The Union times. [volume] (Union, S.C.) 1894-1918, July 07, 1905, Image 1
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JCIty of Union and Suburbs Has- 1~T TT 1%T T 1"\ 1^7 fTl T "M M 1 ^ City of Union and Suburbs Has
<W Five Large Cotton Mills, One Knitting I IJ I I I H I I I / IJ Five Graded Schools, Water Works,
1 *nd Spinning Mill with Dye Plant, Oil I I I H~r I I I H H^ ^ I I I I Sewerage System, Electric Lights, Three
jLMill, Furniture Manufacturing and I HI I I J I" I I Hj I Hv.|N|f I I I H^ I I ' J k 1 Banks with aggregate capital of $250,000,
Lumber Yards, Female Seminary. _|_. H I JBL^I J X v JL ' X w -I? _HL XV JL JKLmgJk I Electric Railway. Population 7,000.
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t>lerk of Court ""M*4loV!'"' .1
f VOL. LV. NO. 27. ONION, SOOTH CAROLINA, FRIDAY, JULY 7. 1905. #1.00 A YEAR:
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Win. A. Nicholson
Union, South
PAY IIMTEF
? Time Certificate
THE JAPANESE ARMY f
ir %irv m. i /% % /\/
rtiiu nrtv Y . a
John A. B. Scherer, Ph. c
D. L. L. D. y
t<
AUTHOR OF "FOUR PRINCES," ?
"JAPAN TODAY," ETC. ji
e
It was not until the year 1872 ^
that reawakened Japan under- J*
topk the organization of a modr1 h
prp army and navy, Being by Jj
this time thoroughly convinced ai
that Western nations could teach n
them somewhat in the matter of
h military effectiveness, the new e
Sat-Cho government, surround- c<
ing the Emperor and holding the : {J
rems of rule, concluded from the , Rj
investigations of their worldtouring
embassy that France 1
could furnish the best drillmas- ?T
ters. French military advisers 11
were therefore employed for tl ,e Sl
army, but these were afterwards ai
supplanted by Germans. An ef- ai
fective modern army resulted in w
a surprisingly short time, simply aJ
because the soldiers of old Japan "
were surpassingly brave and loy$1
through ipimemoral dfill,with P'
p, native alertness and thorough,- ?*
pess that gave fheni immediate J
grasp of pew forms, and a self, j*
control that addg the summit \
touch to soldiery. Conscription!
laws of the most radical eharac
ter annually supply fresh materi- K
al from the flower of the youth |JT
oi tne land at tne rate ot lorty "
thousand or more. In the rigid ?
weeding-out process?for the
most stringent mental and phys- v
ical tests are in practice?those K
who are rejected as fighting men s<
are sent with the army as trans- n
pprters. The father of the army 2
is the Marquis YamagatP, wh'p A
has now (at the age of 66) at" ?.
tained to the rank of field mar* 11
ahal. In fifteen years his army g
has grown ^om an enlistment of s<
228,848 men to a strength of 508,- J
268, all told, on a peace footing. J
There are six chief military .
stations, evenly distributed 2
throughout the empire. J]
Baron Yamamoto, the present ^
- minister of the navy, is to this "
branch of the service what Ya- J
magata has been to the army. In 9
1902, against the most vigorous J
opposition, he induced parlia- J!
monf fn thp s?rtn at tl
V vv V?#?V?V'A V* w VVflDVi uv J
tion of six first-class battleships Jf
within the next ten years, so Y
that Japan has not yet approach- 11
ed the limit of her naval expan- Y
sion. It was Great Britain that 5
supervised the beginnings, send- J
ing out a small school of instruc- b
Itors so long ago as 1867, under 0
the Shogunate, and a larger one
in 1873, after the Restoration, h
Dockyard work, however, was r
committed to the direction of the v
French. The principal dockyards e
I are at Yokosuka, in the gulf of e
Tokyo, but there are others at i
Kuoe, in the Inland Sea; Sasebo, ?
near Nagasaki; Maizum, on f
the west coast; and Mororan, in e
tjie Island of Yazo. There are t
four shipbuilding poncerns where t
steelframe steamers cap be con- I
structed; and some idea of the t
rapidity with which Japan is r
I mastering this difficult industry c
can be gained from the fact that i
out of tne nine and a half mil- <
lion tonnage of steam vessels ?
passing annually through her
ports, fully three million are of i
native construction. At the be- i
| ginning of the war with Russia t
1 the naval fleet included six first- j
P class battleships, eight armored <
cruisers, and fourteen protected 1
. cruisers. At the close of the first s
| year's fighting three of these ves- 1
sels haa been lost, while the <
Russian Eastern fleet, of equal I
fighting strength in the begin- ]
ning, had been practically swept <
tl
& Son, Bankers, *
si
fii
i Carolina, le
bi
pl
tEST ON S
be
bi
sh
s of Deposit. j"
I ca
anMMHMaaM,! fic
_ Ja
rom the seas. wi
The principal naval academy is ne
t Etajima, an island of the g0
eautiful Inland Sea. Appli- re
ants must be at least sixteen Mi
ears of age, and are subjected iie
y rigid examination. The train- jn
ig is strict in the extreme, and ha
u-jitsu is the favorite physical toj
xercise. The average age of na
le navv is the lowest, in tVif>
rorld, as is also the average 0f
ejght; No one over 20 years of th<
ge is accepted for enlistment, ba
nd the average statute is only trc
ve feet and four inches. f0]
It is a theory that "in Japan tei
very subject nas a chance for a ce]
emission in the imperial an
avy," but the theory is hardly ac<
orne out by the facts. And m(
lis applies also to the army, be
he Sat-Chc, Wans have a virtual xh
tonopoly he1I, as well as in civ- j,a
affairs, lie province of Sat- g0
jma has not only furnished such tb<
rmy leaders as Nogi, Kuroki eV)
ad Oyama, but practically the eV)
hole of the navy, from Togo th<
nd Yamamoto downward. In ea]
le Japanese mind the Satsuma wa
ten are credited chiefly with m
lufa^e, Choshu men with tio
igacity?therefore the former fu]
fe spldiers and sailors, men of tia
ash and daring, while the latter Eti
re diplomatists and chiefs of eV(
imlnlstration. But the fact is, jn(
iese two Southern clans simply civ
. 9 _1 - 1 ? V
ftinea control 01 tne govern- p0
lent in 1868, and have never re- f01
nquished it since?clan-govern- 0C(
lent having supplanted the trc
hogunate. 0f
The hero of Port Arthur, Nogi an
[iten, is the Japanese ideal of a pe
tidier. His enthusiastic ad- trc
lirers even call him the "incar- trc
ation qf the imperial wargod." as
[p has given utterance to his scj
wn conception of the warrior- 0f
fe in the following striking lan- tio
uage: "When a man becomes a rjc
tidier he must be perfectly tin
dlling to lead henceforth a life
hat is somewhat different from
he life of an ordinary man. It st)
5 impossible for him thereafter mi
3 enjoy liberty and wealth in cj?
he same manper as his fellows, p0
Vhat J mean is this; that the pc
oldier who would perform bis
uties with credit on a battle
eld must, of necessity, have m,
rained himself to perform all an
hat is expected of him in the tir
ays of peace. There outfit not
0 be any neglect or any defects
1 his daily fife. The man who CI
/ould rightfully aspire to the
tonor of fighting unaer the sun- F<
lag must first have learned to
e a man through the conquest
i himself in times of peace."
That Nogi has practiced what
le preaches is proved by his me- or
norable words when the news
vas brought to him that his eldist
son?the pride and hope of tj
ivery household?had been killed ^
n the battle of|Nanshan. "Iam ^
flad he died so splendidly," the
ather said. "It was the great- rj
sst honor he could have. As for ^
he funeral rites in his memory, m
hey might as well be postponed a|
'or awhile, A little later on a
hey may be performed in con- 0>
lection with those to the memory w
>f my second son, Hoten, and y(
nyself." His second son fell re
luring the last days of the siege
iround Port Arthur. ,
This wondrous spirit of loyalty
nheritance from feudal days, is w
lot confined to the officers of the w
army, but is shared by the hum- n<
[>lest of the people. The Rus- b;
nan war has afforded number- i<j
ess examples. There was the tc
aged mother, for example, who si
learned that her soldier-son was ti
ietained at home on her account, ai
Slaying herself in patriotic sac- 01
rifice, she withdrew the bloody a
dagger in time to hand it to her tx
5n with the Spartan injunction
lat he should plunge it into the
earts of the enemy. And a
;ory comes of a humble jinrik1a
man, who, because he could
nd no caretaker for his motherss
children, slew them and
aried them in the family teme
grounds, that he might go off
i the war. The blanket wnerehe
wrapped their little dead
>dies as ne took them to their
irial was afterward cut into
ireds by the equally patriotic
iest and distributed as priceas
relics to the pilgrims who
me to do honor at the sacriial
grave. What wonder that
pan wins victories?
And loyalty does more than
in battles. It is loyalty in conction
with an enlightened clanvernment
that accounts for the
markable courtesy of the army,
uch as we should like to beve
it, doubtless we should err
accounting for the good bevior
of the Japanese army al?ether
on the grounds of good
ture, or deep-set convictions
mercy. The inherent cruelty
the Japanese soldier is far too
oroughly established, and the
rbarous conduct of these same
>ops on the occasion of the
rmer fall of Port Arthur, only
1 years ago, is of much too reit
occurrence, to allow of such
inner transfiguration of charter
as would explain on purely
>ral principles their humane
havior toward the Russians,
e true explanation, however,is
rdly less wonderful. The clanvernment
which radiates from
j imperial palace in Tokyo into
ery regiment of the army and
ery ship of the navy is one of
e most astute bodies of men on
rth. They are profoundly
itchful of international sentijpt
in their desire for internanal
regard, and they are also
tly familiar wiih the reveren1
loyalty of the troops to their
nperor, which they nave used
ery means to enhance. Having
;urred the opprobrium of the
dlized world on account of the
rt Arthur massacre, they have
restalled the repetition of such
uurrences. How? By an ex;mely
simple expedient in view
Japanese loyalty. Messages
^ sent in the name of the Emror
commanding merciful
jatment, and the regard of the
>ops for their sun-god is such
to serve in the place of a conence,
even amid the carnage
battle, or in spite of temptans
to pillage. It will be a seals
time of transition when
eir worship of the Emperor is
stroyed.
In accounting for the martial
ength of the new Japan we
ast not overlook the commerd
astuteness that has made
ssible the "sinews of war,"
>or as the Island Empire is, her
lanciers have made such use of
eir resources as to produce al3st
incredible development in
i amazingly short space of
ne.?The Southern Home.
nglaniT responsible
>r Russo-Japanese War
?Germany's Designs in
the Par East.
More than once has it been
>enlp stated in French reviews
at Englpnd is really responsie
for the Russo-japanese war.
French political writer, An e
Bheradame, in an article in
le Correspondent, declares:
Russia believes, and believes
ghtly, that England and the advents
of Lord Curzon have
ade it their busipesg ft) bphg
>out the Russo-Japanese war.
t the same time, Russia quite
rprlnoks thfi nnlipv nf fiprmnrtv. !
hich for the last twenty-five j
jars has been systematically dieted
to the definite object of
etting Russia entangled in the
fairs of the far East.
The game of Germany, played
ith so much skill and discretion
hich M. Cheradame refers to is
one other than that inaugurated
y Bismarck. On many occas ns
the Iron Chancellor is said
) have shown a passionate dere
to oust Russia from all parcipation
in European affairs
na give her the fullest liberty
f action in Asia. To his friends
t St. Petersburg he is reported
) have saicR "Russia fyas poth
in? to do with the West: her |
mission is in Asia, for there she
represents civilization."
"In 1880, during the most acute
period of the negotiations between
Russia and China respecting
Kulja and Ili territory, the
action of the German minister,
von Brandt, the writer explains,
affords the most conclusive proof
that at that time the chancellor
of Willidm I. maneuvering
to entangle Russia in the far
East. Mr. von Brandt, who has
taken so active a part in the af|
fairs of eastern Asia and has
done so much to introduce Germany
into Chinese waters, was a
disciple and an admirer of Bismarck.
<
In proof of his assertions, M. i
Cheradame proceeds to quote (
from the political correspondence j
of the minister of one of the <
great Western powers at Peking, i
then quite unknown to the public.
When the Russo-Chinese
conflict was at its height, and
war was threatening, the diplomatist,
whose name is withheld,
wrote in effect to his government
in the summer of 1880:
Not only did Mr. von Brandt
advise all the Christian powers
tA o (Vi*OA tfimiilfnriAAiioltf nwnnU a
w w oiiuuitaucvuisij tv uuoii ^
China and each sieze what was* *
most expedient, but he endeav- 1
ored to push matters to the worst <
by exalting the advantages of a ]
war between Russia and China. ?
My recent conversations with my *
colleague, My, von Brandt, con- '
firm me-ii\tHs idea that encour- [
agements to?" carry out such a
strange policy must have been
given by the cabinet of Berlin to
that of Sti Petersburg. As soon
as the war -should have broken
out, Mr. von. Brandt made no
mystery of the : intention of his
government to lay hands on any
well-choseji position whence the
navy ofcould usefully
second ti.e' operations of her
commerce or the action of her
diplomacy at Peking.
Again, early in 1881, the
Western diplomatist pointed out
that while Mr. von Brandt was
driving Russia to war, Germany
was supplying arms to the Celestial
Empire. He wrote:
I learn that 100,000 Mauser i
?\ i i i j L_. n
rmes nave ueen soiu Dy merman (
merchants, aTid that over 20,000 ?
have already been delivered. It \
might be of use to send these \
particulars to St. Petersburg, if .
only to enlighten the government ;
of the Czar as to the views which i
inspire German policy in the (
presence of the difficulties pend- j
ing between Russia and Cnina.
The next instance of German s
policy in China cited by M. Che- \
radame is the Kiao-Cnau affair. .
Here he shows that in 1891 Ger- ;
many was entertaining secret ,
plans with regard to it.
Lastly, M. Cheradame deals
with the Russo-Japanese war. 1
He thinks that Germany desired \
war, but hopes that Russia will \
win, for a victorious Russia on ,
the Pacific is expected to be as
profitable to Germany as the j
power of the Czar in Europe is ,
rlioo/lvonfnryA/Mio Hn f VIA AfUnt* I
vilOUVi Y CHllOgvVllOt VII Ifll^ V/VI1CI
hand, if Russia does not get \
Korea, and if she must abandon ;
southern Manchuria to the Mikado,
Germany will become the first
enemy of Japan. Russia, embroiled
in the affairs of the far 1
East, will leave the Balkan peninsula,
Constantinople, and
Turkey in Asia almost free to
German influence. Even if Russia
triumphs, it is certain that
for many years she cannot be an
"offensive" military danger to
Germany, and thus the military
power of Germany in ^he old
world wjl| foe almost doubled
without h farthing a extra extra
expense for armaments.
Germany seems to know how to
deceive Russia, and Russia, concludes
M. Cheradame, has always
defended herself badly
against her patient and tenacious
German adversary.
SUOGESTEDRUSSOJAPANESE
ALLIANCE.
It appears that there has been
some support in Japan to the
suggestion, which was originally
credited to the Emperor of Germany,
that, after the war, a
, friendly understanding amounting
to an alliance should be
i brought about between Russia
, and Japan. The Anglo-Japanese
^alliance ha$ not, \n the opinion
%
F. M. FARR, President.
T
Merchants and Pla
Successfully Doing Bus
Ib the OLDEST Rank i
haa a capital and aurp
ia the only NATIONA
haa paid dividends at
I I pays FOUR per cent
D la the only Rank In ITi
haa Rurfflnr-Proof vat
pays more taxes than .
WE EARNESTLY SOL
of a number of prominent Japanese
periodicals, come up to the
expectation of the Mikado's
government. Dissatisfaction
with it has been concealed by the
thin veneer of noliteness whioh
the Japanese express toward
England so long as the alliance
actually exists. Although the
Japanese journals fn general do
lot refer to this subject, many
)f the leading men are, it is
ilaimed, looking forward to the
,ime when the island empire will
eadjust all her diplomatic relations.
''The whole ground of these reations
is covered in an article,
jntitled /'The Conclusion of
?eace Between Russia and Jalan,"
which appears in the
Taiyo (Tokio). Tne writer, Mr.
T. Hayakawa, a member of the
lapanese House of Representa:ives,
begins by stating that
Russia is not by any means so
'ormidable a power as the world
las heretofore believed. If vou
;urn over the pages of the hisjory
of Russian expansion, he;
jays, "you will at once perceive
hat the Muscovite has never
ilayed a fair game." Russian
iggression, he .goes on . to say,
las been directed, not against
:ivilized nations with modern
nilitary equipment, but against
backward races, such as those
n Siberia, or against such miseriblv
equipped nations as Turkey
ind other minor peoples in the
Balkins. Russia's real strength
md never been fully tested until
t came into collision with that
)f Japan. The secret of Russian
success, this writer believes, lies
n the fact that she has heretofore
wielded her weapons only
igainst weaker enemies, as well
is in the fact that she enjoys a
most favorable geographic situation,
which prevents successful
invasion. Her geographical situation
also has stimulated her desire
for expansion. In order to
ievelop her commerce and to
idvance her civilization, Russia
found it absolutely necessary to
establish outlets on southern
waters.
Intoxicated by her successes,
which had been easily achieved
ill dealinc wit.h h#?r w#??lror ari_
tagonists, Russia underestimated
Japan's power and resources.
Always modest, and generally
too meek; Japan had always acquiesced
in Russia's propositions.
Thus, the northern bear robbed
the island empire of Saghalien,
and, in conjunction with Germany
and France, took from her
the Liao-Tung Peninsula at the
close of the Chino-Japanese war.
The negotiations leading up to
the r> resent strucrirle further im
pressed Russia with the patience
of the island nation. Russia's
arrogant and challenging attitude
was due really to complete ignorance
of the resources of her
little enemy.
IS A ftU?SO JAPANESE ALLIANCE
POSSIBLE?
A treaty of alliance between
two nations on a close footing is
impossible so long as one has no
regard for the rights of the
other. Up to the present moment,
it has been utterly impossible for
Russia and Japan to come to an
understanding of such a nature.
But, now that the Muscovite
government has become convinced
of the prowess of the
Japanese nation, it is quite possible
that St. Petersburg would
really desire to form an entente
cordiale with the Tokio government.
The gist of the proposition
advanced by Mr. Hayakaws
is found in his closing paragraph'
It is neither possible nor wise
to entirely drive the Russians
out of Manchuria. An attempt
to expel them from northem
China would mean the treijaen
J. D. ARTHUR. Cashier.
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dously greater task of wiping
them out entirely from Siberia,
a task which no sane man would
ever dream of accomplishing.
So long as Russia holds Siberia,
it is but natural that she will attempt
to force her wav to iJ>?
Eastern seas. Th? danger of the
Russian advance in the far Kast
lies, not in the fact of the advance,
but in its military nature.
If this advance should be of a
peaceful nature, aimed at the
promotion of her commercial
interests, without jeopardizing
the sovereignty of China and
Korea, there is no reason why
Japan should not respect Russian
rights in Manchuria. The present
war is waged because Japan
was forced to deliver Manchuria
and Korea from the oppression
of Russia. When Japan's protectorate
over Korea has been
universally recognized, and when
Manchuria has been returned to
the Chinese Government, Japan's
aims have been well-nigh accomplished.
If she insists on
curDing Russian influence entirely
in the far East, time, we
believe, will tell that Japan has
blundered. But if, generously
casting aside hostile feelings
after tne peace treaty, the now
belligerent nations enter into an
alliance, together they might
prove the strongest force in pre?
serving the peace of the far
East. Russia is now fully aware
that as an opponent Japan is
very formidable, but as an ally
she could be made a strong and
reliable friend. If Russia will
renounce her ambition for military
aggrandizement, and will
extend her hand in friendly relationship
to Japan, with the
view of promoting her own commercial
interests in eastern Asia,
we Japanese will gladly welcome
her as our friend and ally.
ODDESSA LEADING CITY
OP SOUTHERN RUSSIA.
The city of Odessa, the scene
nT fllA IVlAof cfovflinn*
ux U1I& uiuov DI.U1 UCVC1UJJ"
ments in the growth of revolution
in the Czar's empire, is the
most important city and seaport
in Southern Russia and the fourth
city of the empire in population.
It is situated in the government
of Kherson, on an elevation
sloping toward an inlet of the
Black Sea. It lies about 32 miles
northeast of the mouth of the
Dniester and 938 miles by rail
southwest of Moscow.
The general appearance and
atmosphere of Odessa are rather
European than Russian. The
city was built during the ninetnonfV*
nainhiKir an A la
v\yv^VM VVI4VVI4 J ) U1IU JO) UlClClV/l^
the youngest among the large
cities of Russia. It is regularly
laid out around the bay, and has
a number of fine streets and
, squares, from which magnificent
, views of the sea are obtained.
i The most popular boulevard is
the Nikolayevsky boulevard,
from which a grand stairway
leads to the bay.
; The Russians of Odessa com
prise scarcely one-third of the
5 inhabitants of the city, about
J 150,000 of the residents being
, Jews and the remainder Greeks,
. Armenians, Turks and people of
various European nationalities.
[ In general the members of the
; lower classes of Odessa are per\
sons of the most desperate char;
acter.
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