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Uai4% 1We will cling to the Pillars of the Temple of our Libertlee, Bad if it must fall, we will Perish amidst the Euins." VOLUME V. Eefiel& Court nons-, 8. V., bar)h S, 84. - NO.S. DEIEILD AD VERTISIER, BY W. F. DURISOE, PROPRIETOR. TERMS. Three Dollars per annum, if paid in advance-Three Dollars and Fifty Cents if not paid before the expiration. of Six Months from the date of Subscription and Four Dollars if not paid within twelve Months. Subscribers out of the State are required to pay in advance. No subscription received for less than 6ne year, and no paper discontinued until all arrearages are paid, except at the op tion of theP ublisher. All subscriptions will be continued un leis otherwise ordered before the expira tion of the year. Any person procuring five Subscribers and becoming responsible for the same, shall receive the sixth copy gratis. Advertisements conspicuously inserted at 624 cents per square, (12 lines, or less,) for the first insertion, and 43J cts. for each continuance. Those published monthly, or quarterly will be charged $1 per square for each insertion. Advertisements not having the number of insertions marked on them, will be continued until ordered out, and charged accordingly. All communications addressed to the Editor, post paid, will be promptly and strictly attended to. SPEECH OF MR. CALHOUN, Of South Carolina, On the Report of Mr. Grundy, of Tennessee, in relation to the Assumption of the Debts of the States by the Federal Government.-U. States Senate, February 5, 1840. (Concluded from our last.) I trust that I have now established to the entire satisfaction of the Senate, the truth of the great principle which has been laid down-that every increase of protec tive duties is necessarily followed, in the present condition of our country, by an ex pansion of the currency, which must con tinue to increase till the increased price of production, caused by the expansion. shall be equal to the duty imposed, when a new tariff will be required. Assuming, then, the principle as inconvertible, it follows that the natural tendency of the protective system is toexpand, in seeking to accom plish its object, till it terminates in explo sion. It would be easy to show, from w hat has already been stated, that this tendency miGst continue till the exports shall be so reduced as to be barely sufficient to meet the demads of tho country for the articles not included in the protection; as it must be obvious, so long as they exceed that a mount, so long mustspecie continue to be in our favor, till the protection is broke down by the expansion of the currency. The consumation, therefore, of the sys. tem, must be one of two things; explosion, or the reduction of the exports, so as not to exceed the amount of the exports. so as not to exceed the amount of the unprotec ted articles; but either termination must prove disastrous to the system; the former by a sudden and violent overthrow, and the latter the impoverishment of customers and raising up of rivals, as they ceased to be customers. To baie a just conception of its operation in this particular, it will be necessary to bear in mind, that the South and the West are the great consumers of the products of the North and East; and that the capacity of the South to consume, depends on her great agricultural staples almost exclusively; and that their sale and consumption depend mainly on the for eign market. What, then, would be the effect of reducing her exports to the point indicated, say to forty or ifty millions of dollars ? Most certainly to diminish her capacity to conisume the products of the North and East in the same proportion. followed by a corresponding diminution of the revenue, and the commerce andI navi gation of the country. But the evil would not end there, as great asit would be. It would have an equal or greater effect on the consumption of the West. That great and growving section is the provision por tion of the Union. Hecr wide and fertile region gives her an unlimited capacity to produce grain and stock of every descrip tion; and these, for the most part, find their market in the staple States. Cut off their exports, and their market wvould he de stroyed; andI with it, the means of the West, to a great extent, for carrying on trade with the Northero and E astern States. To the same extent, they and the staple States wvould be compelled to produce their own supplies, and would thus, from consumlo.rs, be converted into rivals with the other section. How much wiser for all would be the opposite system of low duties, with the market of the world opened to our great agricultural staples? The effects would be a vast increase of our exports, with a corresponding increase of the capacity to consume on the part of the South and West, making them rich and contented customers, instead of isopoverished and discontented rivals of the other section. 3t is time that this subject shoukl be regar ded in its true light. The protective sys tem is neither more tier less than a war on the exports. 1 again repeat, if we canntot import, we edunnot long export; and just as w.e-cut offor burden tl-.e imports, to the same extent do we, in effect, cut off and burden the exports. This I have long asen, and shall now proceed to prove, by reference to the pitblic documents, that nry assertion is sustained by facts. The table of exports shows that during the seven pears from 1824 to 1831,our domes notwithstanding the great increase of our population during that period. Your sta tute book will show, that during the same period, the protective system was in its greatest vigor. The first relaxation took place in December, 1830, under the act of the 20th May, of the same year, which made a great deduction in the duties on coffee and tea. I shall now turn to the table, and give the exports of domestic articles for those years, beginning with 1824: Here Mr. C. read the following state ment : In 3824 the domestic exports were $50.649,500 1825 " " " 66,944,745 1826 " " " 53,055,710 1827 " "d " 58,92J,691 1828 " " " 56,669,669 1829 " " " 55,700,193 1830 " " " 59,462,029 If we take the average of first three anti the last of the these years, we shall find the rormer is a million and a half greater thaa the latter, showing an actual falling of, instead of an increase, to that extent, in our exports. With 1831, the reduction of duties com menced on the articles mentioned; and in December, 1833, the first great reduction took place under the compromise act. I shall turn to the sdme table, beginning with 1831, and read a statement of the exports for the eight years under the ap proach to the free trade system. It is but an approach. I invite especial attention to the rapid rise, after the great reduction in Decenher, 1833. , In 1831 the domestic exports were $61,277,057 1832 " " " 63.137,470 1833 " " "i 70,317,608 1834 "o" " 81,034,162 1835 " " " 101.189,082 1836 " " " 106,916.680 .1837 "d " " 95,564,414 1838 " " "d 96,033,821 How rapid the rise just as the weights are removed! The increase, since the great reduction in 1833, has nearly doub led the average exports, compared with the average of the seven tariff years pre ceeding 1831, and would have quite dou bled them, had not the expanded and de ranged condition of the currency, and the consequent embarrassment of commerce, prevented it. But what will appear still more extra ordimiry-to tho-&e who have not reflected on the operation of the protective system, is the great increase or the exports of our domestic mantuactures, as the dutiesgo off, following, in that respect, the same law that regulates the exports of the great ag. ricultural staples. It is a precious fact, that speaks volun', and which demands the serious consida tion of the manufac turing portion of the Union. I well re member the sanguine expectations of the friends of the system, of the great increase of the exports of domestic manufactures which they believed would follow the tariff or 1828. Well, we now have the result of experience, under that act, and also under that of a partial approach to free trade, and the result is exactly the reverse of the anticipations of the friends and advo cates ofprotection. Sa far from increasing, under the tariff of 1828, the exports of manufactured articles actually diminished, while they have rapidly increased just as they have gone off. But the table of exports shall speak for itself. During the four years, under the tariff of '24. that is from that year to '29, when the tariff of'28 went ir.to operation, the exports of domestic manufactures grad ually declined from $5,729,797, in the year '25, to S5,548,354 in the year '28. From that time it steadily declined, under the tariff of '28, each succeeding year showing a falling off compared with the preceding, till '33, declining, throughout the period, from $5,412,320 in '29. to $5, 050,633itt '32. and showing an aggregate falling ofl, during the whole tariff re~irneo of eight years, from '2.5 to '32, of nearly $700,000. A t this point, we enter on the relaxation of the system, and there has been an on ward move, with but lit tle vibra tion, throughout the whole period, till the present time. The last year wve have is '38, when the exports exceeded any pre 'ceding year. They amotunted to $S, 397,078, being an increase, during the six years of the reduction of duties, of $3,346, 445, against a falling off, in the preceding eight-years of protection, of 8700.000-an increase of 65 per cent, in six .years, and this in the tmidst of all the embarrassment of commerce, and expansion and derange went of the-currency, add, let me add, what has been so much dreaded by the friend of manufactures, the miahty increase of the exports of our great agricultunral sta ples, during the same period; a cdare pi-uof that, under :ho free trade system, the one .does not interfere with the other. Let no friend of manufactures suppose that this interesting result is accidontal. It is the operation of fixed laws, steady, and immu table in their course, as I shall hereafter show. Now, sir, I feel myself, with these facts. warranted in asserting that if the deranged state of the currency had not interfered, the great manufacturing interest would have gone on in a flourishing condition during the whole period of the reduction under tho compromise act, proving there by, to the satisfaction of all, the fallacy of the protective system. Any supposed loss, fiom the reduction of duties, would have been much more than made up by the in creased ability of the South and West to consume, and the rapidly growing impor tance of the foreign market. But I have not yet clone with the system. It has additional and heavy sins to answer for. The Tariff of 1828 is the source in which has originated that very derange. mont of thn currency, which has so greatly embarrassed, at this time, the very interest it was intended to protect, as well as all other branches of industry. Bold as is the assertion, I am prepared to establish it to the letter. It has already been proved that the great expansion of the currency in '29, '30, and '31, was the immediate effect of the tariff of'28. It remains to be shown that the cause of the still greater and longer con tinued expansion which has terminated in the overthrow of the banking system, and the deep and almost universal distress of the country, may be clearly traced back to the same source. To do this, we must return to the year '32, and trace the chain of events to this time. In that year, the pub~lic debt was finally discharged. The vast revenue which had been poured into the Treasury by the tarifr of 1828, and which bad accelerated the payment of the public debt, could, after its discharge, no longer be absorbed in the ordinary expen ditdres of the Government, and a surplus began to accumulate in the Treasury. The late Bank of the United States was then the fiscal agent of the Government, and the depository of its revenue. Its growing amount, and prospects of great future increase, began to act on the cupidi ty of many of the leading State banks and some of the great brokers of New York. Hence their war against that institution; and hence, also, the removal of the de; posites. The late President I believe to have been really hostile to the Bank on principle; but there would have been lit tIe or no motive to remove them, had it not bcen for their growing importance, and hostility which the desire of possessing them had excited. They were removed, and placed in the vaults of certain State banks. To this removal and deposite in the State banks,.the members over the way are in the habit of attributtiug all the disorders of the currency which have since followed. Now I ask, in the first place, is it not certain, if it had not been for the sur plus revenue. the deposites would not have been removed? And, in the second, if there would have been a surplus had it not been for the tarifr of '28 ? Again is it not equally clear that it was the magnitude of the surplus. and not the removal, of itself, that caused the after de rana'emeut and disorder? If the surplus had been Iut two or three millions, the or clinary sumn in deposite, it would have been of little importancd where i: was kept; whether in the vaults of the Bank of the United States, or those of the States; but involving, as it did, fifty millions and more, it became a question of the highest impor tance. I again ask, to what is this great surplus to he attributed, but to the same cause? Yes sir, the tariff of 1828 caused the surplus. and the surplus the removal and all the after disasters in the currency. aggravated, it is true, by being deposited in the State Banks; but it may be doubted whether the disaster would have been much less, had they not been removed. Be that, however, as it may, it is not ma terial, as I have shom n, that surplus itself was the motive for the removal. The sur plus poured into the Treasury by millions. in the form of bank notes. The with drawal from circulation, and locking up in the vaults of the deposite banks, so large 8h amount, created an immense vacuum, tobe replenished by repeating the issues which gave to the banks the means of un bounded accommodations. Speculation now coinmenced on a gigantic scale; pri ces rose rapidly, and one party, to make the removal acceptable to the penple, ur ged the new depositories to discount free. ly, while the other side produced the same effect,.by censuring them for not affording as extensive accommodations as the Bank of the United States would have done, had the revenue been left with it. Madness ruled the hour. The whole community was intoxicated with imagicary prospects of realizing immense fortunes. With the increased rise of prices began the gigantic speculations in the public domain, the price of which, being fixed by law, could not partake oft the general rise. To enlarge the room for their operations, I know nor how many millions (fifty, I would suppose at least, of the public revenue) was sunk in puchasing Indian lands, at their fee simple price nearly, and removing tribe after tribe to the West, at enormous cost; thus subjecting millions on millions of the choicest public lands to be seized on by the keen and gready speculator. The tide tmow swelled with irresistible force. From the Banks the deposites passed by discounts into the bands of the land speculators; from thenm into the hands of the receivers, and thence to the banks; and again and again repeating the same circle, and, at every revolution, passinig millions of acres of the public domain from the people into the hands of speculators, for worthless rags. H ad this state of things continued much longer, every acre of the public lands, worth possessing, would have pas sed from the Government. At th1is stage the alarm took place. The revenue was attempted to be squandered by the wildest extravagance; resolutionis passed this body, calling on the Departments to know how much they could spend, and much resent menmt was felt because they could not spend fast enough. The deposite act was pas sed, and the Treastury circular issued; but, as far as the currency was concerned, in vaitn. -The explosion followed, and the banks fell in convulsions, to be resusciated, for a moment, hut to fall again from a more deadly stroke, under which they now lie prostrate. -I have now presented, rapidly, the un broken chain of events up to the prolific sources of our disasters, and down to the present time. in addition to caucus ori ginating directly in the tariffof 828, there were several collateral powerful ones, which have contributed to the present pro% trated condition of the currency and the banks,but which would have been-compar atively harmis of themselves. Among these was the important change in the charter of therBank of England, at the last renewal; aboyt the time our surplus reve nue began to accumulate, by which its notes were mgde a legal tender in all ca ses, except between the bank and its cred itors. The obvious effect of this modifica tion was to diminish the demand for spe cie in that great mart of the world, and,in consequence, mast have tended powerful ly to keep the exchange with us in an easy condition, while the tide of circula tion was rapidly rising to a dangerous height. But there was another cause which contributed still more powerfully to the same result: I refer to the great loans negotiated abroad by States and cor pprations. T6 these I add the operation of the United Statei Bank of Pennsylva nia, the direct object of which, in some of its more prominent transactions, was to prevent the exchange from becoming ad verse to us. By the operation of these causes com bined, the exchanges were kept easy for years notwithstanding the vast expansion which our circulation had attained, from the powerful action of the more direct cat ses to which I have adverted. The stroke was delayed, but not averted, and fell but the heavier and more fatally, because de layed. And where did it fall when it caine, most heavily? Where the measure which cause it originated; oaf the heads of its pro jectors. Behold how error, folly, and vice, in the ways of an inscruptable Providence, turn hack on their authors. It is full time for the North, and more especially for New En:land, to pause and ponder. If they would hear the voice f one who has ever wished them wel would say that the renewal of the protec tive system would be one of the greatest calamities that could befall yot. What ever incidental good could be derived from it, you have already acquired. It would. if renewed, prove a pure, unadulterated evil. The very reverse is your true policy. The great question for you to decide is, how to command the foreign market. The home market, of itself, is too scanty for your skill, your activity, your energy. your unequalled inventive powers, your untiring industry, your vastly increased prpulation, and accumulated capital. Without the foreign market, your unex ampled march to wealth and improvement must come to a stand. How, then, are you to obtain command of the foreign mar ket? That is the viral question. The first and indispensable step is a thorough reformation of the currency. Without a solid, stable, and uniform cur rency, you never can fully succeed. The present currency is incurably bad. It is impossible to give it solidity or stability. A convertible bank currency. however well regulated, is subject to violent and sudden changes, which must forever unfit it to be the standard of value. It is by far the most sensitive of all to every change, commercial or political, foreign or domes tic; as may be readily illustrated by refer ence to the ordinary action of foreign ex changes on such currency. For this pur pose, let us assume that our ordinary cir culating medium, when exchanges are easy, amounts to $100,000,000, consisting, as it does, of convertible bank paper. Let ussuppose that it is all issued by what is called sound specie paying banks, with a circulation of three dollars of paper forone dollar in specie, which is regarded as con stituting safe banking. Next, suppose ex change abroad turns against us, to the amount of 810,000,000. Is it not clear, that instead of reducing the circulation bry that amount, that is, to $0,000,000, which it would do if it consisted only of specie, it would be reduced three tiames the a mount; thbat is, to, $70,000,000? L et' us now suppose the exchange to turn the oth er way, from this point of depression, and to be kept flowing in that direction till it came to he $10,000,000 in our favor, in stead ofthat amount against us. The re stilt would be, under the operation of~ tho same law, not to increase our circulation to $110,000,000 only, which would lbe the case if consisting of specie, but to $130, 000,000; making a difference between the extreme points of depression and* eleva tion of $60,000,000-more than equal to one-half of the usual amount of circulation by supposition, with a corresponding in crease of prices--instead of $20,000,000, equal only to a fifth, and with but a pro portional effect on prices. A change the other way, from the extreme point of ele vation to that of extreme depression, would cause the reverse effect. I hold it certain that no honest industry, pursued with the view to moderate and steady profit, can lhe safe in the midst of such sudden and vio lent vicissitudes-vicissitudes as if from summer to winter, and from winter to sum mer, without the interuention -of full or spring. Such great and sudden changes in the standtard of value must be particti larly fatal with us, with our moderately accumulated capital, compared to the ef feet on the greater accumulation abroad, in older countries. In stating the case supposed,. I have assumedl numbers at ran dom, without pretending to accuracy as applied to our country, simply to illustrate the principle. The actual vibration may he greater or less than that supposed, but in every country where bank circulation prevails, it must be greater and .greater, just in proportion to the extent of its pre valence. For this diseased state of your currency, there is but one certain remedy-to return to the currency of the Constitution. Read that instrment. and hear what it says. "Congress shall coin money and regulate tile value thereof; no State shall emit bills of credit, or make any thing but gold and silver a legal tender." Here are pos itive and negative provisions; a grant of power to Congress. and a limitation on the power Of the States, in reference to the currency. Can you doubt that the ob ject was to give to Congress the control of the currency ? What else is the mean "to regulate" the value thereof! Can you loubt that the currency was intended to be specie? What else is the meaning "to coin money?" Can you doubt, on the other hand, that it was the intention that the States should not supercede the curren cy which Congress was authorized to es tablish? What else is'rhe meaning of the provisions that they shall not issue hills of credit, or make any thing but gold and sil ver a legal tender? Can we doubt, final ly,'that the country is not in the condition that the Constitution intended, as far as the currency is concerned ? Does Congress, in point of fact. regulate the currency? No. Does it supply a coin circulation? No. Do the States, in fact, regulate? Yes. Does it consist of paper, issued by the authority of the States? Yes. Is this paper, in effect, a legal tender? Yes; it has expelled the currency of the Constitu tion, we are compelled to take it or nothing. Well, then, as the currency is in an uncon stitutional condition, the conclusion is irre sistible that theConstitution has failed to ef feet what it intended, as far as the currency is concerned; but whether it has failed by misconstruction, or the want of adequate provisions, is not yet decided. Thus much however. is clear; that it is through the a gency of hank paper that it has failed, and the power intended to be conferred on Congress over the currency has been su perseded. But for that, the power of Con gress over the currency would have been this day in full force, and the currency itself in a constitutional condition. Nor is it less clear, that the Constitution can not be restored, while the cause which has. superseded it remains; and this presents the great question, how can it be removed? I do not intend to discuss it on this occa sion. I shall only say, that the task is one of great delicacy and difficulty, requiring much wisdom and caution, and in the ex ecution of which, precipitation ought to be carefully avioded, but whiten executed, then, and not till then, shall we have the solid, stable. and tiniform currency inten ded by the Constittttion, and which is in dispensable, not only to the full sucess of our mantfactureq, and all other branches of productive industry, but also the safety of otr free institutions. The next indispensable step to secure to the manufactures the foreign market, is low duties and light burd ens on produc tions; yes, as low and light as the wants of the Government will permit. The less the burden-the freer ard broader the scope giver to the products of our mani fact tt res-the bet ter for then. Above all, avoid the renewal of the protective spstem. It would be fatal, as far as the foreign market is concerned. Its hostile effects I have already shown from the table of exports; and shall now, by a few brief remarks, prove that it must be so. Passing by other reasons: I shall present but one, but that one deci sive. It has been shown that the effect of the protective system is to expand the currency in the manufacturing sections, until the increased price of production shall become equal to the duty imposed for pro tection, when the importation of the pro. tected articles must again take place; that is to say. that its effects are to enable foreign manufactures to meet ottrs in our own country, tunder the dtsadvantages of paying high additional duties. Howv, then, with that result, would it he possible for our manufacturers to meet the foreign fab rics of'the same description abroad, where there can he no duty to protect them ? There can be no answer. The reason i3 decisive. I do not wish, in what I have said, to beconsidered the advocate, of low wages.. I am in favor of high wages; and agree that the higher the wages. the stronger thte evidence of prosperity; provided (and that is the important point) t~ey are so natural ly, by the efectiveness of industry, and not in consequenice 'of an inflated currency, or any artificial regulation.'- When 1 say the effectiveness ofindustry, C mean to com prehend whatever is calculated to make the labor of one country more productive than that of others. I take into consider ation skill, activity, energy, itnvention, perfection of instruments and means, tme chanical and chemical; abundan-ce of capi tal, natural and acquired; facility of inter course and exchanges, internal and exter nal, and, in, a word, what, ever may add to the productiveness of labor. High wages, wvhen attrihutahle to these, is the certain evidence of productiveness, and is, on that account,and that only, the evidence of prosperity. It is easily understood. Just as such labor would command, when compared with the less productive,a greart er number of pounds of sugar or tea, a greater quantity of clothing or food, in the same proportion would it command more specie, that is, higher wages, foyr a day's work. But, sir, here is the imporant con sitderation: high wages from such a cause, require no protection-no, not more than the high Wages of a man against the low wages of a hey, of man against women, or the skilful and energetic against the awk ward and feeble. On the contrary, the higher such wages the less the protection required. Others may demand protection against it-not itagainst others. The Ve ry demand of protection. then, is but a con fession of the want of effectiveness of la bor (from some cause) on the side that makes it;'but, as a general rule, it will turn out that protection, in most cases, is a mere fallacy, certainly so when its efects are an artificial expansion of the currency. So far are high wages from being the evidence of prosperity, in such cases, or, in fact, whenever caused by high protectiont bigh taxes, or any other artificial cause, it is the evidence of the very reverse, and al ways indicates something wrong, and a tendency to derangement and decay. Having arrived at this conclusion, I will now hazard the assertion, that in no country on earth is labor, taking it all in all, more effective than ours; and especial ly in the Northern and Eastern portions. w hat people can excel our Northern and New England brethren in skill, invention, activity, energy, perseverance, and enter prise? In what portion of the globe will you find a position more favorable to a free ingress and egress, and facility of inter course, external and internal, through the broad limits of.our wide spread country a region surpassed by none, taking into con sideration extent and fertility? Where will you find such an abundant supply of 'nat ural capital. the gift of a kind Providence; lands cheap, plenty and fertile; water pow er unlimited; and the supply of fuel, pnd the most useful of metal's iron, almost without stint. It is true, in accumulated capital, the fruits of past labor, through a long succession of ages, not equal to some others countries, but even in that, far from being deficient, would be more than com pensated by the absence of all restrictions, and the lightness of the burden imposed on labor, should our Government, State and General, wisely avail itself of the advan tages of our situation. If these views be correct, there is no country where labor, if left to itself, free from restriction, voild be more efective, and where it would command greater abundance of every necessary and comfort, or higher wages; and where, of course, protection is less needed. Instead of an advantage, it must, in fact, prove anImpediment. It is high time, then, that the shacklss should be thrown off industry, and'its burden light ened, as far as the just wants of the Gov ernment may possibly admit. 'We have arrived at the manhood.of our vigor. 0 pen the way-remove all restraints-take off the swaddling clothj that bound the limbs of infancy, and let the hardy, intel ligent and enterprising sons of New En gland, march forth fearlessly to meet the world in competition, and she will prove, in a few years, the successful rival of old England. The foreign market once com manded, all conflicts between the differ ent sections and industry of the country would cease. It is hetter for us, and you, that our cotton should go out in yarn and goods, than in the raw state; and when that is done, the interets of all the parts of this great Confederacy--North, East, South and West-with every variety of its pursuits, would be harmonized ; but not till then. If the course of policy I advocate be wise, as applied to manufactures, how much more strickingly so must it be when to the other two great interests of thatsec tion, commerce and navigation ? I pass the former, and shall conclude what 1in tended to say on this point, with a few re maks applicable to the latter. Naviga tion (I mean that employed in our foreign trade,) is essentially our outside interest, exposed to the open competition of the lowest wages, not only without protection, but with heavy burdens on almost every article that enters into the outfit, the rig. ging and construction of our noble vessels, the timber exccpted. If, with such oner ous burdens, it has met in successful ri valry, the navigation of all other coun tries. What an impulse it would receive if the load that bears down its springs were roemoved ! and what immense addi tionas that increased impulse would give not only to our wealth, but to the means of national influence and safety, where only we can be felt, and in the quarter from which only external danger is to be apprehended ! I have now, air. President, concluded what I proposed to say, when I rose to address the Senate. I have limited my remarks to the prominent consequnences, in a pectiaitry and fiscal viewy, which woutld result, should the scheme ofassump tion be adopted. There are higher, and still rmore important, consequences, which I have not attempted to trace: I mean the effects, morally and politically, as re sulting from those which I have traced, and presented to the Senate. This, I hope, may be done by some other Sena tor, in the course of the discussion. But I have said ennugh to show that the scheme. which these resolutions are intended to condemn, ought to be avoided as the most fatal poison, and the most deadly pesti lence. It ts, tn reality, but a scheme of plunder. Let blood be lapped, and the appetite will be insatiable. But the States are deeply in debt, and. it may be asked, what shall he dones? L . know that they are in debt-deeply in. debt. 1 deplore it. Yes, in debt, I am not afraid to assert it, in many instances, for the most idle p~rojects, got tip and pur sued in the most toughtless manner. Nor am I -ignorant how deep -pecuniary emi barrassments, whether or States or indi viduals, blunt every feeling of honest pride, and deaden thie sense of justice; but, I do trust, that there is not a member of this great and proud Confederacy, so lost to every feeling of self-respect and senna of instice, as to desire .to charge its