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The Sumter Watchman was founded in 1850 and the True Southron in 1866. The Watchman and Southron now has the combined circulation and influence of both of the old papers, and is manifestly the best advertising medium in Sumter.

Governor Blease takes the humane and the only proper view of the Penitentiary tuberculosis situation. It calls for immediate action and if he closes the hosiery mill and has a general cleaning out of the Penitentiary, he will have the support and endorsement of a very large majority of the people of the State regardless of whether they are political friends or enemies.

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With Roosevelt's protige, Stimson, running the war department the danger of war with Mexico is greatly augumented. A war would afford opportunity for Roosevelt to fake the country once again with his spectacular yellow journal methods and get into the lime light and to a man of his notoriety seeking disposition a with Mexico would be a cheap price to pay for his rescue from political obscurity and insignificance.

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Jones, the Union county wife poisoner has not yet been granted the expected pardon, but it was almost too much to expect, even of Governor Blease, that he would set aside the verdict of the court in the face of the reports of Judge Memminger and Solicitor Sease, who strongly and unequivocally disapproved of the petition for a pardon.

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The Charleston S. A. L. baseball team is going after the world's record held by the Manning State League team for the past five or six years capturing that record will be a more unique feat than winning a pennant.

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Farmers who are growing corn on the Williamson plan have had the assistance of nature in the stunting process thus far.

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The suggestion that the water works pumping station be electrified is entirely feasible, if the Sumter Lighting Cimpany wants more business and will make the city a reasonable rate on the power needed to operate the pumps. The drayage bill on the coal consumed at the pumping station is a difference between the actual cost of power and the cost at the pumping station, under present conditions, that affords an opportunity to the Sumter Lighting Company to furnish electric power for the operation of the pumps at a profit to itself and at a saving to the city. It would pay the city to make a contract for electric power, even if it cost as much as is now paid for coal, exclusive of drayage, and saved nothing at all on the other operating expenses, although it ought to be possible to cut down the operating expenses and repair bill materially by the substitution of electric power for steam. It would cost a considerable amount, of course, to install electric pumps, but we believe the difference in cost of operation would more than pay for the new machinery in a few years.

SCHOOL TRUSTEES TO ORGANIZE

Meeting Called for Saturday at the Office of the County Superintendent of Eudcation.

The trustees of the various schools in the county are to meet Saturday at the office of the county superintendent of education to organize a trustee association for Sumter County. This is a move in the line of progress that is being taken up in many of the counties of the State and Sumter County, not to be left behind, is now to have a organization of its trustees.

The fact that the association was to be organized became known some time ago and many of the trustees in various parts of the county have expressed their interest in the movement and their hope that it would be successful. Sumter county now has a very live teachers' association in the county, a rural school improvement association and has lately celebrated its first field day, which was a most successful event. The organization among the trustees has now been taken up and it is hoped that it will be as successful and do as much good as the organizations among the teachers of the county have done.

GREAT TRUST OUTLAWED.

GREAT TRUST OUTLAWED.
STANDARD OIL MONOPOLY ORDERED DISSOLVED BY SUPREME COURT.

Chief Justice White Renders Momentons Decision in Long Continued Case Against Rockefeller's Trust—Standard Oil Trust Held to Be in Violation of Sherman Anti-Trust Law and An Illegal Combination in Restraint of Trade.

Washington, May 15.—The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and its 19 subsidiary corporations were declared today by the supreme court of the United States to be a conspiracy and combination in restraint of trade. It also was held to be monopolizing interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman anti-trust law. The dissolution of the combination was ordered to take place within six months.

Thus ends the tremendous struggle of years on the part of the government to put down by authority of law a combination which it claimed was a menace to the industrial and economic advancement of the entire country.

At the same time the court interpreted the Sherman anti-trust law so as to limit its application to acts of "undue" restraint of trade, and "not every restraint of trade." It was on this point that the only discordant note was heard in the court. Justice Harlan dissented, claiming that cases already decided by the court had determined once for all that the world "undue" or "unreasonable" or similar words, were not in the statute. He declared that the reasoning of the court in arriving at its findings was in effect legislation which belonged in every instance to congress and not to the courts.

Every since the decree in this case in the lower court, the United States circuit court for the Eastern district of Missouri, was announced, hope has been expressed by the "business world" that the law would be modified so as not to interfere with what was designated as "honest business." Tonight that section of the opinion calling for the use of the "rule of reason" in applying the law as regarded in many quarters as in answer to the prayers of the "business world."

The opinion of the court was announced by Chief Justice White. In printed form it contained more than 20,000 words. For nearly an hour the chief justice discussed the case from the bench, going over most of the points in the printed opinion, but not once referring to it in order to refresh his memory. Before him sat a distinguished audience of the most famous men of the country. Senators and representatives left their respective chambers in the capitol to listen to the epoch-making decision of the court. Most eager to hear were Attorney General Wickersham and Frank B. Kellogg, special counsel of the government, who had conducted the great fight against the Standard Oil.

None of the brilliant array of counsel for the corporations or individual defendants was present in the court during the reading of the opinion.

Today, as on previous decision days for months past, rival brokerage agents with messengers in line to the various telephone and telegraph instruments throughout the capitol, were on hand, but to their dismay the announcement of the decision was not begun until an hour after the closing of the stock markets.

Many expected that the decision of the court in the dissolution suit against the tobacco corporations would be handed down immediately after the decision in the Standard Oil case. This was not done, however, but the decision is expected on May 29, the last decision day of the court until next October.

The opinion of the court today was construed to mean that the tobacco case, like every other case in which restraints of trade are alleged, must be subjected to the new test of reasonableness of the restraint, as laid down in the Standard Oil decision.

By far the greatest portion of the opinion of the chief justice was devoted on the justification of the court in requiring that the "rule of reason" be applied to restraints of trade before they were held to be violations of the Sherman anti-trust law.

The court found this justification in the common law of the forefathers and in the general law of the country at the time the Sherman anti-trust law was passed. In short the court held that the technical words of the statute were to be given the meaning which those words had in common law and in the law of the country at the time of the enactment. This meaning of the words, according to the court, called for the exercise of reason in determining what restraints of trade were prohibited.

Chief Justice White in his opinion first reviewed the preliminary proceedings in the case in the circuit court of the United States for the Eastern district of Missouri. He recited especially the essential points in the bill of the government, asking for the dissolution of the Standard Oil, and the answer questioning the jurisdiction of the court and denying the statements of the government. He dismissed the objection to the jurisdiction in a few words, by holding that it was not well founded. He then came to the arguments as to the law and the facts in the case saying that out of the "jungle" of law and facts both sides were agreed only in one thing, and that was that the determination of the controversy rested upon the proper construction and application of the first and second sections of the anti-trust acts. The views of the two sides as to the law, the chief justice said, were as wide apart as the poles. The same, he said, was true as to the facts.

"Thus, on the one hand, with relentless pertinacity and minuteness of analysis," said the chief justice, "it is insisted that the facts established that the assailed combination took its birth in a purpose to unlawfully acquire wealth by oppressing the public and destroying the just rights of others, and that its entire career exemplifies an inexorable carrying out of such wrongful intents, since, it is asserted, the pathway of the combination from the beginning of the time of the filing of the bill is marked with constant proofs of wrong influence upon the public and is strewn with the wrecks resulting from crushing out without regard to law the individual rights of others.

"It is asserted that the existence of the principal corporate defendant, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, with its vast accumulation of property, because of its potency for harm and the dangerous example which its continued existence affords, is an open and enduring menace to all freedom of trade and a byword and reproach to all modern economic methods.

"On the other hand, in a powerful analysis of the facts, it is insisted that they demonstrate that the origin and development af the vast business which the defendant's control was but the result of lawful competitive methods, guided by economic genius of the highest order, sustained by courage, by a keen insight into the commercial situation resulting in the acquisition of great wealth, but at the same time serving to stimulate an increased production, to widely extend the distribution of the products of petroleum at a cost largely below that which previously prevailed."

In this state of affairs, the chief justice seized upon the single point of concord, namely, the application of the two sections of the Sherman anti-trust law, as the initial basis of an extension of the contention. The rest of his opinion divided itself into a consideration of the meaning of the Sherman anti-trust law in the light of the common law and the law of the United States at the time of its adoption, the contentions of the parties concerning the act and the scope and effect of the decisions of the supreme court, the application to the fact and lastly the remedy.

In striving to get at the meaning of the two sections of the law, he said the sole subject with which the first section dealt was "restraint of trade," and that the "attempt to monopolize the monopolization" was the subject of the second section. The chief justice said that in getting at the meaning of the words he would be guided by the principle that where words are employed in a statute, which at the time had a well known meaning in common law, or in the law of this country, they were presumed to have been used in this sense unless the context compels to the contrary.

He summarized his search into the common law and the law of the country at the time the Sherman anti-trust law was passed so far as the first section was concerned as follows:

"A. That the context manifests that the statute was drawn in the light of the existing practical conception of the law of restraint of trade because it groups as within that class not only contracts which were in restraint of trade in the subjective sense, but all contracts or acts which theoretically were attempts to monopolize, yet which in practice had come to be considered as in restraint of trade in a broad sense.

"B. That in view of the many forms of contracts and combinations which were being evolved from existing economic conditions it was deemed essential by an all-embracing enumeration to make sure that no form of contract or combination by which an undue restraint of interstate or foreign trade could save such restraint from condemnation. The statute under this view evidenced the intent not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts, whether resulting from combinations or otherwise, did was not unduly restrain interstate or foreign commerce, but to protect that commerce from being restrained by methods whether old or new which constitute an interference that is an undue restraint.

"C. And as the contracts or acts he provision were not ed, since the enumeration addressed itself simply to classes of acts ,these classes being broad enough to embrace every conceivable contract or combination which could be made concerning the trade or commerce or the subjects of such commerce, and thus caused any act done by any of the enumerated methods anywhere in the whole field of human activity, to be illegal, if in restraint of trade, it follows, its provisions necessarily called for the exercise of judgment which required that some standard should be resorted to for the purpose of determining whether the prohibitions contained in the statute had or had not in any given case been viloated. Thus, not specifying but indutably contemplating and requiring a standard, it follows that it was intended that the standard at the common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the statute, was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether in an given case a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which the statute provided."

As to the second section he said the investigation of the common law and of law at the time the Sherman act was passed established that it was intended to supplement the first and to make sure that by no possible guise could the public policy embodied in the first section be frustrated or evaded. Having in the first section forbidden all means of monopolization of trade, that is, unduly restraining it by means of every contract, combination, etc., the second section according to the chief justice, seeks if possible to make the prohibition to the act all the more complete and perfect by embracing all attempts to reach the end prohibited by the first section by any attempt to monopolize, or monopolization thereof, even although acts by which such results are attempted to be brought about or are brought about, be not embraced within the general enumeration of the first section."

Here the chief justice first spoke of using the "rule of reason" in applying the statute to any given case. He said:

"And of course, when the second section is thus harmonized with and made, as it was intended to be, the complement of the first, it becomes obvious that criteria to be resorted to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations of the section have been committed is the rule of reason guided by the established law and by the plain duty to enforce the prohibitions of the act and thus the public policy which its restrictions were obviously enacted to subserve. And it is worthy of observation, as we have previously remarked concerning the common law, that although the statute by the comprehensiveness of the enumerations embodied in both the first and second sections makes it assiduously certain that its purpose was to prevent undue restraints of every kind or nature, nevertheless, by the omission of any direct prohibition against monopoly in the concrete, it indicates a consciousness that the freedom of the individual right to contract, when not unduly or improperly exercised, was the most efficient means for the prevention of monopoly since the operation of the centrifugal and centripetal forces resulting from the right to freely contract was the means by which monopoly would be inevitably prevented if no extraneous or sovereign power imposed it, and no right to make unlawful contracts having a monopolistic tendency were permitted. In other words, that freedom to contract was the essence of freedom from undue restraint on the right to contract."

The chief justice next considered the cotnention of the parties as to the meaning of the statute. He said in substance the propositions of the government were reducible to the claim that the language of the statute embraced "every contract, combination, etc., in restraint of trade," and left no room for the exercise of judgment but simply imposed the plain duty of applying its prohibitions to every case within its literal language. The error of the government on this point, Chief Justice White said, was in assuming that the decision of the court had been in accordance with the contentions.

"This is true," said the chief justice, "because as to the case which may come under the classes stated in the first section and the restraint of trade to which that section applies are not specifically enumerated or defined, it is obvious that judgment must in every case be called into play in order to determine whether a particular act is embraced within the statutory classes and whether if the act is within such classes its nature causes it to be restraint of trade within the intent of the fact.

"To hold to the contrary would require the conclusion either that every contract, act or combination of any kind or nature, whether it operated as a restraint on trade or not, was within the statute and thus the statute would be destructive of all right to contract or agree or combine in any respect whatever as to subjects embraced in interstate trade or commerce, or if this conclusion were not reached, then the contention would require it to be held that if the State did not define the things to which it related and excluded resorts to the only means by which the acts to which it relates could be ascertained—the light of reason—the enforcement of the statute will be impossible because of its uncertantity.

"The merely generic enumeration which the statute makes of the acts to which it refers and the absence of any definition of restraint of trade as used in the statute leaves room for but one conclusion, which is that it is expressly designed not to unduly limit the application of the act by precise definition, but while clearly fixing a standard—that is, by defining the ulterior boundaries which could be transgressed with impunity, to leave it to be determined by the light of reason, guided by the principles of law and the duty to apply and enforce the public policy embodied in the statute, in every given case, whether any particular act of contract was within the contemplation of the statute."

The chief justice took up the facts and the applications of the statute to them. The court found that the result of enlarging the capital stock of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and the acquisition by that company of the shares of the stock of the other corporations in exchange for its certificates gave to the corporation an enlarged and more perfect sway and control over the trade and commerce in petroleum and its product. The effect of this, Chief Justiie White said, the lower court held, was to destroy "the potentiality of competition" which otherwise would have existed to such an extent as to be a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the first section of the act, and also be an attempt to monopolize, and a monopolization to bring about a perennial violation of the second section.

"We see no cause to doubt the correctness of these conclusions," said the chief justice, "considering the subject from every aspect, that is, both in view of the facts as established by the court and the necessary operation and effect of the law as we have construed it upon the inferences deducible from the facts."

In scrutinizing the acts and doings of the Standard Oil in the past for the purpose of getting assistance in discovering intent and purpose, Chief Justice White left a cutting remark:

"We think no disinterested mind can survey the period in question without being irresistibly driven to the conclusion that the very genius for commercial development and organization which it would seem was manifested from the beginning soon begot the intent and purpose to exclude others which was frequently manifested by acts and dealings wholly inconsistent with the theory that they were made with the single conception of advancing the development of business power by usual methods, but which, on the contrary, necessarily involved the intent to drive others from the field and to exclude them from their right to trade and thus accomplish the mastery which was the end in view. And, considering the period from the date of the trust agreement in 1879 and 1883 up to the time of the expansion of the New Jersey corporation, the gradual extension of the power over the commerce in oil which ensued; the decision of the supreme court of Ohio, the tardiness or reluctance in conforming to the commands of that decision; the method first adopted and that which finally culminated in the plan of the New Jersey corporation, all additionally serve to make manifest the continued existence of the intent which we have previously indicated and which, among other things, impelled the expansion of the New Jersey corporation."

Finally the chief justice came to apply the remedy. He said that ordinarily where violations of the act were found to have been committed it would suffice to enjoin further violations. In a case, however, where a monopolization or attempt to monopolize was established, or the existence of a combination is proved, the continuance of which was a perennial violation of the statute, the relief was called for.

The lower court, he pointed out, had first enjoined the combination and in effect directed its dissolution; second, forbidding the New Jersey corporation from exercising any control by virtue of its stock ownership over the subsidiary corporations and enjoined those corporations from recognizing in any manner the authority or power of the New Jersey corporation by virtue of such ownership; third, enjoined in the sixth section of the decree the subsidiary corporations, after the dissolution, from doing any act which could create a like illegal combination; fourth, enjoined the New Jersey corporation and all the subsidiary corporations from doing any business in interstate commerce pending the dissolution of the combination by the accomplishment of the transfer of stocks which the decree in its essence required, and fifth, gave 30 days to carry out the directions of the court. The court said this decree was right and should be affirmed except as to what it termed "minor matters." One of these was the extension of the time the decree should be put into effect from one month to six months. The other modification was more important and had to do with the sixth section of the decree, which forbade the formation by the subsidiary corporations or their stockholders of like combinations.

"We construe the sixth paragraph of the decree," said the chief justice, "not as depriving the stockholders or corporations to live under the law of the land, but as compelling obedience to that law."

Real Estate Transfers.

The following transfers of real estate were recorded during the past week in the office of the County Clerk:

Mrs. Julia L. Hines to Mrs. Fannie L. Walters,, 200 acres in Shiloh township, $1,050.

Harriett R. Eberhardt to Emmie A. Sanders, 103 acres near Hagood, $5,000.

Mrs. Lola Young to Charles L. Cuttino, lot and premises on Broad street extension, $25 and the assumption of a $700 mortgage.

R. D. Lee, et al, as executors, to T. J. Cummings, as executor, 120 acres in county, $6,000.

Emma Gamon, Peter Bradley, Edward Bradley, Lena Robertson, Carrie Tomlinson to Thomas Bradley, 26 1-2 acres in county, $196.33.

Russel D. Zimmerman to Mary M. Pickney, 10 acres and premises, $650.

Margaret Moore, et al to Ida Moore, 36 acres in county, $1.00 and other consideration.

W. R. Wells to W. W. Skinner, 51 1-2 acres on Sumter-Bishopville road, $1,957.

Master to Hugh C. Haynsworth, lot on Manning avenue, $30.

R. L. Wright to J. C. Spann, lot on Purdy street, $525.

W. T. Hunter to Hardy Anderson, 4 6-10 acres on Sumter-Wedgefield road, $5.00 and other consideration.

Rembert Company to G. A. Murray, lot in town of Rembert, $275.

A. H. Sanders to Robert Moody, lot and store at Hagood, $1,175.

Lavinia Johnson to Hettie McMillan, the custody of her infant son, $10.

J. H. Archer to J. R. Ligon, 5.55 acres in county, $1,100.

Sumter Ice Light and Power Company to Perry Moses and F. A. Bultman, three lots and buildings situated on them, $150,000.

Perry Moses and F. A. Bultman to H. T. Hartman, three lots in the city with buildings on them, $300 and other considerations.

H. T. Hartman to Sumter Lighting Company, three lots in city with buildings on them and all appurtenances formerly belonging to the Sumter Ice, Light and Power Company, $385,000.

Sam J. Jenkins to Emma J. Wilson, lot in town of Mayesville, $200.

In The Police Court.

There were only a few cases to be heard in the Police Court Monday morning by Recorder Lee when his court convened that morning.

Dillard Cooper was found guilty of riding a bicycle at night without a light. He was fined $2.00 fir the offight. He was fined $2.00 for the offense and $1.00 for not appearing in

Willis Taylor was charged with vagrancy to which charge he plead not guilty. He was unable to give a good account of himself, however, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $15 or to serve 30 days. He did not have the money to pay the fine so took the days.

Willis Taylor was also given a preliminary for grand larceny. He was charged with stealing $60 from G. Schiadaressi and held over for the court of general sessions. Bail was fixed
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