Edgefield advertiser. (Edgefield, S.C.) 1836-current, March 26, 1840, Image 1
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1We will cling to the Pillars of the Temple of our Libertlee, Bad if it must fall, we will Perish amidst the Euins."
VOLUME V. Eefiel& Court nons-, 8. V., bar)h S, 84. - NO.S.
DEIEILD AD VERTISIER,
BY
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SPEECH OF MR. CALHOUN,
Of South Carolina, On the Report of Mr.
Grundy, of Tennessee, in relation to the
Assumption of the Debts of the States by
the Federal Government.-U. States
Senate, February 5, 1840.
(Concluded from our last.)
I trust that I have now established to
the entire satisfaction of the Senate, the
truth of the great principle which has been
laid down-that every increase of protec
tive duties is necessarily followed, in the
present condition of our country, by an ex
pansion of the currency, which must con
tinue to increase till the increased price of
production, caused by the expansion. shall
be equal to the duty imposed, when a new
tariff will be required. Assuming, then,
the principle as inconvertible, it follows
that the natural tendency of the protective
system is toexpand, in seeking to accom
plish its object, till it terminates in explo
sion. It would be easy to show, from w hat
has already been stated, that this tendency
miGst continue till the exports shall be so
reduced as to be barely sufficient to meet
the demads of tho country for the articles
not included in the protection; as it must
be obvious, so long as they exceed that a
mount, so long mustspecie continue to be
in our favor, till the protection is broke
down by the expansion of the currency.
The consumation, therefore, of the sys.
tem, must be one of two things; explosion,
or the reduction of the exports, so as not
to exceed the amount of the exports. so as
not to exceed the amount of the unprotec
ted articles; but either termination must
prove disastrous to the system; the former
by a sudden and violent overthrow, and the
latter the impoverishment of customers
and raising up of rivals, as they ceased to
be customers. To baie a just conception
of its operation in this particular, it will be
necessary to bear in mind, that the South
and the West are the great consumers of
the products of the North and East; and
that the capacity of the South to consume,
depends on her great agricultural staples
almost exclusively; and that their sale and
consumption depend mainly on the for
eign market. What, then, would be the
effect of reducing her exports to the point
indicated, say to forty or ifty millions of
dollars ? Most certainly to diminish her
capacity to conisume the products of the
North and East in the same proportion.
followed by a corresponding diminution of
the revenue, and the commerce andI navi
gation of the country. But the evil would
not end there, as great asit would be. It
would have an equal or greater effect on
the consumption of the West. That great
and growving section is the provision por
tion of the Union. Hecr wide and fertile
region gives her an unlimited capacity to
produce grain and stock of every descrip
tion; and these, for the most part, find their
market in the staple States. Cut off their
exports, and their market wvould he de
stroyed; andI with it, the means of the
West, to a great extent, for carrying on
trade with the Northero and E astern States.
To the same extent, they and the staple
States wvould be compelled to produce
their own supplies, and would thus, from
consumlo.rs, be converted into rivals with
the other section.
How much wiser for all would be the
opposite system of low duties, with the
market of the world opened to our great
agricultural staples? The effects would
be a vast increase of our exports, with a
corresponding increase of the capacity to
consume on the part of the South and
West, making them rich and contented
customers, instead of isopoverished and
discontented rivals of the other section.
3t is time that this subject shoukl be regar
ded in its true light. The protective sys
tem is neither more tier less than a war on
the exports. 1 again repeat, if we canntot
import, we edunnot long export; and just as
w.e-cut offor burden tl-.e imports, to the
same extent do we, in effect, cut off and
burden the exports. This I have long
asen, and shall now proceed to prove, by
reference to the pitblic documents, that
nry assertion is sustained by facts. The
table of exports shows that during the
seven pears from 1824 to 1831,our domes
notwithstanding the great increase of our
population during that period. Your sta
tute book will show, that during the same
period, the protective system was in its
greatest vigor. The first relaxation took
place in December, 1830, under the act of
the 20th May, of the same year, which
made a great deduction in the duties on
coffee and tea. I shall now turn to the
table, and give the exports of domestic
articles for those years, beginning with
1824:
Here Mr. C. read the following state
ment :
In 3824 the domestic exports were $50.649,500
1825 " " " 66,944,745
1826 " " " 53,055,710
1827 " "d " 58,92J,691
1828 " " " 56,669,669
1829 " " " 55,700,193
1830 " " " 59,462,029
If we take the average of first three anti
the last of the these years, we shall find
the rormer is a million and a half greater
thaa the latter, showing an actual falling
of, instead of an increase, to that extent,
in our exports.
With 1831, the reduction of duties com
menced on the articles mentioned; and in
December, 1833, the first great reduction
took place under the compromise act. I
shall turn to the sdme table, beginning
with 1831, and read a statement of the
exports for the eight years under the ap
proach to the free trade system. It is but
an approach. I invite especial attention
to the rapid rise, after the great reduction
in Decenher, 1833. ,
In 1831 the domestic exports were $61,277,057
1832 " " " 63.137,470
1833 " " "i 70,317,608
1834 "o" " 81,034,162
1835 " " " 101.189,082
1836 " " " 106,916.680
.1837 "d " " 95,564,414
1838 " " "d 96,033,821
How rapid the rise just as the weights
are removed! The increase, since the
great reduction in 1833, has nearly doub
led the average exports, compared with
the average of the seven tariff years pre
ceeding 1831, and would have quite dou
bled them, had not the expanded and de
ranged condition of the currency, and the
consequent embarrassment of commerce,
prevented it.
But what will appear still more extra
ordimiry-to tho-&e who have not reflected
on the operation of the protective system,
is the great increase or the exports of our
domestic mantuactures, as the dutiesgo off,
following, in that respect, the same law
that regulates the exports of the great ag.
ricultural staples. It is a precious fact,
that speaks volun', and which demands
the serious consida tion of the manufac
turing portion of the Union. I well re
member the sanguine expectations of the
friends of the system, of the great increase
of the exports of domestic manufactures
which they believed would follow the tariff
or 1828. Well, we now have the result of
experience, under that act, and also under
that of a partial approach to free trade,
and the result is exactly the reverse of
the anticipations of the friends and advo
cates ofprotection. Sa far from increasing,
under the tariff of 1828, the exports of
manufactured articles actually diminished,
while they have rapidly increased just as
they have gone off.
But the table of exports shall speak for
itself. During the four years, under the
tariff of '24. that is from that year to '29,
when the tariff of'28 went ir.to operation,
the exports of domestic manufactures grad
ually declined from $5,729,797, in the
year '25, to S5,548,354 in the year '28.
From that time it steadily declined, under
the tariff of '28, each succeeding year
showing a falling off compared with the
preceding, till '33, declining, throughout
the period, from $5,412,320 in '29. to $5,
050,633itt '32. and showing an aggregate
falling ofl, during the whole tariff re~irneo
of eight years, from '2.5 to '32, of nearly
$700,000. A t this point, we enter on the
relaxation of the system, and there has
been an on ward move, with but lit tle vibra
tion, throughout the whole period, till the
present time. The last year wve have is
'38, when the exports exceeded any pre
'ceding year. They amotunted to $S,
397,078, being an increase, during the six
years of the reduction of duties, of $3,346,
445, against a falling off, in the preceding
eight-years of protection, of 8700.000-an
increase of 65 per cent, in six .years, and
this in the tmidst of all the embarrassment
of commerce, and expansion and derange
went of the-currency, add, let me add,
what has been so much dreaded by the
friend of manufactures, the miahty increase
of the exports of our great agricultunral sta
ples, during the same period; a cdare pi-uof
that, under :ho free trade system, the one
.does not interfere with the other. Let no
friend of manufactures suppose that this
interesting result is accidontal. It is the
operation of fixed laws, steady, and immu
table in their course, as I shall hereafter
show.
Now, sir, I feel myself, with these facts.
warranted in asserting that if the deranged
state of the currency had not interfered,
the great manufacturing interest would
have gone on in a flourishing condition
during the whole period of the reduction
under tho compromise act, proving there
by, to the satisfaction of all, the fallacy of
the protective system. Any supposed loss,
fiom the reduction of duties, would have
been much more than made up by the in
creased ability of the South and West to
consume, and the rapidly growing impor
tance of the foreign market.
But I have not yet clone with the system.
It has additional and heavy sins to answer
for. The Tariff of 1828 is the source in
which has originated that very derange.
mont of thn currency, which has so greatly
embarrassed, at this time, the very interest
it was intended to protect, as well as all
other branches of industry. Bold as is the
assertion, I am prepared to establish it to
the letter.
It has already been proved that the great
expansion of the currency in '29, '30, and
'31, was the immediate effect of the tariff
of'28. It remains to be shown that the
cause of the still greater and longer con
tinued expansion which has terminated in
the overthrow of the banking system, and
the deep and almost universal distress of
the country, may be clearly traced back
to the same source. To do this, we must
return to the year '32, and trace the chain
of events to this time. In that year, the
pub~lic debt was finally discharged. The
vast revenue which had been poured into
the Treasury by the tarifr of 1828, and
which bad accelerated the payment of the
public debt, could, after its discharge, no
longer be absorbed in the ordinary expen
ditdres of the Government, and a surplus
began to accumulate in the Treasury.
The late Bank of the United States was
then the fiscal agent of the Government,
and the depository of its revenue. Its
growing amount, and prospects of great
future increase, began to act on the cupidi
ty of many of the leading State banks and
some of the great brokers of New York.
Hence their war against that institution;
and hence, also, the removal of the de;
posites. The late President I believe to
have been really hostile to the Bank on
principle; but there would have been lit
tIe or no motive to remove them, had it
not bcen for their growing importance, and
hostility which the desire of possessing
them had excited. They were removed,
and placed in the vaults of certain State
banks. To this removal and deposite in
the State banks,.the members over the
way are in the habit of attributtiug all the
disorders of the currency which have since
followed. Now I ask, in the first place, is
it not certain, if it had not been for the sur
plus revenue. the deposites would not have
been removed? And, in the second, if
there would have been a surplus had it not
been for the tarifr of '28 ?
Again is it not equally clear that it was
the magnitude of the surplus. and not the
removal, of itself, that caused the after de
rana'emeut and disorder? If the surplus
had been Iut two or three millions, the or
clinary sumn in deposite, it would have been
of little importancd where i: was kept;
whether in the vaults of the Bank of the
United States, or those of the States; but
involving, as it did, fifty millions and more,
it became a question of the highest impor
tance. I again ask, to what is this great
surplus to he attributed, but to the same
cause? Yes sir, the tariff of 1828 caused
the surplus. and the surplus the removal
and all the after disasters in the currency.
aggravated, it is true, by being deposited
in the State Banks; but it may be doubted
whether the disaster would have been
much less, had they not been removed.
Be that, however, as it may, it is not ma
terial, as I have shom n, that surplus itself
was the motive for the removal. The sur
plus poured into the Treasury by millions.
in the form of bank notes. The with
drawal from circulation, and locking up in
the vaults of the deposite banks, so large
8h amount, created an immense vacuum,
tobe replenished by repeating the issues
which gave to the banks the means of un
bounded accommodations. Speculation
now coinmenced on a gigantic scale; pri
ces rose rapidly, and one party, to make
the removal acceptable to the penple, ur
ged the new depositories to discount free.
ly, while the other side produced the same
effect,.by censuring them for not affording
as extensive accommodations as the Bank
of the United States would have done, had
the revenue been left with it. Madness
ruled the hour. The whole community
was intoxicated with imagicary prospects
of realizing immense fortunes. With the
increased rise of prices began the gigantic
speculations in the public domain, the price
of which, being fixed by law, could not
partake oft the general rise. To enlarge
the room for their operations, I know nor
how many millions (fifty, I would suppose
at least, of the public revenue) was sunk
in puchasing Indian lands, at their fee
simple price nearly, and removing tribe
after tribe to the West, at enormous cost;
thus subjecting millions on millions of the
choicest public lands to be seized on by
the keen and gready speculator. The tide
tmow swelled with irresistible force. From
the Banks the deposites passed by discounts
into the bands of the land speculators;
from thenm into the hands of the receivers,
and thence to the banks; and again and
again repeating the same circle, and, at
every revolution, passinig millions of acres
of the public domain from the people into
the hands of speculators, for worthless
rags. H ad this state of things continued
much longer, every acre of the public
lands, worth possessing, would have pas
sed from the Government. At th1is stage
the alarm took place. The revenue was
attempted to be squandered by the wildest
extravagance; resolutionis passed this body,
calling on the Departments to know how
much they could spend, and much resent
menmt was felt because they could not spend
fast enough. The deposite act was pas
sed, and the Treastury circular issued; but,
as far as the currency was concerned, in
vaitn. -The explosion followed, and the
banks fell in convulsions, to be resusciated,
for a moment, hut to fall again from a
more deadly stroke, under which they now
lie prostrate.
-I have now presented, rapidly, the un
broken chain of events up to the prolific
sources of our disasters, and down to the
present time. in addition to caucus ori
ginating directly in the tariffof 828, there
were several collateral powerful ones,
which have contributed to the present pro%
trated condition of the currency and the
banks,but which would have been-compar
atively harmis of themselves. Among
these was the important change in the
charter of therBank of England, at the last
renewal; aboyt the time our surplus reve
nue began to accumulate, by which its
notes were mgde a legal tender in all ca
ses, except between the bank and its cred
itors. The obvious effect of this modifica
tion was to diminish the demand for spe
cie in that great mart of the world, and,in
consequence, mast have tended powerful
ly to keep the exchange with us in an
easy condition, while the tide of circula
tion was rapidly rising to a dangerous
height. But there was another cause
which contributed still more powerfully
to the same result: I refer to the great
loans negotiated abroad by States and cor
pprations. T6 these I add the operation
of the United Statei Bank of Pennsylva
nia, the direct object of which, in some of
its more prominent transactions, was to
prevent the exchange from becoming ad
verse to us.
By the operation of these causes com
bined, the exchanges were kept easy for
years notwithstanding the vast expansion
which our circulation had attained, from
the powerful action of the more direct cat
ses to which I have adverted. The stroke
was delayed, but not averted, and fell but
the heavier and more fatally, because de
layed. And where did it fall when it caine,
most heavily? Where the measure which
cause it originated; oaf the heads of its pro
jectors. Behold how error, folly, and vice,
in the ways of an inscruptable Providence,
turn hack on their authors.
It is full time for the North, and more
especially for New En:land, to pause and
ponder. If they would hear the voice f
one who has ever wished them wel
would say that the renewal of the protec
tive system would be one of the greatest
calamities that could befall yot. What
ever incidental good could be derived from
it, you have already acquired. It would.
if renewed, prove a pure, unadulterated
evil. The very reverse is your true policy.
The great question for you to decide is,
how to command the foreign market.
The home market, of itself, is too scanty
for your skill, your activity, your energy.
your unequalled inventive powers, your
untiring industry, your vastly increased
prpulation, and accumulated capital.
Without the foreign market, your unex
ampled march to wealth and improvement
must come to a stand. How, then, are
you to obtain command of the foreign mar
ket? That is the viral question.
The first and indispensable step is a
thorough reformation of the currency.
Without a solid, stable, and uniform cur
rency, you never can fully succeed. The
present currency is incurably bad. It is
impossible to give it solidity or stability.
A convertible bank currency. however
well regulated, is subject to violent and
sudden changes, which must forever unfit
it to be the standard of value. It is by far
the most sensitive of all to every change,
commercial or political, foreign or domes
tic; as may be readily illustrated by refer
ence to the ordinary action of foreign ex
changes on such currency. For this pur
pose, let us assume that our ordinary cir
culating medium, when exchanges are
easy, amounts to $100,000,000, consisting,
as it does, of convertible bank paper. Let
ussuppose that it is all issued by what is
called sound specie paying banks, with a
circulation of three dollars of paper forone
dollar in specie, which is regarded as con
stituting safe banking. Next, suppose ex
change abroad turns against us, to the
amount of 810,000,000. Is it not clear,
that instead of reducing the circulation bry
that amount, that is, to $0,000,000, which
it would do if it consisted only of specie,
it would be reduced three tiames the a
mount; thbat is, to, $70,000,000? L et' us
now suppose the exchange to turn the oth
er way, from this point of depression, and
to be kept flowing in that direction till it
came to he $10,000,000 in our favor, in
stead ofthat amount against us. The re
stilt would be, under the operation of~ tho
same law, not to increase our circulation
to $110,000,000 only, which would lbe the
case if consisting of specie, but to $130,
000,000; making a difference between the
extreme points of depression and* eleva
tion of $60,000,000-more than equal to
one-half of the usual amount of circulation
by supposition, with a corresponding in
crease of prices--instead of $20,000,000,
equal only to a fifth, and with but a pro
portional effect on prices. A change the
other way, from the extreme point of ele
vation to that of extreme depression, would
cause the reverse effect. I hold it certain
that no honest industry, pursued with the
view to moderate and steady profit, can lhe
safe in the midst of such sudden and vio
lent vicissitudes-vicissitudes as if from
summer to winter, and from winter to sum
mer, without the interuention -of full or
spring. Such great and sudden changes
in the standtard of value must be particti
larly fatal with us, with our moderately
accumulated capital, compared to the ef
feet on the greater accumulation abroad,
in older countries. In stating the case
supposed,. I have assumedl numbers at ran
dom, without pretending to accuracy as
applied to our country, simply to illustrate
the principle. The actual vibration may
he greater or less than that supposed, but
in every country where bank circulation
prevails, it must be greater and .greater,
just in proportion to the extent of its pre
valence.
For this diseased state of your currency,
there is but one certain remedy-to return
to the currency of the Constitution. Read
that instrment. and hear what it says.
"Congress shall coin money and regulate
tile value thereof; no State shall emit
bills of credit, or make any thing but gold
and silver a legal tender." Here are pos
itive and negative provisions; a grant of
power to Congress. and a limitation on
the power Of the States, in reference to
the currency. Can you doubt that the ob
ject was to give to Congress the control of
the currency ? What else is the mean
"to regulate" the value thereof! Can you
loubt that the currency was intended to
be specie? What else is the meaning
"to coin money?" Can you doubt, on the
other hand, that it was the intention that
the States should not supercede the curren
cy which Congress was authorized to es
tablish? What else is'rhe meaning of the
provisions that they shall not issue hills of
credit, or make any thing but gold and sil
ver a legal tender? Can we doubt, final
ly,'that the country is not in the condition
that the Constitution intended, as far as the
currency is concerned ? Does Congress,
in point of fact. regulate the currency?
No. Does it supply a coin circulation?
No. Do the States, in fact, regulate?
Yes. Does it consist of paper, issued by
the authority of the States? Yes. Is this
paper, in effect, a legal tender? Yes; it
has expelled the currency of the Constitu
tion, we are compelled to take it or nothing.
Well, then, as the currency is in an uncon
stitutional condition, the conclusion is irre
sistible that theConstitution has failed to ef
feet what it intended, as far as the currency
is concerned; but whether it has failed by
misconstruction, or the want of adequate
provisions, is not yet decided. Thus much
however. is clear; that it is through the a
gency of hank paper that it has failed, and
the power intended to be conferred on
Congress over the currency has been su
perseded. But for that, the power of Con
gress over the currency would have been
this day in full force, and the currency
itself in a constitutional condition. Nor
is it less clear, that the Constitution can
not be restored, while the cause which has.
superseded it remains; and this presents
the great question, how can it be removed?
I do not intend to discuss it on this occa
sion. I shall only say, that the task is one
of great delicacy and difficulty, requiring
much wisdom and caution, and in the ex
ecution of which, precipitation ought to be
carefully avioded, but whiten executed,
then, and not till then, shall we have the
solid, stable. and tiniform currency inten
ded by the Constittttion, and which is in
dispensable, not only to the full sucess of
our mantfactureq, and all other branches
of productive industry, but also the safety
of otr free institutions.
The next indispensable step to secure to
the manufactures the foreign market, is
low duties and light burd ens on produc
tions; yes, as low and light as the wants of
the Government will permit. The less
the burden-the freer ard broader the
scope giver to the products of our mani
fact tt res-the bet ter for then. Above all,
avoid the renewal of the protective spstem.
It would be fatal, as far as the foreign
market is concerned.
Its hostile effects I have already shown
from the table of exports; and shall now,
by a few brief remarks, prove that it must
be so. Passing by other reasons: I shall
present but one, but that one deci
sive. It has been shown that the effect
of the protective system is to expand
the currency in the manufacturing sections,
until the increased price of production shall
become equal to the duty imposed for pro
tection, when the importation of the pro.
tected articles must again take place;
that is to say. that its effects are to enable
foreign manufactures to meet ottrs in our
own country, tunder the dtsadvantages of
paying high additional duties. Howv, then,
with that result, would it he possible for
our manufacturers to meet the foreign fab
rics of'the same description abroad, where
there can he no duty to protect them ?
There can be no answer. The reason i3
decisive.
I do not wish, in what I have said, to
beconsidered the advocate, of low wages..
I am in favor of high wages; and agree
that the higher the wages. the stronger thte
evidence of prosperity; provided (and that
is the important point) t~ey are so natural
ly, by the efectiveness of industry, and not
in consequenice 'of an inflated currency, or
any artificial regulation.'- When 1 say the
effectiveness ofindustry, C mean to com
prehend whatever is calculated to make
the labor of one country more productive
than that of others. I take into consider
ation skill, activity, energy, itnvention,
perfection of instruments and means, tme
chanical and chemical; abundan-ce of capi
tal, natural and acquired; facility of inter
course and exchanges, internal and exter
nal, and, in, a word, what, ever may add
to the productiveness of labor. High
wages, wvhen attrihutahle to these, is the
certain evidence of productiveness, and is,
on that account,and that only, the evidence
of prosperity. It is easily understood.
Just as such labor would command, when
compared with the less productive,a greart
er number of pounds of sugar or tea, a
greater quantity of clothing or food, in the
same proportion would it command more
specie, that is, higher wages, foyr a day's
work. But, sir, here is the imporant con
sitderation: high wages from such a cause,
require no protection-no, not more than
the high Wages of a man against the low
wages of a hey, of man against women, or
the skilful and energetic against the awk
ward and feeble. On the contrary, the
higher such wages the less the protection
required. Others may demand protection
against it-not itagainst others. The Ve
ry demand of protection. then, is but a con
fession of the want of effectiveness of la
bor (from some cause) on the side that
makes it;'but, as a general rule, it will turn
out that protection, in most cases, is a mere
fallacy, certainly so when its efects are an
artificial expansion of the currency. So
far are high wages from being the evidence
of prosperity, in such cases, or, in fact,
whenever caused by high protectiont bigh
taxes, or any other artificial cause, it is
the evidence of the very reverse, and al
ways indicates something wrong, and a
tendency to derangement and decay.
Having arrived at this conclusion, I
will now hazard the assertion, that in no
country on earth is labor, taking it all in
all, more effective than ours; and especial
ly in the Northern and Eastern portions.
w hat people can excel our Northern and
New England brethren in skill, invention,
activity, energy, perseverance, and enter
prise? In what portion of the globe will
you find a position more favorable to a free
ingress and egress, and facility of inter
course, external and internal, through the
broad limits of.our wide spread country
a region surpassed by none, taking into con
sideration extent and fertility? Where will
you find such an abundant supply of 'nat
ural capital. the gift of a kind Providence;
lands cheap, plenty and fertile; water pow
er unlimited; and the supply of fuel, pnd
the most useful of metal's iron, almost
without stint. It is true, in accumulated
capital, the fruits of past labor, through a
long succession of ages, not equal to some
others countries, but even in that, far from
being deficient, would be more than com
pensated by the absence of all restrictions,
and the lightness of the burden imposed on
labor, should our Government, State and
General, wisely avail itself of the advan
tages of our situation. If these views be
correct, there is no country where labor,
if left to itself, free from restriction, voild
be more efective, and where it would
command greater abundance of every
necessary and comfort, or higher wages;
and where, of course, protection is less
needed. Instead of an advantage, it must,
in fact, prove anImpediment. It is high
time, then, that the shacklss should be
thrown off industry, and'its burden light
ened, as far as the just wants of the Gov
ernment may possibly admit. 'We have
arrived at the manhood.of our vigor. 0
pen the way-remove all restraints-take
off the swaddling clothj that bound the
limbs of infancy, and let the hardy, intel
ligent and enterprising sons of New En
gland, march forth fearlessly to meet the
world in competition, and she will prove,
in a few years, the successful rival of old
England. The foreign market once com
manded, all conflicts between the differ
ent sections and industry of the country
would cease. It is hetter for us, and you,
that our cotton should go out in yarn and
goods, than in the raw state; and when
that is done, the interets of all the parts of
this great Confederacy--North, East,
South and West-with every variety of
its pursuits, would be harmonized ; but
not till then.
If the course of policy I advocate be
wise, as applied to manufactures, how
much more strickingly so must it be when
to the other two great interests of thatsec
tion, commerce and navigation ? I pass
the former, and shall conclude what 1in
tended to say on this point, with a few re
maks applicable to the latter. Naviga
tion (I mean that employed in our foreign
trade,) is essentially our outside interest,
exposed to the open competition of the
lowest wages, not only without protection,
but with heavy burdens on almost every
article that enters into the outfit, the rig.
ging and construction of our noble vessels,
the timber exccpted. If, with such oner
ous burdens, it has met in successful ri
valry, the navigation of all other coun
tries. What an impulse it would receive
if the load that bears down its springs
were roemoved ! and what immense addi
tionas that increased impulse would give
not only to our wealth, but to the means
of national influence and safety, where
only we can be felt, and in the quarter
from which only external danger is to be
apprehended !
I have now, air. President, concluded
what I proposed to say, when I rose to
address the Senate. I have limited my
remarks to the prominent consequnences,
in a pectiaitry and fiscal viewy, which
woutld result, should the scheme ofassump
tion be adopted. There are higher, and
still rmore important, consequences, which
I have not attempted to trace: I mean
the effects, morally and politically, as re
sulting from those which I have traced,
and presented to the Senate. This, I
hope, may be done by some other Sena
tor, in the course of the discussion. But
I have said ennugh to show that the scheme.
which these resolutions are intended to
condemn, ought to be avoided as the most
fatal poison, and the most deadly pesti
lence. It ts, tn reality, but a scheme of
plunder. Let blood be lapped, and the
appetite will be insatiable.
But the States are deeply in debt, and.
it may be asked, what shall he dones? L .
know that they are in debt-deeply in.
debt. 1 deplore it. Yes, in debt, I am
not afraid to assert it, in many instances,
for the most idle p~rojects, got tip and pur
sued in the most toughtless manner. Nor
am I -ignorant how deep -pecuniary emi
barrassments, whether or States or indi
viduals, blunt every feeling of honest
pride, and deaden thie sense of justice;
but, I do trust, that there is not a member
of this great and proud Confederacy, so
lost to every feeling of self-respect and
senna of instice, as to desire .to charge its