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and interests of its inhabitants ?is is entertained by a State Legislature for tho wishes and prosperity of those for whom they legislate. Tho spirit of our Constitution and the genius of our Govern mont require that in re? gard to any law which is to affect und have a permanent hoing upon a peo? ple, their will should assert, at least, a reasonable influence upon those who arc acting in the capacity oft heir legislators. Wculd, for instance, the I legislature of thu Stute of New York, or ol' Pennsylvania, or of Indiana, or of any State in the Union, in opposi? tion to thc expressed will of a Large majority of the people whom they were chosen to represent, arbitrarily force upon them as voters all persons of thc African or negro race, and make them eligible for office without any other qualification than a certain term of residence within the States? In neither of tho States named would the colored population, when acting alone, bc able to produce any great social or political result. Yet in New Y'ork, before lie can vote, the man ol color must fulfill conditions that are not required of the white citizen. In Pennsylvania, the elective fran . chise is restricted to white freemen, while in Indiana, negroes are ex? pressly excluded from the right oi suffrage, lt hardly seems consisten! with the principle of right and jus? tice, that representatives of States, where suffrage is either denied thc colored man, or granted to him or qualifications requiring intelligence or property, should compel the peo? ple of the District of Columbia to trj an experiment which their own con? stituents have thus far shown au un? willingness to test for themselves nor does it accord with our republi eau ideas, that the principles of self government should lose its force when applied to the residents of tin District, merely because their legisla tors are not like those of the States responsible through the ballot to th? people for whom they aro the law? making power. The great object o placing theseatof Governmentundei ? the exclusive legislation of Congress was to secure the entire independence of the General Government from un due State influeuce, and to enable i to discharge, without danger of iu terrnptiou or infringement of its an thority, the bigh functions for whiel it was created by the people. Fo this important purpose, it was cedet to the United States by Marylnm and Virginia, and it certainly neve could have been co?te .'.plated, as on of the objects to be attained b; placing li unii< r the exclusive juris diction Congress, that it would af ford to propagandists or political par .ties a place for an experimental tes of their principies and theories while, indee.], the residents of th seat of Government are not citizen of any State, and are not, therefore allowed a voice in the electoral co: lego, or representation in the conn cils ox the nation, they are, newi theless. American citizens, an entitled as such to every right whir.' pertains to citizens of our commo country. In all matters, then, affeel ing their domestic affairs, tho, spiri of our Democratic form of Govert ment demands that their wish should be. consulted and respectci and they be taught to feel that, a though not permitted practically t participate in national concerns, the are. nevertheless, under a paterni Government, regardful of their right, mindful of their wants, and solicitoi for their prosperity. It was ev dently contemplated that all loci questions would be left to their dec. sion, at least to aa extent that woul not be incompatible with the objei for which Congress was granted e: elusive legislation over the seat ( Government. When the Constiti tion was yet under consideration, was assumed by Mr. Madison that i inhabitants would bc allowed a mi nicipal legislature for local purpose derived from their own suffrag When, for the lirst time, Congres in the year 1800, assembled at Was! ington, President Adams, in li speech at tts opening, reminded tl two Houses that it was for them i consider whether the local powe over the District of Columbia, veste by the Constitution in the Congre of the United States, should be ir mediately exercised, and he ask< them to consider it as the capital of great nation, advancing with une ampled rapidity in arts,.incommerc in wealth and in population, ai possessing within itself the resource which, if not thrown away, or 1 mentably misdirected, would seen to it a long course of prosperity ai self-government. Three years hi not elapsed, when Congress was ea ed upon to determine the proprie of retroceding to Maryland and V ginni the jurisdiction of the territo which they had respectively reli rpiished to the Government of t United States. It was urged, on t one hand, that exclusive jurisdioti was not necessary or needful to the C vernment; that it deprived the in] bitants of the District of their poli cal rights; that much of the time Congress was consumed in legislati pertaining to it; that its governmc was expensive; that Congress was ii competent to legislate for the D trict, because the members wi strangers to its local concerns, a that it was an example of a Govei ment without representation, an < p?riment dangerous to the liberti of the States. On the other hand, was held, among other reasons a successfully, that the Constitutif the acts of cession of Virginia a Maryland, and the Act of Congie accepting the graut, all contemplated I the exercise of exclusive legislation I by Congress, and that its usefulness, if not its necessity, was inferred from the inconvenience which was felt for want of it by the Congress of the Confederation; that the people them? selves, who, it was said, had been de? prived of their political rights, had not complained, and did not desire a retrocession; that the evil might be remedied by giving them a represen? tation in Congress when the District should become sufficiently populous, and, in the meantime, a local legisla? ture; that if the inhabitants had not political rights, t'iey had great politi j cal influence; that the trouble and expense of legislating for the District would not be great, but would dimi? nish, and might, in a great measure, be avoided by a local legislature, and that Congress could noL retrocede the inhabitants without, their consent. Continuing to live substantially under the laws that existed at the time of the cession, and stich changes only I having been made as were suggested by themselves, the people of the Dis? trict have not sought, by a local l?gis? lature?, that which has generally been willingly conceded by lin" Congress of the nation. As a general rule, sound policy re? quires that the Legislature should yield to the wishes of a people, when not inconsistent with tim Constitution and the laws. The measures suited to one community might not be well adapted to the condition of another, and the persons best qualified to de? termine such questions are those whose interests arc to bc directly af? fected by any proposed law. In "Mas? sachusetts, for instance, male ]>ersons are allowed to vote without regard to color, provided they possess a certain degree of intelligence. In a popula? tion in that State of 1,231,060 there were, by the census of 1860, only 9,002 persons of color, and of thc males over twenty years of agc there were 33'J,08G white to 2,002 colored. By tho same official enumeration, there were, in thc District of Columbia, G0,'.)"3-l whites to 14,310 persons of the colored race. Sinei! then, however, the population of the District has largely increased, and it is estimated that, at the present time, there are nearly 100,000 whites to 30,0U0 ne? groes. The cause of the augmented numbers of the latter class needs no explanation. Contiguous to Mary? land and Virginia, the District, during the war, became a place of refuge for those who escaped from servitude, and it is yet thc abiding place of a considerable population of those who sought within its limits ashelterfrotu bondage. Until then, held in slavery, and denied all opportunities fo'rmen j tal culture, their first knowledge of the Government was acquired when, by conferring upon them freedom, it became the benefactor of their race. The test of their capability for im? provement began when, for the first time, the career of free industry and the avenues to intelligence were opened to them. Possessing these advantages but a limited time, thc greater number of that population having entered the District of Colum? bia during the latter years of the war or since its termination, we may wei! pause to inquire whether, after so brief a period, the}* are, as a class, capable, of an intelligent exercise ol thu. right of suffrage, and qualified tc discharge the duties of official posi? tions'? Thc people who are daily witnesses of their mode of living, and who have become familiar with their habits of thought, have ex? pressed their conviction that they art not yet competent to serve as electors, and thus become eligible for office in tho local Government under whici they live. Clothed with the electiv? franchise, their numbers, airead} largely in excess of the demand foi labor, would be soon increased by ai: influx from tho adjoining States, drawn from fields where employ ment is abundant They wonk" in vain seek it here, and sc add to the embarrassment al? ready experienced from the large ?class of persons congregated in tin District. Hardly yet capable o forming a correct judgment upon tin important questions that often make thc issues of a political contest, thc} could readily bc made subservient tc the purposes of designing persons. While in Massachusetts, under thc census of 1800, the proportion o white to colored males over twent} years of age was 130 to one, here thc black race constitutes nearly one third of the entire population, whils the same class surrounds thc Distric on all sides, ready to change thin, residence at a moment's notice, ?inc with all the facility of a nomadii people, in order to enjoy hereafter ; short residence, a privilege they linc nowhere else. It is within thei; power in one year to come into tin District in such numbers as to have thc supreme control of the whit race, and to govern them by thei own officers, and by the exercise o all thc municipal authority, am among the rest, the power of taxa tion over property in which the' have no interest. In Massachusetts where they have enjoyed tin; benelir of a thorough educational system, ? qualification of intelligence is re quired, while here, suffrage is ex tended to all without discrimination as well to the most incapable win can prove a residence in the Distric of ono year, as to tho30 persons o color, who, comparatively few ii number, arc permanent in habitation and having given evidence of meri and qualification, aro recognized a useful and responsible members o the community, imposed upon an unwilling people, placed by the Con? stitution under the executive legisla? tion of Congress. It would be viewed as an arbitrary exercise of power, and as an indicatio: by the country of the purpose of Congress to compel the acceptance of negro suffrage by the .Stales, lt would en? gender a feeling of opposition and hatred between the two races, which, becoming deep-rooted and ineradica? ble, would prevent them from living together in a s'ate of mutual friend? liness. Carefully avoiding every measure that, might tend to product such a result, and following the cleat and well ascertained popular will, wc should assiduously endeavor to pro? mote kindly relations between them, and thus, when that popular wil louds the way, prepare for the gradu al and harmonious introduction o' this new element into the pol?tica powrer of the country. It cannot bi urged that the proposed extension o: suffrage in the District of Columbi: is necessary to tumble persons o color to protect cither their interesta or their rights. They statut her? precisely tis they stand in Peunsylva nia, Ohio and Indiana. Here, si: elsewhere, in all that nertaius ii civil rights, there is nothing to dis tinguish this class of persons fron citizens of the United States, fo they possess the full and equal bene ht of all laws and proceedings fo: the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, ant are made subject to like punishment pains and penalties, and none other any law, statute, ordinance, regula tion or custom to the contrary not withstanding. Xor, as has beet assumed, are their suffrages necessary to aid a loyal sentiment here, fon local government already exists o undoubted fealty to the Government and is sustained by a commuuit; which were among the first te tostif; their devotion to the Union, am which, during the st ruggle, furnisher their full quotas pf men to the mili tary service of the country. Tb exercise of tho elective franchise i thc highest attribute of ?tu America citizen, and win n guided by virtm intelligence, patriotism, and a prope appreciation of our institutions, COE stitutes the true basis of a Denn eratic form of Government, in wine the sovereign power is lodged in tb body of the people. its influent: for good necessarily depends up?> the elevated character and patriotism of the elector: for ii' exercised b persons who do not justly estim?t its value, and who art; indifferent t to its results, it will only prove means of placing powvr in the ham of the unprincipled and ambitious and must event nate in the complet destruction of that liberty ol' whit it should l"i tho must powerful coi servator. Creal danger is therefoi to be apprehended from an untimel extension of the elective franchise 1 any new class in our country, espi chilly when a large majority of th: class, in wielding the power tin placed in their hands, cannot be e: peeted correctly to comprehend tl ditties and responsibilities which pe tain to suffrage. Yesterday, as were, 4,000,000 of persons wert1 he] in a condition of slavery, that lui existed for generations; to-day, tin are freemen, and are assumed by la to be citizens. It cannot be pr sumed from their previous conditio of servitude that, as a race, they' rti as well informed as to the nature i our Government as the intelligei foreigner who makes our land tl homo of his choice. In the case i the latter, neither a residence of fh years and the knowledge of our ii stitutions which it gives, nor attael nient to the principles of the Const tution, are thc 011I3" conditions upc which be can bo admitted to citizei ship; he must prove, in addition, gooit moral character, and thus gb reasonable grounds for the heh that he will be faithful to the obligi tions which, bb assumes as a citi/.e of the Republic. Where a peopl the source of all political powe speak by their suffrages through tl instrumentality of the ballot box, must be carefully guarded again: the control of those who are corni] in principles and enemies of free ii stitutions, for it can only become 1 our political ?nd social system a sa! conductor of 1 ealthy popular sent ment when kept free from demorali ing influences. Controlled throng fraud and usurpation by the desigi ing, anarchy and despotism must ii cvitably follow. lu the bands of tl patriotic and worthy, our Goven mont will be preserved upon the prii ciples of the Constitution inheriti from our fathers. It follows, thor fore, that in admitting to the balle box a new class of voters, not qua: lied for the exercise of the eleetr franchise, we weaken our system Government, instead of adding to i strength and durability. In returning this bill to tho Senat I deeply regret that there should 1 any conflict of opinion between ti legislative and Executive departmen of the Government, in regard tome sures that vitally affect the prosper! and peace of tho country. Sincere desiring to reconcile tho States wi one another, and the whole people the Government of the United State it hus been my earnest wish to t: operate with Congress in all zncasur having for their object c proper ?ti complete adjustment of thc qncstio: resulting from our late civil wa Harmony between the co-ordina braue!:'.-- of the Government, al wa m ee.- . ay for tho public welfare, \v never more demanded than at tl present time, and it will, therefore, be my constant aim to promote, as far as possible, concert of action be? tween them. The differences of opi? nion that have already occurred have rendered "mo only thc more cautious lest tho Executive should encroach upon' any of the prerogatives of Con? gress, or by exceeding in any manner i the constitutional limit of bis duties, destroy the equilibrium which should exist between thc several co-ordinate j departments, and which is so essen - ; tial to the harmonious working of the j Government. I know it has been ? urged that the Executive department is more likely to enlarge the sphere ; of its action than either of thu other two branches of the Government, and especially in the exercise of thc veto power conferredupou it by the Con? stitution, lt should be remembered, however, that this, power is wholly negative and conservative in its cha? racter, and was intended to operate 'as a check upon unconstitutional, hasty and improvident legislation, i and as a means of protection against invasions of thc just powers o? the Executive and Judicial j >eparfcmeu' s. : It is remarked by Chancellor Kent i that , to enact laws i.s a transcendent I power, and if the body that possesses it be a full and equal representation of the people, there is danger of its pressing with destructive weight upon all the other paris of the machinery of Government, lt lias, therefore, been thought necessary, by thc most skillful and most experienced artists in the science of civil polity, that a strong barrier should be erected for the protection and security of the other necessary powers of the Go? vernment. Nothing has been dei med more fit and expedient for the pur? pose than tile provision that th?! head of the Executive Department should be so constituted as to secure a re? quisite share of independence, and that he should have a negative upou the passiug of laws, and that the judiciary power, resting on a still more permanent basis, should have the right of determining upon the validity of laws by tho standard of the Constitution. The necessity of some such check in the hands of the I Executive is shown by reference to ! the most eminent writers upon our I system of Government, who seem to concur in the opinion that encroach j incut - are most to bc apprehended from the department in which all legislative powers are vested by tin Constitution. Mr. Madison, in re? ferring to tho difficulty of providing some practical security for each 1 against the invasion of the other, i remarks that the "legislative depart? ment is everywhere extending thc sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.' The founders of our republic seen neve r to have recollected the dauget from legislative usurpations, which by asembling all power in the samt bauds, must lead to the samt; tyrann* as is threatened by Executive usurpa lions. In a representative republic where the Executive magi.,tracy i: carefully limited, both in the exton ami the derivation of its power, am where the legislative power is oxer cised by an assembly which is in spired by a supposed influence ove i the people, with an intrepid cordi dence in its own strength, which i sufficiently numerous to be incapabL of pursuing the objects of its pas sions by means which reason pre scribes, it is against the enterprising ambition of this department that tb people ought to indulge all thei jealousy and exhaust all their pre cautions. The legislative departmen derives a superiority in our Govern ment from other circumstances. It constitutional powers being at one more extensive and less susceptible o precise limits, it can, with tho greate facility, mask under complicated am indirect measures the encroachment which it makes on the co-ordinat departments. On the other side, th Executive powor being restrains within narrower compass, and beinj moro simple in its nature, and th judiciary being described by land marks still less uncertain, projects o usurpation by either of these depart ments would immediately betray am defeat themselves. Nor is this all, a the legislative department alone ha access to the pockets of thc people and has in some, constitutions ful j discretion, and in all a prevailinj influence over the pecuniary reward I of those who lill tho other deparl ments. A dependence is thus create in the latter which gives still greate facility to encroachments of the foi mer. We have seen tba-'- tho tei dency of Republican Governments i to an aggrandizement of the legi; lative at the expense of tho othc departments. Mr. Jefferson, in rc ferring to the early Constitution c Virginia, objected that by its prov sions all tho powers of Governmenl legislative, executive and jndicia resulted to the legislative body who ly; that the concent rating these i the same hands is precisely the dei nition of despotic government. J will be no alleviation, that thes powers will be exercised by apluralit of hands and nut by a single om One hundred and seventy dospo would surely be as oppressive as om As little will avail ns that they ai chosen by ourselves. An eicctn despotism was not tho Govemniei wo fought for, botone which shoal not only be founded on free princ pies, but on which the powers < Government should be so divid? and balanced among several bodies < magistracy as that no one could tran cend their legal limits without beir effectually checked and restrained t the others. For this reason, that convention which passed the ordi? nance ot' government laid its founda? tion on this basis-that tho legisla? tive, executive and judiciary depart? ments shoulq. be separate and distinct, ! so that no person should exercise the powers of more than oue of them at 1 the same time; but no barrier was provided between these several j powers. The judiciary and execu- ; tivc members were left dependent on ] the legislative for their subsistence in | office, ami some <>f them for their continuance in it. If, therefore, ai Legislature assumes executive ami. judiciary powers, m> opposition is likely to be made: nor, if made, can be effectual, because, in that case, they may put their procec lings into tht? form of an act of assembly, which will render them obligatory on the other branche-. They have ac? cordingly, in ?nany instances, decided rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy, and thc direc? tion ?d' tho executive (luring the whole time of their session, is becom? ing habitua! and familiar. Mr. Justice Story, in his comment? aries on the Constitution, reviews the same subject, and says that tho truth is, that the legislative power is the great, and over-ruling power in every free Government. The repre? sentatives of the people will watch jealously every encroachment of the Executive Magistrate, for it trenches upon their own authority; but who shall watch the encroachment of these representatives themselves? Will they be as jealous of the exercise of power by themselves as by others? There are many reasons which may be as? signed for the engrossing influence of the Legislative department. In the first place, its coustitutiouarpow ers ure more extensive and Less capa? ble of being brought within precise limits than thoseof either of thc other departmants. Tho bounds of the Executive authority are easily marked out and defined. It. reaches few ob? jects, and those ave known. It cannot transcend thevi without being brought in contact ?vito thc oilier de? partments. Laws may cheek and re? strain ami bound its exercise. The same remarks may apply, with still greater force, to the judiciary. The jurisdiction is or may li.- bounded to a few objects or persons* for liowevci general and unlimited, its operations are necessarily confined to the mere administration ol' private amt public justice. It canuet punish without law; it cannot create controversies te act upon: ii c..:i decide ouly .upon rights and cases as they are brought before it; it evin do nothing lor itself, it must do everything for others; it must obey th;1 laws, and if it corruptly administers them, it is subjected to the power of impeachment. On tin other band, tin; legislative power, except in the few cases of constitu? tional prohibition, is unlimited. It is forever varying its means ami it. ends; it governs the institution! and laws ?ind public polie;?* of tin country; it regulates all its vast inter ests; it disposes of all its property, Look but at the exercise of two ol three branches of its ordinary powers it levies all taxes; it directs and ap propriates all supplies; it gives tht rules for the descent, distributioi amt devises of till property held by in dividuals; it controls the sources ano the resources of wealth; it changes, a its will, the whole fabric of the laws it moulds, at'its pleasure, almost al thu instructions which give strengtl ami comfort ami dignity to society lu the next place, it is the direct visi ble representative of the will of tht people in till the changes of times am circumstances; it has the pride as wei as the power of numbers; it is easibj moved and steadily moved by th< strong impulses of popular feeling and popular odium; it obeys, withou reluctance, tho wishes and tho will o the majority for the time being. Tin path to public favor lies open b> such obedience, and it linds, no only support, but impunity, in what over measures the majority advise even though they transcend the con stitutional limits; it has no motive ti be jealous or scrupulous in its owr usc of power, and it linds its ambi lion stimulated and its arm strength cited by the countenance and tin courage of numbers. These view; are not alone those of men who lool with apprehension upon the fate o; republics, but they aro also freeb idmitted by some of the stronges advocates for popular rights and tin permanency of republican institu? tions. Each department should hav< a will of its own. Fach should hav? its own independence secured beyoiic the power of being taken away bj either or both of the others; but, a tue sanie time, the relations of eacl to the other should be so strong th a then; should be a mutual interest ti restrain and protect each other lhere should not only be constitu tional means, but personal motives to resist encroachments of ene o 'ither of the others. Thnsambitioi would be made to counteract ambi Lion; the desire of power to choc! [rower, and the pressure of inter?s LO balance an opposing interest. Tht udiciary is naturally and almost ne ?essarily, as bas berni already said Aio weakest department. It can hav io me.ue; of influence by patronage ts powers can never be wielded lo tself; it has no command over th *?urse ortho sword of the nation; i ..an neither levy taxes nor appn u'iate money, >r command armie ?or appoint t.; office, lt is neve wrought into co* 'et with the pcopl >y constant : '-als, and solicit:: Lions, and private intercourse, wbic bolong to all tho other departments, of Government, tt is seen only in controversies, or in trials and punish? ments. Its rigid justice um! impar? tiality givo it no chums to favor, how? ever they may to respect; it stands solitary and unsupported, except by that portion of public opinion which is interested only in tile strict admi? nistration of justice, lt can rarelv secure tho sympathy or zealous* sup? port either of the Executive or the Legislature, if they an- md, us is not iinfrequently the case, jealous ol its prerogatives. The constant necessity of scrutinizing the acts of each upon tin- application of any private per? son, and the painful duly of pro? nouncing judgment that these acts are a departure from the law or Con? stitution, eau iiave no tendency t: conciliate kindness or nourish influ? ence. It would seem, therefore, that some additional guards would, under such circumstances, li . necessary to protect this department from the absolute dominion of the others. Ye! rarely have any such guards lice:, applied, and every attempt to intro? duce them has been resisted with a pertinacity which demonstrates how slow popular leaders are to introduce cheeks upon their own power, and how slow tlie people are to believe that the judiciary is the iv al bulwark of their liberties. If any depart? ment of the Government has undue influence or absorbing power, it cer? tainly has not been either the Execu? tive or judiciary. In addition to what 1ms; been said by these distinguished writers, it.may also be urged that the dominant party in each House may, by thc adoption of a sufficient number of members, or by the exclusive uepresentation of a requisite number of States, reduce the minority to less than one-third. Congress, by these means, might be enabled to pass a law, the objections of the Presideut to thc contrary not? withstanding, which would render impotent the other two de] artments of the Government, and maire inope? rative the wholesome and restraining power which it was intended by the t rainers of the Constitution should be exerted by them. This would be a practical concentration of all power in the Congress of the United States. This, in tin- language of the author of the Declaration of Independence, would be precisely tie.- definition of despotic Government. I have preferred to reproduce these teadhiugs of the great statesmen and i-iinstitutional lawyers of the early and later days of the republic*, rather than to rely simply upon an expression of my own opinions. We cannot too often recur to them, especially at a conjuncture 1 i icc; the present. Their application to our actual condition is so apparent that they now come tons a living voice, to be listened to with more .attention than at any previ? ous period of our history. We have been and are yoi in Cue midst of popular commotion; the passions aroused bj- a great civil war are still dominant. It is not a time favorable to calm and deliberate judgment, which is the only safe guide, when radical changes in our institutions are tobe made. The measure now before me is one of those changes. It ini? tiates an untried experiment for a peo? ple who have said with one voice that it is not for their good. This alone should make us pause; but this is not all. The experiment has not been tried, or so much as demanded by, tho people of the several States for themselves. In but few of the States has such an innovation been allowed as giving the ballot to the colored population without any other quali? fication than a residence of one year; in most of them, the denial of the ballot to this race is abso lute, and by fundamental law placed beyond the dominion of ordi. nary legislation. In most of those States, the evil of such suffrage woult be partial; but small as it would be it is guarded by constitutional barri ers. Here the innovation assume; formidable proportions, which maj easily grow to such an extent as te make the white population a subordi nate element in the body politic After full deliberation upon tlii. measure, I cannot bring myself t< approve it, even upon local consider ation, nor yet as the beginning of ai experiment on a larger scale. I viele to no one in attachment to that rul< of general suffrage which distin guishes our policy as a nation, bu there is a limit wisely observed hith crto which makes thc ballot a privi lege-a trust-which requires of som classes a time suitable for probation and preparation. To give it indis criminatory to a new class, wholl; unprepared, by previous habits am opportunities, io perform the tras which it demands, is to degrade it md finally to d ?stroy its power; fo it may be safely assumed that n political truth ts better cstablishci than that such indiscriminate am ill-embracing extension of popula suffrage must end at last in its de struction. ANDBEW JOHNS< >N. IN AN INDU.NATION.- Forney i in quite an indignation because "a: ax-member of the rebel Congress, 1 W. Moore, of Kent ucky, and bis wife made their appearance and were n jeived by the President among th members of the present loyal Coi" -jress," on New Year's day. Forne jays that this was "brazen-faced rein impudence," but at the same tim -tates that ..perhaps it was not gem tidly known that thc official notice ? the reception invited members < reff. Davis' Congress."