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BY A.S. JOHNSTON. NEC DEESSE, NEC SUPERESSE REIPUBUCJI PUBLISHED WEEKLY. TOL. 33"KOi 48 COLUMBIA, S.C. OCTOBER 88, 1837. ANNUM, TELE OOLTCISXA T3LBSOOPS 18 PUBLISHED BY A. S. JOHHSTON, Every Saturday BCondnf, <Mi|> 1TSIT WXDKXSDAY A5D SATURDAY MORS I KG DTRXXG THX SXSSIOIT OP THE LEGISLATURE. TERMS : Three dollars per annum, if paid in advance, or Four dollars at the end of the year. Advxr ti sxmxxts conspicuously inserted at 75 eet-J per ?qtrare for the first insertion, and 371 cents for everymbwytiMmiaB. AD advertisements ordered in the inside every publication ? or inserted otherwise than regnhiiy, to be charged as new for every insertion. Advertisements not having the number of insertions marked on them will be contin ued tiB ordered out, and charged accordingly. AH accounts for advertising, above $25 and under $50, 25 per cent, deduction ? above $50, 40 per cent, de duction. SPEECH Of MR. KING, of Georgia, on the Bill im posing additional duties, as depositaries, in certain cases, on Public Officers. IN SENATE. September 23, 1337. After some strong and pungent remarks upon the failure of the Pet Bank system though he admitted that it might have done, and still could do, much better than hereto fore, if the Executive would consent to let it alone, and cease the continual interferences by which the banks have been tormented, and the commerce of the country deranged, ever since the Execctive had taken the control of the finances. Mr. K. then proceeded to notice the plan of the ^committee as proposed to be amended. This he looked upon as a new experiment, though it had been alleged to be otherwise by the Senator from Missouri. The Senator in sisted that we were ahead of our destiny, and ought to go back to the glorious days of the Roman empire to learn lessons on finance and political economy. This plan was strongly recommended as having been that under which the Roman quaestors made their mUd exactions from the people. It was also re commended most warmly by the Senator, because it was that under which the war levies of Napoleon were made, and the finances of Spain and Turkey collected and disbursed. ? Upon the first recommendation, the Senator had given us a most eloquent discourse upon Roman heroism ; bloody battles, and the levies of the quaestors. He had spoken of the great pleasure with which he read Roman history on these subjects, and the delight with which he contemplated the renown of this great peo ple. Well: Mr. K. said he had read some Roman history too, though certainly not 3s good an historian as his friend from Missou ri. But if any thing in Roman history had made a strong impression upon his republican mind, it was the heartless cruelty, the un feeling rigor, and tyranny with which -exac tions were made upon the people by the Ro man quaestors; and unfortunately for the Sen ator's Roman precedent, when these exactions had been made by plundering the Roman people and provinces to support heroism in the trade of conquering and plundering the rest of mankind, these exactions were deposited with Roman bankers appointed for the pur pose. As the Roman precedent was not found exactly satisfactory to Mr. R. he proceeded to notice the system so warmly recommended as the plan of that great democrat and ardent lover of liberty and free institutions, the Em peror Napoleon- His friend from Missouri had stated that when the Emperor mounted the throne of power, he found the State Cof fers empty, or nearly so; but in a short time they were filled to overflowing. Thereupon the Senator produced a book, or a document, to prove the important fact. The fact was not doubted; but how were these wonders of finance accomplished? Let his impoverished country and the blood and tears of unhappy Germany answer the question. However, perhaps the financiering of this great econo mist was strongly recommended from the fact that the largest and most timely accession to his finances was made by the robbery of the bank ; and that too a bank belonging to one of the freest and most commercial cities of 'Europe.* Mr. K. said he saw nothing in these Impe rial precedents, ancient or modern, very ap plicable or very captivating ; and as he saw nothing in the happy and prosperous con dition of the People of these free and com mercial nations, Turkey and Spain, to ex cite his envy, he would rather consider this as a new and untried experiment, and digest it a little better before it was adopted. Sfr. K. added, that the System was already in operation, as the changes proposed did not alter essentially the specie system adopted by the Executive since the suspension of specie payments. The postponement would give us a little more time to observe the workings of the system, and ascertain the wishes of the People. He was glad to see the finances res tored to Congress, their lawful guardian; on almost any terms; but really they were in such a worthless and ragged condition, from Exe cutive manipulation, that it was difficult to say what disposition had better be made of them. Mr. K. said he doubted whether he ought .to detain the Senate to say any thing upon the vcauses of the present distress, which had call ed Congress together. As this subject had been dwelt upon however, by every speaker who had preceded him, and was certainly of great importance to the-country,it was perhaps the duty of every member te give his views up on the subject, The subject, said he, is too important to the trifled with. It comes to the doors and dwellings, and reaches the bread and business, of every citizen, of every condi tion; aud I shall give my views, however un willingly, uninfluenced by all personal friend ship and party associations. Unless we as certain the causes which have so strangely brought the country into its present distressed condition, in a time of profound peace, we shaU neither know how to apply present rem edies n?r avoid similar evils in future. Mr. K. then said he had not the slightest doubt that our difficulties were owing entire ly to the* unfortunate policy and violent mea sures of the Executive in relation 19 the finan ces for several years past. This was the only cause, and this was abundantly sufficient. ? * Hamburg. Mr. K. said he could prove this to any one who would not shut his eyes to facts, and close his understanding against correct in formation on the subject. He had felt and expressed his astonishment when he first read the Presidents message, at the Statements of the President in relation to these causes; and he had been equally astonished at hearing his friends from Connecticut and North Carolina adopt these statements, and take them as ad mited truths. The President was entirely mistaken in these statements, and to allow them to remain uncorrected would only con tinue to obscure and mystify the subject. Mr. K. then read a passage from the Pre sident's Message. Now, that over-banking, over-issuing, &c., as mentioned by the President, have been operating causes, is only a common belief.? But where did they originate, and who pro duced them? That is the first question. And here Mr. K. stated that the President was mistaken in every fact assumed by him to exculpate our own Government from the charge of bemg-the -original cause of the mischief. Other countrieshave been suffering no "evils similar to those suffered by ourselves," ex cept those which they have suffered by their connexions icitk and losses by us. And "a reference to the amount of banking capital, and the issues of paper credits, put in cir culation in Great Britain, <fcc., during the years 1834, 1835, and 1836." will not "show an augmentation of the paper currency there, as much disproportioned to the real wants of trade as in the United States." Nor has there been in England any general rise of prices ; nor do we witness "in both countries the same redundancy of paper money, and other facilities of credit," or "the same spirit of speculation." These positions of the President are entirely errone ous, and the facts he supposes have not a shadow of existence. He said he did not, of course, make these contradictions in an offensive sense or in a way disrespectful to the President. He had been in favor of his election, and did not re gret it. He moreover believed him to be a man of patriotism and integrity, as well as intelligence, and he hoped to be able to sup port his Administration. But if he was (as he was doubtless) a "sincere inquirer after truth," he would be glad to be corrected in views calculated to deceive the People, and divert their minds from the true agency by which they have been overwhelmed. ? The President's "difference," in fact, ought to have shown him where the fault lay.? He states that <be nation has become bank rupt. The other sustained itself, and is now nearly recovered. Why this "difference ?" Why, simply because ours is the distress of the debtor unable to pay the debt ; theirs is the distress of die creditor for want of the money due him. The creditor of a bank rupt is frequently much injured for want of his money, but it does not necessarily follow that he also fails. And in no case is hftj chargeable with the follies and extravagancies that brought about the disaster. He may have been too confiding, but there his fault ends. The injudicious prodigal, with bad advisers, may contract debts, multiply obli gations, make experiments, and become em barrassed and bankrupt. The confiding neighbor who trusted him too far may feel sensibly the want of his debt, be obliged to curtail his expenses, or otherwise econo mize for a while ; but, being the creditor, and therefore most likely the richer of the two, he is not so likely to be ruined. [Here Mr. K. read an extract of a letter from a gentle man of Liverpool, stating that "there is no distress in ?ngland except that which grows out of American connexions : and that is passing off, though much of the debt re mains unpaid."] ?ngland, we are told from all quarters, is now easy, and, with an abun dance of capital, prepared to make invest ments, and engage in new enterprizes. Tel a mere check to the lavish accommodations of the capitalist , by the embarrassment of his debtor , is analogized with the utmost compla cency to the prostrate and helpless condition of his bankrupt debtor himself! ! Those, he said, who insisted that the national distress could not have been occa sioned by the acts of our own Executive, be cause there had been some distress in those commercial nations, with whom we trade, put him in mind of that great philosopher who stumped his toe in the darkness of mid night, and railed out against the sun for not shining in the night instead of the day: alleging as the result of his most profound observation, that there was light enough in the day without him. They confounded cause and consequence, and lost all connexion between them. It never occurred to the philosopher that the sun might itself be the cause of light, and these gentlemen cannot see our own agency in producing this em barrassment abroad, though the one agency is just about as plain as the other. Mr. K. said he would try and remove the difficulty of those who felt so much embar rassment on this subject by proving ? 1. That there had Seen no redundancy of the currency in England between 1834 and 1837 ; but, on the contrary , the value of money during this period had greatly increased , by the increase of national wealth , whilst currency remained about stationary. 2. That there had been in England no national overtrading, and that her exchanges had been depreciated by receiving our credit in exchange for her cash and commodities. 3. That our extraordinary, but speculative, demand for the products of English labor had created some activity, especially to the manufacturing interests. ? Our increased de mand for the products of their labor, coun teracting our unnatural credit demand for their money also ; and, thereby, only main taining prices which otherwise ( so far from a speculative rise ) would have been depreciated by an appreciation of money. These propositions, Mr. K. said, would rather astonish those who bad taken it for granted, without inquiry, that by some magi cal fatality the whole worl<^ had been guilty of follv similar to our own, and visited with similar punishment. But if they wotyld/ take leave of mere assumptions, stumr speeches, party presses, and vagrant coi tures, and be content with the plain evidf>fce of their senses, he thought he wo?*14/f*"aiD~ . .?as#Ction of tain every proposition to in* all who would listen f % ^ On the first proposition, let us see wheth er "a reference to the amount of banking capita], Sec. in Great Britain during the years 1834, 1835, and 1836, will show an augmenta tion of paper currency there as much dispro portioned to the wants of trade as in the United States." Mr. K. then read the following table, (prepared from official statements :) Circulation of the Bank of England, joint stock , and private banks. ? Bank of Eng. Joint stock. Private. Total, Jan. 1833, 18,381,000 1,315,000 8,836,000 28.409,000 1834, 18,377,000 1,258,000 8,733,000 28^68,000 1835, 18,100,000 2,188,000 8,231,000 28^)19,000 1836, 17,427,000 3,095,000 8,357,000 28^75,000 1837, 17,868,000 3,755,000 7,258,000 28^81,000 The foregoing table is made from the February monthly returns of the Bank of England, and the December to March quar terly returns of the joint stock and private banks, as being the most likely way to a|H proximate to the aggregate for the month of January. The original official returns we*e before him, Mr. Xing said, and were at the service of any gentleman ; and the monthly and tri-monthly variation in the entire circu lation was so trifling that it was scarcely worth naming. It would be seen, from the above table, that the entire "augmentation of paper currency" in England during the years 1834, 1835, and 1836, the period mentioned by the President, was only <?323,000, or about one third of one per cent, on the cur rency, estimating the whole currency of England at <?200,000,000 ; and the entire "augmentation" during 1833 to 1836 inclu sive, (commencing one year earlier,) was only <?413,000, or not quite one-half of one per cent, on the paper circulation. Now let us see whether tins'* incase is "similar to our own," during the same period. Mr. King then presented a statement which he believed to be as accurate as it could be made by a collection and continuation of the returns of local banks up to 1st January, 1837. It was more likely to be an under than an over estimate, from the great diffi culty of finding new banks, and getting statements of their issues. The following is the statement : On the 1st of January in the following years the state of the banks was this : Capital Number of banks. Loans Bills in circu lation Depo sitee liabilities on bills & depositee. Millions of Dollars. 1830 320 145 200 61 55 117 1834 506 200 324 95 76 171 1835 558 231 365 104 83 187 1836 567 252 458 140 115 255 1837 677 324 591 186 155 341 By the above table it will be seen that, when we add the estimated amount of specie in 1834 and 1836, respectively, we find an augmentation of the entire currenoy of near ly 94 per cent., and an augmentation of paper circulation of nearly 96 per cent.? Our own entire currency, then, 'during the years 1834, 1835, and 1836," has increased nearly 94 per cent., and our paper circulation, during the same period, nearly 96 per cent. ; whilst the entire currency of England has increased about one third of one per cent., and her paper circulation, during that period, having fluctuated a mere trifle at any time, and sometimes even contracted, is found at the end of the period mentioned, to have in creased only about 1 J per cent. He had not given himself the trouble to be very minute in the calculations above, and had used round numbers ; but no use of authentic materials could vary the result more than a mere frac tion, and strict accuracy would most likely make the comparison more unfavorable to the statement of an equal expansion in the two countries during the period referred to. Instead of equality, then, we had, for England, an increase in the entire estimated currency of the nation of about one third of I one per cent. ; In the United States, an increase of about 94 per cent. ; In England, an increase of paper currency of about l? per cent. ; Id the United States, an increase of about 96 per cent. So much (said Mr. King) for an equal ex pansion of the currency in both countries. As to the "other credits," they were not tan gible, but every man of any observation must know that On this item we should suffer in the comparison more than in the other.? Credits were certainly multiplied in England, in some districts, by the increase of the num ber of joint stock banks, by which new con nexions were formed, and the number of] ehecks, drafts, &c. increased. But the in crease of joint stock banks (deducting the private banks melted into them) bears no comparison to the increase of banks in this country, as we find frojh official statements. The conseqnent increase of credits, though they cannot be ascertained with precision in either country, may .be compared by, the re .SlilL Th/L irtrrenee of credit A has been based on the same national cash capi tal , as appears by the unchanged quantity of the currency , as exhibited by the tables. And that it has not been redundant is unansicera bly proven by its having produced no general speculative rise of prices. To speak of a re dundancy of currency or credit , when no specu lative rise in cotnmodities has taken place , is perfect nonsense. Where facts have been Stated and not proved, I have taken issue, and disproved them by facts fully established. Where facts are conjectured, pwill present ly introduce evidence to piyve the conjec tures groundless, by proyAg the absence t>f consequences invariably/connected with them . The only way in wrfa redundancy of cur rency or credit depreciates foreign exchange is by producingy?peculative rise in prices, and a consequei^overtrading. England has not overtrad?*f on the contrary, she has ex ported morgan she imported, and left up enormou/y in her debt. But whilst she has a large/oalance against us, exchange was again / her, and making a continual cjrain upp/ger bullion ! This strange financial A commercial anomaly, so embarrassing to __e English, I will hereafter explain, after having completed the proof on the first pro position. He then read the evidence of Mr. Gurney, a man of so much intelligence and authority on these subjects as to be called before the joint stock bank committee lately appointed bv Parliament. This witness shows remark able intelligence on the subjeet of finance, but is here strangely embarrassed for want of facts, of which he seems entirely igno rant. [Here Mr. K. read the evidence of Mr. Garney as follows :] Evidence of Mr. Gurney before the Committee of Joint Stock Banks. Q. 9529. Has there been any change of late in the state of the London money mar ke( There has been a gradual increase in the t^(^594W*ro what do you attribute that altered state of the money market in Lon d?One cause has been the exportation of bul lion to foreign countries ; but I apprehend the MAIN CAUSE IS, the circuJanng medmm existing in Europe and the mercantile parts of America (!) is not increased m proportion to the transactions, and that the same quan tity of circulating medfomr** perhaps even a reduced quantity has to perform a much larger amount of transactions. , Q 2595. Would not the effect ot it, owing to that to which you have alluded, be rather indicated in a fall in the money pn of commodities 1 r That is the tendency of it >* but the^^ conflicting causes that have marvellously maintained (not increased) the value of com modities generally. Mr. Gurneyis a bill broker, who Procl'r" the discount or rediscount of country bil in the London market. He was, therefore, well acquainted with the facts, and the sub ject on which he speaks, so far as England is concerned ; and he tells us "the value of money had gradually increased. And in another part of his evidence he tells i us that the increase is about 20 per cent. He knew this as a fact, and in England he was enabled, in some measure, to account for it, 0' knew that currency had not increased ; wt>?l8^ from the progressive increase of national wealth, commodities and transactions tad.? He could, therefore, account for the depre ciation of exchange, and export of gold to America, on no other supposition than that the currency of the -commercial parts of America" was even more contracted and dis proportioned to commodities than in ng an . But why was the appreciation of money dicated by a fall in the money prices of com modities?" Though this was the natur "tendency," conflicting causes marvellously maintained prices." What were ec?n, flicting causes referred to by Mr. GurneJ ? Evidently the "increased activity in the man ufacturing districts" by the increased demand for the products of English labor for Ameri can consumption. The d^eciahcmofcom-^ modities by the appreciation ofmoncywas counteracted gh by an increased demaru) for them. Ihoug ideas 0f Mr. Gurney seem clear, he seems, for want of facts, to be involved in embarrassment and apparent con,?^""nn That the value of money was raised in Eng land by an insufficiency in quantity, was in consistent with the exportation of gold, un less in America, also, the currency was con tracted. And yet a contraction of the currency in America was inconsistent with our demand for English manufactures. Had the witness, however, known that, so far 'from a contraction, our currency had ?*?n 100 per cent., and that exchang our favor whilst there was a large balance against us ; that we were draining them of their gold in defiance of this heavy debt and redundant currency; his embarrassment would have increased, until he ascertaine that we were performing all the* e comme - cial miracles under a new sys?emof finance by which we exchanged our credit for their capital, and, after going in debt for ahu^e commercial balance, borrowed, a amount and thereby turned the exchanges against them by borrowing their own money. Mr K. then further sustained his propo entered for home consumption, and the official and deelared valuation both embracing the period q eept the official valuation for 1837, which he taLn0ttT1offi^0^Mr,K.iSaidi, actually "o gradual increase in the I'J ""S' second proposition (Mr. K. said) Thiscvidence was the perfect agreement,* on to? of Mr Holsey PalmeraodMr Knowles fa. their coDt.OTersy concermDg ^be action of the joint-stock banks and the c^ duct of the Bank of England Mr. Palmer in apologizing for *0 contraction of the bank, and alluding to the causes &c^s " it is necessary to state these, as they seem in JXTeeTIL arisen from overtrading or no aegrtt, n J nance in commercial any undue speoulatwe advance prices." Mr. Knowles, howeversnots.ais fied with this admission, but w.shmg the fact established beyond doubt, he tHng, and refute q&Hr . Know..*, cumncT'hwl been increased by the increase currency fw* u 0r prices, of national wealth, says. j f , had I lime to prepare one, ^prw beyond question that so far from rally inmanv cases there has been a JaU even 3'S ; a factquHe.ncomPatf able with an over issue and p the currency. While, prices has ta^en place, it u \ dis V ^ ble to causes prospectively ajfectin0 as to supply Doubtless crease of manufacturing stocky U ? J> likely also, some loca ov ]ar(>c pro stock banks was occastoned by .lie lar? , fits they derived from the discount of Ameri can securities and credit* to supply our credit demand for money; for under our preposter ous system adopted in 1834, of importing borrowed money to multiply credits upon, we have been willing to take all their cash as well as all their commodities, and give more than any body else for them, if they would only let us have them on cwd^? These partial fluctuations were uncertain and unimportant, and, so far as they did exist, If M all, are ea sily accounted for, and principally* if not en tirely, to be attributed fip t connexion with us. In no view of the subject could they be used as evidence of a national redundancy of currency or credit, or of a national overtrad ing, neither of which* at we .- have seen, had taken plaee. / Mr. K. said that the latter part of the se cond proposition* and the wholetffthe third, seemed to be established by infereoce' from the positions already estaMijjiedif andthe prooft' already adduced. The only fuller proof that could be deemed necessary on these points, was to establish th?J fact that at the very time we were importing large sums of specie under under the encouragement of the wise policy of the Executive, as it was called, we were enormously indebted, not on ly on a commercial balance, but also for mo ney borrowed in the very face of this com mercial balance against us. Mr. K. said, at here again became his un pleasant duty to prove that the President was mistaken in his estimate of the amount of our foreign debt. It was important to notice this mistake with another view. We would not act in reference to our true situation as debt ors, if we believed we owed nothing. The President gives the estimate of our foreign debt in March last at thirty millions of dol lars. The President could have had no un worthy object in this under-estimate; but still it is a mistake, and one thsft should be noticed and corrected. If the estimate of the Presi dent were correct, the debt had evidently been paid, and overpaid. He had seen an estimate more than two months ago, which seemed reasonable, and probable in all its details, which estimated the liquidation of pur foreign debt since the suspension of specie payments at $32,000,000. We had been remitting spe cie, and exchange, and shipping cotton ever since; and he had not the slighest idea that we had paid and liquidated in different ways, since March last, less than forty-five, and perhaps fifty millions of dollars: and yet we find the exchanges heavily against us. He hoped, then, our banks would not begin to expand, and our people to overtrade, on the presumption that Europe was indebted to t a. Mr. K. said no one could pretend to accu racy as to the amount of our foreign debt in March last, but he thought he could satisfy the Senate that if every species of obligation were taken into account, it was much nearer one hundred and thirty than thirty millions of : dollars. Mr. K. then proceeded to famish the Sen ate with such evidence as he had to offer on this subject. In the first place, he took the commercial balance alone for the year 1836, as reported by the Secretary of the Treasu ry, at upwards of sixty millions. It seemed, by the report furnished at this session by the Secretary, that he estimated the commercial balance which remained as a foreign debt, at over thirty millions; and perhaps this state ment misled the President, who took the Sec retary's commercial balance of one year for the entire balance at the period referred to. He thought, however, that the Secretary was mistaken even as to this commercial balancfc for 1836. He seemed to have deducted thir ty millions from the sixty (as Mr. K. suppos ed,) for our share of the profits of trade. Mr. L. though not a cent should be deduct ed. We had it from English accounts, and had too much reason to believe the fact, that the principal articles of American exports de clined from 30 to 40 per cent, between July, 1836, and April, 1837. He believed, then, we had lost on our exports the full amount of profit, and perhaps more, and that the gross amount of balance might safely be estimated as a foreign debt against us for the year 1836 alone. Mr. K. then proceeded to show th* amount of money we had borrowed in Enrope in the space of one year ending in the fall of 1836. As Europe owed us nothing on an exchange of commodities, of course the amount ef spe cie (beyond that included in the statement of imports) which we obtained from them, must have been obtained on credit in some form or other. ? ? A statement made by Mr. Fayott, of Paris, a man of great re search and many opportunities, he believed as much to be relied on as any other. This statement was made in the latter part of (if he mistook not) of 1836, and purported to be an estimate of the specie shipped from Eu rope to America during the year preceeding the statement. This statement Mr. K. read, as follows: ^ . Statement from F rederick fayott s essay, published in Paris in 1836, of the amount of specie shipped from Europe to America in one year previous to the date of the es say. England, from documentary evi dence, say <?6,041,666 Holland, two loans, forming to gether 2, 500, 000. one-half shipped in specie, i,A>u,uuu In France, the indemnity 18,000 000 fr. and Hottinguer loan . 14,000,000 together <?8,624,999 If the above statement is correct, (and it was certainly more likely to be under than over the true amount.) we had imported near forty millions of dollars in one year, besides the' indemnity, which, if the laws of trade had been allowed a free operation, would have been more profitably drawn for than im ported. Adding the above sum <o the com mercial balance of 60,000,000, ?pd we bad evidence of about lOfcQOO.OOO ess. on y the sDecie included in imports. In addition to this it was well known, he ssid, that we had been issuing credits tq a gre?ter er a less ei tent ever since the commencement of 1834, and the entire foreign dcbt might safely be nut down at much more than 100,000,000, in March last. The debt being established, it follows that the state of our foreign ex changes have been false and delusive, and having been effected by the use of credit, bare been PB indication ?f ?h? ??? bi\,auce of trade on a fc'w enchase ?f wnwpdities; credit having the same efTeetpnthe ewhang m bi?Mh of a* ?uhi?i bj ; am _u ?old not be nocessary to P?J debt before exchange* would be equah?^;_a very large portion of it having assumed the form offnYestments, on which w?tf?1lMo|ily have to pay the interest; ami, tnreof the commerce between thotwocoun tries will bw it ??nr LI"L*rT 2. debt agaiqst us, without *|ectu?f tN ?*? ChJ^K. said that h? hoped be had pfosen to the satisfaction of^STflenntl, that tho causes of the present jKWfCSS mon to Other cotnnuwwd countries, jrhicn, 4q feet, H sufferiwl 0*?ly f9 i^ed*'norW^^r?cnl?,'ITe ri^,np"C" similar to our own. Thej causes, then, must be located in our own ?HT. said he would endeavour to c*pW?wh' how, and by whatagency they onginated here. . He then cutback to the WOWl of Ae deooskes in 1833? a measure that pfi W frequently spoken of before* a e having been productive of much terbalanc'rag good. He had briefly J* its agency in bringing the comj^f J"** then present condition at the It . and every prediction then made ^bfcotP? true, and each cause W manner there stated, so fares thoy M^been since developed. He wo?|d ?nhr npw oy of it what all admitted? that it proceed 1 1 pan ic which home consumption in tbe lMter part pi and part of 1834, white the P???WF ?V portTwas not affected By foreign market. The ????**? a rise in our fefeign or fourteen millions of specl. po?M ffl g ua. This effect was not an&iMted It the President, as we could see by of his views when the ^^Leie than He had no more idea ofbnngi^^WMW he had of brwgmg LondontoA^^y tne removal, of the depositee. itfasone the measure immediate!* boasted of P of the happy results cf that wise meagre, from '^rhieh many and "J"*?*** Df* were to flow in wXfc the currency was already W" w dant; and that this Ppecie, thus our finances ruined. PapaMW**/?" . expelled. &** specie will flU the afewofcurren^T EawWoj^W^ and 'cannot, under such ^ g '1..7,n:r expected wmSHmw* * come the basis of farther tapes by ?m?? s, the whole coptijiuhig to a speculate me in ^ psxm ssafe This, of course, produced specU^PPn home and heavy nmmkf% wa? iBstribnted in a great ntunborof g^^rjsaSasa ^ xtr ofth.ro s sr kks bloated and diseased eooditws ,0 manifest itself in the snnuper ? Igfr 5%^9?3P awviniw^H ? -? ? *'"? ft best financiers of Europe. The natural juLtfiverise of prices bste,froa?ave4wfc ir currency and credit; was** exd2E^J!?d ^SJraJSnt^tSS or foreign debt. 1 si we praventeoinis our bah Ace W ?T> vs W4 ivivi^h VVsrf. . ? vr ^ . by tending them boo^tbeok s hares, State stocks, credits of Tinour descriptions, to a greater umuit than we owed then, By tbeae tdfeans we raised oo? ? f ? ? means ui mo nouno they speculations at home bad produced ah} oat an nnlim ited demand for money, and we WPqp take all theis cash, as well as all their camwodlUea, and overbid their own capitalixtt to get tim, provided we oooU make the operation <m credit. Thus we continued invertin*4he laws of trade, and utteHy cQnfoundix^ the bank directors and pgpi talis t* pf England, untjj the summer of 18JJ6, We find that the bank direc, tors then made the discovery that the Unj^d Stales had beer draining them of their gold *^oo credit,*' and they took steps to prevent jt, by increasing the rate of interest in Juoe to 41, and in August to five pey cent. ? Let us now return to the United States. Ifl Jpnf,. 1836, the ruin threatened by ao la/ge an aocumula, tiop of the public money, and the uses that were made of it, and the unsound state of the currency generally, was so manifest, that all parties united it) the opinion that something must he done with it, After full dist uuion and frreof deliberation, Cpngres* with uncommon unanimity, adopted the law to dtk, tribute the deposites among the States. Though nq measure could be free from objection, this was cer, tainly the wisest that could haye. been adopted in reference to U?P end proposed. It'depleted t)ie trea sury, and checked over issues, by ? public law, nitf* full notice, easy terms, and ample piny fpr its ejecu tion. Tbe President, was, unfortunately, opposed tq it, and seemed determined, not only to use every means tp preventits efficienpv. bqt to prevent operation on the Western gnd South westehi deposite banks, fihich, in fret, most needed its operation, With this view, he adopted ihe famous specie lirati lar? a sort of Order in Council ? though thf identi- ' cal meoiUfp bad been a few days beibrp prwiosH a legislative rpe?sure, and, with almpst perfect nimity, rejected by the Senate. The pnncipal, perhaps the only object of this sure, was to savp from explosion some pf the t< ing deposite hanks in the West and Southwest, \ they should bewailed pn to comply with ihe deposito law, %gd surrender the public money. His ubiect could not have be<'n to prevent over-issuf <, sucn an object being inconsistent with his opposition to the deposits bin, which was ccrtainly, pf all others, ih^ best conceived for {liat purpose Whateyef ffii|lrt