had received and repulsed
Pope's successive attacks. Tho last at?
tack was made on a part of the line held
by Gregg's and Tho mas'brigades. These
two brigades, after a gallant resistance,
and when their ammunition was ex?
hausted, retired a very short distance to
the rear, and were awaiting the advance
of the enemy, determined to resist with
the bayonet. My brigade then advanced
past them, drove the enemy back and re?
gained the position in the railroad cut
whioh the enemy had occupied. This
was the last attack on Jackson's lino that
day, and is, I prosnme, the one so glow?
ingly described by Pope. At the close
of the day we held bor whole lino intact,
with all oar dead and wounded in our
hands-as they had remained all the
time. Those brilliant and determined
bayonet charges, so often mentioned by
Federal commanders, were like the play
of Hamlet, with the part of Hamlet left
ont. No one ever saw or felt the bayo?
nets, anlese some poor wounded
soldier lying helpless on the field. All
the fighting on onr side, on the 20th,
was done by Jackson's command, except
an affair, abont dnBk, between King's
division, of MoDowell's corps, and the
advance of Longstreet's command,
whioh began to arrive between ll A. M.
and 12 M. in the day, bat did not engage
in the battle until Elie g made his od
vanoe, ander the idea that Jackson was
retreating; whioh wac a very great delu?
sion.
In a despatch dated 5.30 A. M., the
30th, Pope says: "We have lost not less
than 8,000 men killed and wounded; but,
from the appearance of the field, the
enemy lost at least two to one. He stood
strictly on the defensivo, and every as?
sault was made by ourselves. The battle
was fonght on the identical battle-field of
Ball Ban, whioh greatly increased the
enthusiasm of tho men. The news jost
reaches me from the front that the enemy
is retiring toward ths> mountains. I go
forward at once to see. We have made
great captures, but I am not able, yet, to
form an idea of their extent."
Daring the morning and forenoon,
attacks were again made on Jackson's
line, but Longstreet did not come into
action nntil tho afternoon; when, by the
combined attack, Pope's army was driven
from the field and across Bull Bun, with
terrible slaughter.
. Pope says, in his report:
"Every indication, during the night oi
the 29th, and up to 10 o'clock on the
morning of the 80th, pointed to the re?
treat of the enemy from our front."
Further on, in the same report, he
nyc:
"During the whole night of the 29th,
and the morning of the 80th, the advance
of the main army, under Lee, waa ar?
riving on the field to reinforce Jackson,
so that by 12 or 1 o'clook in the day we
were confronted by forces greatly supe?
rior to our own; and these foroes were
being every moment largely inoreased bj
fresh arrivals of the enemy in tho direc?
tion of Thoroughfare Gap."
General Loo's whole army, at second Ma
nasaas, did not amount to 50,000 men. It wai
oomposed of part of the army which had beer
at Richmond during the seven daya, and al
least two divisions, D. H. Hill's and MoLawa'
bad not arrived-they had been left bobine
to protect Richmond until the whole o
McClellan's army got off. Pope's army hat
been largely re-inforoed from McOlollan's, th?
whole of which had landed at Alexandria, anc
Vy a part of the troops of Burnside's oorps
lately from North Carolina, under Reno, 8,(XX
strong.
At 9.45 P. M., on the 30th, Pope telegraphs
to H ailee k:
"The battle was most furious for boan
without cessation, and the ioBses on botl
sides very heavy. The enemy is badi:
whipped, and we shall do well enough. Di
notus uneasy. We shall hold onr own line.1
To this, Halleok replied :
-'You Lavs done nobly. Don't yield ancthe
inch, if you can avoid it, All reserves ar
boing sent forward."
Tot, after all of MoOlellan's troops ha<
arrived to bis aid, and before another gui
had boon fired, Pope telegraphed to Halleok
from Centreville, at 10.45 A. M., 31st:
"I should like t" know whether you fee
S3oaro about Washington, should this arm;
be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as i
man will stand np to the work."
rone's whole army waa noon hurled i oto tb
fortifications around Washington, by th
army wuioh bad beon BO badly whipped oi
tho 30th, and Major-General John Pope disap
pesred from tbe soene of aotion, in some ro
spoofs, a wiser if not a bettor man. He wa
sent on to tho far West to fight tho red mei
of tho plains, and we heard no moro of bit
dariug the war. Pope's or:sir.<tl torco c
40,000, Reno's 8,000, and MoOlellan's 90,0(K
mada 138,000 men, whom General Loo's arm
of IOBB than 50,000 had to deal with on thi
occasion. AU of MoOlellan'B force was not u
at the battle of 30th, but all was up by th
battlo of the 1st of Beptembor, at Ox Hill o
Chantilly. Yet this was another caso c
suporior numbers on our sido.
Tho crossing of the Potomao now followed
and then tho capturo of Harper's Ferry, an
tho battles of Mouth Mountain and Bharpt
burg.
When tho battlo began atSharpuburg, earl
on tho morning of tho 17th of Beptembei
General Lee's whole infantry forco on th
field did not exceed 15,000. A. P. Hill's divi
sion of Jackson's corps, Andoraon'B divisor
with ono or two oxtra brigades temporaril
attached to it, and MoLaw's diviaion, nil c
whioh had participated in tho attack on Hai
per'a Ferry, had not oomo up. With all tho
carno up during tho day, our infantry fore
did not exceed 23,000 mon- Cur cavalry wa
not engaged, and a largo portion of our arti
lory had not crossed tho river from Harper
Ferry; and did not cross until at night, who
the battlo was ovor. Our whole forco, of a
arms, when tho whole wan up, did not uxeoe
30.000.
MoOlellan's army, according to bia Bl atc
meut, numberod 87,104 in action. Yot w
f night him from day-broak until late in the
?afternoon. anrt,?4-iha.-eloaavof ; the iifcjw i
held dor position. We" oontinued to hold it
1 the whole ot tbe next day, and Houlahan dio
not dare to attack vu. i.
In his roport, ho gives thia remarkable esti?
mate of (Jouerai Lee's army. I road bia
language: ...
"An eetimato of the forcea nuder the Con?
federate Gennral Led, made np by direction
nf ann n ral lian ka. from i jformation obtained
by tho examination of prlaoners, acnermro,
?pies, Ac, previous to the battle of Antietam,
is SH follows: Gen. T. J. Jaokson'a corps,
21,778; Gen. James Longa treat'ee?r ps.23,812;
Gen. D. H. Hill's second division, 18,546; Gen.
J. E. B. 8tswart's cavalry, 6,400, Gen. Bah
som's and Jenkins' brigades,'8,000; forty-six
fegimeata not included iu above, 18,400; artil
o ry ec li m a te tl at 100 gu ne, B.?OO; total, 97.?9
These estimates give the actual numbor of
men pr?sent and flt for duty."
You must recollect that McClellan was con?
sidered the gentleman among the Federal or
Uu in n commanders-and thia ia bte statement1
of (ho force opposed to him at Uharpsbnrg.
There was a rumor that Banks WAH Jackson S
commissary, and I suppose McClellan thought
the commissary ought to know the strength
of the corps, at least. Banks, however, was
not with McClellan at Bharpsburg, and this
estimate of bis, I presume, was mado while
Ju uk ?on was figuring in Pope's rear, and
Banks was one of the corpa commanders of
the latter. Some allowance, therefore, must
bo made for him, as he always saw with von
largely magnifying glasses whoa "Stonewall
Jackson" was about.
There are sumo curions reflections whioh
snggeat tnomseives in connection with Mc?
Clellan's statement of his own forces. It
mast bo remembered that tho troops nuder
McClellan's command on the Potomac, and
ia Maryland and Delaware, on thu lat of
March, 18G2. numbered over 193.00O for dnty;
tbe Ninth Corpa, (Burnside's,) numbering
over 13.000 at Bharpsburg. had been brought
from North and South Carolina; PremontV
command from North-western Virginia, and
Homo troops under Siegel, from Missouri, had
also arrived aiuco the 1st of March; and very
recently some troops had come from the
West, under Cox, besides thu recruits from
new levies that had beeu received What had
reduced that immense foreo to 87,161 men, on
the 17th of September, 1862? Bow was it
the weak "rebel" government at Richmond
had been enabled to invade tho enemy's
country with an army of ovsr 97,000 mon,
while the strong, "patriotic'' government at
Washington had been ablo to rally, from all
tho "loyal" North and Nurth-wust, to pre?
servo "tho best government tho world ever
saw," to defend the national capital, aud to
{irotect tho "loyal" States against tho "rebel"
tordos by which they worn threatened, only a
little over 87,000 men? This is a little curi?
ous, is it not?
You may think it a little strange that Gun.
Lee had le s than 30,000 moa at Sharpahurg.
The who'o force for duty in tho Department
of Northern Virginia, at the close of July
1862, wan 69,559. as shown hy the official ro?
port ?ow on file in the Archivo ?nice al
Wa? too. I oopv from a statement from
the re.< ?rta given by a Northern writer-all
Confederates hoing denied access to thom,
Some troops had to be left at Richmond, al
Drury's and Chaffiu's Bluff*, and at otho*
point's-and one army had not beeu reinforced
to any material extent-00,000 men, inclusive
of D. H. Hill's and MoLawa' divisious, were
thu utmost that could be carried into th?
field. Thero had been tho battle of Cedai
Hun, the fighting cn the Rapid an, the Beriet
of battles at Second Manassas, Ox Hill, Har
per's Ferry and South Mountain-all withou
any reinforcements. Of course, coueiderabh
loases had been eustatnod in all these battles
but, ic addition to that, there waa a beavj
falling off bom straggling caused by uttei
exhaustion.
Our army had been marching and flghtinj
almost continually since the battle of Cedai
Run. The men wure badly clothed and werai
shod-our rations had given ont st seconi
Manassas-in fact, some of the troops o
Longstreet's corps came to that battle with
out rations. From that time until we got int?
Maryland our men had to live principally oi
frosh beef and green corn, without salt o
bread. That diet is better than non?, by i
good deal, but it is a very weakening one ti
march and fight on-as some of you, perhaps
know. Tho consequenco of all thia was tba
beforo we crossed tho Potomao many of ou
men had entirely hr >kon down from exhaust
ion and sore feet, while many had straggle*
off for food. The loss from theta causes wa
very heavy, and you can understand how los
thau 60,000 men could very easily ho ruducci
to loss than 30,000, iu a campaign of six week?
in which many bloody battles had been fough
against vary large odds. To show that I ar
not out of tho way in my estimate, I will stat
that tho samo reporta from which I hav
quoted show only 52,609 men for duty in th
whole department at the close of September
after the stragglers bad all oom? un and man
convalescents had returned to duty. Yo!
must recollect that the troops under MoClel
lan and Pope numbered, on the 6th of August
1862, according to Halleek's statement. 130 00
for duty; that Burnside had brought ove
13,000; that Cox's division had corns from th
Weat since that time, and, besides, there wer
the recruits and reinforcements received a
Washington. If all that force had boon re
dueed to 87,161, when it was BO well clothed
shod and fed, it waa not unreasonable tba
there should bo a falling oft of 30.0UU in Gee
Lee's army, from tho casualties of hattie an
tbe other causes mentioned. Oen. Lee, in hi
report, said his strength wis under 40,00(
but for obvious reasons he never disclosed hi
weakness at any time. Notwithstanding it
smallness, our little army accomplished wor
ders at Bharpsburg. McClellan, in giving th
reasons why he was not ablo to renew th
battle on the 18th, in his report, eaye:
"One division of Sumner's corps, and all c
Hooker's corpa, on the right, had. after figbl
ing most valiantly fer several hours, bec
overpowered by Bambers, driven in great die
order and muoh scattered, so that they wen
for tho time, somewhat demoralized."
To show how they were overpowered b
numbers, let me tell you that, in tue mo rn in t
Hooker's corps, 11.856 strong, had attaoke
the position held by Jackson's command o
the field, thon 1,000 strong, and D. H. Hill
divieion of 8,000-in all 7,000 men. Mani
field's corps, then 10,126 stro.g, then came t
the assistance of Hooker; sud then Hood
two brigades, of less than 1.500, and, latei
my brigade, of leas than 1,000, wore brougt
into the fight. Sumner's corps, 18,813 strong
and Franklin's corps, 12.300 strong, wen
about tho same time, brought to the assis
ance of Hooker's and Mansfield's oorps; an
McLaws' and Anderson's divisions, which ha
arrivod from Harper's Fem, together wit
t*o brigades under T. G. Walker, wont to th
aid of our troops engaged with those fot
corps. Thus less than 18.000 Confederate
witn all that woro brought up, from first t
last, encountered, on that part of the fielt
56,095 of tho enemy. I givo this statement t
to the enomy's foreo engaged on that part <
the field from McClellan's roport, and as t
those engagod on our sido 'rom ruy person;
knowledge and thooflh-ial reports of divisie
commanders, which continu my recolleotiu
and ostimate.
But I have not given yon all McClellan sai
on the subject of superior numbers. On ttl
27th of Soptemhor, ho wroto to llalleck as fe
Iowa:
"In tho last battles, tho enemy was m
doubtedli' greatly superior to us in number
and it wac only hy hard fighting (hat v
gained (ho advantage wo did. As it was, tl
result was at ono period very doubtful, an
wo had all wo could do to win the day."
Win tho day, indoodl Ho had not dared I
rom-w tho attack on the lHih, and ho di
not venturo to claim a victory till on tho 19( I
when ho found dene nil Loo had recrossed ll
Potomac, and then bo began to bread
freely, and crow instily. Verily, my 'fiend
our boys in rusty gray had a wonderful faeuli
of magnifying and multiplying themselves :
hattie; aud language could< not convey
higher compliment to their prowess, than
have given you.
Su*rp*bai g was so dsfsit to ocr ?rrc4> AU
bf MoOtellsn'e efforts to drive ns from the
position had been baffled, with immense
?Unguter of his Troops- over 19,000 killed
and wounded, according to his report. " .We
? waitod his attic*, ?ll tbs. next .day. bat he
waa afraid to renew lt. In the mean time, re?
inforcements were marching io hie assistance,
wolli jitters wss se peSsiMhty of I re-i nfor ce?
ments for Oonoral Leeland the latter bad the
Potomao.immediately in his rear. Be, there?
fore, very properly reorosaed that river, and
McClellan did not follow bim to ronew tho
battle.
Borne persons are disposed to consider this
campaign into Maryland a failure; bnt that
was npt the mao, la .& military .aspect* Wo
did not rai ie Maryland as we boped, bat that
was not because or any reverse to our army.
The spirit of resistance had, in a great mea?
sure, died out in that State. Tho love of
eaao, money and the comforts of lifo had be?
come stronger than the love of liberty. Many
wished us suocees, provided it did not cost
them any great sacrifice; but there were very
fow who were disposed to join ns, even when
wo first crossed the Potomac. Maryland,
however, furnished many most gallant sol?
diers, who cams South at the beginning of the
war.
lu a military point of view, this campaign
.nus a great suceras, though it did not ac?
complish all we deairod. When General Leo
took command of the army, the enemy bad
invested tho Confederate capital, and waa in
sight of ita spirea; tho beleaguered city had
beau relieved, thc enemy investing li driven
oat of the State, aud the Confederate com.
mander, at the oloae of tho campaign, stood
proudly defiant on the extreme Northern bor?
der ol the Confederacy, while his opponent
had had his "baao" removed to tho Northern
bank of the Potomao, at a point moro than
175 miles from the Confederate cspital, as the
bird flies, and his army had been BO crippled
that he was not able tn resume offensive ope?
ration* for near two mouths. When bia army
did move, General Leo was iu a position to
interpone and inflict at Fredericksburg an?
other aigual defeat on tho invading fonte.
I might multiply the instances of tho at?
tempts of our enemies to falsify the truth of
Malory, iu order tu excuse their manifold
failures, and to conceal the inferiority ol
their troops in all tho elements of manhood,
but I would become too tedious.
Tho world canuot bu mado to believe that a
population of 5,000,1)00 could produce more
soldiers than one of 22,000,000, eapecially
whou the latter lind all the world besides u>
rooruit from Thia ia too much liku the old
story of tho Irishman who captured five mun
by surrounding them all at one time.
Burnside waa a little doubtful which had
the numbers at Frederickabarg, and he state*
frankly: "It waa found to bu impossible to
get ibu mon up to tho works. Tho ouumy'a
lire waa too hot for thom." His forco auroa?
tb. river at the battle was 100,000; ours was
very considerably ?maller.
Joe Hooker-"Fighting Joe," aa ho waa
called-for a wonder, did not oiaim that wo
bad thu odds against bini, when ho crossed
the llappahaunock to Chancellorsville, and
issued an order to bia troops, etatiug that be
had tho "rebel army" just where hu wanted
it, aud would proceed to cruah it-and tuuu
went back, under compulaiou, and said, with
a great flourish of trumpets, that the Army
of the Potomac waa the custodian of its own
honor; that it advauced when it pleaaod,
fought whuii it pleased and retired when it
pleased. Fighting Joe. however, said some?
thing quite aa amusing as the old story about
wuperior numbera, which I will give you. lu
his testimony bofore the Committee on the
Couduct of the War, he said:
"Our artillery had always been superior to
that of the r?bela, aa waa* also our infantry,
except in dinoiDliuo, and that, for reasons
not necessary to mention, never did equal
Leo'a army. With a rank and file vastly infe?
rior to our own, intellectually and physically,
teat army ha*, by discipline alone, acquired a
character for steadiness and efficiency unsur?
passed, iu my judgment, in ancient or modern
timen. We have not been able to rival it, nor
baa there bjeu any approximation to it iu the
other rubel armies."
Hooker is manifestly of opinion that the
successes of Leo'a army were duo to ita supe?
rior discipline, not withstanding ita inferiority
in numbers, and its vast inferiority, intellectu?
ally ann physically, to bia own. Ho gives
another opinion which ia not a little amusing,
and may throw aomo light on tho subject, in
tho narnu testimony, hu says :
"Some of oar corps commanders, aud also
officers of other rank, appoar to be nu willing
to go into a light; in my judgment, there are
not many who really Uko to tight."
Thia waa aaid of tho army which waa thc
custodian of ita own honor. It did not aeem
to occur to Hooker, that, porhapa, there
might be something in the oft quoted maxim
of the great dramatic poet, who has aaid,
.Thrice is be armed that hath bia quarrel
just;
"And ho bot naked, though looked up iu
steel,
"Whoae consol?nos with injustice ia corrupt?
ed,"
to explain the difference in tho conduct of tho
two annies.
At Gettysburg, Meado, with an a* my of
100,000 at limit, waa outnumbered by oura,
lesa iban 60,000 strong; and bo was very much
relieved wben General Lee, after a drawn
battle, determined to retiro because his
ammunition waa drawing short. When Grant
took command of all the armies, be determined
to get rid of the bugbear of superior num?
bers, and to have the odds on his aide, ao that
he might deBtroy aa by tho more attrition of
numbers, if nothing else. It was a very costly
experiment to him, in that wonderful cam?
paign, from the Kapidan to the James, where
the military genius of General Lee, and the
fighting capacity and endurance of hts army,
were so coD*piououBly displayed-a campaign
which, in my opinion, stands unsurpassed in
the annals of warfare, for the marvelous ex?
hibition of all tho oloments of the m .;at exalt?
ed military genius, on the part of our com?
mander, and the sublime courage and steadi?
ness of bis little army, which waa leas than a
third as strong aa the opposiug forco; bnt the
history of that campaign has nover been writ?
ten. With an army of vory near 200,000 men,
with the reinforcements that were brought up,
all of Grant'a plans wore thwarted ^nd de?
feated by an army of leas than 50,00fnuen, io
a contest continuing for nearly forty days,
and extending over a diatance of eighty miloa;
and ho waa finally, after a loss in battlo of
considerably more mon than Goneral Leo had
iu all, compelled to tako refuge on James
Uiver, at a point to which hu could havo gone
without tho less of a mau. Ho waa then corn
polled to invoke to his aid, as au ally of bia
?rocosa of attrition, lingering starvation,
hose two agencies slowly but surely did their
work; aud when, at tho head of more thau
150,000 mon, superbly equipped and bounti?
fully fed. bo received tho surrender of leaa
ihan 8,000 worn and oniaciated Confederate
soldiers with arma in their hands; and, in?
cluding tho toamatora, extra-duty men,
wounded and sick, camp followers and strag?
glers, who afterwards carno in, 27,805 men hi
all, wo can well imagine tho (culing* with
which ho and bia principal ollicers looked
each other in thu Taco, and asked, aa well they
might: "Is thia thu army which baa au long
baflied all our mighty efforts? *
it waa but tho ghost bf tho Army of North?
ern Virginia which they conquered. What a
scene waa that, ut that hitherto quiet and un?
known village, in tho interior of Virginia!
Cn tim one hand, stands the very nnprep. s
aoa.-iug form of Ulysses S. tirant, tho mere
croaturu of accident, but the successful oom*
munder now, ut the head nf a mighty boat, in
all the "pride, pomp and circumstance of
war"-I will not say glorious war wailing lo
re?oive tho snrreinirr of bia great mit agonir t
Cn thu other hand, approaches thu Htately
and majestic form of hubert E. Lee,
"Where every god did seem to set his seal,
To give thu world assurance of a niau."
Following bim ooma tba gaunt forma of lea?
AMBjJOflUMB in. tattered gray. to. Uv do wu
tho arma they had won in battle, and which
they had borne ao long with honor. Aa they
atack thoao arma, thoy caat their eyes upon
their beloved commander, whoae heart ia
breaking with a grier uonUerabl?. and they
bnratinto uncontrollable.. tear?-those men
whose, bold hearts had noverquailed amid
?ho deadly strife of tho battlefield, whatover
Odds ?ere opposed io th=T. ;*?h"y ?*4re not
dow conquered in battle, bat they lay down
their arms, beoause toey scarce nave strength
to carry them, and beoause they are weary
and foot-sore, and cannot longer march. Obi
it was a most piteous, moving eight_enough
to make the angela weep. Where waa the
glory of that victory? Had the leader of that
immense host had the feelings of magna?
nimity which ought te apimate all. true sol?
diers, he would have marched his army to
Washington, and demanded that full, com?
plete and perfect poaoe, amnesty and protec?
tion be granted to too men who had given such
unmistakable evidence of devotion to truth, -
honor and right.
No man could look upon that scene at
Appomattox Court House, and for a moment,
iu his heart, believe that the followers of
Robert E. Lee wero traitors or rebels. Cut,
my comrades, the "victor" on that occasion
had not the remotest conception of the true
moaning of the word "magnanimity,1'much
lesa of the sentiment. Talk of UrantV mag?
nanimity on that occasion, in conceding the
terms that he did to General Lee's demande!
I scout the idea. General Lee went to that
interview with tho firm resolve to out his way
oat with the small remnant left, if terms were
not granted him deemed honorable in war.
Grant saw the blue mountains nut far off-ho
had sad experience of what that little army
waa capable-he was afraid General Lee
might make his way into those mountains,
ana then he wonld lose tho supreme glory of
terminating the war by the surrender to him
of his groat antagonist, and he granted the
torrns, without winch ho could uot have pro?
cured that surrender. Call you thia magna?
nimity? But it is said he prevonted General
Leu from being proseonted for treason. He
had, then, fortunately for him, a mentor who
forced the idea into bis dall brain, that his
own honor ami glory were in some way con?
nected with that matter, in maintaining invio?
late tho parole granted Goneral Lee and bia
soldiers, and he acted iu accordance with the
suggestions made to him. That mentor has
Bines gone, and what has been his course, as
thu head of a powerful government, towards
General Leo and his followers? Compared to
what has been done to our people, it would
have hoon mercy to havo hung all our lead?
ers, civil and military, and then granted
peace and amnosty to ino masses. Jeffreys,
himself, could not have devised more exquisito
torture and cruelty than has been inflicted on
all our people.
From that Hold at Appomattox, where the
vast superiority of tho Southern man and
soldier over the Northern was made so inam?
ical to tho dullest comprehension, there went
up a vow to degrade and humiliate into the
very dost the race which bad proved itself so
far above its conquerors in all tbs elements
of genuine manhood. Death could not do it,
for the slaughter of heroes could but make
their virtues shine the brighter. Is it neces?
sary for mo to specify the hellish devious
which have boon adopted to oarry oat the
firm resolve to break and cower the spirit of
our people, or show bow they are now in con?
stant operation? Let the state of things in
your own State, down-trodden under the feet
of your former slaves, and of their far worse
coadjutors, the carpet baggern and native
renegades, with martial law in existence in
many quarters, tell the talel
That great philosophic historian, Gibbon,
tolls us, in speaking of the heathen Emperor
of Rome, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, that
"he was severe to himself, indulgent to the
imperfections of others, just ana beneficent
to all mankind. He regretted that Avidias
Cassius, who excited a rebellion in Syria, had
disappointed him, by a voluntary death, of
tho pleasure of converting an onemy into a
friend; and ho justified the sincerity of that
sentiment hy moderating the zeal of the Se
nato against the adherents of the traitor."
Compare the sentiments and conduct of that
heathen ruler, of a heathen '?people, with
those of tho hoad of this J ree, enlightened,
Christian republic, and his Senate and follow?
ers, and what must bo the judgment?
Aa, at Appomattox, the vast inferiority of
Grant to Gen. i.eo, as a military commander,
was made most manifest, so, at tho hoad of a
powerful nation, his utter deficiency in all the
clements of that true grandeur of soul, so
conspicuously displayed in retirement by his
groat antagonist, has boen most signally de
uionst rated-th'fcarecr ol tho two, reapective
iy, thus furnishing another illustration of the
tact, that
"Pigmies are pigmies still, though perch'd on
Alps.
And pyramids aro pyramids in vales."
We are sometimes told that we must turn
our hacks upon the past, forget all our che?
rished traditions, ideas and principles, and
fall in with the progressive spirit of the age,
sinning moans to a regenerated and re-invi?
gorated Union-that we submitted oar cause
to tho arbitrament of arms, and tho decision
was against us-and that tho highest law
which eau exist is that established by force of
arms.
That tho red-handed conqueror, with hia
foot upon the necks of his victims, or the
armed robber on tho highway should assert
such monstrous doctrine as this is not to be
wondered at; bat when it comes from the man
who, whilo struggling for the right, has been
compelled to yield to tho force of arm? in an
unequal contest, the mantle-I had almost
said of charity, but will say-of oblivion
should bo allowed to fall over the weakness that
cannot resist the temptations or adversity.
I fear there are too many prone to adopt tho
maxims of a prudence which, as Barke says,
whoo carried too far, degenerates into a "rep?
tile virtue."
My comrades, much leese language has been
used, by friond as well as foo, upon this sub?
ject of submitting our rights to the arbitra?
ment of arms; but, in no sense can the South?
ern Statea be said to have submitted their
right to withdraw from the Union to any suoh
arbitrament. They exercised that right which
was theirs, and tendered a peaceable settle?
ment of all tho questions growing ont of their
withdrawal. A war of invasion and coercion
was most unjustly and ruthlessly waged
against them, and they resorted to arms to
defend their rights, their country, their
homes, thoir all against the sword, robbery
and fire, combined, all of which weroemployed
hy tho spoiler. The result of the war settled
no question of right, but merely rurniabed an?
other instance of tho fact that in this world
truth and justice do not always prevail, and
that might ia often moro powerful than right.
When the captive Jews sat down by the
rivera of Babylon and wept for the desolation
of their land, their spoilers required of them
mirth and a song, but thoy Iring their harp?
upon the willows; and tho Psalmist baa pat
into their months these words:
"How shall wo sing the Lord's Bong in a
strange land?
"If 1 forget thoo, O, Jerusalem, Ut my right
hand forget her cunning.
"It I do not remember thoo, let my tongue
cleave to the roof of my mouth "
Can wo he loss faithful than thej?
No! weean never turn our backs upon tho
past,unless wu turn them upon the gravea
and memories ot Lee, Sydney Johnston,
Stonewall Jackson, Gregg ami all our bravo
comrades who tell upon thu field of honor and
i glory. We eau never forgot, until wo consent
to nungin and amalgamate our race and blood
with that of our former slaves in a universal
miscegenation, so aa utterly to degrado our?
selves to tho lovel to which our foes aro seek?
ing to reduce us.
We must and will uresorvo, groon and fresh,
i tho memories of our dead heroes, while tho
I noble and true women of the South will con
timm, from year to year, lo strew Howers on
j their graves, and teach their fair daughters to
I perpetuate the pious custom; and wo will ad
?how to all ? g ea, that we were not unworthy to
ibo the BoIdWs'ot-?nr.great'loadera, let De
rear a monumoni/ or monomania,- io Uiei?,
toslSy'fo^a^
tm o to them in life, did not abandon them in
death. Snob monuments Are. ?otneooMary
toperpetnateitfceh? fame,'for that'U raa wide
as tho bounds bf civilization, and will be se
enduring as..tho mountains, abd bille,?nd
piaie.i, and vaiioye, aud rivera Ot'iu?u Onu
well beloved South. It is to onreelvoo, that
we owe the duty of furnishing an, enrlnrlng
witness or our nudity io our u?ui? sud tb?
memory of oar. great leaders. .,
Myoomrades, might and wrong oauuot.al?
ways prevail-a Just and righteous Godru?es
-above and over all; and however gloomy and
dara everything may now appear around os,
1 have a firm and abiding faith that the time
is corni o g wb?n it will be a higher and more
hono rabio title for a man to ba able to say:
"My aneeaior wore tho gray, and fought in
the same great struggle for right to which
Robert E. Loo. Sydney Johnston and Stone?
wall Jackson devoted th em nelves " than to be
able to claim descent from one who fought at
Ko ii COOT al lo a, or came over with William the
Conqueror. Jj ..
Let us, therefore, foster and extend our fra?
ternal associations and perpetuate them; and
iet every uooiederate soldier jealously guard
his reputation and honor as such, so as to
transmit the rion heritage to his posterity un?
impaired, taking to himself as a guido, in lt?
full and highest import, the advioeof Polonius
to his son:
*'-to thine ownaelf bs tree;
?nd itmnet follow as night tb ed ty;
Thoa oanst not be false to any man."
COLUMBIA. S. C.
Thursday Morning, November 16,1871.
General Early's Address?
We present this morning to oar read?
ers the address of General Early before
the ?oath Carolina Survivors' Associa?
tion. It was delivered in this city on
tho 10th instant, and received with ap?
plause by a large and appreciative audi?
ence of both sexes. Goo. Early, when
the late war ended, was a lieutenant
general in the groat, the immortal Army
of Northern Virginia. During the war
he fought with conspicuous gallantry,
handled his troops with marked ability,
and endured with great fortitude the
hardships of the war. He was, further?
more, eminent for truth, courage and
independence. And, to orown it all, he
enjoyed the confidence of General Lee.
With euch a record, General Early esme
to Colombia to address the survivors of
the war in this State. He was entitled
to a warm reception. He received it.
But this is not all. His utterances are
entitled to special consideration. Gen.
Early's record shows him a man of ac?
tion as well as words. We submit, there?
fore, that his address may well be pe?
rused with care, and that his suggestions
and propositions should be carefully
weighed. It will be found a valuable
paper-full not only of fine thoughts
and manly sentiments, but full also of
those facts and figures, derived from the
roo ord, which better than mero asser?
tions will establish the olaims of our sol?
diers to thoir full measure of fame. I ft
is meet that the light of troth be thrown
upon tho history of the late war. This
is a duty - re owe to the dead. It is meet
that we vindicate our past aud cherish
in our heart of hearts all that is valuable
in it. This is not only a mournful plea?
sure. It is also a useful thing. For,
proud and eeoure as respeots their past,
a people become thereby strengthened
for the duties of the present and the
possibilities of the future. As one reads
the vindication by Gen. Early of the ac?
tions and the motives of our dead sol?
diers, he must be more or lees than a
man if he does not find his soul moved
to sympathy in behalf of a cause so
bravely fought for, and in behalf of the
men who for that cause so gallantly died.
We commend Gen. Early's address alike
to the friends and foes of the "conquered
banner." At the same time, we trust
that upon our own people it will have
the effect of stimulating them to action
in the present and for the future. For
ourselves, we have no suggestions of de?
spair or despondency. We feel hopeful.
We may look mournfully into the past,
but not too long should we linger by the
graves of buried hopes and dead aspira?
tions. If the "Lost Cause" could speak
to tho living, wonld it not bid us to take
counsel of our hopes, and not of our
doubts? Faithful to tho memory of the
dead, we must also, heart within and
God overhead, act in tho living present.
THANKSGIVING..-If President Grant,
aptly remarks the Savannah Republican,
wishes tho people of the South to ob?
serve his 30th November appointment,
ho must give them something to be grate?
ful for. It is not fit to proclaim thanks?
giving when the occasion demands fast?
ing and prayer. Thia suggestion of
thanks and striking down the libertiesof
the people with military cohorts as con?
temporaneous events, and from the same
source, are rather calculated to shook
honest mon, and in a meaner that eau
hardly be considered devotional. If, in
thu meantime, the President should re?
call his troops and throw open the doors
o? his South Carolina bastiles, the peo
plo of the South will bo enabled to re?
spect his proclamation without hypo?
crisy.
. ?s .?->
Ccu. McClellan declines io eu????u
Tweed.