The Darlington flag (Lydia, SC) 1851-1852, May 21, 1851, Image 1
DEVOTgD TO SOUTHERN RIGHTS, MORALITY, AGRICULTURE, LITERATURE. AND
JlJ iJil
EOUS NEWS.
JA1ES H. NORWOOD, EDITOR.]
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VOL. 1.
DARLINGTON C. H., S. C., WEDNESDAY MORNII^ MAY 21, 1851
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would never have arisen. Long
before this generation saw the
the question of slavery would hav
o»
3 light,
exfeen
POLITICAL.
(From the Charleston Mercury.)
AN EXAMINATION INTO THE POLICY OF
STATE ACTION.
Addressed to the Members of the Con-
lion to assemble in Charleston, on the
5th of May, 1851.
If, then, we have nothing to hope
from the present state of parties; if the
Southern States refuse to act in con
cert; if the state of public affairs is
suph jbat delay is danger; and these
are the points we have so far attempt
ed to prove, there remains but one
question for us to ask: Will the sepa
rate action of South Carolina dissolve
the Union, and lead to the construction
of a Southern Confederacy? And if
not, can South Carolina maintain her
existence as a separate ami indepen
dent power ? And when we talk thus
of separate action, it is necessary that
the time and sort of action should be
definitely stated, to avoid all vagueness
and uncertainty in the argument. It is
now of the, fir«t importance that wc
should understand each other: not on
ly that we exchange sentiments, hut
we should know how far wo agree In
serious practical details of the grave
business which lies before us. When
we speak, therefore, of separate State
action, we mean a call of the State
Convention at some period between the
1st February, 1852, and the probable
adjournment of., the next session of
Congress^the Iftvficr after the 1st of
February the better, for the sole and
simple purpose of deefering South CiBt
olina an independent State, free to con
trol her own fortunes, whether they be
for better. M worst'. And this mea-
be preceded course
settled. But the irreconcilable differ- ware, &c., is consumed in the ucigl
ence between Northern and Southern 1 — :V1 -— - e c '--'
sentiment has aggravated its bitterness
every year for more than half a centu
ry ; and however much they may re-
gref the uncontrollable current of po
litical events, the South must recognise
in us, a little sooner or a little later, the
necessary consequence of their own
doctrines, professions and practices.—
Every one who is at all familiar with the
history of the country, knows that the
? uestions which the secession of South
Carolina would force upon Congress
for settlement, arftfhose very questions
which have in theory divided the par
ties for many years—that the party
strife upon them, has waxed fiercer and
fiercer, and what is more to the point,
that upon them parties have assumed
an eminently sectional character; and
we ask, with confidence that the reply
is not to be found, what is there to
cause the belief that on these questions,
put in their most aggravated form, at
the most critical period of our histo-
Georgia and Alabama; and a large, in
deed it has been said the largest, por
tion of her imports of dry goods, hard
V
boring States. Now-, if the State se
cedes, and the Federal Government
does not direct an armed resistance
against this measure, they will at least
lay heavy tariffs upon all imports from,
and exports into, South Carolina, by
the neighboring States, and these added
to the duties necessary for the revenue
of the State, will at once prostrate both
the import and export trade of the State.
And it is a fair remark at the outset,
probable that in the present disturbed
state of Southern sentiment, the Fed
eral Government w ill venture upon this
broad and palpable imposition on such
Southern States as remain in the Union?
A seceded State is a dangerous exam
ple to a discontented neighbor. Can
any one doubt but that if during the
Creek troubles, Georgia had been j in order to obtain
bounded by an independent and sym- Because, if at this
pathizing State, she would have settled
her difficulties by a natural and profita
ble ftllutnce, and can any one now
doubt whether if the Federal Govern-
|ieftceablc secession.. But what if the
1 Government appeal to w ar, that ulti-
i mate and highest arbiter in national
affairs? We answer first, that if the}’
do, the more unanimous the sentiment
by which that war is supported, the
less support does the argument drawn
from it give to those who urge delay
Southern concert,
moment, after all
the valiant and ioffignant rhetoric
which has echoed throngh the Southern
States, the South unites with the North
in forcibly preventing the secession of
ernr
iMOtattempt to injure South Caro- j Carolina, why this fact is proof con
that this argument is, to some extent, j linn, ffirough her neighbors, by annoy- elusive that the state of Southern sen
a local one; that it affects, particularly ing them with vexatious burdens on timent is such, that concert of tin
and directly, only Charleston, the coni- their trade, ns must necessarily be done Southern States, with a view to the dis-
mercial city of South Carolina, and : on the above supposition, tliatthey will solution of the Union, is an ascertain-
-«tty
applies, indirectly, to the State at large, mak* 1 common cause ? We cannot,
only so far as the State may determine therefore, realize the dangers to South
to raise her revenue by duties on im
ports; and even then, when it is con
sidered that all trade into the State
wilj be foreign trade, and duties would
be imposed, not merely on European
importations, through Charleston, but
also on the large domestic trade in cat
tle, grain and pork, which takes place
endeavoring to meet presumes, even
supposing that such a scheme of pro
hibiting tariffs should be possible; it
would only
present import trade which looks to
re-export; all import for home con
sumption would profit necessarily.—
ry, the South will desert her old creed, over the inland border, the force of the Take the Planter: his cotton and rice
and in order to gratify Northern fauati- objection is still further weakened.— would as usual go to Charleston for
cism, desolate Carolina with the rava- But we have no idea that South Caro- sale; there would be no duty on its ex-
ges of war, and in order to strengthen Una would resort to a duty on foreign port, and its market could in no w ise
the doctrine of State rights, will vote importations as we understand them,at l>e effected by Federal Legislation:
millions to the destruction of a sove- ; present, and we believe the imposition whereas, everything that he buys in re-
reign State! | of a discriminating Lax, by the Federal turn, negro cloth, hardware, woollens.
ed impossibility, delay what period of
time we choose. But without South
ern trade which the argument we are i cm support, the Government could not
wage war for a day. The probability,
therefore, of a warlike resistance on
the part of the Government, is at once
affect that portion of our | evidence that our position in the Union
is that of a subject and unconsidered
minority, which has no mode open to
it but an appeal to that Power who
does not always give the race to the
swift, nor the battle to the strong. If
the South will not support us in se
cession, there is no possible princi
ple on which it can lie reasoned
that they will support us in any
„ r . „ ...v , other mode of redress. A Southern
In the next place, secession thus | Government, on foreign goods import- all the luxuries of life, coming here Confederaay is only a multitude of se-
timed would lie effected upon the eve of ed through Carolina, utterly impossible, under a system of free trade, would l>e , cessions ; anil the spirit which is to cf-
a Presidential election. It would be in the first place the Government can- so much cheaper as even to allow for feet the greater revolution, will not
another difficulty to be met—a new not, under the express language of the increased direct taxation for the pur- | surely lend itself to the repression of
Constitution, lay a heavier tax on goods
imported through a frontier town of
Carolina, into North Carolina or Geor
gia, than it can on the same goods im
ported through Now York; for the ex
plicit provision of Section 8, Article
1, is: “All duties, imnosts and excises
shall be uniform throughout the United
to import at present $10QBQt) worth
I of wmch i
i is con-
and dangerous issue to be joined ; an
element of mischief, dangerous to be
used, and impossible to be neglected.
Confounding as such a question would
be to the party tactics of Congressional
legislation, no man can estimate what
results it would produce if thrown
among the people at such a juncture.
.South Carolina seceded—the practical
question thus brought home to every
Southern heart—strong, able, ardent
minorities at work in every South- j sumed in South Carolina, and the hal
eru State—the people in one mad fer- ance sent into Tennessee, Georgia and
uient from Maine to Toms, wkh the North Carolina, dee. At present he
excitement of the Presidential election pays his duty to the General Govern-
—Congress ft argumentative confusion meut at the port of Charleston. South
where would the government find Carolina secedes, aiM in necessary
strength to support a war, the very policy makes Charleston a free port,
manifesto of which would lie a chal- The same merchant imports again
lenge to a party strife in the bosom of
l the beligercnt Republic ? The advan
tages, then, of secession at such a time
pose of revenue. Take again the Man- the less. The possibility of a war,
ufatoturer; under the Constitution no * then, on the part of the General Gov
States.” Suppose, then, a merchant
at present 8It
of dry goods, 850,000 of
sure
h J
Su
the' withdrawal of^he United
'tates Senators and wie members
of Congress from their responsi
bilities at Washington. In discussing
the probable results of such a course
of action, w’c are noL it must bo re
membered, discussing tne general poli
cy of secession from the Union. That
matter the State has already argued,
and in her judgment, at least, settled.
We are now discussing only the merits
of one special mode of secession—that
is, by a single State at a given time.—
In this view, then, the first advantage
ofihis course would be, that, seceding
during the session of Congress, before
the Administration could, under the
Constitution, act, the National Legis
lature would be called on to settle the
jierplexed question of State rights. Had
we a purely freesoil section, the solu
tion, of course, would be as prompt as
powtive; but the Southern States, still
renresented a t Washington, have a fear
ful interest in the answer, and it will
be for them to declare a civil war
iigaiust State sovereignty, and to aban
don their traditionary hostility to a
military and Consolidated Government,
at the very moment that such a Gov
ernment has grown from a mere Con
stitutional possibility into an armed re
ality, before the Government dare fire
n gun. Now, is there any fair ground
for believing that the Southern States
are prepared to arm the Government
against the doctrine of the political in
violability of a single State. A civil
war commenced against the votes of
the South, will of necessity, unless hu
man nature has changed its character,
force that Southern minority into the
lines of the beleaguesed State, and those
whom they would at first protect, by
their votes, they will finally assist with
their arms. Now, what chance is
there of a Southern vote for the arm
ed repression* of 84Mi Caro lina re
bellion ? Of course, if with the North
againsfc us, there was unanimity at
the South in the same way of think
ing, our cause would ba hopeless ; but
if the South were unanimous in their
opposition to our views of the great
questions of the day, the present »shuc
are: I. That we give the question a
practical character, which apjieals at
once and directly to the sympathies of
the whole Southern people. 2. That
our secession is based on principles to
which most of the Southern States are
committed, and to which, upon the re
turn of every Presidential election, the
great parties in the country formally
pledge themselves; and 3. That we
strike at the very moment of all others
when an administration is weakest to
resist. Their period of power in the
last quarter of its existence—every mea
sure tested in Congress by reference
to party ends—the national council to
which it must appeal for support, dis
tracted and divided—the doctrines
against which they must declare war,
proclaimed openly in the Senate—the
commerce of the freesoil action of the
country trembling in apprehension of
even successful hostilities. Where, in
the whole circle of Constitutional ap-
plianoe Jls the administration to find
that reMfttless and resistless strength—
that terrible unity and energy of pur-
jKise which alone can give to tyranny
the semblance of a just authority ? If
then, acting on these impressions, South
Carolina secedes at the time proposed,
it will be for the federal government to
decide on the course they will pursue;
whether they will regprt to lorce to
drag the seceding State back intolhe
Union, or whether they will leave ns to
to ourselves, satisfied that the results
of our experiment will soon bring us
back, craving dtlce more the shelter of
the old fold. If resort to force lie the
policy of the government, a state of
affairs will arise which we will exam
ine presently; but as our previous re
marks indicate, the difficulty lying hi
the way of such a decision, and as the
highest political authorities of the State
1 have been quoted in support of the
opinion that we will be allowed to work
out our experiment undisturbed, we
shall first examine the position of the
State under the latter aspect The ar
gument of those opposed to State ac
tion may in this case be thus fairly
stated.
8100,000 worth of merchandize; the
portion consumed in the state pa}s no
duty at all, a clear gain of so much to
the people; the balance, if sent into
the neighboring States, cannot, r.ccor-
duty could be imposed by the Federal
Government on the raw material; the
Cotton which now comes from our
neighboring States, so that his condi
tion would in no wise be altered. And
so with the cotton factor who now ex
ports from Charleston: there would
lie no additional cost on cotton coming
from the Union; and how, if the Charles
ton market still offered fair prices, could
his business be affected ? Granting,
then, even tiro almost impossible case
of an increased duty by the Federal
Government on goods imported into
Charleston, the import merchant only
would be reached, and he only to the
excess of his importation over the con
sumption at home; and it is a fair in
ference that increased cheapness of
supply under • free port system, would
give an increased home consumption.
Where then are the dangers to our in-
ding to t « Constitution, ■ as quoted dustry? In increased direct taxation
above, be made to pay a heavier duty j for the support of an independent gov
than at New Y’ork, or those at Charles
ton, if we were still in the Union; and
the only practical difference to the im
porting merchant is, that he pays the
duty on such of his cargo as he sends
into the Union, a few hundred miles
more inland, than he did before. Be
sides which, the Federal Government,
in the attempt to collect duties on such
eminent, an army and navy. &c., is
the reply. Now this reply is based
on an assumption os yet unproven, in
that wo need a government so vastly
more expensive than our present one.
W’e do notlielieve it. As the State of
South Carolina would not surely un
dertake to play arbiter in the affairs of
the world, our object would be to hus-
a line of frontier «s the inland line of band our own resources, perfect our
Carolina, would be involved m an ex-
|>ense, at once so immense and so Idle,
as to baffle the ingenuity of an indebt
ed Treasury and an economical Ad
ministration.
And so with exports; the express
language of the Constitution declares
in the some article and section: “No
tax or duty shall bo laid on articles ex- based on the acquiescence of the Fed-
own institutions, and show
How wide the limfts stand.
Between a splendid and a happy land.
Against whom would we require an
army and navy at the commencement
of our national career ? The whole
argument we have been making is
ported from any State.” Now, in the
face of this provision, how is it possi
ble for the Federal Government to pre
vent tho continuance of the present
trade from Georgia, Alabama, Tenues-
see, &c. We will be a foreign nation;
they will lie exporting States of the
Union, and under the provisions of their
Constitution, will trade with us so long
as suits their interests. There is not
a solitary article which at present
cqpies to Charleston from the interior
—not a pound of cotton which the Gov
ernment of the Union can constitution-
tionally charge with one cent of duty
on its way to us. We, therefore, ac
cept and return the argument of those
who oppose the action of the State.—
We will admit that the wealth of the
State depends ou the im|>orts and ex
porta. With those imports, whether
from the Union or abroad, tho Federal
Government cannot interfere; those
exports, they cannot control; or if by
a technical adherence to the Constitu
tion, they violate its spirit and purpose
in declaring one set of duties on goods
imported directly from Europe, and
another set on goods imported through
Carolina, what will that bo but saying
the people of Tennessee and North
oral Government in our departure, and
in what possible way would we come
in contact with the groat powers of the
earth ? And if we do, if there is such
a tiling as political necessity, dare the
United States stand by and see us fall
in a contest with a foreign power ?—
The fact is incontrovertible, that in such
a case, our onemies would be our natu
ral and necessary allies. Our foreign
relations would certainly call for no
immense expenditure, and the burden
of new expenses would be called for
only or chiefly for government ma
chinery, for the collection of taxes, and
and the institution of a system of post
roads and offices through the State, for
our present Constitution, with very
slight modifications, would answer all
our purposes. Our Executive, our
Legislative, and onr Judicial depart
ments are already organized and pro
vided for. That our direct taxation
would, at the outset, be increased, is
ernment, upon our contemplated seces
sion, implies a unanimity on the part
of the South with the great Freesoil
section of the country, which does not
exist And oven supposing that the
Congressional support of the South
could be obtained for a war, in which
every conceivable loss would be borne
by the Southern slavcholding section,
and any possible gain would result to
the Northern Freesoil section, suppo
sing such an incredible state of affairs,
there is in every Southern State, as can
Ik) demonstrated, a minority large
enough and ready enough, to organize
for effective action, and upon the first
report of the cannonade of Charleston,
to commit the whole South irrevocably
to the issue of the struggle. The idea
of a civil war on such a subject, con
fined within the borders of a single
State, is an impossibility. And sup
posing the conquest of South Carolina
achieved, her final disposition would be
for the triumphant government a more
insoluble problem than even the admis
sion of California.
Upon the merely military question of
our capability of defenfe, we cannot
enter. When a nation encounters the
perils of war, it is not always, nor of
ten, on a mere calculation of strategic
advantages. Every such line of con
duct rests partly upon moral and po-
litical considerations, and the question
w ith us is—for the advantages resulting
from the secession of the State, are we
willing to ran the risk of war? and
what are the risks ?
1. Throughout the South there is a
strong undisguised sympathy for our
cause, not strong enough to force other
States to act with us, ImU strong enough
to prevent their acting against us.
2. 'Die question of war or peace is
to he determined in Congress, by
Southern votes—these votes, represent
ing interests identical with ours, add
already recorded with ours in protest
against the course of the Northern sec
tion of the country.
3. The moral certainty that a hos
tile collision will inflame public opin
ion, until the whole South bursts into
one universal flame.
4. The demonstrable injury which
a civil war would work upon the indus
trial interests of the Northern manufac
turing section of country.
5. The utter Constitutional j torpid
ity into which the conquest of Caroli
na—she refusing to resuinj her posi
tion as a State—would place the Gov
ernment
0. The militaiy probabilities of a
prolonged contest. Taking these things
into consideration, with flic additional
The wealth of South Carolina is de- | Carolina—it is as cheap and more con
certain; but it is equally certain that fact that from the nature of our staples
the increase would not weigh heavily foreign powers interested in the regu-
where it is in advance most decried, larity of our commerce, it may ho Itir-
that ia, upon the commercial interests ly doubted whether the General Gov-
of the State. And after all, if we eminent can hazard the consequences
gravely aad manfully prefer indepen- of war. And at least it iinyr tie safely
rived from her imports and exportc.-
A large proportion, both of imports
and exports, is neither produced nor
consumed within the State borders;
very much of the Cotton, for instance,
shipped from Charlerton, i« grown in
South
ven ient for you to import through
Carolina than New York, therefore,
ou to import i
New
we will increase the tariff on your inu
portations through Carolina, and thus
make you bear all the burden of onr
war on this seceded State. And is it
dei*u t we must not too eagerly count
the coot, and whine piteously, in mere
anticipation of the self-denial we ex
pect to practice. It is the inex
orable law of nature, that there is no
enjoyment that is not dearly bought hy
endurance.
So much for the supposition of a
a war eonductod under
ceu which mast hamper
asserted that
the circumi
the
none of those o
whelming odds, those
arda, which have immortrfartl the
ly straggles of such repuMk*
land and 8witzerh»d.%But if n
e concluding year of the present ad^
ministration, offers
now is not the timd, after our loud mid
lofty words, to blench from danger.—
We have challenged tlie future, and
come in shape however questionable
we must follow it. The sooner, tin t),
the State determines on her plans, the
better. Tbe time for half measure i ■
gone. Men either lielieve that the
language of the State is an idle braga-
docia, and our fair fanje is thus griev-
iously wounded in the house of our
friends, or else believing that there is
sofU earnestness in our purpose, the
public mind of the State is uneasy and
restless, discontented with the present,
uncertain of the future. This should
be ended: we are called upon in some
measure to contribute to its determina
tion.
If there is any strength in the rea
soning submitted to your attention, tho
secession of South Carolina from the
Union within eighteen months is a ju
dicious and honorable policy, consist
ent with the character, the professions,
the safety of the State. Without in
truding upon the province of the State
Convention, it is within the legitimate
1 duty of the Convention of Associations
to aid in establishing that conviction—
in bringing about that consummation.
And wc close these remarks with the
earnest hope that the Convention will,
in its deliberation and action, icali/o
the advice given by a great statesman,
j on an occasion scarcely more sole n:
“If ever there was a time that calls ou
us for no vulgar conception of tilings
and for exertions in no udgitr strain,
it is the awful hour that jtnividence has
now appointed to ibis nation. Every
, little measure in a great ciror can, w id
bring on no small ruiii. Nothing
and be directed above the mark wv
must aim at; everything below' it is ab-
i solutely thrown away.”
BEAUFORT,
TuTmrRE.
The Richmond Examiner coicludcB
an able article ou the Cqiupnimise in
the following strong language.;
“ The people of thf North, by a vast
majority, are detcrniipcd en the dow n
fall of all the legal barriers w hich pro
feet the institutions of tli< Southctn
•States. That people hate ti», their
clergy hate us, their leaders hate us,
their children are bred up to accom
plish our ruin. Of what account is a
fugitive slave law to the South, when
i from the necessity of the case it must
be enforced among that people and by
that people’s officers? TTiis reflection,
from the firstdjymor of the proposed
law, fiufficicnfrJLassured all men who
were not determined to be deceived,
that the whole affair was a swindle—a
' thimble-rig—a stool pigeon business.—
i No man in the Congress which passed
the compromise bills did not know that.
I Yet the gain of this tiling of straw is
i the excuse which they gave forwnrren-
! dering a territory which would have
' thrown the balance of power antirely
I into Southern hands, and secured the
I Union from all the storms which all tho
fanatics of all the Bostons could raise
in the next hundred years.
“ As it stands, the face of the future
is far different. Clouds, shadows, and
darkness rest upon it. 'ITiese are, in
deed,‘but the beginning of sorrows.’
How the South is to defend itself any
more, we cannot tell. Every day in
creases the preponderanco against us-
Hemmed, in a limited, witn all the
world against us, and a crusade preach
ed for our overthrow, more fanatical,
more powerful, and more fearless than
that which 1’eter the Hermit stirred up
a thousand years ago, we will secure
our independence oniy through oceans
of blood and fire. We may hojie that
some fortunate interposition of events
may belie the indication of the presqpt
time; but that the facts now extant all
point to a terrible future, can no more
lie doubted than the existence of these
facts is attributable to tire CongreM
which compromised the Constitution.
NAURU YS.^cillRED HABITS.
Geecd mantained that nature was
more potent than art, bile Dante as
serted to the contrary. To prove this
principle the great Italian bard referred
to his cat, which, by repeated practice
he had taught to hold a candle in its
paws, while he supped or read. Cecco
(Wired to •vilness the experiment, and
came not unprepared for the purpose.
While Dante's cat was performing its
part, Cecco lifted the lid ofapot which
he had filled with mice. The creature
of art instantly showed tlie weakness
of a talent merely acquaired and drops
the candle, flew on the mice w ith
instinctive propensity. Dante
lumself disconcerted, and it was
thqf. the advocate for the or-
principle of native faculties had
’ his