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. jaf - 2.2. . -awB I.?wn~.SJ_i Thirty prohibition agents on Wdnesday raided the'Phoenix brewery in New York, said to be as larye as many of the pre-prohibition breweries end supplying many *>f the city's speakeasies. The plant is estimated as worth 12,000,000. <-> CHILDREN CRY FOR IT? A^HILDREN hate to take medicim ^-'as a rule, but every child lovea the taste of Caatoria. This pure vegetable preparation is just as good as it tastes; Just as bland and just as harmless as the recipe reads. When Baby's cry warns of colic, a few drops of Caatoria have him soothed, asleep again in a jiffy. Nothing is more valuable in diarrhea. When coated tongue or bad breath tell of constipation, invoke its gentle aid to cleanse and regulate a child's bowels. In colds or children's diseases, you should use It to keep the system from clogging. ? Caatoria is sold in every drug store; the genuine always bean Ghas. IL Fle'-rher's signature. * ?* deduce the Acid ^'sS^^EVroiiS'nirTe |<!5 Too muh M*d mmm fU atOOMwh Bttd btMtllMS N?. . AlhnM J% TV bo* rte^TMflkofHi?iBli3CM MMCMM? tesMkMi COM MvtrMhm OMMky UpH Kb TohnMrfiTocid. For 60 jjiii^^ oUockM^r withphjwMom m inrt num idm yvc wwi Nwm know whwtto do. Crado nod harmful methods wtt nerer appaal to row. Go poor* tak lor your own taka. It may rre a Ml many dfceflreeabte hours. Got the tannine PkOlipe Milk of Miyigjs.1 ** . hare P? wtisww toa mr' jxmUV* i i T] J HEADACHES - NEURITIS NEURALGIA, COLDS Whenever you have some nagging ache or pain, take some tablets of Bayer Aspirin. Relief is immediate! Th?"v's scarcely ever an ache or pain th it Bayer Aspirin won't reliev e?and n< \. r a time whets \ou can't take it. The tablets wi?h the Bayer cross are nlwavs safe. They will not depress the heart, or otherwise harm you. Use them as often as thev ran spare you any pain or discomfort. Just Ive sure to buy the genuine. Lxainine the l>ox. Beware o! imitations. Aspirin is the trade-mark of Bayef manufacture of monoaceticaadeater of salicylicacid. immmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmr**". i mkmir " ' ~ mm i. g=g==ji My Experiences I In the World War || I By General John J. Pershing < Jf CapiMk lift, n ?u wnnlii Wt fin N?*tW Asorti? 1 W'M .. M Mnny? AJh?s?. W?i4 i%>?? iwcrid. I>d?<toin dw B W. N. U. t I%ih?i1i? >ij?hiMi>s is wfcshmtpit peoMbked. Jp CHAPTER XXXI M?roll 21 the great German offensive begun ugulnst the British armlet between the Olse and the Hcarpe, near the junction of the French and British linen, on n front about fifty miles In lenKth, extending from near I,a Fere to Arras, Near the center of the attack waa General (tough's Fifth army, with the Thlnf army under General Byug on Its left. The artillery bombardment preceding the Infantrjf advance was of abort duration, but of great Intensity, with excessive use of gus shells. Following a heavjt barrage the German Infantry. using the same tactical methods that had been so successful at Flga and Carporetto, delivered Its blow. The weather favored the enemy as a heavy fog continued Intermittently for three days, much to the disadvantage of the defense. The overwhelming force of sixty-four especially trained German divisions out of their one hundred ninety-two then on the weetern front compelled the British lines to yield. Although at the end of the first day the Fifth army hnd not entirely given awny, Its losses had reached several thousand, and there was no question that the Germans were making a serious attempt to separate the British and French armies. British Pushed Back 37 Miles. The last one of Gough's reserves was put In on the second day, yet he received no support to stop the widening gap In the British front until the following day, when one French Infantry division and one French dismounted cavalry division arrived. On the 24th four others got Into position. These divisions and others that came In the next two or three days were put Into battle by General Fayole without regard to the Integrity of units or the order of their entry, some of them being very short of ammunition. The British Fifth army was evidently overwhelmed from the start, yet no British reinforcements were sent to Gough until the 2-ltli. and then only one division, no others arriving during the first week. By the fifth day the German forces had driven a salient Into the British front some thtrty-sev- 1 en miles deep and were threatening the Important railway center of Amiens, the capture of which would probably have made a complete breach between the French and British armies. In the moment of greatest stress, when It seemed very doubtful whether the German advance could he stopped. General I'etaln sent the following order to his armies: "The enemy has hurled himself upon us In a supreme effort. "He wants to separate us front the Rngllsh so as to open the way to F'aris. Cost what It may. he must he stopped "Hold your ground! Stand firm! Our (American) comrades are arriving. All together you will throw yourselves upon the invader. "The battle Is on.?Soldiers of theMarne. of the Yser and of Verdun. I call upon you. The fate of France hanga in the balance." The reports from the front gave an extremely dark picture of disaster, and I felt we should do everything poa slble to render assistance. It was to offer General I'etaln such of our troops ns could he used that I went to Cam. plegne March 25. The general s cusrouiary conmreni and nonchalant attitude was entirely gone and he wore a very worried ex preaaioa. I told tilm that for the mo ment I should waive the Idea of form Ing the I corps and that any of our di vlsloivs that could be of service were al Ilis disposal, hut with the qualify Ing remark that of course we should look forward exenruallv to their as semhly under their own commander. March 24 it developed that the French divisions had received orders that If the enemy continued hie drive in the direction of Amiens they were to fall back so as to cover Paris. Mar shal ilalg. fearing that this wjpuld re | suit In separating the two armies, at I ones communicated the situation to his government This brought about sn Important conference at Douiion* 1 March 20 between members of the British and French governments, tn which it was decided that Some uu thority should be designated to co-or ^ miw dlnate the action of .the iwo armies, and General Foch wu* selected. I wu? fiot present tit the Doullen* conference, hut upon learning of Km action it aconied essential that Generul Foch himsclf should know our desire to do what wo could to strengthen the ullles. The British loss was then call muted at not less than 150,(JMJ. 1 re call meeting l.ord NorthcHffe March 24 and found idm almost unable to speuk of It. ko many of hia friends had lost relatives. The deprtfftion among their people wua probubly worse thun at any other period of the war. Among the French there was much anxiety as to the safety of I'aria and there was talk of the government having to move to Bordeaux aguin. as It hud done In 1914. The allied Hues had uot been stabilized and although I had offered our troops to Betuln It seemed to me that.lt might be well to make It emphatic that I was ready to put Into buttle everything we could muster, l hat) often thought of the possibility of having to do this, and I went to find out the situation and lei General Foch know our attitude. Qlvee Word to Foch. As we entered General Koch's farmhouse headquarters near Clermont-aurOise, Cleinence<\u, Fo6Jh, Petaln aud I.oucheur were intently studying a map spread out on the table. The situation was pointed out to me. showing that already the British had used thirty divisions und the French seventeen against the Germans' seventyeight. It seemed to be the opinion that the British Fifth army was getting back on Its feet and that the lines would hold for the time being. I Intimated that I bad come to see General Koch and tlie others withdrew Into the yard, leaving us alone. I told him that the Americans were ready and anxious to do their part In this crisis, that I was willing to send him any troops we had, and asked for suggestions as to how we might help. He was evidently very much touched and In his enthusiasm took me by the arm and without hesitation rushed me out across the lawn to where the oth rs stood, and asked me to repent what I had said to him. They, of course, showed keen interest. especially M. C'lemenceau. as I told thein what I had said to General Foch. Colonel Boyd, my aid. was kind enough to say that, under the Inspiration of the moment, my French waa spoken with a fluency that I could not have mastered ten minutes before or after. Perahing'a Offer of Troops. It appeared In the French papers the next morning, although I feel certain that It was written up In much better French than I actually used. The English translation follows: "1 have come to tell you that the American people would consider It a great honor for our troops to be engaged In the present battle; I ask you for this In their name and my own. "At this moment there are no other questions hut of fighting "Infantry, artillery, aviation, all that we have are youra; use them as you wish. More will come, In numbers equal to requirements. "I have come especially to tell you that the American people will be proud to take part-In the greatest battle of history." If the responsibility bad been mln^ I should not have hesitated a momeftt five divisions then In France. The First was the only one used for the time being, the others being plnred In quiet sectors, each to relieve two French divisions. As our divisions were more than twice as large as theirs It amounted to almost immediate reinforcement of ten dUislons. At the time of the G<^rthair attack a battalion of the American Sivth regiment of engineers was on duty behind the British Fifth army, engaged In. railway construction and repair*. These., troops were given arms and participated with the British forces In the defenslve operations until after the lines were stabilised. CHAPTER XXXII Secretary of War Baker went to London to discuss with the British authorities the prospects for additional shipping and also the general subject of munitions. While there he sent rue ''in ii .fc? he following lelegrum 5li?r?-li 2ft, MM* rmlMHlyliig *uggf*tlt?MS f*?m Hie prime iiiuleter which *1towed I lie deep uuxl My of the British: I have Just had a Ion* talk with he prime miiilaier. He urges three proposals for your consideration. ttrat, hni <mr division*. In France he placed jnmediately In line to relieve French II visions for service elsewhere, quiet sector* being chosen for troopa with est trainin*. 'Second. Ihnl nil available engineer roopa be taken from llnoa of commito|> ill ion work and sent lo aid of British iiglneera preparing positions buck of .ii sent line*. It la urged (hat suspeu ..on of our work would he but letp...r:iry ami that the work suggested, I* tuperutlve. Third, ihai 1 i i fa tit ry he Kent first of he entire "is dBUlou* to lie truna ported b> British in slew of present acute need* of 11 ;<t army, No answer o (lie forgoing '* lU'ceHKiiry until I me you when we can die* cuxx the suggestions fully." First Division Ordered Into Line. My diary notes the following: Chaumoiit, Friday, March 21), 11)1$.?Held conference with tlie secretary of war and Geiieral ' Bliss yesterduy on Joint recommendation of military represents, lives of the war council. Left I'aris this morning for C'iiuuntqnt. ^ At Petait^s request, the First division ordered to battle line, which Mr. Maker said people at horns would enthusiastically approve. Mr. Paul Cravath dined with us this evening, and speaking of unitj, favored placing control In the hands of a committee composed of Murshal lialg, General Petaln and myself. Council Asks Change in Plana. The situation had become so serious that the military representatives seemed to think It necessary lo recommend that all previous [dans for the shipment of American troops he dlsrc guided and thai nothing but Infantry and machine gun units be shipped until otherwise directed by the supreme war council. This they did In the form of a joint (or unanimous) note, which was, of course, approved by the supreme war council. I was very much surprised ut the attitude of General Bliss, our military representative with the council, as without his consent the Jolut note could not have been submitted to the council. When the joint note was presented to Secretary Baker I pointed out to him and General Hliss thut th^ proposal, if approved by the President, would place the disposition of American units entirely In the hands of the supreme war council and take thera quite out of our oojitrol, even for training, and would without doubt destroy all possibility of our forming an American army. The secretary was as strongly opposed to any such outcome as I, and after some discussion he dictated his views in a cable to President Wilson explicitly recommending that the control of our forces should be retained by our commander In chief and that the note be approved only in that sense. Reply From Wilson. The message forwarding the Joint note with Mr. Baker's comment was answered by a cable from Washington dated March 30. which stated: "The President concurs in the Joint note of the permanent military represents tlvfll Of llu> supreme war rryity ell in the Sense formulated In your No. 6T March 28, and wishes yog?to regard yourself authorised to decide questions of immediate co-operation or replacement." It was thought that this statement, coming from the President, would check, at least for the time being, the demands of the allies that we provide units for building up their divisions. The President's message was followed March 30 by a cuble from the department, which stated: "The recommendations of secretary of war to President . . . that preferential transportation be given to American Infantry and machine-gun units In present emergency understood and will be followed." It went on t?> say that these units pertaining to three divisions, the Third, Fifth and Seventy-seventh, would be sent at once, and those of throe other divisions about May 1. Replying April 3 to the department's cable, I emphasised that It was "not intended that our units should replace the losses ..f British or French organizations, and therefore our artillery should he led I in readiness to fol low when called for." although it was possible that tlo> -dilation might tiecome "so serious that some of our Infantry units will he. forced to serve with British temporarily." My intentions wore further Indicat ed by saying; "Americans must not lose sight of the purpose to build tip divisions and corps of their own." ami also, "we must avoid the tendency to Incorporate our Infantry Into British divisions wher? it will be used up and never relieved." My cable recommended that the Infantry of two divisions he sent by British shipping and two by our own. but that present plans should go no further than this. It was my purpose hot to become too .deeply Involved In . fJh agreement that would make it tm. possible later to form our own Independent force under our own officers. CHAPTER XXXIII Secretary Baker and I had frequently discussed the question of a supreme silled cotiiimimler. him) wh were both rowdy* to accept II in principle when profMuted. mler Ci??i(itt(f|u I went, April A. to BcmuvmIn to u?eet with the aupremr war council. Arriving early. Oolong r.oyU mid 1 hud to wait au hour at the hold d* vlll?* before M. Cleiueuceuu mid Lloyd George cam* Into the cou fen-nce royiu. Marshal Half, General y.M ii. I'etafn, Hlr Henry Wilson, Bliss, \V>> gund and myaelf were the others l>irilcl|?at|ng. Brigadier General Spier* acted * Interpreter, and Lieut Col. Mir Mau rice llankey, who usually accompanied Mi l.loyd George, as recorder. The (nig was final I y called to order by M ?Tetiienctmu, who stated Its purpo.se. saying In substance: "Wk have come together to settle1 a scry simple question regarding the fum tlons of General Foch. I tlilnk we are all in agreement as to the coir.-ijination of allied potion, hut there Is some difference in the understand* ing of lieneral Koch's powers as cou(c-red uj>oii him at the Doulleus cou ferciice of March 20. General Foch will explain his difficulties." f Foch Calls for Action. General Koch then set forth briefly ills situation, as follows: "The powers conferred by the Doulleus conference were limited to the co ordination of action between the allies. They were conferred while the action waa on. The power to co-ordl* mite has been construed to bo limited to the time the allies wero In action. That was March 26 at DooUena. Now we are at April 8. "Now that the two opposing armies ore no longer tn action bat hare stopped and are facing oach other, there (a nothing to co-ordinate. There should be authority to prepare for action and direct It. So w# art right t back where we were, and nothing can he done until an action, start# again.'' Lloyd George Pleads for Unity. Mr. Lloyd George then entered the discussion, saying substantially: "We have had more ftian three years of this wur and we have not had unity of action during that time. During the last year we hove had two kinds of strategy, one by llalg and another by Petain. both different, and nothing 1ms been gained. The only thing that was accomplished was by General Nlvelle, when be was In suprelne command. "General Koch Is now empowered to co-ordinate the action of the allied armies, but this does not go far enough, as he has no uuthorlty to control except by conferring with the respective commanders In chief. He wants authority to prepare for action. I think the resolution made at Doullens should be modified so that we may have a better understanding. I shouMpllke to hear what General Bliss and Genera! FeVshlng have to any." Perehlng Give* His Views. I then gave my view, which was set forth In a brief memorandum prepared in pencil after the discussion began, as follows: "The principle of unity of command la undoubtedly the correct one for the allies to follow. I do not believe it Is possible to have unity of action without a supreme commander. We have already had experience enough In trying to co-ordinate the operations of the allied armie#, without success. There has never been real unity of action. "Such co-ordination between two or three armies is Impossible no matter who the commander In chief may be. Each commander in chief Is interested In his own army and cannot get the Other commnndar't pnlnf flor grasp the problem as a whole. I am In favor of a supreme commander and belleva that the anccess of the allied cause depends upon It "I think the necessary action should b# taken by this council at onca. 1 am In favor of conferring the supreme command upon General Foch." When I had finished Mr. Lloyd George came over to where I sat took me Dy me nana nna saia: "I agree fully with General Pershing. This Is well put." After some further informal discussion, a draft of the resolution was submitted which omitted reference to the American army. Whereupon I called attention to the oversight, saying: i "I think this resolution should In elude the American army. The arrangement Is to be In force, as I understand It, from now on, and the American army will soon be rendy to function as such and should be included as an entity like the British and Frencn armies." "There Is no American army yet as such. General Peiain interjected, "na its units are either in training or are amalgamated with the British aim French." Pershing Has U. S. Included. 1 here may not be an American army in force functioning now," I re plied, "but there soon will be, and 1 want this resolution to apply to It when It becomes a fact The American government la represented here at this conference and In the war, and any action as to the supreme command that Includes the British and French armies should also lactada the American army." The foregoing account of the conference may not be an exact record of tba language used, bnt it I# given as my aid took it do**. The following resolution waa then feed and adopted: Kooh U the British, French and American governments w|th the co-ordlnattoa of the ao Won of the allied armies oa the western front; to this end there is con fsrred on him all the power necessary for Us effective reallwUJoo. .To the #a?na end the British, French and American governments confide la Gen r*r Foch the ?tmteglc direction of'| military op^rurionT^^*1"1^^? i "TH# 4-1 tin III ill I, I ,.|M I .* Hrltlah, miM ?*?? A Mill exerH** ?? Ml? run * ** Ui'fl'-Hl <llr4ot|..i? ?f m,h "MmJW;. nmrnnm-, m !;*???? " ?w?*"'? >' r opinion hl? nrni> |? ., ,f ^ 1 r,"in Allied Commandor |n Cj,,^ The Idea of mi ?|||?, iiHd lH.m cuMHHd uiHiiy 11iio'x ui.?in<.|H,ivH?1 In various rw.Honn. p.H|t|,,? wise. II Ion! (Ihv?t '< Mdj>Mted by I lie wiprem,, ?*,, nlM With the <ll*trum thin the allies. It w*? ^ "M rthi.lit the (Iim IhIoii |? ftlV);r " '-Mt pretne commander. ami iK^ibm gency of the Hltmnlori. * The <lo*iwnntlnn of H' commander In older of ?. ' MHMlee In rWl|, W),? t French. April 15 I received . L? from M. CleiimiM-eu., ?4jvu,il(i Mr. Lloyd ,m(J 4^* uggcsllon. and naked if i ,, J\?; replied In a pergonal note exJ2i ' my agreement subject to the cZH tlou of President Wilson, which M April 17. Once the question of suprea#1^B mand waa settled the co-ordlniL^B ergles of the Allied anniea\>2W directed with maximum effect tt^B a common end. While dark dxy/5 i still ahead, we were spared th.? ; grin of^ InefOcleucjr through |tHflJ f teamwork. (Continued next week) Engineer Dies at ThroUkWf Now York, July 27. -When bany to New York express of^l New York Central railroad p^| into the Grand Central tcrminal?^H today, few of the 300 paseXS knew that Tom Galvin, the eng^? had died of a heart attack bringing his train to an unsehc^? stop at Beacon, N. Y. I I Train attendants removed 1 "I from the cab and the fif?;!, brought the express to this citj^| Heat Scorches The West Los Angeles, July 27. Kxir^^l heat in the southwestern corne^B the United States .was blamed ttfl for three more deaths and swH prostrations. ^? Two persons succumbed at Bk ley, Cal., yesterday as the mcrctfl rose to 114 degrees, increasin^^H 19 the number of deaths in Catffl nia's Imperial Valley and' Ar?? within the last four days. I After hearings lasting sevtfl weeks before the inter-state merce commission in Washington? the question of a 15 per cent, r? in freight rates, the hearings i? be adjourned this week until A? ust 31. Up to this time the r? roads have been presenting evide? in behalf of the raise. .Shippers? opponents of the raise will pre?? their side of the case when the he? ings are resumed. Salvation Army Laaalaa Handing Out Ooughnuta. ROBTW. MITCHMM Architect I ; Crocker Camden, g. C. 1 EYES EXAMINED 1 and Glasses Fitted 1 THE HOFFER COMPANY! Jewelers and Optometrtot?-H R. E. Chewning & Soil General Contractors I and Builders Phone 386 Camden, 8. OH Estimates Furnished on AO 1 Classes of Work | Floors Sanded on Reautfl At DeKALB COUNCIL aSA Junior Order U. A.*; Regular council seooxdj ; fourth Mondays month at 8 p.m. Visiting Bjjjjl are ^welcomed. A. W. Recording' Secty. Jk Ino-moH FOE CONNS AND CAtW^ i M.d. 1. C.m4?i Am* PoKaBb^Plh^ ? "^1