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- i % t>~ 1 1 ' JCIty of Union and Suburbs Has- 1~T TT 1%T T 1"\ 1^7 fTl T "M M 1 ^ City of Union and Suburbs Has <W Five Large Cotton Mills, One Knitting I IJ I I I H I I I / IJ Five Graded Schools, Water Works, 1 *nd Spinning Mill with Dye Plant, Oil I I I H~r I I I H H^ ^ I I I I Sewerage System, Electric Lights, Three jLMill, Furniture Manufacturing and I HI I I J I" I I Hj I Hv.|N|f I I I H^ I I ' J k 1 Banks with aggregate capital of $250,000, Lumber Yards, Female Seminary. _|_. H I JBL^I J X v JL ' X w -I? _HL XV JL JKLmgJk I Electric Railway. Population 7,000. L' =- A . ,. "**" * ' & - ' . -? t>lerk of Court ""M*4loV!'"' .1 f VOL. LV. NO. 27. ONION, SOOTH CAROLINA, FRIDAY, JULY 7. 1905. #1.00 A YEAR: ^??????? ? "" " " " a ??????? * Win. A. Nicholson Union, South PAY IIMTEF ? Time Certificate THE JAPANESE ARMY f ir %irv m. i /% % /\/ rtiiu nrtv Y . a John A. B. Scherer, Ph. c D. L. L. D. y t< AUTHOR OF "FOUR PRINCES," ? "JAPAN TODAY," ETC. ji e It was not until the year 1872 ^ that reawakened Japan under- J* topk the organization of a modr1 h prp army and navy, Being by Jj this time thoroughly convinced ai that Western nations could teach n them somewhat in the matter of h military effectiveness, the new e Sat-Cho government, surround- c< ing the Emperor and holding the : {J rems of rule, concluded from the , Rj investigations of their worldtouring embassy that France 1 could furnish the best drillmas- ?T ters. French military advisers 11 were therefore employed for tl ,e Sl army, but these were afterwards ai supplanted by Germans. An ef- ai fective modern army resulted in w a surprisingly short time, simply aJ because the soldiers of old Japan " were surpassingly brave and loy$1 through ipimemoral dfill,with P' p, native alertness and thorough,- ?* pess that gave fheni immediate J grasp of pew forms, and a self, j* control that addg the summit \ touch to soldiery. Conscription! laws of the most radical eharac ter annually supply fresh materi- K al from the flower of the youth |JT oi tne land at tne rate ot lorty " thousand or more. In the rigid ? weeding-out process?for the most stringent mental and phys- v ical tests are in practice?those K who are rejected as fighting men s< are sent with the army as trans- n pprters. The father of the army 2 is the Marquis YamagatP, wh'p A has now (at the age of 66) at" ?. tained to the rank of field mar* 11 ahal. In fifteen years his army g has grown ^om an enlistment of s< 228,848 men to a strength of 508,- J 268, all told, on a peace footing. J There are six chief military . stations, evenly distributed 2 throughout the empire. J] Baron Yamamoto, the present ^ - minister of the navy, is to this " branch of the service what Ya- J magata has been to the army. In 9 1902, against the most vigorous J opposition, he induced parlia- J! monf fn thp s?rtn at tl V vv V?#?V?V'A V* w VVflDVi uv J tion of six first-class battleships Jf within the next ten years, so Y that Japan has not yet approach- 11 ed the limit of her naval expan- Y sion. It was Great Britain that 5 supervised the beginnings, send- J ing out a small school of instruc- b Itors so long ago as 1867, under 0 the Shogunate, and a larger one in 1873, after the Restoration, h Dockyard work, however, was r committed to the direction of the v French. The principal dockyards e I are at Yokosuka, in the gulf of e Tokyo, but there are others at i Kuoe, in the Inland Sea; Sasebo, ? near Nagasaki; Maizum, on f the west coast; and Mororan, in e tjie Island of Yazo. There are t four shipbuilding poncerns where t steelframe steamers cap be con- I structed; and some idea of the t rapidity with which Japan is r I mastering this difficult industry c can be gained from the fact that i out of tne nine and a half mil- < lion tonnage of steam vessels ? passing annually through her ports, fully three million are of i native construction. At the be- i | ginning of the war with Russia t 1 the naval fleet included six first- j P class battleships, eight armored < cruisers, and fourteen protected 1 . cruisers. At the close of the first s | year's fighting three of these ves- 1 sels haa been lost, while the < Russian Eastern fleet, of equal I fighting strength in the begin- ] ning, had been practically swept < tl & Son, Bankers, * si fii i Carolina, le bi pl tEST ON S be bi sh s of Deposit. j" I ca anMMHMaaM,! fic _ Ja rom the seas. wi The principal naval academy is ne t Etajima, an island of the g0 eautiful Inland Sea. Appli- re ants must be at least sixteen Mi ears of age, and are subjected iie y rigid examination. The train- jn ig is strict in the extreme, and ha u-jitsu is the favorite physical toj xercise. The average age of na le navv is the lowest, in tVif> rorld, as is also the average 0f ejght; No one over 20 years of th< ge is accepted for enlistment, ba nd the average statute is only trc ve feet and four inches. f0] It is a theory that "in Japan tei very subject nas a chance for a ce] emission in the imperial an avy," but the theory is hardly ac< orne out by the facts. And m( lis applies also to the army, be he Sat-Chc, Wans have a virtual xh tonopoly he1I, as well as in civ- j,a affairs, lie province of Sat- g0 jma has not only furnished such tb< rmy leaders as Nogi, Kuroki eV) ad Oyama, but practically the eV) hole of the navy, from Togo th< nd Yamamoto downward. In ea] le Japanese mind the Satsuma wa ten are credited chiefly with m lufa^e, Choshu men with tio igacity?therefore the former fu] fe spldiers and sailors, men of tia ash and daring, while the latter Eti re diplomatists and chiefs of eV( imlnlstration. But the fact is, jn( iese two Southern clans simply civ . 9 _1 - 1 ? V ftinea control 01 tne govern- p0 lent in 1868, and have never re- f01 nquished it since?clan-govern- 0C( lent having supplanted the trc hogunate. 0f The hero of Port Arthur, Nogi an [iten, is the Japanese ideal of a pe tidier. His enthusiastic ad- trc lirers even call him the "incar- trc ation qf the imperial wargod." as [p has given utterance to his scj wn conception of the warrior- 0f fe in the following striking lan- tio uage: "When a man becomes a rjc tidier he must be perfectly tin dlling to lead henceforth a life hat is somewhat different from he life of an ordinary man. It st) 5 impossible for him thereafter mi 3 enjoy liberty and wealth in cj? he same manper as his fellows, p0 Vhat J mean is this; that the pc oldier who would perform bis uties with credit on a battle eld must, of necessity, have m, rained himself to perform all an hat is expected of him in the tir ays of peace. There outfit not 0 be any neglect or any defects 1 his daily fife. The man who CI /ould rightfully aspire to the tonor of fighting unaer the sun- F< lag must first have learned to e a man through the conquest i himself in times of peace." That Nogi has practiced what le preaches is proved by his me- or norable words when the news vas brought to him that his eldist son?the pride and hope of tj ivery household?had been killed ^ n the battle of|Nanshan. "Iam ^ flad he died so splendidly," the ather said. "It was the great- rj sst honor he could have. As for ^ he funeral rites in his memory, m hey might as well be postponed a| 'or awhile, A little later on a hey may be performed in con- 0> lection with those to the memory w >f my second son, Hoten, and y( nyself." His second son fell re luring the last days of the siege iround Port Arthur. , This wondrous spirit of loyalty nheritance from feudal days, is w lot confined to the officers of the w army, but is shared by the hum- n< [>lest of the people. The Rus- b; nan war has afforded number- i<j ess examples. There was the tc aged mother, for example, who si learned that her soldier-son was ti ietained at home on her account, ai Slaying herself in patriotic sac- 01 rifice, she withdrew the bloody a dagger in time to hand it to her tx 5n with the Spartan injunction lat he should plunge it into the earts of the enemy. And a ;ory comes of a humble jinrik1a man, who, because he could nd no caretaker for his motherss children, slew them and aried them in the family teme grounds, that he might go off i the war. The blanket wnerehe wrapped their little dead >dies as ne took them to their irial was afterward cut into ireds by the equally patriotic iest and distributed as priceas relics to the pilgrims who me to do honor at the sacriial grave. What wonder that pan wins victories? And loyalty does more than in battles. It is loyalty in conction with an enlightened clanvernment that accounts for the markable courtesy of the army, uch as we should like to beve it, doubtless we should err accounting for the good bevior of the Japanese army al?ether on the grounds of good ture, or deep-set convictions mercy. The inherent cruelty the Japanese soldier is far too oroughly established, and the rbarous conduct of these same >ops on the occasion of the rmer fall of Port Arthur, only 1 years ago, is of much too reit occurrence, to allow of such inner transfiguration of charter as would explain on purely >ral principles their humane havior toward the Russians, e true explanation, however,is rdly less wonderful. The clanvernment which radiates from j imperial palace in Tokyo into ery regiment of the army and ery ship of the navy is one of e most astute bodies of men on rth. They are profoundly itchful of international sentijpt in their desire for internanal regard, and they are also tly familiar wiih the reveren1 loyalty of the troops to their nperor, which they nave used ery means to enhance. Having ;urred the opprobrium of the dlized world on account of the rt Arthur massacre, they have restalled the repetition of such uurrences. How? By an ex;mely simple expedient in view Japanese loyalty. Messages ^ sent in the name of the Emror commanding merciful jatment, and the regard of the >ops for their sun-god is such to serve in the place of a conence, even amid the carnage battle, or in spite of temptans to pillage. It will be a seals time of transition when eir worship of the Emperor is stroyed. In accounting for the martial ength of the new Japan we ast not overlook the commerd astuteness that has made ssible the "sinews of war," >or as the Island Empire is, her lanciers have made such use of eir resources as to produce al3st incredible development in i amazingly short space of ne.?The Southern Home. nglaniT responsible >r Russo-Japanese War ?Germany's Designs in the Par East. More than once has it been >enlp stated in French reviews at Englpnd is really responsie for the Russo-japanese war. French political writer, An e Bheradame, in an article in le Correspondent, declares: Russia believes, and believes ghtly, that England and the advents of Lord Curzon have ade it their busipesg ft) bphg >out the Russo-Japanese war. t the same time, Russia quite rprlnoks thfi nnlipv nf fiprmnrtv. ! hich for the last twenty-five j jars has been systematically dieted to the definite object of etting Russia entangled in the fairs of the far East. The game of Germany, played ith so much skill and discretion hich M. Cheradame refers to is one other than that inaugurated y Bismarck. On many occas ns the Iron Chancellor is said ) have shown a passionate dere to oust Russia from all parcipation in European affairs na give her the fullest liberty f action in Asia. To his friends t St. Petersburg he is reported ) have saicR "Russia fyas poth in? to do with the West: her | mission is in Asia, for there she represents civilization." "In 1880, during the most acute period of the negotiations between Russia and China respecting Kulja and Ili territory, the action of the German minister, von Brandt, the writer explains, affords the most conclusive proof that at that time the chancellor of Willidm I. maneuvering to entangle Russia in the far East. Mr. von Brandt, who has taken so active a part in the af| fairs of eastern Asia and has done so much to introduce Germany into Chinese waters, was a disciple and an admirer of Bismarck. < In proof of his assertions, M. i Cheradame proceeds to quote ( from the political correspondence j of the minister of one of the < great Western powers at Peking, i then quite unknown to the public. When the Russo-Chinese conflict was at its height, and war was threatening, the diplomatist, whose name is withheld, wrote in effect to his government in the summer of 1880: Not only did Mr. von Brandt advise all the Christian powers tA o (Vi*OA tfimiilfnriAAiioltf nwnnU a w w oiiuuitaucvuisij tv uuoii ^ China and each sieze what was* * most expedient, but he endeav- 1 ored to push matters to the worst < by exalting the advantages of a ] war between Russia and China. ? My recent conversations with my * colleague, My, von Brandt, con- ' firm me-ii\tHs idea that encour- [ agements to?" carry out such a strange policy must have been given by the cabinet of Berlin to that of Sti Petersburg. As soon as the war -should have broken out, Mr. von. Brandt made no mystery of the : intention of his government to lay hands on any well-choseji position whence the navy ofcould usefully second ti.e' operations of her commerce or the action of her diplomacy at Peking. Again, early in 1881, the Western diplomatist pointed out that while Mr. von Brandt was driving Russia to war, Germany was supplying arms to the Celestial Empire. He wrote: I learn that 100,000 Mauser i ?\ i i i j L_. n rmes nave ueen soiu Dy merman ( merchants, aTid that over 20,000 ? have already been delivered. It \ might be of use to send these \ particulars to St. Petersburg, if . only to enlighten the government ; of the Czar as to the views which i inspire German policy in the ( presence of the difficulties pend- j ing between Russia and Cnina. The next instance of German s policy in China cited by M. Che- \ radame is the Kiao-Cnau affair. . Here he shows that in 1891 Ger- ; many was entertaining secret , plans with regard to it. Lastly, M. Cheradame deals with the Russo-Japanese war. 1 He thinks that Germany desired \ war, but hopes that Russia will \ win, for a victorious Russia on , the Pacific is expected to be as profitable to Germany as the j power of the Czar in Europe is , rlioo/lvonfnryA/Mio Hn f VIA AfUnt* I vilOUVi Y CHllOgvVllOt VII Ifll^ V/VI1CI hand, if Russia does not get \ Korea, and if she must abandon ; southern Manchuria to the Mikado, Germany will become the first enemy of Japan. Russia, embroiled in the affairs of the far 1 East, will leave the Balkan peninsula, Constantinople, and Turkey in Asia almost free to German influence. Even if Russia triumphs, it is certain that for many years she cannot be an "offensive" military danger to Germany, and thus the military power of Germany in ^he old world wjl| foe almost doubled without h farthing a extra extra expense for armaments. Germany seems to know how to deceive Russia, and Russia, concludes M. Cheradame, has always defended herself badly against her patient and tenacious German adversary. SUOGESTEDRUSSOJAPANESE ALLIANCE. It appears that there has been some support in Japan to the suggestion, which was originally credited to the Emperor of Germany, that, after the war, a , friendly understanding amounting to an alliance should be i brought about between Russia , and Japan. The Anglo-Japanese ^alliance ha$ not, \n the opinion % F. M. FARR, President. T Merchants and Pla Successfully Doing Bus Ib the OLDEST Rank i haa a capital and aurp ia the only NATIONA haa paid dividends at I I pays FOUR per cent D la the only Rank In ITi haa Rurfflnr-Proof vat pays more taxes than . WE EARNESTLY SOL of a number of prominent Japanese periodicals, come up to the expectation of the Mikado's government. Dissatisfaction with it has been concealed by the thin veneer of noliteness whioh the Japanese express toward England so long as the alliance actually exists. Although the Japanese journals fn general do lot refer to this subject, many )f the leading men are, it is ilaimed, looking forward to the ,ime when the island empire will eadjust all her diplomatic relations. ''The whole ground of these reations is covered in an article, jntitled /'The Conclusion of ?eace Between Russia and Jalan," which appears in the Taiyo (Tokio). Tne writer, Mr. T. Hayakawa, a member of the lapanese House of Representa:ives, begins by stating that Russia is not by any means so 'ormidable a power as the world las heretofore believed. If vou ;urn over the pages of the hisjory of Russian expansion, he; jays, "you will at once perceive hat the Muscovite has never ilayed a fair game." Russian iggression, he .goes on . to say, las been directed, not against :ivilized nations with modern nilitary equipment, but against backward races, such as those n Siberia, or against such miseriblv equipped nations as Turkey ind other minor peoples in the Balkins. Russia's real strength md never been fully tested until t came into collision with that )f Japan. The secret of Russian success, this writer believes, lies n the fact that she has heretofore wielded her weapons only igainst weaker enemies, as well is in the fact that she enjoys a most favorable geographic situation, which prevents successful invasion. Her geographical situation also has stimulated her desire for expansion. In order to ievelop her commerce and to idvance her civilization, Russia found it absolutely necessary to establish outlets on southern waters. Intoxicated by her successes, which had been easily achieved ill dealinc wit.h h#?r w#??lror ari_ tagonists, Russia underestimated Japan's power and resources. Always modest, and generally too meek; Japan had always acquiesced in Russia's propositions. Thus, the northern bear robbed the island empire of Saghalien, and, in conjunction with Germany and France, took from her the Liao-Tung Peninsula at the close of the Chino-Japanese war. The negotiations leading up to the r> resent strucrirle further im pressed Russia with the patience of the island nation. Russia's arrogant and challenging attitude was due really to complete ignorance of the resources of her little enemy. IS A ftU?SO JAPANESE ALLIANCE POSSIBLE? A treaty of alliance between two nations on a close footing is impossible so long as one has no regard for the rights of the other. Up to the present moment, it has been utterly impossible for Russia and Japan to come to an understanding of such a nature. But, now that the Muscovite government has become convinced of the prowess of the Japanese nation, it is quite possible that St. Petersburg would really desire to form an entente cordiale with the Tokio government. The gist of the proposition advanced by Mr. Hayakaws is found in his closing paragraph' It is neither possible nor wise to entirely drive the Russians out of Manchuria. An attempt to expel them from northem China would mean the treijaen J. D. ARTHUR. Cashier. H E inters National Bank, tineas at the "Old Stand." in Union. Iuk of S10\000, L Hank In Union, mounting to $300,400. . interest on deposits, lion inspected by on officer, lit, and Safe with Time-Lock, ALL tho Ranks in Union combined. JCIT YOUR BUSINESS. dously greater task of wiping them out entirely from Siberia, a task which no sane man would ever dream of accomplishing. So long as Russia holds Siberia, it is but natural that she will attempt to force her wav to iJ>? Eastern seas. Th? danger of the Russian advance in the far Kast lies, not in the fact of the advance, but in its military nature. If this advance should be of a peaceful nature, aimed at the promotion of her commercial interests, without jeopardizing the sovereignty of China and Korea, there is no reason why Japan should not respect Russian rights in Manchuria. The present war is waged because Japan was forced to deliver Manchuria and Korea from the oppression of Russia. When Japan's protectorate over Korea has been universally recognized, and when Manchuria has been returned to the Chinese Government, Japan's aims have been well-nigh accomplished. If she insists on curDing Russian influence entirely in the far East, time, we believe, will tell that Japan has blundered. But if, generously casting aside hostile feelings after tne peace treaty, the now belligerent nations enter into an alliance, together they might prove the strongest force in pre? serving the peace of the far East. Russia is now fully aware that as an opponent Japan is very formidable, but as an ally she could be made a strong and reliable friend. If Russia will renounce her ambition for military aggrandizement, and will extend her hand in friendly relationship to Japan, with the view of promoting her own commercial interests in eastern Asia, we Japanese will gladly welcome her as our friend and ally. ODDESSA LEADING CITY OP SOUTHERN RUSSIA. The city of Odessa, the scene nT fllA IVlAof cfovflinn* ux U1I& uiuov DI.U1 UCVC1UJJ" ments in the growth of revolution in the Czar's empire, is the most important city and seaport in Southern Russia and the fourth city of the empire in population. It is situated in the government of Kherson, on an elevation sloping toward an inlet of the Black Sea. It lies about 32 miles northeast of the mouth of the Dniester and 938 miles by rail southwest of Moscow. The general appearance and atmosphere of Odessa are rather European than Russian. The city was built during the ninetnonfV* nainhiKir an A la v\yv^VM VVI4VVI4 J ) U1IU JO) UlClClV/l^ the youngest among the large cities of Russia. It is regularly laid out around the bay, and has a number of fine streets and , squares, from which magnificent , views of the sea are obtained. i The most popular boulevard is the Nikolayevsky boulevard, from which a grand stairway leads to the bay. ; The Russians of Odessa com prise scarcely one-third of the 5 inhabitants of the city, about J 150,000 of the residents being , Jews and the remainder Greeks, . Armenians, Turks and people of various European nationalities. [ In general the members of the ; lower classes of Odessa are per\ sons of the most desperate char; acter. I Subscribe for The Times. ? I WisK'' ?*""r" "T ? ? - ?"C ?-U~?-S!.1