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tare "been rite motive, t*he measure was an unwise *nd unfortunate one, deranging the whole internal Kunmerce of the country, producing panic, breaking upexchanges, and destroying credit, at the very tithe" ?fail others, when the country should have been permitted to make (lie best of its rcs-ourcca, without violence or surprise. " ? Mr. K. said he was sorry to see his friends who had voted against this Executive measure throughout, mow coming forward sanctifying an Executive tri umph over tbelesrwative authority, by acknowledg ing their ernyr. f Iljs worthy friend ftom Connecticut had mid thai thonsrh he had- voted uniformly against it, yet rltat it '"might have done some good in saving the bonks.'* This confession of h;s friend was, per haps, a harmless offering to Fxeeutivejx>w*r ; but as he did not approve of sm-h gratuitous henevolen? e at ? i matter o.' such importance tntno country, he must say to hi* friend that he en tirely disagreed with him, itnd mu-t call upon him for some of the beneficial effects of this wise and I salutary measure. The Senator told us himself in j next breath that'the deposite banks, and all other bonks are broken, and that the public money, both ! specie and paper, have become unavailable in tiieir ! vaults. The patient is dead, and yet the treatment is boded; If a quack, in defiance of all remonstran ces, continues his treatment, and the patient dies, we may conjccture that he would have done no better with a different treatment, or without treatment; but how he could have done worse, it is somewhat diffi cult to conceives. This measure, then, condemned . by the Senate, condemned by the Cabinet, condemn ed by the People', afier a fuH trial, condemned by the whofo legislative authority; and condemned by the strong evidences of the mischief it has produced, is persevered in by the Executive, landed for its ** salutary effect*," and w s referred to by one Sen stor (looking at Mr. Benton) as " the glorious specie circular. " [31r Benton. "Yes, the ever-glorious specie circular."] Mr. K. jvith great animation. Ah, yes, it is aii glory and no good. Where are the evi- j deuces of your glory? .Is i here any thing glorious in I the present unhappy condition of the country? Your ' government insolvent and disgraced. Our people branded by foreigners as a nation of fmdulent bank swindlers; your merchants bankrupt; } our umuvB^bttrers Shguisiung inlowness SStt'Clstress; your planters ruined, and two-thirds of rhe labouring population of the United States Utnaientd icitk actual sturm firm. These are the evidences of the u saluta ry" effects of measures we are called on to glorify. Wby^sir, the Senator must have forgotten that glory "has depreciated in the-market. Like paper cnrrency, it has been redundant, and is now almost as much belcw par, as rag money; very much for the same reason* loo. On examination we fin- that neither has had a very solid basis to restupon. So much (said $fr. King) for the glory of this order, f now propose to take a more dispassionate, and belter reasoned view of it as a financial nea jX;. . '? . ? The pbun objection to the circular as a financial measure is, that it did violence to alt the laws of trade and commerce by the forcible interference of the Government. Too easing operations of exchanges, so usefni and necessary in adjusting ascertained bal ances between differvntsections of the country, were suddenly and violently nterrupted. The useful ad monition of an unfavorable balance, as: indicated by fho eaehanfr ?, was not only disregarded, but that Wapce forcibly increased. The destructive tenden cy of such an interference by Government in the commerce of the country has been acknowledged by the Senator from ^Torth Carolina (!tfr. Strange) tho' I thought tho principle might have been better rp ulaed by him. Such measures produce the same ef fects in the same way, whenever and wherever ap plied in a free commercial country; always taking the Ptoopte by srrprise, and" breaking uo the estab hshed order of things. The business of the country it as effectually deranged and disorganized by such violence as is the human system by the destruction of the heart. Commerce has its laws. TTie people study them, and h^ study, observation and experience, become acooatnird with them, to a very great extent, and make their cs'caiaijons and regulate their business accordingly. They always must great ly suffer when forcibly deprived <rf those advantages; and partieu lariy if the force be appfied to a paper or mixed cur rency. Doubtless the evils of a paper currency (though it has some advantages) are very great. I do not know, in many respects, that they are over-esti mated by the Senator from Missouri. I hope he, however,, after the moat lata! experience to the coun try, witt come to -the conclusion that the evils ?f the system. can only bereached by a legislative authori ty that can reach the system itself It ps acknowl edged that we have no power over the system, and yet, hy this Executive lashing and fretting, and ih mi? ig. and torturing, we keep tho counts? .and the curriocy in a perpetual fever, and fluctuation, giving us ail the evils of the system, without its ad vantages Sir, yon might as weft undertake to make a fott-grown intellectual man, with trowel and mortar and regulate tfat circulation ol his blood with a tin ker's tools, *a to undertake to make ar uniform stand ard of value of a paper or mixed, currency, and to regulate Tts fube^ens, as money, by the continual tinkering, and the successive and sudden application ot force oy the iron hand of Government- Sir, you cau'tdo it; you havenot^homaterials nor the. laws for such a consummation. You may do infinite mischief, " but you -w?' never do any good. You may break up iMNtncu, mi rukxthe industrious classes, but you najpaarf to -augr class, except such as know taf to profit by confusion, ?nd speculate on the mis fortunes of their fellow mien. , ?" Ele tan that at the very limevthis strange order was issued, exchange was already sufficiently high linst the & nth west and West, to have made the tr^njmwii inn of specie a profitable operation. This w as seen by the Senate when they wiihsuch unani mity refused to take the responsibility of the measure. *1N| effect as foreseen, was first tu raise the exchan ge*, and then hreajt them up. Why, sir, said be, if l)m who'e currency of the country had been specie, any measure opposing the force of Government to the laws of trade, the practical effect of which should be fcrrecfOirc the actual transmission of specie against therale of exchange, would so far double the exchan es, upon a sstthesaiatical principle, by requiring two transits of specie instead of one. So true is the ope ration of this principle, that even an arbitrary requi sition that the. paper moi.ey alone of the Atlantic seaboard shsttk$ be *eceived for public lands would have produced a heavy effect upon the. exchanges because in the exchanges it would have added to the /fc^ng sido oftiie account. But, sir, when we come to the actual opera?;* n in oaestioa; when we come to take not only money from a point where it is due, and send it to a point -Jjcoos which it is owing ? to lake it from the creditor seqpl it.to> the debtor, but perform this rough aud anti-commercial operation by taking, aw ay the very bases upon which, five-sixths of the cur ency rests, yuu produce effects that can never be arithmetical! y calculaied, aud of which no adequate conception. can be formed, except by witnessing the aetuat effects al most immediately produced by. the. measure on the ^commercial seaboard, and tho?e sections upon which the measure was intended to operate. An ejtact ra tau would coutract the whole currency in the money market, from which the specie is thus.' drawn, in the pro port isn in-which paper is based on specie, there by contracting six millions for every one thus ab stracted, if the pro )ort:on be five paper dollars based on ooe of specie. But we all know that such mea sures do not operate in an exact, but in a loose rati?i, from the apprehension, the confusion, panic and atom which they create, and the commercial cesour ee? they cut off. This measure curs off, to a great extentr ihe resources of the Atlantic "nerchants in tha enormous amount of debt due then* from the West ana Southwest, for it not only unnaturally sent their money frwm t-' etn, but prevented any coming to them. But determining to have some triends to the measure, it has been insisted that although it may have ruined the Atlantic merchants, and done injury to creditors, yet it was a great blessing to the people ol" the West- These people, however, it seems, are not so easily gulled by these forced blessings, for, af ter a <W trial of it, their representatives, with great unanimity, voted last session to repeal it. The able speech of one of their representatives (>Ir Walker) at Che last session, explained to us the nature and op eration of this blessing, and the Legislature of his State had by a resolution, unanimously sustained him. He did not know liow grateful his friend felt for these blessings forced upon bim by the F^xecutive, and which had contributed so largely to bankrupt his constituents; bat for himself, Mr. K. said (to use a rustic phrase) he woukl not like to be funntUed, even with champaigne. But what was its chappy effect" upon the West ami Southwest, whilst it ruined the seaboard ? Was the debtor aidj6d whilst the creditor was oppressed? Not at ail, sir. Whilst this specie was on the voyage of its exile, and after it reached the deposite banks, so (or a* the commercial and planting interests were con cerned, it might as well have been buried jn the raid die of the e- rth, or carried hack to the mines of Mexi &?0. IHd it aid the merchant in paying his Northern and Eastern debts? No; it immediately increased cost to him of such payment, by increasing the of exchange, whils*, at the same time, it closed him all the usual resources of obtaining money > increase in the rate of exchange increased the er of a demand upon the banks by the mer cuauts, whilst they had also to answer the demands of their bill holders, who might want to purchase the public lan-is. What Northern exchange they had was soon exhausted in reducing their circulation, whilst they could not prudently do any busine-s that would place their own usues in the hands of the bu Sins33 part of the community. Against the business p"rl of (lie community, both merchants arid planters, they nere suddenly and effectually closed. I bey t could not payout paper for fear tbat specie would fi>e demanded for it, for the reasons before named. r.They could not pav. out specie or discount for mer chants, because the high rare of exchange and dtffi ttilty of procuring it a*,any price, would have sorted it back in twenty four hours to the section from vi uch it had been nnr.arurally exiled. 1 hey could not pay our specie to the planters, for they owed the mer chants, ami its destinot ion wouhl have been the same. If, then, thev <lid any business at all, they must do it with the purchasers ot public lands, m which tney were secure of a return of the specie depositcs. c cordingly they favoured this class of customers, in order to do anv business at all, and the I resi en 11m self, in his Message, refers to the circular operation by which they contracted many millions of e t UP?" ! a few millions of specie; and yet one p"pu a a I to recommend this measure has been, tha; it was ; aimed at land speculators! . I The measure, Mr. K. said, seemed to have been [ attended with unmitigated mischief E*en , I of public lauds had most probably been increas j f it, before the suspension of specie pn> men s. ^ e ; was no other way of accounting for the ea\j a mount of those sales, after the mania for specu a ion had already begun to decline. Mone> became r aud difficult to procure, and all the public lands in market nery much culled and selected. The depos it banks in the new States had been devoted almost exclusively to the use of speculators, as before stated, and moreover, a great number were induced to go in to the business after the adoption of the order, who otherwise wonld not have thought of it. urs, e said, is an enterprising, speculative People; and whenever Government commns an error, or adopts an unusual measure, they begin to th nk what can be made of it in a financial point of view^ According ly, the impression was very general that this mea sure wonld greatly check purchases, and that the monopoly of these whp would raise specie tor the purpose would be mtatch more valuable Inini " ^ step had been taken to destroy competition. He said he knew of several himself who collected their capi tal, turned ij into specie, and went into the business, who, but for tbe-order, would not have thought of it. Forthese reasons, an intelligent gentleman from the West had given it to him as his opinion, that the sales had been much increased by the operation of t e order, and he (Mr^K ) believed it. If, then, it were so desirable to check the sales of the public lands, the object had failed: even the President acknowledges in his Message, that the effect of the order in that particular bad been overestimated. But this was not the object of the order. The object of the order was to prop up a few tottering deposite banks, against the combined but salutary operation of th? distribution law?aad a heavy exchange. The President, or his advisers, saw that some of the deposite banks in the West and Southwest had expanded enormously, and were in a precarious condition, and exchange already sufficiently high to endanger demands on them for specie; and he feared that, when asked also for a por tion of the public money, they would explode and eive a triumph to his enemies, by the failure of his favorite experiment. He determined to sustain them at every hazard, and without a sufficient regard to the interests of the people. Did he succeed in this object? No. On the contrary, in this last grand coup d'etat , or, rather, coup <T argent to sustain his ex periment, by succoring a few tottering pet banks, he broke the whole; yes, sir, broke the whole; for, al though I do not intend to attribute to this order more importance than it deserves in bringing the country into its present condition, yet I have not the remotest conception that we should have had a general sespen sion of specie payor ents, and a national bankruptcy, but for the adoption of this order. He said he be lievecLhe could prove this to the satisfaction of all who would listen to the facts, and impartially attrib ute to human passion its natural agency in stimulating human action. - What then would probably have been the condi tion of the country, if this measure had never been adopted? It was, before the adoption of the order, in a diseased, bloated and feverish condition, entirely at the mercy of our foreign creditors. The Bank of England had already taken steps to prevent the fur ther .extension of our credits there, and by the ad vance in the rate of interest had stopped our credit drain upon their bullion, before or about the time the order west into operation. This raised the value of money on the seaboard, where the European debt was owing. Credits to Western and Southwestern b inks, and individuals, which had been greatly ex tended by Northern and Eastern banks, had been checked, and balances were expected to aid in ad justing the foreign debt. This debt, every intelligent merchant saw, must now press upOn us to a very considerable extent. .The foreign exchange would have pressed upon the seaboard; the seaboar ' would have pressed tipon their Western, Southern, and Southwestern' debtors. Much of the specie of the banks of .this section would have gone back to the seaboard, 'from which it had been taken, and gone to Europe, from which it had been first borrowed. We should have had a pressure, some bankruptcies among merchants* and many failures among specula tors*, many of tWwin, however, never had any thing and therefore <ponkl loose nothing but their credit. A great number.' of imprudent and unsound banks would also ha^e exploded, as they should have done: and the impuqtfes of the system would have run off. Many of :hese bank* were mere fancy affairs ? the mere funguses of the Treasury ? built up without capital, and m$B9ged without prudence. Banks that could not sustain themselves under the legitimate operations of tsade and commercial demand, should have been permitted to stop. The public good, and even of prudent and solvent banks, required it. What signified a- few millions of unavailable funds, in a few imprudent deoosi'te banks (even if this measure had saved them, ishlch it had not,) compared with the mischief and loss resulting from breaking up the ex changes, destroying credit, choking up the natural channels of commerce, and preventing the resources of ike country from flowing to those points where the demands of commerce required them? The con dition of rne country was known, and the necessity of preparing for a heavy revulsion began to be felt. As usual, however, in the financiering of the ex-Pre sident; what was raised by unsuccessful experiment, must be torn down by passion. Never, at any period in our history, did we so much need the privilege of making the besiof our resources by a free and undis turbed circuki ion of our means. Because the patient was diseased by experiments, was this a reason that he could not be killed by quackery? His condition required the greater care, and a freer circulation; but the President's remedy wus like turning the patient heels upwards to cure "him of the apoplexy; or put ting him to the rack, to reduce a paroxysm of the fe ver. Fifteen millions Of Specie ? perhaps much less ? shipped precisely at the time, from the points and at the rates which should have sent it to meet our fo reign debt, would have satisfied our foreign creditors for ihc present, maintained the value of our exports, and given us time to meet the balance, by economy and another crop. - < - Men are operated upon by the same passions, whether acting in numbers or as individuals. If one man, by extravagance or bad management, becomes indebted to another more than he has immediate means to pay, but honestly acknowledges the debt, pays down, with punctuality, all the ready means he has to spare, and asks for time to collect his means, and make another crop, the indulgence will be gran ted. Hut if hp insultingly tells the creditor he had no business to trust him ? that this debt shall not be paid, and adopts measures to run off his means into the wilderness, tokeep his creditor from getting hold of them., oaenly boasts of the tricks by which the creditor is thus defrauded ; the latter immediately stops all- cxetlif, .and, instead of receiving j>ark demands tfe vtfhole, and resorts to the rao>t summa ry and violent process tocollect the debt. This was 7>redsely the relation between England and this country when this order went into opera tion. The Bank of England ascertained early in 1836 that the United States had been draiuing them of their bullion 4iton credit.'' They adopted the most gentle means in their power to restore the ex changes and bring back a part ofthdr bullion. The drain was stopped, but nothing or but very little re turned to them. By the adoption of the circular, specie was drawn out of active circulation tc a great extent , and bore a premium which drexoit in the wrong direction. This premium in the West was at one time 5 and 10 per cent. It was drawn from the com mercial points by some to sell to small dealers ; all emigrants drew and carri^ it, besides what was drawn by others for larger speculations. But it was not omy "carried ojf by a premiiun in the wrong direc tion, but that which was. so carried off, and all other specic, was lockfd up and prevented from flowing to the points where it was required. What was the result? Why, the usual rate of exchange did not carry off the specie except to a very small extent. While t he foreign exchange pidled one way, the strange policy of the President was pulling theoiher; and exchange was l^ur 14 per cent before the suspension of specie payments. Our enterprising merchants saw iheir danzer from this unnatural warfare against them, but still continued manfully struggling to save their own credit and the honor of the nation. This fact shows how unjust and cruel have been the charges heaped upon the merchants, of conspiring against their own country by a run upon the banks. They con -pired to prevent a run, as appears by the premiums they con sented to pay for exchange, rather than demand spe cie. Even their interests, in fact, is a sufficient an swer ro the reckless charges which have been made against them. Well, sir, vvc left England hi expectation of getting s mie remittances to restore a part of the money we had borrowed frotti her Those remittances, b.owever} i were maile to a very trifling; extent. ./? the mean I tune, the President and his friends were boasting of the wise policy , of the President , in forcibly preventing the operations of exchange, and preventing the pay ment ~bf our foreign debt. This circular, with the euMgioms on this "wise policy," reached England, and the enemies of the Bank of England began to taunt them with the imnotcncy of the means they had adopted to get back the gold which it was alleged their own mismanagement and want of foresight had suffered to be drawn from them. The temper inspir ed by this measure, and the taunts and boastings which followed it, was natural enough, and may be seen by the language of the deputy Governor of the bank. It will be recollected that it i< admitted on all hands that it was the last actibn of the Bank of England on American credits that produced our sus pension- If T prove that this action wasm-de neces sary, or provoked by the specie circular, and what followed it, I have fully established my conclusion from admitted premises. What says this officer of the bank in reference to the vnporings of the debtor who tricks and defies his creditor instead of paying him, or showing a willing n^ss to pay him ? I will read to the Senate his own words. Mr. King then read from a late English pamphlet written by Horsley Palmer, the deputy Governor of | the bank, in answer to the charges of Mr Lloyd : "In answer to the fifth objection, it is to be stated I that no expectation was intended to be held out that gold would return from America so long as it proved more advantagf oils to ship silver; but the expecta tion meant to be conveyed was, that notwithstanding all the bombast of the American President, bullion would shortly return to Europe from the United States, and that belief is now in the course of being fulfilled by the daily expected arrivals of silver, with which gold is procurable in the markets of Europe " The "expected arrivals of silver," or gold either, however, did not come, or almost were very trifling. "Our modern financiers had put a clamp upon it, with about as much wisdom as would have been indicated by seizing upon and stopping the exportation of our cotton when more valuable in Europe than here. The principle of expediency is precisely the same. There was one mode by which we could be crushed in an instant. It was "to blow upon American credits" when offered for discount or rediscount by the Amer ican houses, or the joint-stock banks. This wag postponed to the last, from the disastrous consequen ces apprehended to the manufacturing interests. The temper displayed in the above extract, however, will show that they were ready to do that, if abso lutely necessary, to prevent an insulting triumph. The "bombast" and the circular were continued ; "the bank blew on Americon credits;"' our whole foreign debt came upon us at once ; a panic wjs pro duced ; a short struggle was made by the merchants; but a run upon the banks followed ; they suspended ; the Government suspended ; the nation became bankrupt ; and we are now assembled to contemplate the wisdom and glory of turning the commerce of a country upside down to make it proper, and btiry ingits resources to enable it to pay its debts- Who cannot plainly see from this connexion of facts and inferences, causes and consequences, that this un wise interference with the finances produced the action of the Bank ol England which is admitted to have produced the suspension I This is all plain enough, but an effort is made to draw our attention from the true causes by crying out conspiracy ; yes, a conspiracy between our merchants and English bankers and the bank of England, to defeat the exe cutive policy ! ! Never was a man so beset with plots and conspiranes as our venerable ex- President.* Whenever a new financial system explodes, or one of his experiments fails, he insists it is the result of a vile combination against him arid his policy, and calls upon the democracy to rescue him from the hands of his enemies. Now, the. interest of the par ties is a sufficient guaranty against this, and it again most unfortunately happens to Be contradicted by a known and notorious historical fad ; the bank applied to Government to drive American secu-ities out of market / They were saved by the liberals. A cu rious conspiracy this ; ?nd rather an unprofitable one, too, methinks, for merchant and bankers to engage in John Bull will probably loose twenty five or thirty millions by it. But, (continued Mr K ).we are told of frequent convulsions before. Unfortunate references, Mr. K. thought, for those who made them. What were they when compared to the present 1f That of 1819 arose from too hasty an effort to restore the confu sion into which the finances had fallen under 'the State hanks; thai of 1825 was known to have been brought upon us by England ; and was short in du ration ana comparatively trifling in consequence^ ami what was that of 1832, that is so much harped on ? Why, but for the diligence of gentlemen in looking up evidences of these great revolutions , they would not have been known orre collected out of the seaports, and hardly there. He recollected some short paragraphs in 1832, alluding rather timidly to the "rattling of specie in Wall-street this continue ed a few days, about five millions were shipped; the Bank of the United States drew bills for about an equal amount ; the foreign creditor was satisfied, and the panic ended. We had then no Executive financiering, no specie circulars ; trade was left in the hands of its lawful gjiardians ,* specie went off when the rate of exchange required it ; and, by the prompt payment of fixe rnulions, the Bank of the United States gof the nation a credit for the balance , rzhich was paid by the crop and a diminished import. Vet such had been the nature of the warfare against the bank whilst in life, and now against its ghost, that his friend from Connecticut, in the next breath after having praised the circular, made a fu rious attack upon the bank, for interfering with the laws of trade in 1832, and preventing the export of specie to the whole amount oj the foreign debt How this argument was to be reconciled with the specie circular and the whole "policy" and arguments by which it has been lauded and justified* Mr. lv? would leave to the Senator and the iriends of that measure to settle among themselves. This charge against the bank, he thought, carried the true doctrine to the opposite extreme. A. demand for a cash bal ance always admonishes the nation that it has over traded ; and unless it has the whole amount to spare, it is frequently an advantage to pay a part and have time to adjust the balance. He thought then the bank had done well in 1S32 to pay what was required in specie, and get the nation credit for the WuaDCC until the crop of exports could be sold. It Was fre quently of advantage to an individual, he said, when he had become unexpectedly indebted, to pay what ready money he had, and get credit for the balance until the sale of his crop ; and one advantage of a national institution was, that itn credit alwajs ena bled it in such circumstances to get indulgence for the nation , as a friend wis sometimes useful in get ting credit for an individual. Sir, said he, the late of this institution was most extraordinary. If Mr. Biddle expanded, he was bribing the country : if he contracted, he was ruining the country : if he ex ported specie, he was conspiring against the country ; if he stood up, he was impudent: if he sat down he was suspicious : if he lay down, he was useless : and whenever he made a move, whether he crossed above or below the executive, he equally muddled the waters. ' lie thought the Senator from Connecticut had made another mistake in stating that the expansion of the bauk occasioned the speculative rise in prices, and our importations of 1831. The over-importation preceded the expansion, and the expansion wasavow edly intended to circulate the increase ot commodi ties occasioned by the over-importation. The specu lative rise, and over-importation of 1831, were _ow in,r to a cause as natural as the ebb and now of the tides, and almost as periodical . They arose from the preceding low prices, which had stimidatedj-qtl sumpfiofr, awrextvatrsred the stock* m fluctuations are always going on in every nation to some extent, and arise from the impossibility of keeping up, in the extended business of a nation, an exact 'elation between supply and demand. Mr K said the United States Bank, though no longer in' existence, had been the theme of every elf, Ionian who had addressed the henate. He "should say no more of it than was necessary to justi fy and defend himselt and the numerous friends of the administration who had believed in the utility of that institution. IIw defence although that institution was established by the demo cratic party, every friend of it is placed, in sweeping denunciations, among aristocrats, rogues,an conspi rators; ranked with the "B.dclka and th Bann^ and the banks," and set upon m full cry by dunces and demagogues, anxi .us only to turn attention from their own mischievous blunders and errors. When he came to maturity, he said, he found the Bauk of the United States in successful and happy operation. He learned its history, and found hat it was established by the party to which he had always been attached, with the immortal Ma*1155?11 at head ; who after fatal experience had changed his opinion on the subject This paternity recommend ed it, but reflection as well as experience convinced him of its great utility as a financial agent to the Government, as an aid to internal and external com merce, and a wholesome regulator of an otherwise unregulated paper system. As an original he was and ever had been oppose, to the whole pa per system, but the system certainly had many ad vantages in a free country, and moreover was lixecj upon 5s, and no one ge oration either could or would I bear the sacrifices it would cost to get rid of it. And (added he) tho progress we should make in getting rid of the system and its abuses, by putting do\\ n the Bank of the United States, was predicted by me in the Senate in 1834. , Sir, the great Temperance President, or temperance reformer, Mr. ueiavan, : who sends us so many temperance papers, raiyut just as well have undertaken to ertcodragc the cause of temperance in which lie is engaged, by breaking up one respectable grocery in Chesnut street^that he might raise up 500 grog shops m the Liberties, the villages, and the Western wilderness. He thought it the part of wisdom not to waste itself on impractica ble extremes, but to seenre the blessings of the sys tem, and avoid as many of its evils as possible. 1 his be thought was best effected by a national bank, with the aid of the Treasury. The vast extent ot our country gave full time to such an institution to lop off redundancies and fill up deficiencies fin notice of an irregularity in the currency in any particular sections before trie effcct became general. It was clearly the interest of such an institution to perform these duties faithfully. Its own successful operation in a great measure depended 0:1 it; which was the best guaranty to the public that they would be so performed. He also believed that the money of the nation could be entrusted to no agency so little dan gerous to liberty, or s ? unlikely to use it for political purposes. Experience proved the truth of this opinion. We hail again the best of all securit y that is. the srruritif of interest. To ensape in politics, or unite itself with a political party , is dratli to the insti tution. What evidenro had been shown, or could I be shown, that the bank ever hinted an interference with politics, until it supposed the Executive to make an overture for that purpose? In 1829 the K*?cu" tive commenced a correspondence with the bank to procurc a change in the President of the Hampshire branch. He did not say that any thing improper was intended by the Executive, but it was the first interference of the kind, and the bank sup posed it to be an attempt to inlist it in politics, and unite the power of the bank with the power ot the Government. It declined on the ground that the bank never had and could not now think of interfer ing in the politics of the country. The rest is known. The Message followed wilh a charge of what no body had ever heard o! before, and recommending a Treasury bank, uniting the power and patronage oi a bank to that of the Government. From that time forth the Executive continued to struggle for the money power until it took possession of it in 1833, by the removal of the depositee. I only mention these facts, sir, to prove the great reluctance with which such an institution will always engage in politics.? Its interest requires the custom and friendship ol both political parties, and it cannot prosper against a war by either The money power of the 1 reasury is great, let it be lodged where it will; but for the reasons stated, I believe it is less in a national bank, connected icith and dependent on the busnuss of the country , than in any other. There was no danger of the political influence of a bank, if the Executive would let it alone. Some adm'tted that the bank had been improperly attacked, but that, being attack ed, it had over-issued and otherwise mismanaged in its struggles for a re-charter. This might be true to so me extent, but, if so, it is more an objection to the direction than the institution, and might be prevent ed by a simple provision in the charter, which the old charter ought to have contained. Sir, these are the opinions I have always enter tained, and were the opinions of my then colleague, when I came into the Senate : they were known to our constituents. But as this was a matter of expe diency, on which" they had a right to judge, they expected to be, and shall be, represented ; and their wishes, when I last heard from them, were against a national bank. In fact, although I believe it un fortunate that the old bank was destroyed, the ques tion of establishing a new one, at this time, is a very different question. Under our anti-bank administra tion, the bank oapital has been much more than doubled, m a few years.. Is it expedient to add to It? If so, the practicability controlling it, by a national bank of permissible size, and the manner 01 doing it, are important questions. The present rate of exchange, too, would render it difficult to procure specie lor the institution, and create a demand lor it, that would, for the present, add to the distress. There .were some other reasons that had been refer red to/but.which he would not, at this time, notice. But, we are gravely told, sir, that the Bank of the United Stat??, with its 'still greater strength, has not been able to prevent the present state ot affairs ; that it 'has not been able to check other in stitutions, or save itself.' " This reference to the bank would have done very well for a party news paper ; but I must confess I was somewhat astonish ed to find it in a message of the President of the United States. Can it be supposed that the most ignorant can be deceived by this catch at ?, ^an?e ? Whoever thought of holding the Bank of the United States responsible for the currency, or as a financial regulator, after the withdrawal of its branches, ot even after the removal of the deposites. What - ligation was it under to the publick, after the pu ic had taken away thedepositcs and dispensed with its services? Was it under any very strong obligation, if it had the power, to aid the Executive m an expe riment made at its expense, and intended for its des truction? I should think not; and to hold a ? ate bank responsible, becaus it is called the Bank the United States," is absolutely ridiculous. It has fallen into line with the multitude of State banks, created under the late Administration. It has ported his "policy" by importing specie on credit, that it might hatch more paper upon it. It has glo ried in the confusion of the'exchanges, by which l has made millions. In short, ? like the rest of the State banks, it has gone for making money ; it has joined its fortunes with the State banks; it has bor rowed specie like the State banks ; has expande with the State banks; has shaved with the State banks; has failed with the State banks, anc is a S ate bank, and yet it is held responsible to the country as a national bank. Sir, it is no more a United States bank, and not so much as the little Burlington bank, which produced such a happy effect with a modicum of the spoils sent to it, and pressingly sent for more to operato on the elections, 4lin-anticipation of the wool clip. There is a Lnited ?States Bank for ye , established by the Executive to pre vent the public mony from being employed to operate on the politics of the country ! Why, then, these valiant charges upon a ghost; this war upon a sign : these tilts upon a tombstone? ^ They are about as useful, and about as retinal, as the charges of the redoubtable Don Quixotte upon [ the windmills. . f ? u In connexion with these perpetual efforts to frigh ten us with ghosts and "things that are not, Mr. K. said he had never had his democratic feehngs so shocked as they had been by a sentiment of the Sen ator from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun,) ? applauded by his friend near him, (Mr. Strange.) \V e were told that though expedient, we should not make this State bank a depository, "beaiuse it would I be a triumph over the Government. nrthe ment? The "Government at the Hermitage s or the Government at the White House? These Govern ments were both, to be sure, supposed to be inimical to the present State bank, because they did not like Mr. Biddle, its president, who was formerly president of the national institution. But what had the Go crnment had to do with the present State institution? He had supposed, until lately, that th? meant the legislative power, as established by the Constitution ; and if the people trough their repre sentatives, according to the forms of theConsututmn, should deem it expedient to make any State fjw'jjn tion a depository, it would be no objection with jura that either the ex-President, or present Executive, - was supposed to be inimical to one of its ojficere. 1 oo not propose (said he) to make this institution a epoe itory, and nobody has proposed or thought of propo sing it, so far as 1 know. Why, then, this war whoop against it ? To show our devotion to the sup-^ posed Executive will ? "A change, what a change, has been produced in the tone ot American ieeling by these violent encroachments and recent triumphs of the Executive over the Legislative authority, in finances! All ey#s are turned to the Executive. The spirit of our lathers has tied, i ne blood of '76 has run out. Sir, there have been more gray hairs brought upon the head of our yonth fiil and vigorous Republic in the last four years, than ought to have grown upon it in one entire century of quiet and peaceful administration, with the consti tutional co-operation of the legislative departments. My friends'need not be astonished at the freedom with which I express these sentiments. They be lieve with me, they have acted with mo. We heve vainly s-tood up together against the will of the Exe cutive. Our efforts have been impotent. We have been trampled under foot. The Executive has had his way, and we see the result- I only wish my friends to join mc in taking a firm stand to teach the Executive that his friends are to be consulted in measures of such unmense importance to the People asthos. by which finances have been ruined. I have no idea of destrting them, sir ; they need not apprehend that. 1 am Oaly expressing freely senti ments I and they have entertained, and not very carefully concealed. 1 am . party man, sir. All I am as n politician I was made ^ by party. I have no sympathies wilh any other pari; except that with which I have always acted, and ijy which I have b.-en honored. I respect my polity opponents as my fellow citizens, living under the s^e laws, sub ject to the same Government, and equal., honest and oat riot ic with myself. But I differ wt* them in some of the essential and fundamental yinciples upon which our Government should be admii:slered, and have nothing to expect from them. I am a democrat, a real democrat. Jdonotm.?e the profession ad captandum ; I fear it is becon*l ? rafher unpopular; but my early habits and youth - fill associations made me so. In fact, the sent | !vas planted in my heart by nature, cultivated by education, and approved by reason. I be heve a de mocratic Republic to be the most philosophical gov ernment, and best calculated to develop the energies and sustain the dignity of ir.an, so long as the pco pie havo sufficient intelligence to qualify them for self-government. I. therefore, abhor tyranny and irresponsible power in every possible form in which it can be presented ; whether it be presented in the hypocritical garbof republican homespun, or tinsell ed over in the glittering trappings of royalty. I go for a strict construction of the Constitution, limited Executive patro* age, and an economical administra tion of the Government ; and you will never find me here, sir, with democracy and economy upon the lips, and tyranny and plunder in the heart. "I borrow no false liveries from heaven to serve the devil in." Mr. K. after some further remarks, concluded this branch of the subject, by saying, that he had full confidence that the President, when some present difficulties were removed, would admir.ister his de partment with wisdom and patriotism, and he hoped and expected to be able to give him his feeble sup port. Hut he just wished to tell him now, that if he intended "to trend in the footsteps" of his predeces sor in trampling on the legislntive authority, in the management of a subject of all others of the most importance to the people, he should feel it his duty to jostle him out of them. He never would consent, he said, to surrender the finances to the exclusive control of the Executive. If we did this, we should share the fate of every other nation who had sub mitted to Executive financiering : we should first become a nation of beggars, and then a nation of slaves. >Ir. K. said he had been led on to a length alto gether unexpected to himself, and he feared tiresome to the Senate. Several other topics had been sug gested by the remarks of other gentlemen, that* he would like to touch, but he would dispense with them, and come to a conclusion, after a tew words more upon the bill and amendment under conside ration. As to the separation from the State tbanks as depositories, he conceived that a matter of no great consequence, if in the details we could provide safety to the money, and guard against too much patronage and expense. But, the bil he thought im perfect and obscure on both these points. And when we had passed the bill, we should have but little idea of what we had lione As to the amendment proposed, which restricted the receipts of the Government to gold and silver, he could never consent to think of it, without hear ing from his constituents, so Ion* as tepecie is not the common currency, used by the people in the busi ness transactions of the country. They are never prepared with a currency not in common circulation, and would often and truly be r^m nded of the o man quators, who were in the habit, among otl,*r acts of tyranny, of demanding partiaMir kiiutso^ money for the purposes of extortion. Here, 11 uuu specie gatherers, demanding a currency not iurnish ed the people by their own States, or by the ordina ry circulation, will give them more trouble th?ILa11 , their oilier pecuniary transactions, and, being diner ent to the demands made upon them for State taxes, will give to the Federal Government an alien char acter of tvranny and oppression. He could not con ceive, he said, of a measure better calculated to give to the Government of the Union the appearance ot a foreign Government, and alienate the affections ol the people from it, than the measure proposed. But, we are told that the Government only de mands the constitutional currency, and theretore only asserts a right. This is true, sir; but is itt e part of practical wisdom to exert all the power we have, and assert all the rights we claim. _ ftvery man has a right to demand specie at all ,,me8 *or every sale he makes, and for every debt due nun. But suppose every body were to do it, wh;lst pipe. is the common currency, what wonld become ot the country? ... Suppose all the merchants of a single city were to suddenly demand specie for all dues from their cus tomers for sales made and to be made, they would only assert a right : and yet what would be the re sult? The effect would be such upon their debtors and dealers, that they would probably mob the mer chants out of the city. You propose that the Gov ernment shall do that with the people which people dare not do with each other Look at the conduct of the people towards the banks ever since they nave stopped payment, and specie is at a large premium : d<- they assert theirrights, though they have every inducement to do so? I will refer to my own ?tate as a strong argument to dissipate theoretical ^eau ties bv practical consequences. There the banks are by law compelled to pay 18 per cent, on a refu sal to pay specie. They are good, and every bill holder could get his principal and bis 18 per cent, in specie , if he were to demand and insist on it. IV o man of capital could make so good an investment as to get a large sum in Augusta bank bills, make a de mand, and hold them till the bank resumes specie payments. Yet nobody does this; and why. Bo cause they are all friendly to banks? Not at all, sir It is because they are frightened at a view of the con sequences, and yield their own to the interests of the community. They know that if specie is forced from the banks, the banks will have to force it from the merchants, and the merchants from the planters and the great mass of consumers ; and, before the matter wound up, its effects Would %e equal to the confiscation of one-third of the property of the coun try. The laborious and indsutrious chsses consu tute the debtor class, which are much the most nu merous, and much the most needy. On this class the sacrifice would ultimately^ tall. The "benefits would be confined to a few creditors, capitalists, end money-lenders. And the measure you propose (said Mr. K.) will operate precisely in ?e mancer I have described, though perhaps not $o->he same ex tent. It will do to talk about and speak about here, and some people may think welldf'if, whilst they think it is only going to put rti6 merchants to a lit tle trouble; but when they -find, from experience, that the merchants are only their factors , and the operation falls on them, they will be prepared tor a more practical view of the subject. Mr. K. said he was, to-, be sure, opposed to the banking system, particularly its abuses. Bat the People had established it, become accustomed to it, and it now seemed oedesniryto their business and prosperity. He saw" rto reason or expediency in taking away the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury to receive the notes of specie paying banks ?when they resume, disburse them lor Government purposes at the points where collected, and call on the banks for balances, when necessary for transfers of the Government funds from the points where col lected, to the points where needed. Mr. K. here commented upon the estimates which the Senators from Missouri and North Carolina had put upon current bank bills, and the losses which the bill-holders had sustained by the suspension ot specie payments. They seemed to estimate ^the actual value of a bank bill by the proportion^ ^ which the specie in the vaults of the banks bore to the ag gregate of circulation and deposites ; as though the banks had no other means to pay their liabilities but specie. In this way the Senatofs make out the loss of the People by the banks to be immense. ConW there be any advantage in propagating errors so palpable ? As a practical question, so far from the bill-holders having lost, they had generally gained fry the suspension. Mr. K. here discussed the nature and purposes of money. Money said he, represents com modities Its uses arc to command them at pleasure, and circulate them with convenience. Whatever answers this purpose, answers the purposes of money. Its value depends on the quantity of commodities u unit command , and this again depends on the rctaftcn which the quantity of money bears to the quantity oj commodities. ? . The active circulating medmm has been greatly re duced in quantity since the suspension, not only by withdrawing specie from circulation, which has be come a commodity, but by a redaction of ban* paper and hence it is that current bank paper is now much more valuable than gold and silver was before the sus pension, whilst the whole' currency Tioth piper and spe cie , teas depreciated by its redundant quantity. Are the passions and prejudices of men to be wrought upon when their senses may direct them ? Do we not know as an admitted tact, that, current bank bills are more valuable now than before the suspension . Let me ask one of these suffering bill holders what he wishes to do with his money wnich he held at the time of the suspension ? Does he owe a debt . If go, his creditor will be glad to receive it, and expects nothing else. Does he wish to buy provisions for his family ? If so, he gets them cheaper than he could before the suspension of specie payments. Does he wish to buy real estate or stocks ? If so, he can get them from 30 to 50 per cent, cheaper than he could before the supension of specie payments. In short, there is no purpose for which money is used, for which bills are not now more valuable to the holder than before the suspension, whilst the whole curren cy was depreciated by its quantity, except for the pay ment of a foreign debt. Those, then, who clamor most about their losses have lost nothing, but gene rally gained. The merchants sustain the whole loss that is sustained, for they receive it from their debtors at par, and have to pay a premium for specie to pay their foreign creditors. Strictly and logically speaking, Mr. K. said paper was now depreciated, when now compared with bv the amount of premium on specie, because we had no other legal standard to go by. All he ?>eant to say was, that paper was more valuable nm than spe cie was before the suspension, and, therefore, the holder had lost nothing. So glaring ^ the fallacy of estimating the lass of the community by the diffe rence of specie in their vaults and the liabilities of V banks, thnt the community owed the banks more the banks owed the community. Each has a specie; and with a little time for adjust menv, the^banks could kettle every dollar against them w?j^out**^Jlar in specie. He did not wish to be understood as a^i^jjigor even apologizing for an irredeemable bank paper, it was too precarious and subject to fluctuation- But as practical legisla tors, we should view things as they are, and he could see no expediency in endeavoring to impose such fallacieson an already excited community. Mr. K. concluded by saying that he had no wish to postpone discussion, and. therefore, was indifferent as to the present fate of his motion But as he did not like either project, as presented, and wished time to dieest a better , he could not consistently make any other motion, and, therefore, moved the postpone ment of the whole subject to the first Monday in December next. From the Maditonion , THE UNTRIED 44 EXPEDfENT." The sub-treasury system is not an untried expedient. Its principles have been tested by the General "Government, and by one of the States, and found by both to he so defective, asKo make it indespensibly necessary to aban don it. Under the administration of General Wash ington, the principle was adopted of allowing the public moneys, as they were collected, to remain in the hands of the individual col lectors and to be by them deposited in banks to their individual credit. During this ^fceri od, many and large defalcations took place among the officers ef Government. "The col lector of the City of New York, a revolution ary officer of high and irreproachable char acter, became a defaulter to a large amount, not by fraudulently , appropriating the Gov ernment money to his own use, but by a mistaken feeling of indulgence to others who borrowed it. The same result took place with the collector at Boston; and so fatally did this system wolrk'to the prejudice of tEeTToveni ment, and the ruin of individual character, that by an order from the head of the Trea sury, the principle was changed, and the pub lic money was ordered to be dBpOSlfed in The banks to the credit of the Government, to be subject to the drafts of the Treasurer. Thus was the measure tried by the Government, and thus did it fail, and was abandoned.' In the State of Virginia the system was tried, and most signally did it fail. Two of the most distinguished gentlemen of that State were in succession appointed Treasu rers of the State, and having custody of the whole revenue, they both proved to be defaul ters to large amounts, and the sequel' was as tragical as the event was mournful. Virginia abandoned the measure, and ordered the pub lic money to be deposited in the banks to the credit of the State, where it has always been safe, and where the trust has been performed with scrupulous fidelity to the entire satisfac of the Commonwelth. All this is a practical Qommentary upon the Sub-treasury scheme, now so pertinaciously urged upon the coun try, which ought not to be disregarded. 'Hie truth is, the system is demoralising; the temp tations are too many and too strong for th? frailties of man, and we should be admonish ed by the devine principle which teaches us to ask, 4 'lead us not ii^ temptation." The more we reflect upon this *ubjeot,and the more we learn, ttemore confirmed are we in the soundness of our opposition to it. From ' he New York Journal of Commerce , Oct. 15. FOURTEEN DAY^ LATER FROM EUROPE. By the Packet ship Orpheus, Capt. Burs ley, we have received London papers to Sept, L5th, and Liverpool to the 16th, both inclu sive. The dates are fourteen days later than jjefore received. The two armies in Portugal had an engag ment Aug. 28th, in which it appears that the Queen's forces were victorious, and Gen. Sal dana, commanding the insurgents, immedi ately /etreated. He was pursued by the gov ernment troops. Fears were still entertained as to a collision of the French and Turkish squadrons at Tu nis. The cholera had nearly subsided at Mar seilles, but was still raging in several places in the south of France. The Plague was on the decline at Con stantinople. Liverpool Friday, Sept. 15. Cotton Market. ? -We have had a veiy limited demand and a quiet market this weekr which has enabled buyers of ordinary to fair qualities of American to supply themselves at |d to^d under the highest pointoflast week; but in other qualities and descriptions we do not at present observe any alteration in pri ces. * . . AWFUL CALAMITY. ' > The Steambp^ Hfynvt, on her way from New York to Charleston, waswrecked with dreadful loss of life. ; The intelligence was first received in Charleston, through the fol lowing letter. NEWBERN, N. C. Oct. 12, 1837. Messrs. L. M. Wiley , Parish Af Co :? ? Gentleman ? On Saturday last, I left New York in the steam packet Home, for your city with eighty or ninety passengers (30 to 35 -ladies) and a crew of 43, in all about one hun dred and twenty to 130, the wind and weather fine until Sunday night, when it commenced blowing a gale, and continued Monday after noon, steamer commenced to leak, the gale very severe, all hands went to the pumps,~but the warter gained on us when the man in command . concluded to run, her ashore, and did so on Monday night between ten and eleven o'clock, six or 7 mifes from Ocra acock Light House, and in abeut 20 min-r utes she had gone all to pieces* and lost about 80 or 90 drowned and 38 or 40 saved, among the latter was Mr. Lovegreen and Myself. Mr. L. was the only man saved with whom I was acquainted, the soonest I can reach your city will be Tuesday next, when I hope to reach it in safety. ...? Please call on Mr. LovEGRBtNVfkmilyand say he was saved. Mr. H- Tileston, of Spofford, Haseltine 6c Co. is lost. The mail being about to close, I must stop short and subscribe myself, . Yours, most respectfully, H. VAND^RZER, " From the Newbern Spectatok On Monday night last, in consequence of stress of weather and the leaky state of the vessel the captain of the 4,Home," Captain White, was compelled to bear away for the nearest port. Either mistaking the entrance at the Bar, or unable to gain it, the Boat was driven on shore about six miles north of Ocracocke Bar. Our informant, (one of the passengers who was fortunately rescued from a watery grave) reports, that out of about ninety passengers and a crew consisting of forty three persons, only twenty of the former, and we know not how many of the latter was saved ! Among the passengers were between thirty and forty Ladies , of whom but two escaped! Several children were amoqg those who have been thus hurried to eternity, only one of this class Jias been saved. As we have neither space nor time to speak farther of this most melancholy event, we shall merely append the names of the per sons saved, deferring till next week such par ticulars as may be deemed ofimportance.