The Abbeville press and banner. (Abbeville, S.C.) 1869-1924, February 01, 1918, Page THREE, Image 3
1,500,000 Men Available,
Says Baker
(Continued from Page One)
raa that this war, of all others, was
ot a static thing; that our adversary
ras a versatile and agile adversary;
iat every day he revamped and
hanged his weapons of attacks and
is methods of defense; that the stoies
they were telling us were true
rhen they left England and France,
ut an entirely different thing was
robobly taking place there now,
nd they told us of large supplies of
reapons of one kind and anothez
hich they had developed in France
nd England, and which, even before
bey got them in sufficient quantity
- * - * <1 ? M i.L^
lanutactured to taKe tnem irom uie
ldustrial plants to the front were
uperseded by new ideas and had to
e thrown into the scrap heap.
/'They said to us: This is a moving
icture; it is something that nobody
an paint and give you an idea of; it
i not a statistical thing.
S*nt P?nluc|.
"Therefore it became necessary for
S to have eyes there, instant and
nmediate communication with us,
ad we sent over to Prance Gen.
tershing, and we sent with him not
lerely a division of troops?to that
shall refer in a moment?but we
rat with, perhaps the major part of
ta trained, expert personnel of the
nay. Tou know the size of the of*
Mtmlnr nrmv in
CUkl WVip> W* kuv *^0? ?
aia country when the war broke
nt It was a pitiful handful of
*ained men, and yet it was necessary
> divide them up and send over to
fcvnce officers of the highest quality,
j that they would be at the front
nd see in the workshops and in the
ictories and in the war offices and
i the armies,' where consultations
ould take place immediately back
f'the front?so that they could see
te thing with their own eyes, and
snd us back the details by cable
very day of the changing character
f this war.
Using Ejm of Army.
"Gen. Pershing's staff of experts
ad officers over there runs into the
lousands, and they are busy every
dilute, and every day that the sun
isec-1 get cablegrams from Gen.
ershing from ten to sixteen and
renty pages long, filled with measrements
and formulas and changes
I a mifimeter m size, great long
pcifications of changes in details
\ things which were agreed upon
st week and changed this week,
id need to be changed again next
eek, so that what we are doing at
is end is attempting, by using the
res of the army there, to keep up
what they want us to do."
Of Transient Value.
\ \
"Already you will find in your fur?fr
examination into some of the
treaa work of the department, some
' the divisions, when they come
?wn, you will find schedules which
ere agreed upon, weapons which
ere selected and which we had
sorted o manufacture, have been
far discarded that people have foritten
the names of them almost,
id new things substituted in their
see, and those forgotten and new
UlgD 111 uicu yiavv-o.
"So if one gets the idea that this
the sort of war we used to have,
if he gets the idea that this is a
itic thing it is an entirely erronas
idea, and when you remember
it we had to divide this little hand1
of officers that we had and send
large part of them to France and
to think of those who remained at
me and you will realize, I am sure,
it those who remained here had
i double duty, insufficient for either
^ect of it, in numbers?and they
il have this double dtfty?they
d to go forward with manufacturi,
work out industry, and industrial
ations. They had to see about
Implies of raw materials and manurture
finished products and make
>m day to day alterations and
ingea that had to be made and
Si to be in general conference
iggestions, to see whether
aid devise on this side somebich
had not been thought of
jre.
Had to b? Hotpitibla.
r had to hospitable to sug'
which came from the other
jy had to confer with the forcers
who were here and were
Jy being changed, so that
sh from the front could be
idvise with us, and in accordth
that every one of them
/
______ __ had
to be a university professor, going
out into the life of the community
and selecting men who had mechanical
skill and knowledge and
training and adding to his original
1 equipment the scientific training, that
finishing touch which made him avail'
able for use as a military scientist.
Work of Little Groups.
' "As a consequence, this little
group, which stayed here, have built
the great special department of the
army. The ordnance department
starting, I think, with ninety-three
or ninety-six officers, has now, as I
recall the figures, something like 30,000
officers. They have had to be
trained, they have had to be specialized
and that has had to go on
contemporaneously with this tremendous
response to the changing conl
AM 01/1A
uinuns uu me utuvi o*viw.
"In the meantime, when we started
into this war I think it was commonly
thought throughout the country
that our contribution at the outset
might be financial and industrial.
The industries of this country were
largely devoted at that time, the
appropriate industries and many
converted industries, were largely
devoted to the manufacture of war
materials for our allies.
Going to Market.
"Isuggested this morning when we
went into that market we found it
largely occupied, so that our problem
was not going to a shoe factory and
saying 'make shoa^-for us,' but it
was going to a factory which never
made shoes, because all the shoe factories
were busy making shoes for
people from whom we'could not take
?ni1 aom?w Mnom linw tn malfp
U1CUA) ?UU *115 4VW*<1 MVfT vw mmm*m
shoes ita order that you may make
them for us.'
"Now, of course, that is not true
of shoes, but it is true of machine
guns, it is true of other arms, it is
true of forging capacity, which was
the (greatest defect in the country,
and all this time we had not merely
to disturb the program of allied
manufacture in this country, but we
,had not to cut off the supplies of
raw material to our allied, and we had '
not to disturb the industry of this
country to such an extent that products
upon which they depended for
the success of their military operations
would be interefered with,
both agricultural and commercial,
and industrial products.
The Idea at the Onttet.
"At the outset, the idea was that
we would be of financial and industrial
assistance to our allies during
the year 1918, and I think one can
probably read from the Metropolitan
magazine for August a suggestion
which will show what the current expectation
of the country was. The
editor of the Metropolitan magazine
was protesting against what he
believed to be the intention of the
government at that time."
Here Senator Weeks interrupted
to ask if that was the magazine of
which Theodore Reosevelt is associate
editor. Secretary Baker replied
that Mr. Roosevelt was a contributing
editor, and continued:
Quote* Editorial.
"This magazine came out in August^
1917, and this editorial says:
"Since it is our war, we want to
put everything into it so as to finish
it in the shortest possible time, so that
J ?MM?* UA TA A11V
uic nunu iiuijr uo i vu. * v
mind the whole plan of the War Department
had been flavored with a
desire to hold off until the allies
finish the war for us.'
"You see, the editor was dealing ,
with what he supposed to be the in-/
tfntion of the War Department at
that time, that we were holding off
so for as military operations were
concerned, and letting the Allies do
the fighting .
"What he says we should have
done and I ask your particular attention
to it, is this: 'We should have
strained every energy to have gotten
from fifty to one hundred thousand
men to France this year.'
"That is, the year 1917. I tell
no secret, but it is perfectly well
known to everybody in this group
that we have far exceeded what in
August, 1917, was regarded as a
program so ideal that the editor of
this magazine refers to it as a thing
wnicn WtJ uu^iu IAJ navo gtimiiw siery
nerve in a vain but hopeless effort
to accomplish."
In response to a question by Chairman
Chamberlain, the Secretary said
the United States did not have more
than the minimum number of men
in France in Auguust, 1917. He
continued:
"And then the editor goes on:
"And by next year, 1918, we could
have had 500,000 men to send over,
or any part of 600,000 men, which
we could ship.'
"Now, instead of having 50,000
or 100,000 men in France in 1917,
we have many more men than that
in France, and instead of having
half a million men whom we could
ship to France if we could find any
way to do it in 1918, we will have
more than one-half million men in
France early in 1918, and we have
available, if the transportation facilities
are available to us (and the
prospect is not unpromising) one
and a half million who in 1918 can
hp ahinnpd to France."
Senator Weeks asked whether the
Secretary knew who wrote the editorial
and Mr. Baker said he thought
it was attributed to Mr. Wiggin, the
editor-in-chief.
Quizzed by Chamberlain.
"Why, asked Chairman Chamberlain,
"have you not felt it proper to
let the public into the confidence with
reference to these things that you
are telling now?"
"Senator, I confess that I have
hesitated and I still hesitate," replied
the Secretary. "I have here
a statement from Field Marshall von
Hindenburg, in which he /is quoted
as saying in a German newspaper in
contemptuous fashion of us that we
have advertised our preparations for
this war in an unworthy manner."
"Do you think for a moment, Secretary
Baker," said the chairman,
"that there has been ary time within
the last vear that the German secret
service has not been fully advised as
to everything we have done?",
Germany Mystified.
"Yes, Senator, I know. If I may
rely upon the confidential information
which we get from confidential
/
sources, the German government is
still mystified as to the number of
men we have in France or have had
there at any time."
The chairman said he doubted this.
After some discussion as to the policy
of government in announcing
military secrets Mr. Baker said it was
not the policy of American or other
governments to do so, and added:
. England Wouldn't Tell.
"I am saying this now because you
have asked me why I have held back
these facts until now. ?I am saying
to you that you could not get from
Great Britain this minute?I do not
know whether I could get thfe number
n-f snUiaM fleoQ f Rrifnin Vina in
Ui. OV1UIVA0 VI A. VMW ?? ...w ... |
France or at home. I could get an
approximation; I could get whatever
information might be deemed helpful
to the immediate military object
to be accomplished, but I could not
get from Great Britain or France
either one the Actual number of
troops they have at the front.
"It may be that precaution is unnecessary
and yet that is the precaution
which military men have observed,
and I have no further point to
make in the matter of the number of
troops there than to show, as I was
showing when I read that extract,
that our original intention was to
make our military effort in 1918; and
in August, 1917, a zealous advocate
of immediate military activity
laid down as the maximum obtain'
' ? ?-- ? nrklAVl Kah
HDie program, a uuu^ vrmvu nao
been multifold exceeded.
Wolf at the Door.
"Why did we decide to send some
troops to France in 1917? It is no
secret. When Marshal Joffre came
to this country from France, when
the British mission came from France
they told us of a situation which we
had not up to that time fully appreciated.
There had been in France recently
conducted before that an unsuccessful
major offensive. The
French people had suffered, oh! suf
terea in a way noi oniy our language
is not adapted to describe, but our
imagination cannot conceive. The
war is in their country. The wolf
has not only been at their door, but
he has been gnawing for two years
and a half at their vitals, and when
this unsuccessful offensive had gone
on their was not a spirit of surrender
but of fate, about the French people,
and this mighty military engine
which they had seen prepared to
overcome them for forty years was
at them, and that their attitude was
that no matter whether every French
man died in his tracks, as they were
willing to do, or not, that it was an
irresistable thing, and they said to us
'frankly, it will cheer us; it will cheer
our people, if you send over some ol
your troops.'
"We did send some troops.
Profited by Example.
"At that time we had a choice.
We could have sent over, as Great
Britain, our regular army, and in a
very short preparation have put it
into action and suffered exactly what
Great Britain with her 'contemptible
little army,' as it was called l^y their
adversaries. Our army would have
given as good an account of itself
as the British army did, but it would
have been v destroyed like the British
army, and there would have been
no nucleus on which to build this
new army that was to come over a
little later, and it was deemed wiser
to send over a regular division, but
not to send over our whole regular
army at that time.
"Then what happened was that
the regular division went over and
the people of Franco kissed the hems
of their garments as they marched
up the streets of Piiris; the old veterans,
wounded in this war, legless
or armless, stumping along on crutches,
perhaps, as they went up the
streets of' Paris with their arms
around the necks of American soldiers.
Not a single man in that
division was unaccompanied by a veteran.
America had \gone to France
and the French people werB filled
with a sense of gratitude and hopefulness
that had never been in them
before.
Bound Ibjr Stronger Tie*,
"Of coursu, they welcomed the
British, but their need was not so
groat when the British weiil;. Of
course, they welcomed the British,
but there were ties between them and
us wmcn mere nas not Deen yetween
them and the British, and so when
our troops wont there was an instant
spontaneous rise in the morale of
the French, but an equally instant
and spontaneous insistence tluit these
soldiers who came from America
should continue to come in an unbroken
streamAnd
so, we made the election. We
decided not to send the regular army
as a whole, but to send regular "divisions
and National Guard divisions
selected according to the state of
preparation, and keep back here
some part of our trained force in
order that it might inocculate with
its spirit and its training these raw
levies wnicn we were unuuuiK, ouu
one after another these divisions
have gone over until in France there
is fighting army, an army trained
in essentials and in the beginning of
essentials and in the beginning of
military discipline and practice, and
trained seasoned fighters in this
kind of a war on actual battlefields
where it is taking place.
Engineering Regiment*
"Early in this war, when Joffre
was here, and when Balfour was here
they said to us, 'It may take you
some time to get over to us a great
fighting army, but you are a great
industrial country, our man-power
is fully engaged in our industries
and our military enterprises, send
over artisans, special engineering
regiments and troops of a technical
character,' and although it was
not contemplated at the outset,
and only a phrase in the emergency
military legislation shows that the
thing thought of only as a possibility;
yet in a very snort time we naa organized
engineering regiments of
railroad1 men and sent them over
there and were rebuilding behind
the lines of the British and French
the railroads which were being carried
forward with their advance, reconstructing
their broken engines,
and cars , building new railroads,
both back of the French and British
lines, and those regiments were of
such quality that tit the Cnmbrai
assault carried on by General Byng,
when the Germans made their counter-atack,
our engineer regiment
rtiMw /?nwn +Vipir nirlfQ ariH nnades:
and carried rifles into battle and distinguished
themselves by gallant action
in the war itself.
Nurse* and Doctors.
"Very early in this war, Great
Britain, through Balfour and his as
sistants and France through Joffre
said to us, 'Send us nurses and doc
tors.' Why, before we were ucarce
ly in the war American units organ
ized in advance and anticipation b>
the Red Cross, which was taken ove
into the service of the United State
through the Surgeon-General's of
fice, wereon the battlefield and there
are tens of thousands of men in >
England and France, now bless the
mission of mercy upon the first
-American appearing ivt France.
"Our surgeons have set up hospitals
immediately behind the lines
They have been made military in
every sense of the word. They have
not been, especially fortunate in
escaping attacks from the air, and
thus our early loss in- this war, the
lc>sses of Red Cross nurses and doctors
and orderlies and attendants in
hospitals and ambulance drivers,
who were sent over to assist our allies
in these necessary services, not
only rendering assistance, but acquiring
skill and knowledge of the
circumstances and surroundings, so
that when our own troops came in
large numbers they could render like
service to our own forces. But hat
was not enough. It was suggested
that further troops of mechanics
might be needed. By May we began
to see that we were going to be over
there in large force, and the question
that then had to be answered
was how will we maintain an army
in'France? Special studies had to
be made of that problem, and this
is what they showed:
Need of Railroad*. t
.."They showed that the railroads
and the facilities of France had
during this war been kept in an excellent
condition, or better than any
of us supposed possible under war
conditions. Ana; yet, tnat those
railroads were used to the maximum i
to take care of the needs pf the
French and the British themselves,
and that when our army became a
great army it would be necessary
c
for u? to build back of our own line .
i
an independent line of communica- ?
tion. t
"In other words, France was a s
white sheet of paper, so far as we e
were concerned, and on that we had i
not only to write an army, but we c
had to write the means of maintain- i
ing that army, and from the first c
time; when a careful and scientific b
study of the opportunities of France ?
to help us were made, from that hour J
nnfi'l wo h a uo Konn in a
France facilities, instruments, agon- I
cies, just as many as were here in \
the United States, and more?many t
of them of the same character. For \
instance, the French had naturally t
reserved the best ports in France r
for the British. When we came in it x
was necessary for us to have inde- I
pendent ports for entry in order
that there might not be an admixture
of our supplies through these (
ports of disembarkation with those i
of other nations. We were given
ports. As jtou, perhaps recall, the i
ports of France are tidal oorts. ports e
with deep water and ideal basin at s
high tides, with insufficient water c
for landing at the docks when the i
tide is out. ' c
Docks and Wharves. 9
"As a consequence the construction
of docks and wharVes in port j
of that kind is very much more diffir
cult than where you have a deep j
sea harbor, and all you need to do is ^
to erect a pil? wharf. We have had
to build docks; we have had to fab- j
ncaie in mi? country ana sena over
dock handling machinery; we have j
had to send from this country even
the piles to build the docks; we have *
had to have cranes manufactured in j
this country and sent to be erected .
? A I t
on those docks; we have had to erect .
i
over there warehouses at the ports ?
of disembarkation in order that ^
these vast accumulations of store ^
and supplies which go over can b< ^
properly housed and cared for unti ..
they can be distributed into the in
terior. vf
"We have had to take over and f
are in proce& of rebuilding and am t
plifying a railroad six hundred mile
l&ng, in order to carry our product I
from our ports of disembarkatioi j
to our general bases of operation e
and all of that, gentlemen, has to' r
be done, studied uot as a necessary a
thing to do, but when studied out a
and reported here, the manufactur a
ers for those things,have to be car f
ried on in this country and the s
things shipped over there, nails p
crossties, spikes, fishplates, engines o
cars, building. We have had to builc h
ordnance depot and repair shops and f
great magazines of supply in the I
interior. All that problem has beer
carried forward step by step. The
plans for a single ordnance repair
shop which I taw some tint* ago y
covered acres and acres of ground,
lesigned over here, the iron work
fabricated over here, disassembled,
rat in ships and carried abroad to
>c reassembled over there.
"We have lad to build barracks
>ver there for our soldiers, and in
he meantime to build them arouqd
n the French villages. Building bar-caks
over there and building them
lere is a very different thing, genlemen.
^
"When we summoned the lumber
ndustry of this country to produce
he lumber to build our dwn cantonnents,
it came in a great and steady
itream from all over the country,
>ut when we talk about building
mrracks in France it means this: It
neans to organize, as we have orranied,
regiments of foresters, and
lending them over into the forests
if France which they have assigned , o
us for our use, cutting down
he trees, seting up saw mills, mak
ng the lumber in various sizes,
ransporting it to the places where
t is to be used, and then finally
ising it.
"We have had to go back to the ,
Wanting of corn in France in or.ler
hat we might some time make a
larveat Our operations began in
he foreats of France, / not In the
umber yards, as they did in this
:ountry."
.
ABBEVILLE COUNTY
JAIL REPORT
October 26, 1017.*
Vverage daily population, 7.5 prisoners.
\
Plant, Management, and Equipnent.?The
interior of this jail is
constructed principally of wood. It
s three stories high, the prisoners'
[uarters being on the second and
hird floors to which a single wooden ' 1
taircase leads. The fire hazard is
snormouB, as'we have pointed oat in
>revious reports. It could be re-?
luced somewhat by cutting a hole
n the end of the prisoners' corrilor
farthest from the head qf the itairs,
fitting it with a trap door ' '
ind connecting it with the jailer's
(allway by an iron ladder down the
ide of the wall. This improvement
inn Viapti moH<> in Ao UMcofinl/l
rhich is of praetically the same
ype of construction as the Abbeville
jail. After our second inspecion
the jailer made some improve- ; >
nente in management which enables - /,;
ts to give a higher score. ^
Ucommeadatiom to Shoriff on
a|*nwnt. V
1. As to "Prisoners' Quarters:
Conditions."?The floors in ' the
irisoners', quarters should be scoux;id
regularly once a week, and the
rtankets used by the prisoners washid
regularly once a month. The
ewerage buckets in the prisoners'
[uarters should be sunned and careully
cleaned every'day. Enameled
:overed buckets should be used intead
of the open zinc buclceta now
n the cells.
2. As to "Prisoners' Food and ?. Ceding,"
give the prisoners three
neals a day instead of only two.
Recommendation* to Supervisor and
?ommUaionera on Equipment, Etc.
1. As to "Jail's Equipment and .'
iepair."?Have the windows . and
sxterior doors of jthe jail screened
Replace the mattresses oh which the
irisoners sleep with straw ticks' or
otton pads with canvass slip cove*.
lelp to reduce the fire hazard vat
he jail by having a trap door cut
n the end of the prisoners' corridor
>pposite the entrance, connecting hiB
trap door with the jailer**
lallway on the first floor by an iron t
adder up the wall. This door should
>e arranged to lock on the outside
o that in case the stairs caught on
ire there would be another exit
rom the prisoners' quarters which
he jailer could open.
2. As to "Medical Service."?
5ay the jail physicians to make s
physical examination of all prisonirs
within 24 hours of their comnitment
to ia.il. vaccinate nrisoners
.gainst smallpox when indicated,
,nd to visit the jail regularly once
, week inspecting the prisoners'
ood and quarters besides attending
ick prisoners. Send tubercular
irisoners. whether serving sentence
r waiting trial, to the tuberculosis
ospital at the State Penitentiary
or treatment.
teport Board of Charities and Cor
rections. '
'V\
Pay up your subscription before
our aams is cut of.