The daily phoenix. (Columbia, S.C.) 1865-1878, January 08, 1867, Image 2
and interests of its inhabitants ?is is
entertained by a State Legislature for
tho wishes and prosperity of those
for whom they legislate. Tho spirit
of our Constitution and the genius of
our Govern mont require that in re?
gard to any law which is to affect und
have a permanent hoing upon a peo?
ple, their will should assert, at least,
a reasonable influence upon those
who arc acting in the capacity oft heir
legislators. Wculd, for instance, the
I legislature of thu Stute of New York,
or ol' Pennsylvania, or of Indiana, or
of any State in the Union, in opposi?
tion to thc expressed will of a Large
majority of the people whom they
were chosen to represent, arbitrarily
force upon them as voters all persons
of thc African or negro race, and
make them eligible for office without
any other qualification than a certain
term of residence within the States?
In neither of tho States named would
the colored population, when acting
alone, bc able to produce any great
social or political result. Yet in New
Y'ork, before lie can vote, the man ol
color must fulfill conditions that are
not required of the white citizen.
In Pennsylvania, the elective fran
. chise is restricted to white freemen,
while in Indiana, negroes are ex?
pressly excluded from the right oi
suffrage, lt hardly seems consisten!
with the principle of right and jus?
tice, that representatives of States,
where suffrage is either denied thc
colored man, or granted to him or
qualifications requiring intelligence
or property, should compel the peo?
ple of the District of Columbia to trj
an experiment which their own con?
stituents have thus far shown au un?
willingness to test for themselves
nor does it accord with our republi
eau ideas, that the principles of self
government should lose its force
when applied to the residents of tin
District, merely because their legisla
tors are not like those of the States
responsible through the ballot to th?
people for whom they aro the law?
making power. The great object o
placing theseatof Governmentundei
? the exclusive legislation of Congress
was to secure the entire independence
of the General Government from un
due State influeuce, and to enable i
to discharge, without danger of iu
terrnptiou or infringement of its an
thority, the bigh functions for whiel
it was created by the people. Fo
this important purpose, it was cedet
to the United States by Marylnm
and Virginia, and it certainly neve
could have been co?te .'.plated, as on
of the objects to be attained b;
placing li unii< r the exclusive juris
diction Congress, that it would af
ford to propagandists or political par
.ties a place for an experimental tes
of their principies and theories
while, indee.], the residents of th
seat of Government are not citizen
of any State, and are not, therefore
allowed a voice in the electoral co:
lego, or representation in the conn
cils ox the nation, they are, newi
theless. American citizens, an
entitled as such to every right whir.'
pertains to citizens of our commo
country. In all matters, then, affeel
ing their domestic affairs, tho, spiri
of our Democratic form of Govert
ment demands that their wish
should be. consulted and respectci
and they be taught to feel that, a
though not permitted practically t
participate in national concerns, the
are. nevertheless, under a paterni
Government, regardful of their right,
mindful of their wants, and solicitoi
for their prosperity. It was ev
dently contemplated that all loci
questions would be left to their dec.
sion, at least to aa extent that woul
not be incompatible with the objei
for which Congress was granted e:
elusive legislation over the seat (
Government. When the Constiti
tion was yet under consideration,
was assumed by Mr. Madison that i
inhabitants would bc allowed a mi
nicipal legislature for local purpose
derived from their own suffrag
When, for the lirst time, Congres
in the year 1800, assembled at Was!
ington, President Adams, in li
speech at tts opening, reminded tl
two Houses that it was for them i
consider whether the local powe
over the District of Columbia, veste
by the Constitution in the Congre
of the United States, should be ir
mediately exercised, and he ask<
them to consider it as the capital of
great nation, advancing with une
ampled rapidity in arts,.incommerc
in wealth and in population, ai
possessing within itself the resource
which, if not thrown away, or 1
mentably misdirected, would seen
to it a long course of prosperity ai
self-government. Three years hi
not elapsed, when Congress was ea
ed upon to determine the proprie
of retroceding to Maryland and V
ginni the jurisdiction of the territo
which they had respectively reli
rpiished to the Government of t
United States. It was urged, on t
one hand, that exclusive jurisdioti
was not necessary or needful to the C
vernment; that it deprived the in]
bitants of the District of their poli
cal rights; that much of the time
Congress was consumed in legislati
pertaining to it; that its governmc
was expensive; that Congress was ii
competent to legislate for the D
trict, because the members wi
strangers to its local concerns, a
that it was an example of a Govei
ment without representation, an <
p?riment dangerous to the liberti
of the States. On the other hand,
was held, among other reasons a
successfully, that the Constitutif
the acts of cession of Virginia a
Maryland, and the Act of Congie
accepting the graut, all contemplated
I the exercise of exclusive legislation
I by Congress, and that its usefulness,
if not its necessity, was inferred from
the inconvenience which was felt for
want of it by the Congress of the
Confederation; that the people them?
selves, who, it was said, had been de?
prived of their political rights, had
not complained, and did not desire a
retrocession; that the evil might be
remedied by giving them a represen?
tation in Congress when the District
should become sufficiently populous,
and, in the meantime, a local legisla?
ture; that if the inhabitants had not
political rights, t'iey had great politi
j cal influence; that the trouble and
expense of legislating for the District
would not be great, but would dimi?
nish, and might, in a great measure,
be avoided by a local legislature, and
that Congress could noL retrocede
the inhabitants without, their consent.
Continuing to live substantially under
the laws that existed at the time of
the cession, and stich changes only
I having been made as were suggested
by themselves, the people of the Dis?
trict have not sought, by a local l?gis?
lature?, that which has generally been
willingly conceded by lin" Congress of
the nation.
As a general rule, sound policy re?
quires that the Legislature should
yield to the wishes of a people, when
not inconsistent with tim Constitution
and the laws. The measures suited
to one community might not be well
adapted to the condition of another,
and the persons best qualified to de?
termine such questions are those
whose interests arc to bc directly af?
fected by any proposed law. In "Mas?
sachusetts, for instance, male ]>ersons
are allowed to vote without regard to
color, provided they possess a certain
degree of intelligence. In a popula?
tion in that State of 1,231,060 there
were, by the census of 1860, only 9,002
persons of color, and of thc males
over twenty years of agc there were
33'J,08G white to 2,002 colored. By
tho same official enumeration, there
were, in thc District of Columbia,
G0,'.)"3-l whites to 14,310 persons of the
colored race. Sinei! then, however,
the population of the District has
largely increased, and it is estimated
that, at the present time, there are
nearly 100,000 whites to 30,0U0 ne?
groes. The cause of the augmented
numbers of the latter class needs no
explanation. Contiguous to Mary?
land and Virginia, the District, during
the war, became a place of refuge for
those who escaped from servitude,
and it is yet thc abiding place of a
considerable population of those who
sought within its limits ashelterfrotu
bondage. Until then, held in slavery,
and denied all opportunities fo'rmen
j tal culture, their first knowledge of
the Government was acquired when,
by conferring upon them freedom, it
became the benefactor of their race.
The test of their capability for im?
provement began when, for the first
time, the career of free industry and
the avenues to intelligence were
opened to them. Possessing these
advantages but a limited time, thc
greater number of that population
having entered the District of Colum?
bia during the latter years of the war
or since its termination, we may wei!
pause to inquire whether, after so
brief a period, the}* are, as a class,
capable, of an intelligent exercise ol
thu. right of suffrage, and qualified tc
discharge the duties of official posi?
tions'? Thc people who are daily
witnesses of their mode of living,
and who have become familiar with
their habits of thought, have ex?
pressed their conviction that they art
not yet competent to serve as electors,
and thus become eligible for office
in tho local Government under whici
they live. Clothed with the electiv?
franchise, their numbers, airead}
largely in excess of the demand foi
labor, would be soon increased by ai:
influx from tho adjoining States,
drawn from fields where employ
ment is abundant They wonk"
in vain seek it here, and sc
add to the embarrassment al?
ready experienced from the large
?class of persons congregated in tin
District. Hardly yet capable o
forming a correct judgment upon tin
important questions that often make
thc issues of a political contest, thc}
could readily bc made subservient tc
the purposes of designing persons.
While in Massachusetts, under thc
census of 1800, the proportion o
white to colored males over twent}
years of age was 130 to one, here thc
black race constitutes nearly one
third of the entire population, whils
the same class surrounds thc Distric
on all sides, ready to change thin,
residence at a moment's notice, ?inc
with all the facility of a nomadii
people, in order to enjoy hereafter ;
short residence, a privilege they linc
nowhere else. It is within thei;
power in one year to come into tin
District in such numbers as to have
thc supreme control of the whit
race, and to govern them by thei
own officers, and by the exercise o
all thc municipal authority, am
among the rest, the power of taxa
tion over property in which the'
have no interest. In Massachusetts
where they have enjoyed tin; benelir
of a thorough educational system, ?
qualification of intelligence is re
quired, while here, suffrage is ex
tended to all without discrimination
as well to the most incapable win
can prove a residence in the Distric
of ono year, as to tho30 persons o
color, who, comparatively few ii
number, arc permanent in habitation
and having given evidence of meri
and qualification, aro recognized a
useful and responsible members o
the community, imposed upon an
unwilling people, placed by the Con?
stitution under the executive legisla?
tion of Congress. It would be
viewed as an arbitrary exercise of
power, and as an indicatio: by the
country of the purpose of Congress
to compel the acceptance of negro
suffrage by the .Stales, lt would en?
gender a feeling of opposition and
hatred between the two races, which,
becoming deep-rooted and ineradica?
ble, would prevent them from living
together in a s'ate of mutual friend?
liness. Carefully avoiding every
measure that, might tend to product
such a result, and following the cleat
and well ascertained popular will, wc
should assiduously endeavor to pro?
mote kindly relations between them,
and thus, when that popular wil
louds the way, prepare for the gradu
al and harmonious introduction o'
this new element into the pol?tica
powrer of the country. It cannot bi
urged that the proposed extension o:
suffrage in the District of Columbi:
is necessary to tumble persons o
color to protect cither their interesta
or their rights. They statut her?
precisely tis they stand in Peunsylva
nia, Ohio and Indiana. Here, si:
elsewhere, in all that nertaius ii
civil rights, there is nothing to dis
tinguish this class of persons fron
citizens of the United States, fo
they possess the full and equal bene
ht of all laws and proceedings fo:
the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens, ant
are made subject to like punishment
pains and penalties, and none other
any law, statute, ordinance, regula
tion or custom to the contrary not
withstanding. Xor, as has beet
assumed, are their suffrages necessary
to aid a loyal sentiment here, fon
local government already exists o
undoubted fealty to the Government
and is sustained by a commuuit;
which were among the first te tostif;
their devotion to the Union, am
which, during the st ruggle, furnisher
their full quotas pf men to the mili
tary service of the country. Tb
exercise of tho elective franchise i
thc highest attribute of ?tu America
citizen, and win n guided by virtm
intelligence, patriotism, and a prope
appreciation of our institutions, COE
stitutes the true basis of a Denn
eratic form of Government, in wine
the sovereign power is lodged in tb
body of the people. its influent:
for good necessarily depends up?>
the elevated character and patriotism
of the elector: for ii' exercised b
persons who do not justly estim?t
its value, and who art; indifferent t
to its results, it will only prove
means of placing powvr in the ham
of the unprincipled and ambitious
and must event nate in the complet
destruction of that liberty ol' whit
it should l"i tho must powerful coi
servator. Creal danger is therefoi
to be apprehended from an untimel
extension of the elective franchise 1
any new class in our country, espi
chilly when a large majority of th:
class, in wielding the power tin
placed in their hands, cannot be e:
peeted correctly to comprehend tl
ditties and responsibilities which pe
tain to suffrage. Yesterday, as
were, 4,000,000 of persons wert1 he]
in a condition of slavery, that lui
existed for generations; to-day, tin
are freemen, and are assumed by la
to be citizens. It cannot be pr
sumed from their previous conditio
of servitude that, as a race, they' rti
as well informed as to the nature i
our Government as the intelligei
foreigner who makes our land tl
homo of his choice. In the case i
the latter, neither a residence of fh
years and the knowledge of our ii
stitutions which it gives, nor attael
nient to the principles of the Const
tution, are thc 011I3" conditions upc
which be can bo admitted to citizei
ship; he must prove, in addition,
gooit moral character, and thus gb
reasonable grounds for the heh
that he will be faithful to the obligi
tions which, bb assumes as a citi/.e
of the Republic. Where a peopl
the source of all political powe
speak by their suffrages through tl
instrumentality of the ballot box,
must be carefully guarded again:
the control of those who are corni]
in principles and enemies of free ii
stitutions, for it can only become 1
our political ?nd social system a sa!
conductor of 1 ealthy popular sent
ment when kept free from demorali
ing influences. Controlled throng
fraud and usurpation by the desigi
ing, anarchy and despotism must ii
cvitably follow. lu the bands of tl
patriotic and worthy, our Goven
mont will be preserved upon the prii
ciples of the Constitution inheriti
from our fathers. It follows, thor
fore, that in admitting to the balle
box a new class of voters, not qua:
lied for the exercise of the eleetr
franchise, we weaken our system
Government, instead of adding to i
strength and durability.
In returning this bill to tho Senat
I deeply regret that there should 1
any conflict of opinion between ti
legislative and Executive departmen
of the Government, in regard tome
sures that vitally affect the prosper!
and peace of tho country. Sincere
desiring to reconcile tho States wi
one another, and the whole people
the Government of the United State
it hus been my earnest wish to t:
operate with Congress in all zncasur
having for their object c proper ?ti
complete adjustment of thc qncstio:
resulting from our late civil wa
Harmony between the co-ordina
braue!:'.-- of the Government, al wa
m ee.- . ay for tho public welfare, \v
never more demanded than at tl
present time, and it will, therefore,
be my constant aim to promote, as
far as possible, concert of action be?
tween them. The differences of opi?
nion that have already occurred have
rendered "mo only thc more cautious
lest tho Executive should encroach
upon' any of the prerogatives of Con?
gress, or by exceeding in any manner i
the constitutional limit of bis duties,
destroy the equilibrium which should
exist between thc several co-ordinate j
departments, and which is so essen - ;
tial to the harmonious working of the j
Government. I know it has been ?
urged that the Executive department
is more likely to enlarge the sphere ;
of its action than either of thu other
two branches of the Government, and
especially in the exercise of thc veto
power conferredupou it by the Con?
stitution, lt should be remembered,
however, that this, power is wholly
negative and conservative in its cha?
racter, and was intended to operate
'as a check upon unconstitutional,
hasty and improvident legislation,
i and as a means of protection against
invasions of thc just powers o? the
Executive and Judicial j >eparfcmeu' s.
: It is remarked by Chancellor Kent
i that , to enact laws i.s a transcendent
I power, and if the body that possesses
it be a full and equal representation
of the people, there is danger of its
pressing with destructive weight upon
all the other paris of the machinery
of Government, lt lias, therefore,
been thought necessary, by thc most
skillful and most experienced artists
in the science of civil polity, that a
strong barrier should be erected for
the protection and security of the
other necessary powers of the Go?
vernment. Nothing has been dei med
more fit and expedient for the pur?
pose than tile provision that th?! head
of the Executive Department should
be so constituted as to secure a re?
quisite share of independence, and
that he should have a negative upou
the passiug of laws, and that the
judiciary power, resting on a still
more permanent basis, should have
the right of determining upon the
validity of laws by tho standard of
the Constitution. The necessity of
some such check in the hands of the
I Executive is shown by reference to
! the most eminent writers upon our
I system of Government, who seem to
concur in the opinion that encroach
j incut - are most to bc apprehended
from the department in which all
legislative powers are vested by tin
Constitution. Mr. Madison, in re?
ferring to tho difficulty of providing
some practical security for each
1 against the invasion of the other,
i remarks that the "legislative depart?
ment is everywhere extending thc
sphere of its activity, and drawing
all power into its impetuous vortex.'
The founders of our republic seen
neve r to have recollected the dauget
from legislative usurpations, which
by asembling all power in the samt
bauds, must lead to the samt; tyrann*
as is threatened by Executive usurpa
lions. In a representative republic
where the Executive magi.,tracy i:
carefully limited, both in the exton
ami the derivation of its power, am
where the legislative power is oxer
cised by an assembly which is in
spired by a supposed influence ove
i the people, with an intrepid cordi
dence in its own strength, which i
sufficiently numerous to be incapabL
of pursuing the objects of its pas
sions by means which reason pre
scribes, it is against the enterprising
ambition of this department that tb
people ought to indulge all thei
jealousy and exhaust all their pre
cautions. The legislative departmen
derives a superiority in our Govern
ment from other circumstances. It
constitutional powers being at one
more extensive and less susceptible o
precise limits, it can, with tho greate
facility, mask under complicated am
indirect measures the encroachment
which it makes on the co-ordinat
departments. On the other side, th
Executive powor being restrains
within narrower compass, and beinj
moro simple in its nature, and th
judiciary being described by land
marks still less uncertain, projects o
usurpation by either of these depart
ments would immediately betray am
defeat themselves. Nor is this all, a
the legislative department alone ha
access to the pockets of thc people
and has in some, constitutions ful
j discretion, and in all a prevailinj
influence over the pecuniary reward
I of those who lill tho other deparl
ments. A dependence is thus create
in the latter which gives still greate
facility to encroachments of the foi
mer. We have seen tba-'- tho tei
dency of Republican Governments i
to an aggrandizement of the legi;
lative at the expense of tho othc
departments. Mr. Jefferson, in rc
ferring to the early Constitution c
Virginia, objected that by its prov
sions all tho powers of Governmenl
legislative, executive and jndicia
resulted to the legislative body who
ly; that the concent rating these i
the same hands is precisely the dei
nition of despotic government. J
will be no alleviation, that thes
powers will be exercised by apluralit
of hands and nut by a single om
One hundred and seventy dospo
would surely be as oppressive as om
As little will avail ns that they ai
chosen by ourselves. An eicctn
despotism was not tho Govemniei
wo fought for, botone which shoal
not only be founded on free princ
pies, but on which the powers <
Government should be so divid?
and balanced among several bodies <
magistracy as that no one could tran
cend their legal limits without beir
effectually checked and restrained t
the others. For this reason, that
convention which passed the ordi?
nance ot' government laid its founda?
tion on this basis-that tho legisla?
tive, executive and judiciary depart?
ments shoulq. be separate and distinct, !
so that no person should exercise the
powers of more than oue of them at 1
the same time; but no barrier was
provided between these several j
powers. The judiciary and execu- ;
tivc members were left dependent on ]
the legislative for their subsistence in |
office, ami some <>f them for their
continuance in it. If, therefore, ai
Legislature assumes executive ami.
judiciary powers, m> opposition is
likely to be made: nor, if made, can
be effectual, because, in that case,
they may put their procec lings into
tht? form of an act of assembly,
which will render them obligatory on
the other branche-. They have ac?
cordingly, in ?nany instances, decided
rights which should have been left to
judiciary controversy, and thc direc?
tion ?d' tho executive (luring the
whole time of their session, is becom?
ing habitua! and familiar.
Mr. Justice Story, in his comment?
aries on the Constitution, reviews
the same subject, and says that tho
truth is, that the legislative power is
the great, and over-ruling power in
every free Government. The repre?
sentatives of the people will watch
jealously every encroachment of the
Executive Magistrate, for it trenches
upon their own authority; but who
shall watch the encroachment of these
representatives themselves? Will they
be as jealous of the exercise of power
by themselves as by others? There
are many reasons which may be as?
signed for the engrossing influence
of the Legislative department. In
the first place, its coustitutiouarpow
ers ure more extensive and Less capa?
ble of being brought within precise
limits than thoseof either of thc other
departmants. Tho bounds of the
Executive authority are easily marked
out and defined. It. reaches few ob?
jects, and those ave known. It cannot
transcend thevi without being
brought in contact ?vito thc oilier de?
partments. Laws may cheek and re?
strain ami bound its exercise. The
same remarks may apply, with still
greater force, to the judiciary. The
jurisdiction is or may li.- bounded to
a few objects or persons* for liowevci
general and unlimited, its operations
are necessarily confined to the mere
administration ol' private amt public
justice. It canuet punish without
law; it cannot create controversies te
act upon: ii c..:i decide ouly .upon
rights and cases as they are brought
before it; it evin do nothing lor itself,
it must do everything for others; it
must obey th;1 laws, and if it corruptly
administers them, it is subjected to
the power of impeachment. On tin
other band, tin; legislative power,
except in the few cases of constitu?
tional prohibition, is unlimited. It
is forever varying its means ami it.
ends; it governs the institution!
and laws ?ind public polie;?* of tin
country; it regulates all its vast inter
ests; it disposes of all its property,
Look but at the exercise of two ol
three branches of its ordinary powers
it levies all taxes; it directs and ap
propriates all supplies; it gives tht
rules for the descent, distributioi
amt devises of till property held by in
dividuals; it controls the sources ano
the resources of wealth; it changes, a
its will, the whole fabric of the laws
it moulds, at'its pleasure, almost al
thu instructions which give strengtl
ami comfort ami dignity to society
lu the next place, it is the direct visi
ble representative of the will of tht
people in till the changes of times am
circumstances; it has the pride as wei
as the power of numbers; it is easibj
moved and steadily moved by th<
strong impulses of popular feeling
and popular odium; it obeys, withou
reluctance, tho wishes and tho will o
the majority for the time being. Tin
path to public favor lies open b>
such obedience, and it linds, no
only support, but impunity, in what
over measures the majority advise
even though they transcend the con
stitutional limits; it has no motive ti
be jealous or scrupulous in its owr
usc of power, and it linds its ambi
lion stimulated and its arm strength
cited by the countenance and tin
courage of numbers. These view;
are not alone those of men who lool
with apprehension upon the fate o;
republics, but they aro also freeb
idmitted by some of the stronges
advocates for popular rights and tin
permanency of republican institu?
tions. Each department should hav<
a will of its own. Fach should hav?
its own independence secured beyoiic
the power of being taken away bj
either or both of the others; but, a
tue sanie time, the relations of eacl
to the other should be so strong th a
then; should be a mutual interest ti
restrain and protect each other
lhere should not only be constitu
tional means, but personal motives
to resist encroachments of ene o
'ither of the others. Thnsambitioi
would be made to counteract ambi
Lion; the desire of power to choc!
[rower, and the pressure of inter?s
LO balance an opposing interest. Tht
udiciary is naturally and almost ne
?essarily, as bas berni already said
Aio weakest department. It can hav
io me.ue; of influence by patronage
ts powers can never be wielded lo
tself; it has no command over th
*?urse ortho sword of the nation; i
..an neither levy taxes nor appn
u'iate money, >r command armie
?or appoint t.; office, lt is neve
wrought into co* 'et with the pcopl
>y constant : '-als, and solicit::
Lions, and private intercourse, wbic
bolong to all tho other departments,
of Government, tt is seen only in
controversies, or in trials and punish?
ments. Its rigid justice um! impar?
tiality givo it no chums to favor, how?
ever they may to respect; it stands
solitary and unsupported, except by
that portion of public opinion which
is interested only in tile strict admi?
nistration of justice, lt can rarelv
secure tho sympathy or zealous* sup?
port either of the Executive or the
Legislature, if they an- md, us is not
iinfrequently the case, jealous ol its
prerogatives. The constant necessity
of scrutinizing the acts of each upon
tin- application of any private per?
son, and the painful duly of pro?
nouncing judgment that these acts
are a departure from the law or Con?
stitution, eau iiave no tendency t:
conciliate kindness or nourish influ?
ence. It would seem, therefore, that
some additional guards would, under
such circumstances, li . necessary to
protect this department from the
absolute dominion of the others. Ye!
rarely have any such guards lice:,
applied, and every attempt to intro?
duce them has been resisted with a
pertinacity which demonstrates how
slow popular leaders are to introduce
cheeks upon their own power, and
how slow tlie people are to believe
that the judiciary is the iv al bulwark
of their liberties. If any depart?
ment of the Government has undue
influence or absorbing power, it cer?
tainly has not been either the Execu?
tive or judiciary.
In addition to what 1ms; been said
by these distinguished writers, it.may
also be urged that the dominant party
in each House may, by thc adoption
of a sufficient number of members,
or by the exclusive uepresentation of
a requisite number of States, reduce
the minority to less than one-third.
Congress, by these means, might be
enabled to pass a law, the objections
of the Presideut to thc contrary not?
withstanding, which would render
impotent the other two de] artments
of the Government, and maire inope?
rative the wholesome and restraining
power which it was intended by the
t rainers of the Constitution should be
exerted by them. This would be a
practical concentration of all power
in the Congress of the United States.
This, in tin- language of the author
of the Declaration of Independence,
would be precisely tie.- definition of
despotic Government.
I have preferred to reproduce these
teadhiugs of the great statesmen and
i-iinstitutional lawyers of the early
and later days of the republic*, rather
than to rely simply upon an expression
of my own opinions. We cannot too
often recur to them, especially at a
conjuncture 1 i icc; the present. Their
application to our actual condition is
so apparent that they now come tons
a living voice, to be listened to with
more .attention than at any previ?
ous period of our history. We have
been and are yoi in Cue midst of
popular commotion; the passions
aroused bj- a great civil war are still
dominant. It is not a time favorable
to calm and deliberate judgment,
which is the only safe guide, when
radical changes in our institutions are
tobe made. The measure now before
me is one of those changes. It ini?
tiates an untried experiment for a peo?
ple who have said with one voice that
it is not for their good. This alone
should make us pause; but this is not
all. The experiment has not been
tried, or so much as demanded by,
tho people of the several States for
themselves. In but few of the States
has such an innovation been allowed
as giving the ballot to the colored
population without any other quali?
fication than a residence of one
year; in most of them, the denial
of the ballot to this race is abso
lute, and by fundamental law
placed beyond the dominion of ordi.
nary legislation. In most of those
States, the evil of such suffrage woult
be partial; but small as it would be
it is guarded by constitutional barri
ers. Here the innovation assume;
formidable proportions, which maj
easily grow to such an extent as te
make the white population a subordi
nate element in the body politic
After full deliberation upon tlii.
measure, I cannot bring myself t<
approve it, even upon local consider
ation, nor yet as the beginning of ai
experiment on a larger scale. I viele
to no one in attachment to that rul<
of general suffrage which distin
guishes our policy as a nation, bu
there is a limit wisely observed hith
crto which makes thc ballot a privi
lege-a trust-which requires of som
classes a time suitable for probation
and preparation. To give it indis
criminatory to a new class, wholl;
unprepared, by previous habits am
opportunities, io perform the tras
which it demands, is to degrade it
md finally to d ?stroy its power; fo
it may be safely assumed that n
political truth ts better cstablishci
than that such indiscriminate am
ill-embracing extension of popula
suffrage must end at last in its de
struction.
ANDBEW JOHNS< >N.
IN AN INDU.NATION.- Forney i
in quite an indignation because "a:
ax-member of the rebel Congress, 1
W. Moore, of Kent ucky, and bis wife
made their appearance and were n
jeived by the President among th
members of the present loyal Coi"
-jress," on New Year's day. Forne
jays that this was "brazen-faced rein
impudence," but at the same tim
-tates that ..perhaps it was not gem
tidly known that thc official notice ?
the reception invited members <
reff. Davis' Congress."