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An Independent Family Journal? -Beyoted to Politics, Literature and General Intelligence. H?TT & CO., Proprietors* ANDERSON. S. C. THURSDAY, SEPETMBER 2, 1869. VOLUME 5.---NO. 10. _\ ? From the Greenville Enterprise. THE LAW OF D1T0JRCE. We have been favored with a copy of the able opinion of Judge Orr, delivered in the case below stated, on the impor? tant question of Divorce : John E. Walker vs. Mary J. Walker?In the Hommon Pleas, Equity side, Green? ville, May Term, 1869?Petition for Di? vorce?A Yinculo Matrimonii. The Petitioner, John H. Walker, filed his petition on the 31st March, 1869, against Mary Jane Walker, his wife, pray? ing "a divorce a vinculo matrimunii from the said Mary, and that she be permitted to resume her maiden name ef Mary J. Few," on the ground that a few "months after their marriage his wife became ex? ceedingly unhappy in her disposition, un? kind in her treatment to him, used vio? lent, abu3ive and menacing language towards him, and constantly manitested a determined malignity towards him." She "accompanied her language with . blows on several occasions." Her hostil? ity, violence and malignity to him in? creased until at length it became intole? rable, and they wilfully separated about November, 1860, since which time they have lived apart." The parties were duly married on the 31st July, 1856, and a deed of separation executed by them the30th January, 1861. The Defendant having failed to plead, an? swer or demur within the rule, the peti? tion was taken pro confessp on the 17th May, 1869. Testimony was taken before the Clerk in support of the allegations of the petition and reported to the Court. One of the witnesses says of Defendant: "She had a cross, crabbed disposition. It was impossible for any reasonable mind? ed man to have lived in peace and happi? ness with her." Another witness says she "is a high tempered woman; bard to got along with; wanted her own way ontirely ; thinks it utterly impossible that thoy will ever live together again." An? other witness says the Petitioner "treat? ed her kindly and affectionately ; at? tempted to live in peace with her; 6he became dissatisfied without cause; became ill and cross to him; at one time struck at him; she constantly got worse in her disposition and actions towards him until their separation." Before entering upon the consideration of the legal principles involved in this case?an application to the Court to mate a decree of divorce?which has been heretofore uniformly refused by the Leg? islature and Courts of this State in all similar applications, it is proper to de? termine whether tho Courts of the State are now invested with jurisdiction to hear und determine such cases. In the kingdom of Great Britain, the jurisdiction of matrimonial questions bt longed to the Ecclesiastical Courts, and divorces a vinculo matrimonii were re? stricted in England to causes which ex? isted at the time tho marriage was con? tracted, such as causa metus, causa impo tentioe, causa affinitatis, causa consanquini tatis, &c; and though the marriage was unlawful, a sentence of nullity of mar? riage was necessary to dissolve the bonds of matrimony. Marriage was regarded a sacrament of the Church, and tho Pope, exercising a controlling temporal power over Europe, required that the cognizance of such sub? jects should be confided exclusively in the Ecclesiastical Courts, and that divorces a vinculo should not be granted even by that Court for causes arising subsequent to the marriage. The dispensation of the head of the Church being the only re? cognized authority to dissolve a mar? riage for causes arising subsequent to its contraction, though the temporal power of the Pope has long since ceased in Eng? land, the original jurisdiction of the Ec? clesiastical Courts has not been enlarged; they aro restricted to granting divorces a mensa et thora, and the Parliament alone can grant a divorce a vinculo for adultery or any other cause arising after tho mar? riage This, however, is not the law in all tho British Empire. In Scotland, the Keformation exploded this rule of the Komish Church, and divorces a vinculo matrimonii for adultery and wilful and malicious desertion have been uniformly granted. For the samo causes, divorces a vinculo are granted by all the States of the American Union, regulated most gene? rally by statite, but having the authori? ty of the common law as administered in a part of the British Empire; and for the first cause, adultery, tho positive author? ity of the Scriptures?which furnish to all Christian nations the highest, purest and safest rules for social and moral ac? tion. Matthew v. 32. All religions undor tho Fedoral and State Constitutions aro protected in their full and unrestrained exercise, but none are established, and thorofore tho tenets or canons of none Bbould control the de? termination of the question when, how, and for what causes the bonds of matri? mony should be dissolved. It is a ques? tion to be solved by considerations of moral, social and political expediency and Eropriety. When the responsible relation as been entered into, and one of the parties utterly fail, from base depravity or other grave cause to fulfill its high and sacred duties, is it not the duty of the State to provide some tribunal to ad? judge the failure and order the dissolu? tion of the relation. This tribunal should be restricted in the exercise of such pow? ers to causes of the utmost gravity only; those which are temporary or frivolous, ought not to be listened to by a Court. "It is the policy of the law, and neces? sary to the purity and usefulness of the institution of marriage, that those who enter into it, should regard it as a rela? tion permanent as their own lives; its duration not depending npon the whim or caprice of either, and only to be dissolved when the improper conduct of one of the parties shall render the connection wholly intolerable or inconsistent with the hap? piness or safety of the other." Griffin ts. Griffin, 8 B. Munroe, 120. Judge Swift observes: "The render? ing of the contract of matrimony indis? soluble, is running into the opposite ex? treme from that of permitting divorces at the pleasure of the parties. There are many porsons who, on the idea that the marriage contract caunot be vacated for any misconduct, will not behave with the propriety they would if the continuance of the contract were dependent on their exertions to render themselves agreeable to the persons with whom they are con? nected. It is a great hardship that a per son who has been unfortunate in forming a matrimonial connection, must be for? ever precluded from any possibility of extricating himself from such a misfor? tune, and be shut out from enjoying the best pleasures of life. This consideration, instead of adding to the happiness of the connection, must frighten persons from entering into it. It is, therefore, the best policy to admit a dissolution of the con? tract, when it is evident that the parties cannot derive from it the benefits for which it was instituted, and when in? stead of being a sourco of the highest pleasure and most enduring felicity, it becomes the source of the deepest woe and misery." 1 Swift's System, 191. Whether the jurisdiction should be ex? tended in granting divorces a vinculo matrimonii beyond the causes pre-existing at marriage, and to adultery and mali? cious desertion subsequent thereto, need not now be discussed. Up to this point, at leant, the judicial tribunals of most civilized countries exercise jurisdiction. In this State heretofore, marriage, from any cause and under all circumstances, has been absolutely indissoluble?the Courts taking the ground that the Leg? islature had not invested them with pow? er to declare a divorce, and have uniform? ly declined to exercise it. The Legisla? ture has steadily refusod to grant a dis? solution of the marriage tie. There is, perhaps, no other civilized country, ei? ther protestant or catholic, that has not made some provision, either legislatively or judicially, for dissolving marriage for adequato cause, except this Stato. In England, the Ecclesiastical Courts grunt divorces a mensa e.t thora, and the British Parliament a vinculo matrimonii. In Scotland the marriage is dissolved for adultery or malicious desertion, by the Courts, and in the States of the American Union, the samo powers are exorcised by most of the Courts for causes already enumerated, and for others not mention? ed. In Rhnmo vs. Rhamo. McCord's C R. 197, Judge Isott, in a bill filed for alimo? ny, admitted that in Engla id such cases belonged to the Ecclesiat ncal Courts, but considered that alimon/ was an excep? tion in this State by the practice of the Court of Equity, and from necessity, and held that "the jurisdiction of the Court must be limited to the allowing of alimo? ny, and to such orders as are neeessarilj' incident to the effectual execution of such a decree." Again he says: "Although our Courts of Equity have not the power to grant divorces, yet, as the two sub? jects?divorce and alimony?are insepa ble companions in England, we must look to the causes of divorce to ascertain the grounds on which alimony will be allow? ed." In Prather vs. Prather, 4 DeS., C. R. 34, in considering a bill for alimony, Chas. DeSaussure says: "And this, from the necessity of the case, and to redress an injury not otherwise remediable?I allude to several cases which were decided in this Court some years since?expressly on the ground that no other tribunal could give redress, and that it would be unseem? ly and highly mischievous if this Court did not interfere." Chief Justice Dunkin, in the case of Mattison vs. Mattison, 1 Strobhart, C. R. 388, which was a bill to declare a nullity of marriage, said "that there was no dis? tinction in such a bill and a bill for di? vorce; that the Legislature had not con? ferred any such jurisdiction on the Court, and that there was no inherent power in the Court to exercise it. He adopts the ruling of Judge Nott, that the allowance of alimony and incidental orders for car? rying it into effect, was properly cogni? zable by the Court of Equity from "prac? tice and necessity," but could not be ex? tended to divorco or declaring a mar? riage null and void. In all the cases in this State, jurisdic? tion in alimony is taken by the Court from "necessity and the practice of the Court." There was no "practice" of the Court in such a case until "necessity" in? duced its introduction, and therefore the only ground for assuming jurisdiction was "necessity.'' The Court of Equity in this State takes jurisdiction in cases of alimony without any legislative authoriza? tion when such cases are cognizable alone in Ecclesiastical Courts of England, and denies to itself jurisdiction in cases of divorce, also cognizable alone in tho Ecclesiastical Courts of England, because the Legislature of the State has not spe? cially conferred jurisdiction on that Court, to hear and determine divorce cases! Judge Nott says "divorco and alimony are inseparable companions in England,'1 and yet assumed jurisdiction of the one from "necessity," and denies it to the oth? er for want of legislative authority. Does not the "necessity" to exercise the jurisdiction to annul or dissolve a degra? ding marriage, plead the Court as urgent-1 ly as the "necessity" to provide food, clothing and shelter for a helpless wife who has been discarded by an imperious or cruel husband ? Is not the "necessity" as great to ex? ercise this jurisdiction of declaring a "nullity of marriage" whore the revolt? ing fact is exhibited of an incestuous marriage between father and daughter, mother and son, sister and brother? or to grant a divorce vinculo matrimonii to an injured and outraged wife, whose hus? band had introduced into his house and seated at his table a sable paramour? who shared his bed and received his at? tentions, while the unoffending wife re? ceived the crumbs and sulfered tho indig? nities and abuse heaped on her by the faithless husband and hie degraded mis? tress ? Such were substantially the facts in the case of Jelineau vs. Jelineau, 2 DeS., E. E. 45, and the Court, in the graphic language of Bishop on Divorce and Marriage, 288, refused "to sever the living body from the putrid carcass," and exhausted the powers of the tribunal by decreeing, simply, that the husband should maintain the wife he had no shamelessly wronged 1 Chancellor Kent, in an able opinion de? livered in the case of Wightman vs. Wightman, 4 Johnston, C K. 343, reach? es a conclusion exactly the reverse of that decided by the Court in this State. He holds that no legislative authority is needed to confer jurisdiction on the Courts of Equity in Divorce cases?that the power in the Court is inherent. He says: "AH matrimonial and other causes of Ecclesiastical cognizance belonged, originally, to tho temporal courts; and when the.spiritual courts cease the cog? nizance of such cases, it would seem, as of course, to revert back to lay tribunals. 'Divorces a vinculo,' sayn Lord Coke, 'are causa metus, causa impot entice, causa affinitatis, causa consanquinitatis, dec?? These causes, and that of lunacy, are not within the Statute (N. Y.) giving to this Court jurisdiction concerning divorces." Notwithstanding that fact, the learned Chancellor says, that the Court of Equity "is compotont, not merely collaterally, but by a suit instituted directly and for the sole purpose to pronounce a divorce in such cases." Whatever opinion may bo entertained of tho soundness of the judicial decisions or tho practice of the Courts in tlm State, on divorce heretofore, all doubt is now removed by the explicit language of the new Constitution. Article IV., Section 15, provides that "the Courts of Common Pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases of divorce," &c; arid in Sec. 16, "it shall have jurisdiction in all matters of Equity," <fce. Article 14, Section 5, provides that "divorces from the bonds of matrimony shall not be allowed but by the judgment of a court, as shall be pro? scribed by law." It has been suggested that this clause restrains the courts from exercising the jurisdiction conferred in the fourth article until the General As? sembly shall by statute prescribe the causes respectively, for partial and entire divorcos, and the rules and practice in the same. If ^hereafter" had been inserted in the latter clause of the section so as to read "as shall hereafter bo prescribed by law," such construction might have been admissible, but the language used, and properly used, in a Constitution, which I must define general propositions, embra? ces the existing laws, as well as amend J ments and modifications hereafter to be made by the Legislature. Tho object of this section, when ascertained, will re? move all doubt as to its proper construc? tion. The Convention framing the Con? stitution, profiting by tho experience of j other States where Legislative divorces have been granted, and where caprico, favoritism and importunity controlled the I enactment in disregard of all general principles of law,and oftentimes totally inconsistent with the previous acts of the samo body, intended to prohibit all di? vorces by the Legislative?confiding the power exclusively in the courts, which I would bo bound to decide such cases con? formably to settled principles of law. Divorcos are to be grantod conformably to law, and not by Legislative caprice. If tho phraseology of the section had been "as now prescribed by law," it would have precludod tho Legislature from amendments in the future; if "as may hereaftor bo prescribed by law," it j would have excluded tho enforcement of the existing law by the courts, and there? by defeated the grant of jurisdiction con? tained in the fourth article. The word "law" in the section embraces ecclcsiasti-! cal and common law as well as statute law. If the section should bo construed to refer alone to law hereafter to bo enac? ted by tho Legislature, it excludes all ex? cept statute law. Tho phraseology cov? ers what was intended by tho Conven? tion, that the courts in determining di-: vorcc cases should be governed by the existing common law and such statute laws as may hereaftor be enacted. The phraso could not be constructed more per? spicuously to embrace existing law and future enactments Any other construc? tion defeats tho other provisions of the Constitution giving present juri sdiction to the Court of Common Pleas in all cases of divorco, and is in palpabloconflict with the well established rule of construction j that remedial legislation must be liberally construed. "No statutes can bo moro manifestly remedial than those which au? thorize divorce; and,thoreforo,according to established principles, they 'should be liberally and equitably construed to give effect to the remedy."?Bishop on mar? riage and divorce, 290. The Biimo liberal rulo of construction applies to remedial provisions in the Constitution s.s to stat? utes. But it may bo objected that although the Constitution gives the Court of Com? mon Pleas jurisdiction, it does not provido how it shall bo exercised?whether in tho Common Pleas or on the Equi .y side of the Common Pleas. It might be a suffi cient answer that the Common Pleas Courts are invested with jurisdiction in all matters of Equity, and that the Equi? ty side of the Court is the only forum where such causes can be heard, and the various orders passed to give effect to its judgments. Hence the Equity side of tho Common Pleas is the only appropriate tribunal to exercise the jurisdiction con? ferred. In Perry vs. Perry, 2 Paige, 501, Chancellor Walworth says: "But when? ever the legislature (or constitution) dis? tinctly gives the right without creating or appointing any particular tribunal to administer the remedy, it is fairly to be interred that they intended to vest that power in seme of the existing tribunals of the country." Here the constitution gives the right of present jurisdiction, ex? pressly prescribes the Court of Common Pleas as the tribunal, and the inference is that the power is vested on Equity side, because of the adaption of the practice of that Court, to give efficiency to all neces? sary decrees and orders in determining such cases. I conclude therefore, that the Equity side of the Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiotion of divorces a mensa et thoru and a vinculo matrimonii. In the latter class, not only in cases where the cause arose prior to marriage as defined by Lord Coke, but also in cases of adul tery and wilful permanent desertion in cases arising subsequently. That the proper practice is to proceed by bill that the allegations must be sustained by proof taken before tho clerk and reported to the court. That to avoid collusion or con? nivance between the parties, the allega? tions of the bill are not to be taken as truo on a pro confesso order, or by the con? sent of the parties, the prayer for an ab? solute or qualified divorce only being grantable upon proof of tho existence of defined and established legal cause. It follows, hence, that the petitioner in this case, John H. Walker; has not set forth any sufficient legal cause in hin pe? tition why his prayer for a divorce vinculo matrimonii should be granted; and upon the proot submitted, it is not admissible to grant a divorce a mensa et thora. Tho proof establishes the ill temper; petulance and subborness of the Defend? ant, and upon one occasion that she struck at him. Was it such violence and legal cruelty practiced by a woman towards a man that entitles him to claim even a qualified divorce a mensaet thora ? "Cru? elty is any conduct in oue of the married parties, which form a reasonable appre? hension that tho continuance of the co? habitation would be attended with bodily harm to the other." Evans vs. Evans, 4, English. E. R. 3l0. The learned judge (Lord Stowell)) in the same case says: "What merely wounds the mental feel? ings is in few cases to be admitted where not accompanied with bodily injury either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulanco of mannors, rudeness of language, a want ef civil attention and ac? commodation, oven occasion sallies of pas? sion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty. They are high moral offences in the marriage state undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but still they are not that cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on one side as well as on the other; tho suf? fering party must bear in sumo degree tho consequences of an injudicious connection ?must subdue by decent resistance or b}T prudent conciliation ; and if this cannot be done, both must suffer in 6i'Ience." In Lockwood vs. Lockwood, 7 English, E. R. 114, it was held thaf'tbero must be either actual violence committed, atten? ded with danger to life, limb or health, er there must be a reasonble apprehension of such violence." Again in Evans vs. Evans, Lord Stowell say6: "In the older cases of this sort which I have had an opportunity of looking into, I have ob? served that tho danger of lite, limb, or health, is usually inserted as tho ground I upon which tho Court has proceeded to a I separation. This doctrine has been re? peatedly applied by the Court in the cases that have been decided. Tho Court has never been driven off this ground." I Chancellor Walworth, in Perry vs. Perry, 1 Bart., Ch. R. 516, says when the husband is complainant, "it is not suffici? ent to show a single act of violence on her part towards him, or even a scries of such acts; so long as there is no reason to suppose that he will not bo able to pro? tect himself and family by a proper exer? cise of his marital power." From these authorities, it is manifest that the Peti? tioner has not alleged, or proven any sufficient legal cau60 entitling him to a decroo of separation against his wife. Chancellor Kent lays down the rule against the application of tho petitioner in broader terms than any of the foregoing authorities. He says in Van Veghtcn vs. Vcghten, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 501, that "the husband cannot file a bill against his wifo for a divorce a mensa et thora, on the ground of cruelty, desertion or improper conduct," and assigns as the reason there? for, that "tho common law has given to the husband sufficient powor and control over tho wifo to protect himself from such conduct." Applications to the Court for divorce should bo by bill, and not by petition, though tho form in this case, will not en? ter into the judgment to be pronounced. I adjudge that tho petition bo dismiss? ed at tho costs of the Petitioner. JAMES L. ORR. August 13th, 1869. .-* ? " The son of Jesse'1 seems to have dis? appointed the expectations of the Virgin? ia and Mississippi conservatives not a lit? tle?which leads the Lynchnrg Virginian to feel like saying: "What portion have we in David. Neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse. To your tents, 0, Israel!" olitus m? Mm*. Dangers to be Avoided. In the upheaval of political and social elements consequent to a long war and incident to the re organization of nation? al elements, there aro certain dangers to be avoided. Especially is it so in a vast country like ours, inhabited by peoples al? most as distinct in their personal and na? tional characteristics ao if they bad sprung from different races. In the game of "stoop to conquer" which the weaker party is sometimes compelled to play, the greatest circumspection should be used, lest it should undergo some moral meta? morphosis in the course of the contest that shall seriously impair its native force and charactor. Our friends in Virginia, Tennessee, Mississippi and Texas?we call them so because no man will dare question their integrity and devotion to the South have found it necessary, in order to re? cover their rights as freemen, to form for the time being a political union with men with whom they do not agree upon the questions that have of late agitated the country. In other words, they have agreed to suspend for tho time their hon? est convictions of public policy, that they may regain their liberty and put them? selves in a position to bo seen and felt in the great movements of government. They, do not sacrifice those convictions, but simply agree to make them a practi? cal effect in the Government. They are just and true in theory and vindicated by all experience, and as such the day for their resurrection may be looked for with confidence. There is nothing any clearer than the proposition that this Government cannot be successfully ad? ministered upon the principles laid down by the radical party. They contain with? in themselves inherently the elements of disintegration and final expulsion. It is not our purpose now to elaborate them. But while true Southern men thus unite for a great public purpose with those who agree with them on certain vi? tal points, and differ on many others, they should be careful that the character of the union be clearly understood by themselves as well as by others. Assimila? tion is a principle of human nature. When once in association with men, we are apt to adopt their vices as well as their virtues. What may now appear op? posed to all correct views of reason and right, may through familiarity, appear in time less odious, if not positively tolera? ble. This result is to be guarded against as we value our character and our peace. We want no Northern isms and heresies engrafted upon Southern stocks. Above all things, we should shun what they boastingly denominate "New England civilization," as the greatest enemy to truth and our own happiness. If we j'ield temporarily to false theories and principles, let it only be that they may have full scope to work out theii utter destruction. Such is the destiny of error of every sort. Experience is the great test of truth and eliminator of facts from fallacies. In the second place, let Southern men guard well those distinctive characteris? tics that have always drawn a broad line between them and the people of the North, and made the former, as a people, despite their faults, the admiration of tho world. That lofty independence of char? acter, that love of truth, that chivalrous spirit that will do and dare anything for the right, that contempt lor everything that is mean and selfish and groveling, that proud sense of equality with tho highest and magnanimous respect lor the weak and lowly?let these noble traits of Southern character bo guarded as a re? ligious trust, of which neither overawing power nor subtie temptation can ever de? prive us( Nover sink your identity with men who were never your equals in the field or council, and who were cowardly enough to oppress you after you had laid down your arms. We advocate hate for no man or people; wo condemn and eschew the vices and fol? lies of tho North, Tho fortunes of war have decreed that we live together, and we would do so in pence, and even in friendship, so far as we may be allowed; but we protest against the surrender of Southern tone and character, and the transplantation of New England theories and sentiments in Southern soil. The din' we do either we shall be doomed.? Savannah Republican. -?. A Champion Farmer.?We often hear of largo farmers, and we have known and seen many large plantations, but the fol? lowing notice of a champion farmer is a "hickory boyond the persimmon" of all our experience or knowledge in relation thereto. We copy it from the Louisville Courier Journal: John T. Alexander, the great farmer of Morgan county, Illinois, is described as a plain, Homespun farmer?tall, good look? ing, free and easy in manners, without tho least particlo of stylo in words or acts. His farm now comprises about 30,000 acres mostlj' under improvement. This is about one township and a half, about nine miles square, and all good land. Ho has now 5.000 acres of growing corn, and from 1,500 to 2,000 acres of grass. Ho is now feeding about 10,000 head of cattle, and buys and ships East from Chi? cago from 1,000 to 2,000 head each week. Ho has risen to this great prominence by his own talent, energy and integrity. His business each and every year amounts to millions of dollars, and is entirely le-j gitimato, adding to his own woalth and i the common welfare of tho State." . ? Laziness is a good deal like money; tho more a man has of it the more he wants. (The Hew York Tribune on the Cotton Sup* ply. From an able, lengthy and judicious ar? ticle in the New York Tribune, on the subject of the cotton supply, We make the annexed interesting extracts i A geographical fact of the greatest im-? portance lies at the foundation of all just views on the question of the Cotton Sup? ply. England believes that deeper plow? ing, selecter seed, more diligent culture, nicer picking and marketing, will enable her to offset our South with her India. As to quantities this may be; as to quali? ty of staple, never; and this is the reason : Cotton, as to the size of the plant and the number of pods it holds, depends up? on richness of soil and solar beat. These England finds in sufficient pcfection in the valley of the Ganges and on the table-lands of Deccan. But as to the col? or and oilinessot the seed, the fineness and length of itssilken filaments, cotton varies in qunlity according to the mildness and evenness of the autumnal climate. Differ? ent regions in our sunny cotton belt differ in this respect, but the contrast is a mild one, and we have a great ad van tage over the whole of the East Indian peninsula. After July our Southern climate is for the most part rainless till late in the Fall. This is caused by the high lands, which commence from one to two hundred miles from the seaside, where the best cotton grows. Clouds loaded with moisture from the gulf and the ocean off Florida are waf? ted northward, but do not discharge their contents till they reach the cool wooded slopes of the Cumberland and the Alle ghany Mountains. These circumstances gives America her unequaled advantages as a producer of long cotton. In India there is a small district where the conditions are somewhat similar, and rain-clouds in the picking season are at? tracted northward across the lower por? tion of the Ganges Valley to expend their waters upon the frigid slopes of the range that parts India from Tibet. Dac? ca is the central city of this region, ana Dacca lawns have a romantic fame like that of Damascus blades. A study of the geographical conditions in India, as sketched on any good map, will show how limited is the area to which England must be confined in her endeavor to grow such cottons as her finest looms demand. In Lancashire, the great seat of the cot? ton industry of the kingdom, there is at present no more cotton than will keep the mills going five daj-s out of six, and there is a continual struggle among the manufacturers to obtain cotton necessary to prevent a stoppage of the mills. Sad effects aro shewing themselves in the rapidly growing number of operatives thrown out of employment, and in tho increase of pauperism. At a meeting just held in London of representatives of the cotton industry of the North of Englandj and of members of Parliament whose constituencies are interested in that in? dustry, the conviction was generally ex? pressed by the speakers that Lancashire will have to look elsewhere than to this country, seeing that the Americans are using their cotton more and more largely themselves, and will be able to spare less and less of it every yeai; As to other fields of cotton supply, Egypt and Tur? key, it was said, could not be relied upon, and the South American States, including Brazil, had disappointed expectation. In? dia, therefofo, appeared to be the sole quarter to which British manufactures could look for succor. Reunited After Fifty Years Separa? tion.?In our daily of the 15th ult., we gave the history of a romance in real life, whose main facts it may be well to re? count. Samuel, father of Rev. T. B. East? man, ef this city, left Concord in 1819 to better himself in Massachusetts. He left a wife and three children behind, and finally went on a whaling voyage. On his return the family had left this city, and no trace of them were to be found. Fifty years passed away, the first family had grown up, and Mr. Eastman, ignor? ant of their existonce, had married again and raised another family. By an acci? dent, Rev. Mr. Eastman ascertained that bio father was alive, and following up the trace, found and introduced himself to him, and told the story of the past half century, so far as he knew it. The elder Eastman, his second wife be? ing dead, gladly heard the tidings of the lost family, and he came to this city on the 13th, to renew the relations that chance had so sadly sundered. He was joyfully received by his grandchildren, whom he had never 6cen, and on the fol? lowing day performed his first duty, that of visiting his mother's grave. On the 17th, the aged wife, with two of her descendants, arrived in this city from Nashua, and went to the house of her son, where all but one of her family now living were gathered. The husband entered tho room, and they looked at each other in silence for a moment. The old lady was the first to speak, saying, "Is this Samuel Eastman, my husband ?" "And my long lost wife?" he added, and they rushed to each other's arras and kiss? ed with all the ardor of sweet sixteen. By request of the father, a prayer of thanksgiving was offered over the happy reunion by Rev. T. B. Eastman. Tho old couple are now reunited, and, though the bloom of youth has fled, both onjoy excellent health and spirits. The old gentleman's eyesight is defective, owing to straining it at sea, but he says he can throw a harpoon or lance at a whale as well as ever. Ho has never had a doctor in his life. The old lady is also in excellent health, but with impaired hearing. To both wo wish years of con? tinued health and renewed happiness.? Concord (N. K) Patriot, 18ft inst. ? Love is like honesty? mooh talked about, but little understood.