The Anderson intelligencer. (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, September 02, 1869, Image 1
An Independent Family Journal? -Beyoted to Politics, Literature and General Intelligence.
H?TT & CO., Proprietors*
ANDERSON. S. C. THURSDAY, SEPETMBER 2, 1869.
VOLUME 5.---NO. 10.
_\ ?
From the Greenville Enterprise.
THE LAW OF D1T0JRCE.
We have been favored with a copy of
the able opinion of Judge Orr, delivered
in the case below stated, on the impor?
tant question of Divorce :
John E. Walker vs. Mary J. Walker?In
the Hommon Pleas, Equity side, Green?
ville, May Term, 1869?Petition for Di?
vorce?A Yinculo Matrimonii.
The Petitioner, John H. Walker, filed
his petition on the 31st March, 1869,
against Mary Jane Walker, his wife, pray?
ing "a divorce a vinculo matrimunii from
the said Mary, and that she be permitted
to resume her maiden name ef Mary J.
Few," on the ground that a few "months
after their marriage his wife became ex?
ceedingly unhappy in her disposition, un?
kind in her treatment to him, used vio?
lent, abu3ive and menacing language
towards him, and constantly manitested
a determined malignity towards him."
She "accompanied her language with
. blows on several occasions." Her hostil?
ity, violence and malignity to him in?
creased until at length it became intole?
rable, and they wilfully separated about
November, 1860, since which time they
have lived apart."
The parties were duly married on the
31st July, 1856, and a deed of separation
executed by them the30th January, 1861.
The Defendant having failed to plead, an?
swer or demur within the rule, the peti?
tion was taken pro confessp on the 17th
May, 1869. Testimony was taken before
the Clerk in support of the allegations of
the petition and reported to the Court.
One of the witnesses says of Defendant:
"She had a cross, crabbed disposition. It
was impossible for any reasonable mind?
ed man to have lived in peace and happi?
ness with her." Another witness says
she "is a high tempered woman; bard to
got along with; wanted her own way
ontirely ; thinks it utterly impossible that
thoy will ever live together again." An?
other witness says the Petitioner "treat?
ed her kindly and affectionately ; at?
tempted to live in peace with her; 6he
became dissatisfied without cause; became
ill and cross to him; at one time struck
at him; she constantly got worse in her
disposition and actions towards him until
their separation."
Before entering upon the consideration
of the legal principles involved in this
case?an application to the Court to mate
a decree of divorce?which has been
heretofore uniformly refused by the Leg?
islature and Courts of this State in all
similar applications, it is proper to de?
termine whether tho Courts of the State
are now invested with jurisdiction to hear
und determine such cases.
In the kingdom of Great Britain, the
jurisdiction of matrimonial questions bt
longed to the Ecclesiastical Courts, and
divorces a vinculo matrimonii were re?
stricted in England to causes which ex?
isted at the time tho marriage was con?
tracted, such as causa metus, causa impo
tentioe, causa affinitatis, causa consanquini
tatis, &c; and though the marriage was
unlawful, a sentence of nullity of mar?
riage was necessary to dissolve the bonds
of matrimony.
Marriage was regarded a sacrament of
the Church, and tho Pope, exercising a
controlling temporal power over Europe,
required that the cognizance of such sub?
jects should be confided exclusively in the
Ecclesiastical Courts, and that divorces a
vinculo should not be granted even by
that Court for causes arising subsequent
to the marriage. The dispensation of the
head of the Church being the only re?
cognized authority to dissolve a mar?
riage for causes arising subsequent to its
contraction, though the temporal power
of the Pope has long since ceased in Eng?
land, the original jurisdiction of the Ec?
clesiastical Courts has not been enlarged;
they aro restricted to granting divorces
a mensa et thora, and the Parliament alone
can grant a divorce a vinculo for adultery
or any other cause arising after tho mar?
riage This, however, is not the law in
all tho British Empire. In Scotland, the
Keformation exploded this rule of the
Komish Church, and divorces a vinculo
matrimonii for adultery and wilful and
malicious desertion have been uniformly
granted.
For the samo causes, divorces a vinculo
are granted by all the States of the
American Union, regulated most gene?
rally by statite, but having the authori?
ty of the common law as administered in
a part of the British Empire; and for the
first cause, adultery, tho positive author?
ity of the Scriptures?which furnish to
all Christian nations the highest, purest
and safest rules for social and moral ac?
tion. Matthew v. 32.
All religions undor tho Fedoral and
State Constitutions aro protected in their
full and unrestrained exercise, but none
are established, and thorofore tho tenets
or canons of none Bbould control the de?
termination of the question when, how,
and for what causes the bonds of matri?
mony should be dissolved. It is a ques?
tion to be solved by considerations of
moral, social and political expediency and
Eropriety. When the responsible relation
as been entered into, and one of the
parties utterly fail, from base depravity
or other grave cause to fulfill its high and
sacred duties, is it not the duty of the
State to provide some tribunal to ad?
judge the failure and order the dissolu?
tion of the relation. This tribunal should
be restricted in the exercise of such pow?
ers to causes of the utmost gravity only;
those which are temporary or frivolous,
ought not to be listened to by a Court.
"It is the policy of the law, and neces?
sary to the purity and usefulness of the
institution of marriage, that those who
enter into it, should regard it as a rela?
tion permanent as their own lives; its
duration not depending npon the whim or
caprice of either, and only to be dissolved
when the improper conduct of one of the
parties shall render the connection wholly
intolerable or inconsistent with the hap?
piness or safety of the other." Griffin
ts. Griffin, 8 B. Munroe, 120.
Judge Swift observes: "The render?
ing of the contract of matrimony indis?
soluble, is running into the opposite ex?
treme from that of permitting divorces
at the pleasure of the parties. There are
many porsons who, on the idea that the
marriage contract caunot be vacated for
any misconduct, will not behave with the
propriety they would if the continuance
of the contract were dependent on their
exertions to render themselves agreeable
to the persons with whom they are con?
nected. It is a great hardship that a per
son who has been unfortunate in forming
a matrimonial connection, must be for?
ever precluded from any possibility of
extricating himself from such a misfor?
tune, and be shut out from enjoying the
best pleasures of life. This consideration,
instead of adding to the happiness of the
connection, must frighten persons from
entering into it. It is, therefore, the best
policy to admit a dissolution of the con?
tract, when it is evident that the parties
cannot derive from it the benefits for
which it was instituted, and when in?
stead of being a sourco of the highest
pleasure and most enduring felicity, it
becomes the source of the deepest woe
and misery." 1 Swift's System, 191.
Whether the jurisdiction should be ex?
tended in granting divorces a vinculo
matrimonii beyond the causes pre-existing
at marriage, and to adultery and mali?
cious desertion subsequent thereto, need
not now be discussed. Up to this point,
at leant, the judicial tribunals of most
civilized countries exercise jurisdiction.
In this State heretofore, marriage, from
any cause and under all circumstances,
has been absolutely indissoluble?the
Courts taking the ground that the Leg?
islature had not invested them with pow?
er to declare a divorce, and have uniform?
ly declined to exercise it. The Legisla?
ture has steadily refusod to grant a dis?
solution of the marriage tie. There is,
perhaps, no other civilized country, ei?
ther protestant or catholic, that has not
made some provision, either legislatively
or judicially, for dissolving marriage for
adequato cause, except this Stato. In
England, the Ecclesiastical Courts grunt
divorces a mensa e.t thora, and the British
Parliament a vinculo matrimonii. In
Scotland the marriage is dissolved for
adultery or malicious desertion, by the
Courts, and in the States of the American
Union, the samo powers are exorcised by
most of the Courts for causes already
enumerated, and for others not mention?
ed.
In Rhnmo vs. Rhamo. McCord's C R.
197, Judge Isott, in a bill filed for alimo?
ny, admitted that in Engla id such cases
belonged to the Ecclesiat ncal Courts, but
considered that alimon/ was an excep?
tion in this State by the practice of the
Court of Equity, and from necessity, and
held that "the jurisdiction of the Court
must be limited to the allowing of alimo?
ny, and to such orders as are neeessarilj'
incident to the effectual execution of such
a decree." Again he says: "Although
our Courts of Equity have not the power
to grant divorces, yet, as the two sub?
jects?divorce and alimony?are insepa
ble companions in England, we must look
to the causes of divorce to ascertain the
grounds on which alimony will be allow?
ed."
In Prather vs. Prather, 4 DeS., C. R.
34, in considering a bill for alimony,
Chas. DeSaussure says: "And this, from
the necessity of the case, and to redress an
injury not otherwise remediable?I allude
to several cases which were decided in
this Court some years since?expressly on
the ground that no other tribunal could
give redress, and that it would be unseem?
ly and highly mischievous if this Court
did not interfere."
Chief Justice Dunkin, in the case of
Mattison vs. Mattison, 1 Strobhart, C. R.
388, which was a bill to declare a nullity
of marriage, said "that there was no dis?
tinction in such a bill and a bill for di?
vorce; that the Legislature had not con?
ferred any such jurisdiction on the Court,
and that there was no inherent power in
the Court to exercise it. He adopts the
ruling of Judge Nott, that the allowance
of alimony and incidental orders for car?
rying it into effect, was properly cogni?
zable by the Court of Equity from "prac?
tice and necessity," but could not be ex?
tended to divorco or declaring a mar?
riage null and void.
In all the cases in this State, jurisdic?
tion in alimony is taken by the Court
from "necessity and the practice of the
Court." There was no "practice" of the
Court in such a case until "necessity" in?
duced its introduction, and therefore the
only ground for assuming jurisdiction
was "necessity.'' The Court of Equity
in this State takes jurisdiction in cases of
alimony without any legislative authoriza?
tion when such cases are cognizable alone
in Ecclesiastical Courts of England,
and denies to itself jurisdiction in cases
of divorce, also cognizable alone in tho
Ecclesiastical Courts of England, because
the Legislature of the State has not spe?
cially conferred jurisdiction on that Court,
to hear and determine divorce cases!
Judge Nott says "divorco and alimony
are inseparable companions in England,'1
and yet assumed jurisdiction of the one
from "necessity," and denies it to the oth?
er for want of legislative authority.
Does not the "necessity" to exercise the
jurisdiction to annul or dissolve a degra?
ding marriage, plead the Court as urgent-1
ly as the "necessity" to provide food,
clothing and shelter for a helpless wife
who has been discarded by an imperious
or cruel husband ?
Is not the "necessity" as great to ex?
ercise this jurisdiction of declaring a
"nullity of marriage" whore the revolt?
ing fact is exhibited of an incestuous
marriage between father and daughter,
mother and son, sister and brother? or
to grant a divorce vinculo matrimonii to
an injured and outraged wife, whose hus?
band had introduced into his house and
seated at his table a sable paramour?
who shared his bed and received his at?
tentions, while the unoffending wife re?
ceived the crumbs and sulfered tho indig?
nities and abuse heaped on her by the
faithless husband and hie degraded mis?
tress ? Such were substantially the facts
in the case of Jelineau vs. Jelineau, 2
DeS., E. E. 45, and the Court, in the
graphic language of Bishop on Divorce
and Marriage, 288, refused "to sever the
living body from the putrid carcass," and
exhausted the powers of the tribunal by
decreeing, simply, that the husband should
maintain the wife he had no shamelessly
wronged 1
Chancellor Kent, in an able opinion de?
livered in the case of Wightman vs.
Wightman, 4 Johnston, C K. 343, reach?
es a conclusion exactly the reverse of
that decided by the Court in this State.
He holds that no legislative authority is
needed to confer jurisdiction on the
Courts of Equity in Divorce cases?that
the power in the Court is inherent. He
says: "AH matrimonial and other causes
of Ecclesiastical cognizance belonged,
originally, to tho temporal courts; and
when the.spiritual courts cease the cog?
nizance of such cases, it would seem, as
of course, to revert back to lay tribunals.
'Divorces a vinculo,' sayn Lord Coke,
'are causa metus, causa impot entice, causa
affinitatis, causa consanquinitatis, dec??
These causes, and that of lunacy, are not
within the Statute (N. Y.) giving to this
Court jurisdiction concerning divorces."
Notwithstanding that fact, the learned
Chancellor says, that the Court of Equity
"is compotont, not merely collaterally,
but by a suit instituted directly and for
the sole purpose to pronounce a divorce
in such cases."
Whatever opinion may bo entertained
of tho soundness of the judicial decisions
or tho practice of the Courts in tlm State,
on divorce heretofore, all doubt is now
removed by the explicit language of the
new Constitution. Article IV., Section
15, provides that "the Courts of Common
Pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction in
all cases of divorce," &c; arid in Sec. 16,
"it shall have jurisdiction in all matters
of Equity," <fce. Article 14, Section 5,
provides that "divorces from the bonds
of matrimony shall not be allowed but by
the judgment of a court, as shall be pro?
scribed by law." It has been suggested
that this clause restrains the courts from
exercising the jurisdiction conferred in
the fourth article until the General As?
sembly shall by statute prescribe the
causes respectively, for partial and entire
divorcos, and the rules and practice in the
same. If ^hereafter" had been inserted
in the latter clause of the section so as to
read "as shall hereafter bo prescribed by
law," such construction might have been
admissible, but the language used, and
properly used, in a Constitution, which
I must define general propositions, embra?
ces the existing laws, as well as amend
J ments and modifications hereafter to be
made by the Legislature. Tho object of
this section, when ascertained, will re?
move all doubt as to its proper construc?
tion. The Convention framing the Con?
stitution, profiting by tho experience of j
other States where Legislative divorces
have been granted, and where caprico,
favoritism and importunity controlled the
I enactment in disregard of all general
principles of law,and oftentimes totally
inconsistent with the previous acts of the
samo body, intended to prohibit all di?
vorces by the Legislative?confiding the
power exclusively in the courts, which I
would bo bound to decide such cases con?
formably to settled principles of law.
Divorcos are to be grantod conformably
to law, and not by Legislative caprice.
If tho phraseology of the section had
been "as now prescribed by law," it
would have precludod tho Legislature
from amendments in the future; if "as
may hereaftor bo prescribed by law," it j
would have excluded tho enforcement of
the existing law by the courts, and there?
by defeated the grant of jurisdiction con?
tained in the fourth article. The word
"law" in the section embraces ecclcsiasti-!
cal and common law as well as statute
law. If the section should bo construed
to refer alone to law hereafter to bo enac?
ted by tho Legislature, it excludes all ex?
cept statute law. Tho phraseology cov?
ers what was intended by tho Conven?
tion, that the courts in determining di-:
vorcc cases should be governed by the
existing common law and such statute
laws as may hereaftor be enacted. The
phraso could not be constructed more per?
spicuously to embrace existing law and
future enactments Any other construc?
tion defeats tho other provisions of the
Constitution giving present juri sdiction to
the Court of Common Pleas in all cases
of divorco, and is in palpabloconflict with
the well established rule of construction j
that remedial legislation must be liberally
construed. "No statutes can bo moro
manifestly remedial than those which au?
thorize divorce; and,thoreforo,according
to established principles, they 'should be
liberally and equitably construed to give
effect to the remedy."?Bishop on mar?
riage and divorce, 290. The Biimo liberal
rulo of construction applies to remedial
provisions in the Constitution s.s to stat?
utes.
But it may bo objected that although
the Constitution gives the Court of Com?
mon Pleas jurisdiction, it does not provido
how it shall bo exercised?whether in tho
Common Pleas or on the Equi .y side of
the Common Pleas. It might be a suffi
cient answer that the Common Pleas
Courts are invested with jurisdiction in
all matters of Equity, and that the Equi?
ty side of the Court is the only forum
where such causes can be heard, and the
various orders passed to give effect to its
judgments. Hence the Equity side of tho
Common Pleas is the only appropriate
tribunal to exercise the jurisdiction con?
ferred. In Perry vs. Perry, 2 Paige, 501,
Chancellor Walworth says: "But when?
ever the legislature (or constitution) dis?
tinctly gives the right without creating
or appointing any particular tribunal to
administer the remedy, it is fairly to be
interred that they intended to vest that
power in seme of the existing tribunals
of the country." Here the constitution
gives the right of present jurisdiction, ex?
pressly prescribes the Court of Common
Pleas as the tribunal, and the inference is
that the power is vested on Equity side,
because of the adaption of the practice of
that Court, to give efficiency to all neces?
sary decrees and orders in determining
such cases. I conclude therefore, that
the Equity side of the Court of Common
Pleas has jurisdiotion of divorces a mensa
et thoru and a vinculo matrimonii. In the
latter class, not only in cases where the
cause arose prior to marriage as defined
by Lord Coke, but also in cases of adul
tery and wilful permanent desertion in
cases arising subsequently. That the
proper practice is to proceed by bill that
the allegations must be sustained by proof
taken before tho clerk and reported to
the court. That to avoid collusion or con?
nivance between the parties, the allega?
tions of the bill are not to be taken as
truo on a pro confesso order, or by the con?
sent of the parties, the prayer for an ab?
solute or qualified divorce only being
grantable upon proof of tho existence of
defined and established legal cause.
It follows, hence, that the petitioner
in this case, John H. Walker; has not set
forth any sufficient legal cause in hin pe?
tition why his prayer for a divorce vinculo
matrimonii should be granted; and upon
the proot submitted, it is not admissible
to grant a divorce a mensa et thora.
Tho proof establishes the ill temper;
petulance and subborness of the Defend?
ant, and upon one occasion that she struck
at him. Was it such violence and legal
cruelty practiced by a woman towards a
man that entitles him to claim even a
qualified divorce a mensaet thora ? "Cru?
elty is any conduct in oue of the married
parties, which form a reasonable appre?
hension that tho continuance of the co?
habitation would be attended with bodily
harm to the other." Evans vs. Evans, 4,
English. E. R. 3l0. The learned judge
(Lord Stowell)) in the same case says:
"What merely wounds the mental feel?
ings is in few cases to be admitted where
not accompanied with bodily injury either
actual or menaced. Mere austerity of
temper, petulanco of mannors, rudeness of
language, a want ef civil attention and ac?
commodation, oven occasion sallies of pas?
sion, if they do not threaten bodily harm,
do not amount to legal cruelty. They
are high moral offences in the marriage
state undoubtedly, not innocent surely
in any state of life, but still they are
not that cruelty against which the law
can relieve. Under such misconduct of
either of the parties, for it may exist on
one side as well as on the other; tho suf?
fering party must bear in sumo degree tho
consequences of an injudicious connection
?must subdue by decent resistance or b}T
prudent conciliation ; and if this cannot
be done, both must suffer in 6i'Ience."
In Lockwood vs. Lockwood, 7 English,
E. R. 114, it was held thaf'tbero must be
either actual violence committed, atten?
ded with danger to life, limb or health, er
there must be a reasonble apprehension
of such violence." Again in Evans vs.
Evans, Lord Stowell say6: "In the older
cases of this sort which I have had an
opportunity of looking into, I have ob?
served that tho danger of lite, limb, or
health, is usually inserted as tho ground
I upon which tho Court has proceeded to a
I separation. This doctrine has been re?
peatedly applied by the Court in the cases
that have been decided. Tho Court has
never been driven off this ground."
I Chancellor Walworth, in Perry vs.
Perry, 1 Bart., Ch. R. 516, says when the
husband is complainant, "it is not suffici?
ent to show a single act of violence on
her part towards him, or even a scries of
such acts; so long as there is no reason
to suppose that he will not bo able to pro?
tect himself and family by a proper exer?
cise of his marital power." From these
authorities, it is manifest that the Peti?
tioner has not alleged, or proven any
sufficient legal cau60 entitling him to a
decroo of separation against his wife.
Chancellor Kent lays down the rule
against the application of tho petitioner in
broader terms than any of the foregoing
authorities. He says in Van Veghtcn
vs. Vcghten, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 501, that
"the husband cannot file a bill against his
wifo for a divorce a mensa et thora, on the
ground of cruelty, desertion or improper
conduct," and assigns as the reason there?
for, that "tho common law has given to
the husband sufficient powor and control
over tho wifo to protect himself from such
conduct."
Applications to the Court for divorce
should bo by bill, and not by petition,
though tho form in this case, will not en?
ter into the judgment to be pronounced.
I adjudge that tho petition bo dismiss?
ed at tho costs of the Petitioner.
JAMES L. ORR.
August 13th, 1869.
.-*
? " The son of Jesse'1 seems to have dis?
appointed the expectations of the Virgin?
ia and Mississippi conservatives not a lit?
tle?which leads the Lynchnrg Virginian
to feel like saying: "What portion have
we in David. Neither have we inheritance
in the son of Jesse. To your tents, 0,
Israel!"
olitus m? Mm*.
Dangers to be Avoided.
In the upheaval of political and social
elements consequent to a long war and
incident to the re organization of nation?
al elements, there aro certain dangers to
be avoided. Especially is it so in a vast
country like ours, inhabited by peoples al?
most as distinct in their personal and na?
tional characteristics ao if they bad
sprung from different races. In the game
of "stoop to conquer" which the weaker
party is sometimes compelled to play, the
greatest circumspection should be used,
lest it should undergo some moral meta?
morphosis in the course of the contest
that shall seriously impair its native force
and charactor.
Our friends in Virginia, Tennessee,
Mississippi and Texas?we call them so
because no man will dare question their
integrity and devotion to the South
have found it necessary, in order to re?
cover their rights as freemen, to form for
the time being a political union with men
with whom they do not agree upon the
questions that have of late agitated the
country. In other words, they have
agreed to suspend for tho time their hon?
est convictions of public policy, that they
may regain their liberty and put them?
selves in a position to bo seen and felt in
the great movements of government.
They, do not sacrifice those convictions,
but simply agree to make them a practi?
cal effect in the Government. They are
just and true in theory and vindicated by
all experience, and as such the day for
their resurrection may be looked for
with confidence. There is nothing any
clearer than the proposition that this
Government cannot be successfully ad?
ministered upon the principles laid down
by the radical party. They contain with?
in themselves inherently the elements of
disintegration and final expulsion. It is
not our purpose now to elaborate them.
But while true Southern men thus
unite for a great public purpose with
those who agree with them on certain vi?
tal points, and differ on many others,
they should be careful that the character
of the union be clearly understood by
themselves as well as by others. Assimila?
tion is a principle of human nature.
When once in association with men, we
are apt to adopt their vices as well as
their virtues. What may now appear op?
posed to all correct views of reason and
right, may through familiarity, appear in
time less odious, if not positively tolera?
ble. This result is to be guarded against
as we value our character and our peace.
We want no Northern isms and heresies
engrafted upon Southern stocks. Above
all things, we should shun what they
boastingly denominate "New England
civilization," as the greatest enemy to
truth and our own happiness. If we
j'ield temporarily to false theories and
principles, let it only be that they may
have full scope to work out theii utter
destruction. Such is the destiny of error
of every sort. Experience is the great
test of truth and eliminator of facts from
fallacies.
In the second place, let Southern men
guard well those distinctive characteris?
tics that have always drawn a broad line
between them and the people of the
North, and made the former, as a people,
despite their faults, the admiration of tho
world. That lofty independence of char?
acter, that love of truth, that chivalrous
spirit that will do and dare anything for
the right, that contempt lor everything
that is mean and selfish and groveling,
that proud sense of equality with tho
highest and magnanimous respect lor the
weak and lowly?let these noble traits of
Southern character bo guarded as a re?
ligious trust, of which neither overawing
power nor subtie temptation can ever de?
prive us( Nover sink your identity with
men who were never your equals in the
field or council, and who were cowardly
enough to oppress you after you had laid
down your arms.
We advocate hate for no man or people;
wo condemn and eschew the vices and fol?
lies of tho North, Tho fortunes of war
have decreed that we live together, and
we would do so in pence, and even in
friendship, so far as we may be allowed;
but we protest against the surrender of
Southern tone and character, and the
transplantation of New England theories
and sentiments in Southern soil. The
din' we do either we shall be doomed.?
Savannah Republican.
-?.
A Champion Farmer.?We often hear
of largo farmers, and we have known and
seen many large plantations, but the fol?
lowing notice of a champion farmer is a
"hickory boyond the persimmon" of all
our experience or knowledge in relation
thereto. We copy it from the Louisville
Courier Journal:
John T. Alexander, the great farmer of
Morgan county, Illinois, is described as a
plain, Homespun farmer?tall, good look?
ing, free and easy in manners, without
tho least particlo of stylo in words or
acts. His farm now comprises about
30,000 acres mostlj' under improvement.
This is about one township and a half,
about nine miles square, and all good land.
Ho has now 5.000 acres of growing corn,
and from 1,500 to 2,000 acres of grass.
Ho is now feeding about 10,000 head of
cattle, and buys and ships East from Chi?
cago from 1,000 to 2,000 head each week.
Ho has risen to this great prominence by
his own talent, energy and integrity.
His business each and every year amounts
to millions of dollars, and is entirely le-j
gitimato, adding to his own woalth and i
the common welfare of tho State."
. ? Laziness is a good deal like money;
tho more a man has of it the more he
wants.
(The Hew York Tribune on the Cotton Sup*
ply.
From an able, lengthy and judicious ar?
ticle in the New York Tribune, on the
subject of the cotton supply, We make the
annexed interesting extracts i
A geographical fact of the greatest im-?
portance lies at the foundation of all just
views on the question of the Cotton Sup?
ply. England believes that deeper plow?
ing, selecter seed, more diligent culture,
nicer picking and marketing, will enable
her to offset our South with her India.
As to quantities this may be; as to quali?
ty of staple, never; and this is the reason :
Cotton, as to the size of the plant and
the number of pods it holds, depends up?
on richness of soil and solar beat. These
England finds in sufficient pcfection in
the valley of the Ganges and on the
table-lands of Deccan. But as to the col?
or and oilinessot the seed, the fineness and
length of itssilken filaments, cotton varies
in qunlity according to the mildness and
evenness of the autumnal climate. Differ?
ent regions in our sunny cotton belt differ
in this respect, but the contrast is a mild
one, and we have a great ad van tage over
the whole of the East Indian peninsula.
After July our Southern climate is for the
most part rainless till late in the Fall.
This is caused by the high lands, which
commence from one to two hundred miles
from the seaside, where the best cotton
grows. Clouds loaded with moisture from
the gulf and the ocean off Florida are waf?
ted northward, but do not discharge their
contents till they reach the cool wooded
slopes of the Cumberland and the Alle
ghany Mountains. These circumstances
gives America her unequaled advantages
as a producer of long cotton.
In India there is a small district where
the conditions are somewhat similar, and
rain-clouds in the picking season are at?
tracted northward across the lower por?
tion of the Ganges Valley to expend
their waters upon the frigid slopes of the
range that parts India from Tibet. Dac?
ca is the central city of this region, ana
Dacca lawns have a romantic fame like
that of Damascus blades. A study of the
geographical conditions in India, as
sketched on any good map, will show
how limited is the area to which England
must be confined in her endeavor to grow
such cottons as her finest looms demand.
In Lancashire, the great seat of the cot?
ton industry of the kingdom, there is at
present no more cotton than will keep
the mills going five daj-s out of six, and
there is a continual struggle among the
manufacturers to obtain cotton necessary
to prevent a stoppage of the mills.
Sad effects aro shewing themselves in
the rapidly growing number of operatives
thrown out of employment, and in tho
increase of pauperism. At a meeting just
held in London of representatives of the
cotton industry of the North of Englandj
and of members of Parliament whose
constituencies are interested in that in?
dustry, the conviction was generally ex?
pressed by the speakers that Lancashire
will have to look elsewhere than to this
country, seeing that the Americans are
using their cotton more and more largely
themselves, and will be able to spare less
and less of it every yeai; As to other
fields of cotton supply, Egypt and Tur?
key, it was said, could not be relied upon,
and the South American States, including
Brazil, had disappointed expectation. In?
dia, therefofo, appeared to be the sole
quarter to which British manufactures
could look for succor.
Reunited After Fifty Years Separa?
tion.?In our daily of the 15th ult., we
gave the history of a romance in real life,
whose main facts it may be well to re?
count. Samuel, father of Rev. T. B. East?
man, ef this city, left Concord in 1819 to
better himself in Massachusetts. He left
a wife and three children behind, and
finally went on a whaling voyage. On
his return the family had left this city,
and no trace of them were to be found.
Fifty years passed away, the first family
had grown up, and Mr. Eastman, ignor?
ant of their existonce, had married again
and raised another family. By an acci?
dent, Rev. Mr. Eastman ascertained that
bio father was alive, and following up the
trace, found and introduced himself to
him, and told the story of the past half
century, so far as he knew it.
The elder Eastman, his second wife be?
ing dead, gladly heard the tidings of the
lost family, and he came to this city on
the 13th, to renew the relations that
chance had so sadly sundered. He was
joyfully received by his grandchildren,
whom he had never 6cen, and on the fol?
lowing day performed his first duty, that
of visiting his mother's grave.
On the 17th, the aged wife, with two
of her descendants, arrived in this city
from Nashua, and went to the house of
her son, where all but one of her family
now living were gathered. The husband
entered tho room, and they looked at each
other in silence for a moment. The old
lady was the first to speak, saying, "Is
this Samuel Eastman, my husband ?"
"And my long lost wife?" he added, and
they rushed to each other's arras and kiss?
ed with all the ardor of sweet sixteen.
By request of the father, a prayer of
thanksgiving was offered over the happy
reunion by Rev. T. B. Eastman.
Tho old couple are now reunited, and,
though the bloom of youth has fled, both
onjoy excellent health and spirits. The
old gentleman's eyesight is defective,
owing to straining it at sea, but he says
he can throw a harpoon or lance at a
whale as well as ever. Ho has never had
a doctor in his life. The old lady is also
in excellent health, but with impaired
hearing. To both wo wish years of con?
tinued health and renewed happiness.?
Concord (N. K) Patriot, 18ft inst.
? Love is like honesty? mooh talked
about, but little understood.