

Spain Asks For Lee's Recall

And That Supplies be Not Sent to Cubans in Warships.

PRESIDENT MCKINLEY REFUSES BOTH REQUESTS.

Madrid, March 6.—Senor Gullon, Spanish minister of foreign affairs, recently intimated to United States Minister Woodford that the Spanish government desired the recall from Habana of Consul General Lee and that the American warships which have been designated to convey supplies to Cuba for the relief of the sufferers there should be replaced by merchant vessels in order to deprive the assistance sent to the reconcentrados of an official character. Minister Woodford cabled the requests to the Washington government, which replied, refusing to recall General Lee in the present circumstances or to countermand the orders for the despatch of the war vessels, making the representation that the relief vessels are not fighting ships.

Washington, March 6.—The Spanish situation developed two new phases to-day, when it became known that the Spanish government had formally requested the recall of Consul General Lee at his post at Habana, to which request the United States had courteously but firmly refused to comply; also that the Spanish government has suggested the impropriety of sending relief supplies to the Cuban reconcentrados on the cruiser Montgomery and gunboat Nashville, to which suggestion the United States had given a like answer in the negative.

The first intimation of these steps came in a brief and explicit cable dispatch from Madrid. Prior to its receipt, however, the authorities here had been fully conversant with the facts, although no intimation had been allowed to get to the public on either subject. The disclosures from Madrid left no further ground for reticence in Washington, and after a conference at the White House between the President, Assistant Secretary Day of the state department and Secretary Long of the navy department, the following authorized statement was handed to the Associated Press by Judge Day, as comprising everything that was to be said by the administration on the subject.

"The President will not consider the recall of General Lee. He has borne himself throughout this crisis with judgment, fidelity and courage, to the President's entire satisfaction. As to the supplies for the relief of the Cuban people all arrangements have been made to carry a consignment this week from Key West by one of the naval vessels, whichever may be best adapted and most available for the purpose, to Matanzas and Sagua. Though the officials here are non-committal on the subject, it is generally believed that the request for General Lee's recall was made at least a day or two ago, and the Spanish government, after receiving the reply of the state department, has not insisted either upon Lee's recall or upon its contention that the relief supplies should not be sent to Cuba in naval vessels."

Beyond the foregoing, those who had participated in the conference at the White House would not discuss the subject, and it was stated positively that the authorized statement comprised everything that would be given to any one.

The advices from Madrid, together with the authoritative statement here left no room for doubt as to what had occurred. The request for General Lee's recall is understood to have come within the last few days, and doubtless since the last cabinet meeting on Friday, as no reference was made to it at that time. It came through Minister Woodford, a somewhat unusual procedure, as the common mode of requesting the withdrawal of a minister or a consul is through the representative of the government making the request, which in this case is Senor DuBose, the Spanish charge d'affaires. Mr. DuBose had received no instructions on the subject and was in complete ignorance of the demands made through Minister Woodford. The other suggestion of the Spanish government—that relief supplies should not be sent in war vessels—did not come through Minister Woodford, as the Madrid dispatches state, but was presented by Senor DuBose to the state department last Friday.

The responses in both cases went direct to Minister Woodford. There was no loss of time, however, in assembling a special session of the cabinet, or even in any general conference between the President and his cabinet advisors individually. In the protest against the Montgomery and Nashville, Judge Day conferred with Secretary Long, who in turn called in Capt. Crawwinshield, chief of the bureau of navigation. There appeared to be no reasons why a change should be made in the plan for sending these ships on the relief mission and without attaching grave

significance to the request of the Spanish government, the answer was made that the plans for the trip were completed and that the stay of the ships would be as brief and of the most pacific character.

In responding to the request for Gen. Lee's recall, the President does not appear to have deemed the subject open to such discussion as would require the views of his cabinet associates, and after a brief exchange between the White House and the state department the negative answer was dispatched to Minister Woodford. One phase of the incident that tends to show the firm stand taken by the administration is the expedition with which the action was accomplished. Such a matter is ordinarily laid before the cabinet, the views of all its members personally given and the fullest opportunity afforded for discussion. But in this case the Associated Press bulletin furnished to some members of the cabinet the first intimation they had that Gen. Lee's service was open to question. Before the cabinet meeting no hint or complaint of any kind relating to Gen. Lee had been made.

The grounds on which Gen. Lee's recall was asked are not officially disclosed. It is known, however, that the Spanish government has chafed for some time over Gen. Lee's presence in Habana, although this has never taken the form of a definite protest prior to the present time. It began to assume a more serious aspect shortly after the arrival of the Maine at Habana. At that time Gen. Lee escorted Capt. Sigbee on his round of official calls. There were made with due formality, but the Spanish officials took offense when the calls were restricted to Gen. Blasco, Admiral Manterola and the representative of the military arm of Spain's service, and did not include Premier Galvez and his associates of the autonomous cabinet, who represent the new civil regime which Spain is seeking to enforce. The matter came to the attention of Senor Dupuy De Lome, then Spanish minister at Washington, and although there were no protests the situation doubtless reached the state department, as suitable amends were made by Capt. Sigbee's calling on Dr. Congozo, the civil secretary general, Premier Galvez and his associates. There was like irritation over a dinner given by Consul General Lee to the officers of the Maine. The list of guests on that occasion is said to have omitted some of the Spanish naval officers, and to have included, quite conspicuously, the names of a number of American newspaper correspondents who were regarded by the Spanish officials at Habana as antagonistic to them. This also came to the attention of the officials here, but was not made the basis for any action, but rather of unofficial Spanish criticism of Gen. Lee's general mode of procedure.

Within recent days it has been understood by officials here that the feeling against General Lee had been smoothed over, and the request for his recall was for that reason in the nature of a complete surprise. There are circumstances, however, which clearly disclose the grounds for the recall, although it is not known that Spain has made any exact specifications of complaint. Since the Maine disaster a report had been circulated that General Lee held the personal opinion that the explosion was due to external causes. No official report of this character was ever sent to Washington so far as is known. But the mere circulation of the report at Madrid, attributing such views to General Lee, has been the source of much feeling in Spanish official circles. The press dispatches from Madrid also disclose that General Lee is held accountable at the Spanish capital for the project of the purchase of Cuba by the United States from Spain, as well as for a general sentiment of sympathy toward the insurgents.

The suggestion of The Imparcial, a leading government organ, that the next session of the cortes will consider the case of General Lee, shows the strong influence which induced the Sagasta cabinet to ask his recall. In this connection, the fact is noted that Senor Dupuy De Lome is due in Spain at this time. His enforced retirement, on a demand by the United States, is felt to have awakened a counter sentiment at Madrid which finds expression against Consul General Lee. There is little doubt also that such advice as Senor Dupuy De Lome would give to the government or to the press in Madrid would not be conducive toward the retention of General Lee. There is little doubt, however, that the main cause of Spain's action is the sympathies General Lee has shown for the Cuban sufferers.

It is known that his active and open sympathy with the people who have suffered so greatly during the present insurrection, American citizens as well as native Cubans, has not been accepted by the Spanish officials in Cuba as an exhibition of disinterested officialism, such as is expected of consular officers. There were complaints during Gen. Weyler's administration of his conduct, but never in full official form. As a matter of fact, Spain required no formal excuse for the dismissal of a consular officer, according to international law. These officers are not endowed usually with diplomatic privileges, and they exist entirely by the sufferance of the nations to which they are sent. In their case, it is not necessary nor usual to request their home governments to recall them. They live officially only through an exequatur granted by the government to which they are ac-

credited, and this may be withdrawn at any moment. So Consul General Lee may be dismissed from his post at the pleasure of the Spanish government and this would not violate any section of international law. But he is in one respect unique, in that he is endowed with semi-diplomatic powers, by the wish of our government and by the consent of the Spanish government. The request of the Spanish government for his recall may therefore be regarded as tantamount to a demand for the recall of an objectionable minister—such for instance as was Senor Dupuy De Lome. There must be some substantial or satisfactory reason for such a demand in such cases, and as those presented against Gen. Lee probably were confined to the acts he has so far performed with the full sanction and approval of President McKinley, the demand was not entertained as is clearly shown in the formal statement given out by Assistant Secretary Day. Under such circumstances, the incident would close unless Spain took the decisive step of insisting on Gen. Lee's recall, and this failing, giving him his exequatur. This radical course is not expected, however, and all the indications reaching officials here is that Spain will not proceed further with the incident.

The action regarding the cruiser Montgomery and the gunboat Nashville is looked upon by officials here as much less grave than that affecting Gen. Lee. Secretary Long said to-night that he did not regard the question as to what ship would carry the relief supplies as serious in any way or as likely to present any perplexing issues. The desire of the navy department, Mr. Long said, was merely to get the supplies to Cuba on the most available vessel. There are three of these now at Key West, the Montgomery, Nashville and Fern, alike available for the service and one of these, Mr. Long said, would be designated for the trip. The Fern is a despatch boat rather than an armed naval vessel, and her availability for this mission had not previously been suggested. Her choice would probably remove all ground for objection, as she has none of the characteristics of a war vessel. Mr. Long said, however, that the only decision thus far reached was that one of the naval vessels—Montgomery, Nashville or Fern—should make the trip. As this is the first time that public mention has been made of the Fern in connection with carrying the supplies it might be inferred that she will make the trip.

The official orders, however, continue to stand as they were originally made, designating the Montgomery and Nashville, but these could be changed readily if the Fern was felt to be best suited for the work. The naval officials have felt from the first that the Montgomery and Nashville were ill adapted for the carrying of supplies. They are essentially fighting machines, and every inch of available room is taken with their own supplies of cordage, canvas, coal, etc. This was so apparent, that the plans contemplated putting the relief supplies on deck, covering them with tarpaulin, and trusting to the weather and a quick trip to keep the provisions and clothing from damage. The Fern, not being so essentially a fighting machine, but more of the type of a yacht for the speedy conveyance of naval dispatches, has considerable more room for stowing supplies, both below and on deck.

The Cuban relief committee counted on sending 75 tons to Key West, but this has now been increased to 100 tons. It left New York on one of the Mallory line of boats yesterday and is due at Key West next Wednesday. The transfer will take a day, and the plan has been to have the government ship start next Thursday for Cuba.

The decision of the administration to send supplies to the reconcentrados in Cuba was arrived at early in the week. General Lee had represented that he had been unable to distribute the goods that had been received in answer to the proclamation of the President to the American people. He reported that many tons of these supplies were stored in Habana and could not be forwarded to the eastern end of the island. The United States consuls at Matanzas and Sagua la Grande had come in person to Habana to seek for relief after reporting to the state department the terrible conditions existing in their respective districts.

The state department immediately instituted inquiries, and learning that the original decree of the Spanish government, authorizing the free admission of supplies applied only to the port of Habana, secured permission for the free reception of these supplies at all ports.

The next obstacle met was the difficulty of transshipping the goods from Habana eastward, there being a semi-weekly service by steamer, and that subject to many vexations. When the United States cruiser Montgomery returned from her cruise, which included the Cuban ports of Matanzas and Santiago, the officers brought harrowing tales of the distress existing there.

Captain Crawwinshield, the chief of the navigation bureau of the navy department, an officer of the soundest discretion and judgment, was on the ship, an accidental passenger. He told President McKinley directly what he had learned. The result was the immediate decision of the navy department to accede to the requests of the relief committee in New York to forward their supplies to the eastern ports of Cuba. One of the American lines of steamships running to New York had offered to take the bounteous contributions of the American peo-

ple to Key West and the President himself gave the orders for their carriage to eastern Cuba by any of the available ships of the North Atlantic squadron.

The announcement by the Associated Press of the purpose of the government to send supplies to Cuba on naval vessels was made last Wednesday. Within 24 hours there were signs of resistance on the part of the Spanish government. At first this took the shape of a formal inquiry by the Spanish charge d'affaires, Senor DuBose, as to the correctness of the report, the inquiry being couched in an incredulous tone, and later when the affirmation came, there was lodged, not a formal protest, but rather an insinuation that the movement of the naval ships would not be acceptable; that it would be construed into an act of active sympathy on the part of the government of the United States with the insurgents.

But the President had satisfied himself that the course he had chosen—that of sending the supplies in a naval vessel—was the only one that seemed to promise a prompt and efficient relief. There was no time for diplomatic usages, as Gen. Lee's report stated that hundreds were dying daily, and Senor DuBose was so informed.

Senor DuBose, when seen at the Spanish legation to-day, could add little to the fund of information on the two subjects which were attracting so much official and public attention. He had received no word from his government concerning Gen. Lee, and he stated positively that no suggestions concerning Gen. Lee's retirement had been submitted by him to the state department. As to the sending of relief supplies by the Montgomery and Nashville, Mr. DuBose said he felt that merchant vessels were much better equipped for such service, and their use was not open to that misconception in sending supplies by vessels of the navy.

The news concerning Gen. Lee aroused the deepest interest and no little excitement throughout Washington, and for the time being the usual quiet of Sunday evening was put aside. In hotel corridors, at the clubs and in all public places it was the absorbing topic, and not since the Maine disaster was such widespread popular interest evinced in the Spanish situation.

Spain's Purchase of War Ships Confirmed.

Fifty Million Dollar War Appropriation Reported Favorably.

ATTEMPT TO RAISE BIG GUNS OF MAINE ABANDONED.

Special to the Daily Item.

Washington, March 8.—The House appropriation committee has made a favorable report on the bill to appropriate fifty million dollars for immediate use for the purpose of defense in case it should be needed. The vote will be taken this afternoon. There is little opposition to the immediate passage of the bill. Four hours have been allotted for debate and the vote cannot be taken until 5 o'clock.

BIG GUNS CANNOT BE RAISED.

Key West, March 8.—The wrecking tug Right Arm, which has been at work on the wreck of the battleship Maine in Havana harbor arrived in this port this morning. The attempt to raise the big guns of the Maine has been abandoned, and the entire ship and her costly armament and equipment will be given up as a total loss.

SPAIN HAS BOUGHT SHIPS.

London, March 8.—The reported purchase of warships from English shipbuilders by the Spanish government has been confirmed to-day by information derived from the most reliable and authoritative sources.

MANNING THE WARSHIPS.

Brooklyn, March 8.—Men to man the cruisers Minneapolis and Columbia were drafted this morning and sent immediately to Philadelphia where those ships are in readiness to be placed in commission as soon as crews are provided.

TORPEDO FLEET FOR HAVANA.

Madrid, March 8.—Preparations are being hastened to despatch the torpedo fleet to Havana, and orders have been issued for it to sail direct to Havana on Friday.

Washington, March 7.—There were no less than five important events to-day having a bearing, more or less direct, upon the troubled relations between the United States and Spain, viz: The introduction in congress by Mr. Cannon of a resolution carrying \$50,000,000 for the public defence, the withdrawal by the Spanish government of its intimated objection to the continuance in office of Consul General Lee, the order to the cruiser Montgomery to proceed to Habana in place of the Fern, the passage of the bill through the house increasing the artillery arm by two regiments, and the institution of negotiations looking to the purchase of war-ships for our navy.

Mr. Cannon's resolution probably led all other topics in interest, particularly when it became known that it was the result of a conference between the author, the President, Senator Hale and other leading spirits in congress. As for Gen. Lee's case, the news of the satisfactory ending of the incident through the withdrawal of the sugges-

tion by Spain was expected as soon as it was noted that a loophole had been left open through the failure to make the complaint in anything like an official shape. Some fear is expressed that the consul general will not find his post congenial, now that he knows he is an unwelcome guest in Habana, but the administration is relying upon his devotion to the welfare of the Americans in Cuba and American interests generally to submit his own personal wishes to restraint and remain at his post.

Late in the afternoon Senor DuBose, the Spanish charge, received a cipher cablegram from the minister of state at Madrid, Senor Gallon, saying:

"You can disavow the rumor that any official application has been made for the recall of Gen. Lee."

This confirmed Mr. DuBose's view that a misapprehension had occurred and that some intimation concerning Gen. Lee had been construed into a request or demand for his recall, which Mr. DuBose says with positiveness was never intended.

As there has been no explanation so far of the purpose which prompted the introduction of Mr. Cannon's resolution, it may be said that the money is wanted primarily as an emergency fund. It is said by officials who will have the disposition of this treasure that it by no means follows because congress places such a sum of money in the control of the President that he will feel bound to spend all of it. Those who look for a wholesale purchase of warships from the bargain counters of European builders are likely to be disappointed. The navy department at present is inclined to make but one purchase of this kind, at first, at least, in the shape of a substantial ironclad. It does desire to get possession of several of the larger class of torpedo boat destroyers, such as the Sokol of the Russian navy, vessels of 300 tons, able to keep the sea in bad weather, a weak point with our own boats, and capable of enormous speed, such as 32 knots. But such craft are not for sale at all times; they are built to order generally, and could not be procured in this manner in less than six months from the date of contract even in Europe unless special prices were paid. There is no disposition on the part of the navy department to lumber the navy with a lot of unserviceable craft in a spasm of fear, but rather to get a few of the best vessels to be had.

The offers of ships to the navy department are now assuming definite and formal shape. During the day Secretary Long received a call from A. F. Lane, representing the Maxim-Nordensfeldt company and the agent for several war vessels now nearing completion in large foreign shipyards. These include two cruisers of the type of the Cincinnati, which are designed to be 20 knot vessels and two ironclads of 14 knots, which would be called third class battleships under our rating. These are now open to purchase, and it is understood that Mr. Lane's visit was in this connection. The two cruisers are 330 feet long, 48 feet beam and 16 feet draft. They carry six 6 inch and four 5 inch guns, and an auxiliary battery. The iron clads have a 13 3/4 inch belt of harveyized steel. Their armament is two 10-inch guns, four 5-inch, two 6-inch, six 6 pounders and four 1-pounders. Mr. Lane regards these ships as first class in every particular, as they were designed on modern principles and are being built by one of the leading shipbuilding firms of Europe. They are well along toward completion, and all four, it is said, could be in commission within a few months. They were originally designed for one of the South American republics, but there is said to be no obligation which would prevent their acquisition by the United States.

It Means Business.

Yesterday's developments are significant of a coming crisis in the relations between the United States and Spain quite independent of the immediate issues.

The Spanish government has receded from its request for the recall of Gen. Lee. We did not expect this, for it made the request in response to a popular demand and to satisfy national pride, and we could not think that it would back down from a position so clearly taken, thereby challenging the wrath and contempt of its people, a people prone to overrate their strength and to be jealous of their dignity. That Sagasta's government has done so is suggestive of conscious impotence and much "bluffing" in the past. The recession will provoke, unless all reports of Spanish sentiment are false, an outburst against the government, which holds its place none too securely. Weyler and the Carlists will make much of it. Sagasta will be lucky if he shall not fall by it.

But as Spain recedes the United States advances. The impulse has been given, and the momentum of a great people, greatly moved, will do the rest. Most significant is the request for a credit of \$50,000,000, made by a Republican leader after consultation with the President. Scarcely less so is the news of negotiations for the purchase of foreign warships. When to this is added the determination of the administration to send the Montgomery instead of the Fern to Cuba, a warship instead of a despatch boat, the conclusion cannot be evaded that trouble is expected and that we mean to be ready to meet it.

Reason it out. Spain has withdrawn her demands. On the surface

there is no probable cause of war. We must look beneath the surface. Beneath the surface of Habana harbor in the first place, for the discovery of the cause of the Maine's destruction. If the President believed or had been advised that the explosion was due to internal causes, would he ask a war credit of fifty millions? Look yet deeper. It has been repeatedly reported in an administration paper, the New York Sun, that long ago the President notified Spain that if by March 1, autonomy in Cuba should not plausibly claim success the United States would be compelled to intervene. The whole world knows what a failure that autonomy has been. Suppose that Spain's time is up; suppose that, propelled by his party platform, the press and the people, President McKinley has at least resolved to intervene in Cuba—would he not take precisely the course he has taken during the last two or three days?

We believe that more is in this matter than two cancelled demands of Spain. We think that the President realizes, as his western organs do, that the American people demand action and that further supineness will ruin the Republican party. We think that McKinley wants to be re-elected.—State, March 8.

ON A PINNACLE OF PRIDE.

Fatal Fall for the Foolish in Case of War.

Madrid, March 3.—The queen regent has signed the decree reducing the duties on wheat and flour.

The public is much exercised over the report of the presence of a squadron of United States warships at Hong Kong, as it is presumed the vessels intend to threaten Manila, the capital of the Philippine Islands, in the event of war between the United States and Spain.

The Imparcial, in an article headed "To Manila, to New York," quoted an unnamed high personage who scents the idea of an imminent rupture, and says: "The presence of the warships at Hong Kong is only Washington's policy, with a view of contenting the jingoes." The "high personage" is said to have added: "But America has not so many warships as to warrant such bold action. If the Yankees go to the Philippines, the Spaniards will go to New York."

The Globe remarks: "The government is alive to the critical situation, and is silently preparing for the worst. But it is too diplomatic to disclose the procedure by which it is preparing for emergencies."

Parallel With Cuba's Case.

The Central American republics are constantly at war. Assassination and oppression never cease within them. Tyrant rises up to crush tyrant. Forever the people suffer. Is it right that this great and civilized nation of ours should stand idly by while this state of affairs exist in the same hemisphere and not far to the South. This nation of ours is a civilized power. It is its duty to see that civilization is preserved and extended in other lands. The continuance of anarchy in Central America is a disgrace and cause of shame to the United States. The United States has commercial relations with the Central American states which are doubtless suffering from the unsettled and turbulent conditions. It is the duty of the United States to interfere at once. Warships should be sent immediately, the army should be increased and the Central Americans should be thrashed until they are willing to keep the peace and behave prettily. Certainly, Uncle Sam being responsible for what is done in Cuba, is also responsible for Central America. Later the doctrine can be enlarged to take in Brazil, Argentina and Patagonia. On the American continent everybody must be good or submit to chastisement from Uncle Sam.—Greenville News.

English Opinion.

London, March 7.—The Times says editorially this morning:

"If Spain is placed in an awkward position respecting the Lee incident she must thank the indiscretion of her foreign office. She cannot blame President McKinley. Mr. Cannon's bill can hardly be explained by the Lee incident. It is probably due to the rumor that Spain is purchasing war vessels."

"We do not believe that Spain desires war, but if she does this evidence of America's alertness offers a most effectual check. President McKinley appears to be adhering loyally to the policy of firmness, caution and pacific circumspection he has hitherto pursued. No doubt he has the support of the sober and conscientious mass of the American people, but he has had to face outbursts of popular clamor that a weaker man might have mistaken for the voice of the country."

"The complicity of the Spanish government in the Maine disaster is a hypothesis too monstrous and irrational to be entertained and except that there is nothing possible of arrangement between Spain and America, while the intractable nature of Cuba's disorders cannot but inspire thoughtful Americans with a serious doubt as to the wisdom of annexation."