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. II 'I., II l-UJLUU.'^TTTT GENERAL PERSHING'S STORY Oh OPERATIONS OF AMERICAN TROOPS IN THE WORLD WAR Washlngton.-r-The Anal report, of ?eu. John J. Pershing hs comin?md"r to rhici of the American expedltlonmy forces *ln Kurope was made public o> ike secretary of war. Geu. Pershing says in effect. although not in terms, that the American army won the* war ??It wit* this spirit of determination animating every American soldier," aaya General Perahlng, referring t?> Ou Meuae-Argonne battle, "that made It luposHthle for the enemy to maintain tfce struggle until lftli>." The report In lt? more Important de talis ta a* follower In order chut the reasons for uiany Important decisions reached Id the Mrty history of the American expe ditionary force# muy he more clearly auderatood and the true value of the American effort more fully appreci ated. It la desirable to have In mind the main events lending up to the time of our entry Into the war. > 1914?Although the German drive of 1014 bad failed In Ita Immediate parpose. yet her armies had made very Important gains, German forces were In complete possession of Bel* glum and occupied rich Industrial 're gions of northern Prance, embracing one-fourteentb of her population and about three-fourths of ber coal and iron. The German armies held a strongly fortified line 468 miles In length, stretching from the Swiss border to Nleuport on the CngllBh ' channel; her troops were within forty eight miles of Paris and the Initiative remained In German hands. Kn the east the raf^ldlty of J he Rus sian mobilization foh?<d JtA^rmany, even before the bnttle o^^Marne. to send troops to that frontier, hut the close of 1914 found the Russian arm Ifes ejected from Bast Prussia and driven back on Warsaw. The entry of Turkey Into the war, Because of the moral effect upon the Moslem world and the Immediate con stant threat created agulnst allied osmmunlcatlons with the l<"ar Bust, M to un effort by the allies in the dUectlon of the Dardanelles. Allies Helped by Italy. t915?Italy Joined the allies In May Md gave their cause new strength. iSN the effect was more or less offset When Bulgaria entered on the side of He central powers.' The threatening situation on the Btonslan front and in the Balkans was flttll such that Germany was compelled ft exert an Immediate offensive effort In those directions and to maintain anly a defensive attitude on the west ero front, German tiring aeaieve<? ? striking aeries of successes Iti I tic vicln try of th*? Maxurian lakes and in Gailcla. rupturlpii W'arsaxV, Hre*t-Ll tovsk ami Vllua. Tit# i?n{rHl powers overrun Serbia and Montenegro Moan while the Italltin armies forced Auh trla to use approximately one-half Iter strength against them. in the went the French und Brit Uh launched offensive* whtch coat the German armies considerable loss; bat the objectives were limited and the effect was local. The Pardanelles ex pedltloo, having failed lu its in I sal on. was withdrawn Id January. Id Meso potamia the allied operations had Dot been successful. Although the British fleet had establlstytd Its superiority on the sea, yet the CJermau Hubuiarlne blockade had developed luto a serious menace to allied shipping. , Russia 8tlll Pbworful. 1916?~Oermany no doubt believed that her advantage on the eastern front tit the close of 1915 again war ranted an offensive In the west, sod Uer attack agalost Verdun was ac cordingly launched In the spring of 1910. But Russls was not yet beaten, and early fn June, aided at the same time by the threat of an Italian offen sive In the wost, she began the great drive Id Oallcla that proved so dls uatrous to Austria. Ronmania, having entered on the ode or the allies, undertook a prowls Ing offensive against Austria. The Brit ish and French armies attacked along the Romme. Germany quickly returued ro the defensive In the west, and in September Initiated a campaign In the east which, before the close of 1016 proved unfortunate for Russia as well as Rouman+a. Spring of 1917?Retaining on the eastern front the forces considered sufficient tor the Anal conquest of Rus sia. Germany prepared to aid Austria In on offensive against Italy Mei>n while the Russian revolution was wen under way, and by the inid-suuuuer of 1917 the final collapse of that gov eminent was almost certain. The relatively low strength of the German forces on the western froat led the allies, with much confidence, to attempt a decision on this front; but the losses were very heavy and the effort signally failed. The failure caused a serious reuctlon, especially on French morale, both in the army and throughout the country, and at tempts to carry out exteusive or com bined operations were indefinitely sus nended. Sank Millions of Tons. In the live months ending Juno 59 German submarines bad accomplished the (leHtructloo of wore thou 3.250,000 tons of allied shipping. During three years Germany had seen practically oil her offensives except Verdun crowned with success. Her bottle lines were held on foreign soil und she hud with' ; ! Stood every ullled attack since the hlttrne. The German getierol stuff could now foresee the complete elim- j Inutlon of Itnssia. the po*sibillty of de- : fciitlnii Italy before the end of the | ! year and. Dually, the campaign of 1918 ; against the French and British ou the western front which might terminate the war. It cannot be said that German hopes of tiuiil ? victory were extravagant, either as viewed st that time or as viewed in the light of hlatory. Finan cial problems of the allies were diffi cult, supplies were becoming exhaust ed and their armies had suffered tre mendous losses. LMscourugeuient ex isted not only among the civil popula tion but throughout the armies as well. Such was the allied morale that, although their superiority on the west ern front during the last half of 1910 and during 1917 amounted to 20 per cent, only local attacks could be under taken, and tbelr effect proved wholly insufficient against the German de fense. Allied resources In man power at home were low and there was little prospect of materially Increasing their armed strength, even In tho fuce of the probability of having practically the whole military strength of the Central Powers against them In the spring of 191a This was the state of affairs that ex Isted wheu we entered the war. While our action gave the allies much encour agement. yet this was temporary, and a review of conditions made It appar ent that America must make a supreme material effort as soon as possible After duly considering the tonnage pos nihilities I cabled the following to Washington on July 0. 1917: ?'Plans should contemplate sending over at least 1,000.000 men by next May." A general organization project covering as far as possible the person nei Of all combat, staff and admlnls trative units, was forwarded to Wash ington on July 11. Iq this I stated: Needed 1,000,000 Men. "It is evident that a force of about 1,000.000 Is the smallest unit which In modern war will be a complete. well balanced and Independent fighting or ganization. However, It must be equally clear that the adoption of this size forco as a basis of study should not be construed as representing the maximum force which should be sent to or which will be needed In France, ft Is taken as the force which may be expected to reach France In time for an offensive In 1018. and as a unit and hasla of organisation. INuns for the future should be Ivoftm), especially In iflirttni* to the manufacture of artll ?ery aviation and other matt-rial. on three tlme>? this fore**?I. e? at least tt.MNMMNi men " Resolved on an Offensive Before developing plan* for a lino ot communications It was necessary t<? decide upon the probable sector of Uu front for the eventual employment of ^ distinctive American for<*e, our mis slon was offensive and It \vm? essential to'make plans for striking the encm\ where a definite military decision could he (rained. While the allied armies.had endeavored to maintain the . offensive. the British. In order to guard the channel ports, were committed t<> operations In Handera and the French to the portion of the front protecting Paris Both lacked troops to operate elsewhere on a large scale. I To the east the ureat fortified dls iri^t east of Verdun and around Mets menaced central France, protected the most exposed portion of the German tine of communications, that between Mots and Sedan, and covered Hi* Brtey* Iron region, from which ths en emy obtained the greater part of the tron required for munitions and ma terial The coal fields east of Met* were also covered by these same de fenses. ; A deep advance east of Met*, or the capture of the Brley region. b> threatening the Invasion of rich Qer man territory In the Moselle valley and the Saar basin, thus curtailing her supply of coal or Iron, would have a decisive effect In forcing a with drawal of German troops from north ern France. The military and eco nomic situation of the enemy, there fore, Indicated Lorraine as the flelo promising the most fruitful results foi the employment of our armies. The complexity of trench life hart enormously Increased the tonnage of supplies required by troops. Not only was It a question of providing food, out enormous quantities of munitions and material were needed. Upon the railroads of France fell the burden 01 meeting the heavy demands of the 8.500.000 allied combatants then en gaged. If the American army was to have an Independent and fiexlhle sys tem l! could not uw the lines behind the British Ilelglum front nor those In reur of the French front covering Parls^ Chose the 8outh?rn Ports. The problem confronting the Amer i loan expeditionary foro<*{4 'waa then to >?u perl in pose lis rail communications on ihosr of I'nuuc where iluro would be the least possible disturbance to the arteries ?>f supply of ibe iwo great allied armies already in the Held. The | lines selected, therefore, were those leading from the comparatively un used South Atlantic ports of Trance to the northeast, where It was believ ed the American armlet* could ho em ployed to the best advantage. Tor all practical purposes the Amer ican expeditionary forces were based i on the American continent. Throe thou sand iuIIch of ocean to cross, with ths growing submarine menace confront ! ur: us. the quuutity of ship tonnage i that would be available then un-. known, and a line of communications by land 400 miles long from French | port* to our probable front presented [ dlttlcultles that seemed almost Insur j mountnble as compared with those of our allies. In providing for tho storage and dis tribution of reserve supplies an al lowance of 4B days In the base wo | tlons was planned, with 80 days In the Intermediate section, and IB days In I tho advance section. After the safe ty of our sea transport was practical* ly assured, this was reduced to a total of 45 days, distributed proportionate ly. When the armistice was signed all projects for construction had beep completed and supplies were <tn band to meet the needs of 2.000.000 men, while further plans for necessary eon structlou ntid for the supply of nn ad ditional '2.000.000 were well under way. Our Own Fighting Doctrine. A similar scheme was adopted in August, 1017. for our armies. In which tho importance of leaching through out our forces a sound lighting doc trine of our own was emphasized. It provldotj for troop training In all units up to Include .division*. Corps cen ters of Instruction for noncommission ed ofllcers and unit commanders of all urum were established. The array out! corps schools graduated 21.8210 noncommissioned officers and 18,910 officers. Pending the organization and devel opment of our own schools, a Inrgo number of our officers were sent to centers or Instruction of the allied armies. The trulnhig of o\rr earlier divisions was l*gim In close assocl? at Ion with the N>ewh divisions, under conditions sot forth In the following paragraph on divisional training: ?Trench warfaro naturally given prouilucnco to tb? defensive as op* posed to the olfeuwive. To guard against thlis\ the basis of Instruction Nhould he essontluMy the offensive both In spirit and to practice, The defensive Is accepted only to prspgre for future offensive." The long period of trench warfare had so Impressed Mae If upon tbo French and British that they had al most entirely dispensed with training for open warfare. It was to avoid this result In our army and to encour age the offensive spirit that the fol lowlug was published In Octohor, 1917: "The above methods to be employed mttet remain or beeome distinctly our own. "All Instruction must contemplate the .assumption of a vigorous offen sive. This purpose will be empha sized In every pliase of training until it becomes s settled habit of thought. "The rifle and tbo bayonet are the principal weapons of the Infantry sob dler. lie will be trained to a Wgh degree of skill as a marksman. both on ttie tnrget range and in field tiring.. An aggressive spirit must be devel oped milII iho soldier feels himself, as a bayonet fighter, luvlncihle In battle. "All officers and soldiers should realr lie that ut no time In our history has discipline been so Important ; therefore, discipline of the highest order must he exacted at all times. The standards for rhe Ameiicnn army will he those of \Ve?i Point The rigid attention, up* (t'onlimied on font imiro) The milk from a single Roquefort sheep will iii a your provide from SO to 40 pounds of cboese. i Clothes "Whan Grandma tha Dirt Mrnti Ffy" Children are hard enough on clothes let ?lone rubbing them to pieces on a washboard. You don't have to rub with Grandma's Pow dered Soap. No matter how dirty the children get their clothes, Grandma cleans them thoroughly with little effort. Takes the place of both Washing Powder and Bar Soap. Goes farther. Cheaper to use. Only a tablespoonful in the water then rich, foamy, radiant, cleans ing suds, that just roll the dirt out. Baby ;lottae?, childrens1 play clothes, linens ~ancK lawns?Grandma cleans them all perfectly and easily. Buy a package from your Grocer today! The Ease of v the Chalmers Engine Has a Story Quality First W HEN you sit behind the wheel of a present day Chalmers you will long remember the rare ease of its engine. It responds to the slightest call without effort. At high speed you are conscious of no great activity under the bonnet. But you roll along with a certain comfort of mind that is comparable only when you lag along at slow speed and note no "breaking," no "missing," no jerky action?but a quickness, a silence that is smooth and expressive of hign efficiency. There's a story back of this. Most troubles in a car come from vibration. In a Chalmers there is so little vibration as to be negligible. Its crank shaft and reciprocating parts are balanced to a fraction of an ounce, both static and in motion. More than this, Hot Spot vaporizes the raw gaso' line into a "fog," and Ram Vhorn supplies each cylinder with an even "charge." This provides double insurance against vibration, and generates an case of action not often found in a pnntnr rar 1 Once you experience this you, too, will say Chalmers is one of the few great cars of the world. GEO. T. LITTLE Camden, S. C.