The watchman and southron. (Sumter, S.C.) 1881-1930, February 07, 1894, Image 2
Knocks Holes in a Bad Law.
The Anti-Dispensary Argument, of
Mr. J. B. K Bryan.
COLUMBIA, S C.. January 29.-The
argument of Mr. J. P. K. Bryan, of
Charleston against the constitutionali?
ty of the dispensary law was filed in
the Supreme Court to-day. It is one
of tiie ablest expositions of that side
bf the great case .now before the
Court that has been made, and even
in so ralf an abstract of it as is
given below, it is difficult to do it
justice :
PROPOSITION FIRST.
This Act is unconstitutional in the
main principle thereof in that it pro?
vides for the conduct of the whole busi?
ness of liquor dealing in the State of
South Carolina by and through the
State commissioners, agents and employ?
?es. In other words, it puts the State
into the liquor trade, and the
same with its business risks and re?
venues is assumed by the State,
wholly and exclusively conducted by the
State with the public funds of the pub?
lic treasury, and through officers,
agents and employees paid by the State
out of the public treasury.
The Act provides that the State com?
missioners shall purchase al! liquor
for lawful sale in the State, and that
all amounts be paid over monthly to
the Treasurer of the State, and that
the commissoner is to draw a warrant
against the treasury from time to
time to pay the expenses ' ?curred in
conducting the business of said
agency, and provides that the county
dispenser shall not purchase any
intoxicating liquors except from the
State commissioner, and $50,000 of
public funds be appropriated for the
purpose of purchasing liquors to be
sold again to private citizens by coun?
ty dispenser, a State officer.
Under the provisions of the Act
it is clear that no private person with
private funds or in his own
right conducts or can conduct
their business ef liquor selling, bot
that it is conducted by the State,
its officers, agents and employees
under fixed compensation, with the
public fonds and capital of the State
and witt the liquors, the property of
the State, aud that the profits of such
business go into the public treasury
of the State and that of the county
and municipality.
Now we submit the State cannot
go into trade ; that is into the busi?
ness of buying and selling again
any article to its citizens. The
business of merchandising is indivi?
dual aud private The State cannot
itself engage in, compete in or mono?
polize any trade or business, how?
ever much it may regulate or re?
strain or prohibit a trade or business
for the general good of the whole.
In the preamble of the Constitu?
tion of South Carolina the object of
that Constitution is "au explict and
solemn compact with each other,*1 and
"to form a new Constitution of civil
government for ourselves.**
In Section 1 of article I of the
Constitution the "inalienable rights"
are those of property and of the
pursuit of calling and trades and
business. The rights belong to the
individual except when they must
be extinguished for the common
good. They do not belong to the
?tate ; trading is not a fuuction of
"civil*' government
Section 41. Article I, Constitution
of South Carolina, prescribes: "The
enumeration of rights in the Constitu?
tion shaH not be construed to impair
or deny others retained by the peo?
ple ; and all powers not herein dele?
gated remain with the people **
THE STATE NO RIGHT TO TRADE
The right to trade, the commer?
cial power, is nowhere delegated in
the Constitution, and is reserved by
the people. Other powers are
expressly given and enumerated in
the Constitution as the functions ol
"civil government,'* but no hint
or suggestion or implication of the
State as a trader appears any?
where There is HO provision for
it, and no contemplation ot it
in the constitutional framework
of this Government This enumera?
tion in the Constitution of the func?
tions of "civil government" are
exclusive of commen?ai and trading
functions, which are not within the
scope, either expressed or implied, of
"civil government," which is the
design of the Constitution under its
preamble.
This is clearly settled as a matter of
law by the case of Duncan vs Bar?
nett ll S. C., 337, where this Court
held that the affirmative system and
the specific enumeration of the Con?
stitution imply a limit to the power of
the Legislature, and the Legislature
had no power to go further than the
Constitution had prvided.
So here it is manifest that the
Legislature cannot go beyond the
fuuctiou of "civil government," and
cannot add to the affirmative system
set forth in the Constitution a com?
mercial trading, merchandising func?
tion, which does not inhere in a
government or the sovereign, and
which is not conferred, but rather
reserved, nader our Constitution by
thc people. Article 1, Section 41.
This further appears in the history
of civil government. When the
Emperor of Rome waa asked to trade
he repiied, "I am Emperor, would
you make me master of a galley ? By
what means should a Roman cit
gain his livelihood, if we take t
trade, oin of their hands?" U
which Montesquieu, (Spirit of Ls
V*>1 ?, Chapter 19, Rook 22,} sa
"He might have added, who shall
the bounds to us if we monopo
all to ourselves, who shall compe
to fulfill our engagements ?"
For the government to seize o
trade and monopolize it is an invai
of the right of a citizen, says Po
cal Economy, p. 103
The character of sovereign
trader is inconsistent. Adam Smit
Wealth of Nations, 3 vol. 357.
tinder tue Declaration of Indej
dence one of the enumerated rig
was the "trade" of the subject, i
one of the enumerated grievances i
"the cutting off oar trade with
world." For this the king was
nounced aa for an "usurpatic
The remedy and the object of
Government founded by the Am
can fathers, as stated in the Deel*
tion of Independence, was the
ther security" of' this right. ?
Declaiation of Independence j
111 ?. S.. 757, 758; Iff Wall, 1
105, 119, 120.
This question as to whether a ?St
has the right to monopolize and
gage in a trade where it is denied
the individual, has occurred only o
in the history of this country, and
was the State of Indiana attempt
to do with the liquor trade exac
what the State of South Carolina 1
by its Legislature, attempted to
in this case, that is, to engage in a
monopolise the business, and condi
it with the public funds, through
officers and agents, taking its proi
far the State, county and city. A
this attempt was decided by the S
preme Court of Indiana as uncon*
tutional, null aud void. And sm
that time Indiana has, like the oil
Western States, made, and u<
makes, fall exercise of her poli
power over the liquor trade in mc
drastic measures of regulation, supt
vision and restriction, but she b
never since attempted, aa no otb
State has ever attempted to repei
the engaging in and- the conduct
this trade monopolized by berse
See State vs Beebe, 6 Ind. 501.
Of the officers of the State sel lit
liquor the Court says : "They co
stitute no part of the people engag<
in the business on their own accour
but are appointed under the law I
the county commissioners, euppli<
with funds froth the county treasur
and paid a compensation for the
services by the county ; sell at prie*
fixed for them ; make the profits ar
losses of the business for the publ
treasury, and not for themselves."
The Court farther says . "If tl
manufacture and sale of these arti ch
are proper to be carried on in tl
State for any purpose it is not coo
petent for the Government to tal
the business from the people an
monopolize it The Government cai
not turn druggist and become th
sole dealer in medicines in th
State "
"And why ? Because the businet
was at aud before the organization <
the Government, and is properly, i
all times, a private pursuit of th
people, as much as the manufacture
and sale of brooms, tobacco, clothe*
and the dealing in tea, coffee an
rice, aud the raising of potatoes
And the Government was organize
to piotect the people in such pursuit
from the depredations ot powerfv
and lawless individuals, the baron
of the middle ages, whom they wer
too weak to resist by force."
"And for the Government uow l<
seize upon these pursuits is subvei
sive of the very objects for which i
was created, and is inconsistent witl
the right of private property in ant
pursuit by the citizens."
And the Court declared the wholi
system of State liquor trading un
constitutional, null and void.
PROPOSITION SECOND.
The State cannot go into trade be
cause it is opposed to the whole systen
of finance and taxation,11 as set fort)
in Article 9 of the Constitution, whicl
is the financial policy of (lie State, anc
whick has adopted taxation as th
affirmative system of raising the reve?
nue and meeting the burdens and ex?
penses of government,
"These burdens are the burdens oj
civil government," and taxation is the
beneficent and equitable means of the
citizens bearing equally these bur<
dens.
If the profits of trade could be
seized upon by the State to pay the
expense of civil government, then it,
would ouly be a question of how
many trades would be monopolized
by the Government before taxation
would cease. In other words, the
adoption of the principle of the State
engaging in and conducting trade,
and using its profits as revenue,
would nullify the system of taxation.
The result would be that those
classes of citizens who are allowed
to conduct their trades and indus
i tries would in the end pay no taxes
j and bear no burdens ; but the ex?
penses of the Government would be
defrayed by the profits of those trades
which had been monopolized by the
State to the exclusion of other class
of citizens conducting them.
Ia addition to this exposure to loss
in trade, aud the hazard of mercantile
pursuit and adventure, is not a civil
burden for which tax caa be levied.
Taxes are only for the "estimated
expenses of the State for each year."
(Sec. 3, Art 9, Constitution S. C.)
The objects of taxation as set ft
in the Constitution by the en uni
tion of the functions of the Gov<
ment are :
The maintenance of the Cour
the expenses of the Legislature ;
expenses of the executive dep
ments ; the maintenance of
educational system, (Article 1
The maintenance of the charita
and penal institution, (Article 1
The maintenance of the mili
(Article 13.)
These constitute the whole sci
of '.civil" government ih the Const
tion It is an affirmative enume
tion of power and right, which
Legislature cannot go beyond- *
add to without constitutional ame
ment. These object of taxation
those which are usual in other Sta
in ibis country, and are set forth
the bound of the uses of the pul
funds in Wayland's Political Econon
pages 423-433.
Nowhere, and at no time in c
stitutional history or in English s
American jurisprudence, is there a
use of taxes for the conduot of tra?
Nowhere are taxes levied for 1
purpose of exercise of the commerc
power, which is, in the politi
history of Anglo-Saxon civilizatii
distinctively and always a matter
individual enterprise.
Again, and more particularly, 1
State Legislature cannot divert pub
funds by making advances to t
county dispenser to bu; and 8
liquors, "such advantages to be
garded as loans, to be refunded i
of the profits." (See Section ]
Dispensary Act ) And this is
unconstitutional divereion of pub
funds. Feldraann vs City Counc
23 S. C., 62-68, Mauldin vs Ci
Council, 33 S. C., 24.
In Feldmann vs City Council o
Court held it was au uncoustitutior.
diversion of public funds "to loai
public money to the citizen to build
shelter for. his family in the bor
districts of Charleston, even if t
"loan" was secured by mortgage
real estate improved. Here a fortio
is plainly an unconstitutional div<
sion of public funds of the Stat
raised by taxes, to advance them, ai
what they purchase as "loans"
dispensers, without security, or ev<
for the State herself, through h
agents, to apply the public funds
purchase intoxicating liquor to s<
again to the individual private cit
zen-a purpose which is surely n
a public purpose. Mauldin '
Greenville, 32 S. C , 24.
This directly coucerns the ta
payer, a copartner as to the assets i
the political coparterehip, and liabl
with bis property, for the debts i
the State.
In addition to this, by Article U
constitution of South Carolina, tl
General Assembly is forbidden 1
create any further debt or obligatic
by loan of the credit of the State, <
otherwise, except for the "ordinal
and current business of the State "
And we submit, under the const
. tn tiona! principles we have above si
foi th, that it is not, and never wa
the "ordinary and current business <
the State" to engage in trade whic
is not a function of "civil govert
ment."
PROPOSITION THIRD.
The police power of the State, in i
largest extent does not autJtorize a Stai
itself to engage in a business
In this argument our position mm
not be misunderstood as to the exter
of the police power
We admit that the State, can, i
the exercise of the police, powei
put any restriction upon the ind
vidual in the sale or use of intoxica
ting liquors We admit also, tba
the State eau,in the fnllest exercise o
the police power, absolutely prohib?
the manufacture, sale or existence o
intoxicating liquors within lier terri
tory. This police power of the Stat
is a system of restrictions on indi
vidual rights and on property owne<
by individuals. It i3 founded on tin
maxim "Sic t?tere ino ut non laedai
alieno," that the individual shall no
use bis own so as to injure another.
For the health, morals and welfari
of the power is supreme It is salui
populi. But we contend that whet
the State has restricted the individua
! in selling, or when the State shal
have wholly prohibited the sale oi
presence of intoxicating liquors ii
the State, that the police power ii
exhausted. That the police power if
and can be only exerted in restriction
regulation or prohibition. In othei
wo rd8, in this Act, that in the exer
eise of the police power : The State
can require all liquor to be inspected
before sale : to be sold between cer.
tain hours : can prohibit the drinking
of any liquor upon the premises where
it is sold ; prohibit the sale to any
minor or to any habitual drunkard,
and to these restrictions can add
other restrictions limiting and regulat?
ing the traffic by the individual, and
? could even go to the extent of total
; prohibition of sale by the individual
and the destruction of the property
as a noxious poison on this soil.
All of these objects are within thc
proper exercies ot the police power,
and can be accomplished through the
! operation of that power without the
j State itself engaging ?ti or assuming the
I conduct of the trade. But this assurap
j tion of trading function by the
I State, through it officers and agents,
either before or after having excluded
the individual from the trade, either
in competition or monopoly is not
within the police power of the
State, and it is against the Constitu
tion of the State.
In all the cases cited by council
to legislative action by the Sta
held constitutional as to liquor traf
the Court has upheld Acts as com
tutional because they were At
either :
(1) Regulating sales and bus i ni
of intoxicating liquor, or,
(2) Prohibiting sales and busin?
of intoxicating liquor.
But nowhere has the Court uph<
an Act that allowed the State
engage in or monopolize liquor trat
whether it prohibited it or not.
The only case-the Indiana case
in the books is decided against t
right of the State to conduct liqc
trade, and this is founded on tlx
principles of civil government,
understood in American constitutioi
law as a heritage of the Ango-Sax
people.
And the general principle of tl
case is again announced and affirm
with strong emphasis against t
State going into any business in t
following- case, decided within tl
month Rippe vs Becker, Suprei
Court of Minnesota, January 5 182
in which the Court held, ail Judg
concurring: "Tha police power
a State to regulate a business is
be exercised by the adoption of rul
and regulations as to the manner
which it shall be conducted by othei
and not by itself engaging in it
The Court says : "The evide
sole purpose of the Act is to provis
for the State erecting an elevator, ai
itself going into the 'grain elevate
business, a business conducted- 1
the State in its own elevator, and
far as relates to the right of the Stat
under the police power, to regula
business, the position of defendant
counsel really amounts to this : Th
whenever those who are engaged
any business which is effected with
pnblic interest, and hence the subje
of governmental regulation, do n
furnish the public proper and reaso
able service, the State may, as
means of regulating the bu si nee
itself engage in it, and furnish tl
public better service at reaso ti ab
rates, or, by means of such Sta
competition, compel others to do s
The very statements of the propos
tion is sufficient to show to wh
startling results it neccessarily lead
It needs no argument to prove th;
if, in the exercise of the police pow?
to regulate this business, the Sta)
itself has a right to erect and opera!
one elevator at Duluth, if has ti
power to erect and operate twenty
if necessary, at the same point, an
also to erect and operate elevatoi
at every point in the State whei
there is grain to be handled an
stored. Railways are also, under th
same police power, the subjects <
State regulation ; and if it shoul
be deemed that they were m
furnishing the public with propc
service, or charging un reaso nabl
rates, it could with equal propriet
he claimed that it would be a prope
means of exercising the police po wc
of regulating the business for the Stat
itself to construct and opctate con
peting railways. The hack businesi
the pawnbroker's business, tb
manufacture and sale of intoxica
ing liquors, and numerous other kind
of business that might be namer
are also the subject of State reguh
tion ; and, if counsel's contention i
correct, we do not see why, as
means of 'regulating' these kinds c
business, the State itself might nc
engage in running backs, pawi
brokers' shops, building and opera
ting distilleries and breweries, or eve
! running saloons But further illui
j tra tion cannot be necessary. Th
j police power of the State to r?gul?t
a business does not include th
j power to engage in carrying it on
j Police regulation is to be effected b;
restraints upon a business, and th
adoption of rules and regulations a
to the manner in which it shall b
conducted. While the jurists o
continental Europe sometime
j include under the term 'polie
power' all governmental institution
which are established with publi*
funds for the promotion of the publi*
I good, yet, as understood in America!
j constitutional law, the term mean
? simply the power of the State t?
: impose those restraints upon privat?
j rights which are necessary forth?
general welfare of all, and is but th?
power to enforce the maxim : Sh
uturet tuo ut alienum non laedas
The provisions of this Act have nr
j reference to thc regulation, in anj
! such sense, of the 'grain elevatoi
j business/ and the right of the Stat(
j to embark in the construction anc
j operation of these works cannot b(
predicated on the police power."
"The time was when the policy
was to confine the function of govern
ment to the limits strictly necessary
I to secure the enjoyment of life
j liberty and property. The old Jeffer
j 8onian maxim was that the countrj
I is governed the best that is governed
! the least." If the people wist
j socialism and paternalism "the)
j must amend the Constitution of thc
j State. The present Constitution wat
I not framed on any such lines."
"It is always a delicate as well as ar
! ungracious task to declare invalid ar.
j Act of a co-ordinate branch of the Gov
erntment. But the Legislature is not
j the people any more than are thc
; executive and judiciary, and is
.j equally with them subject to thc
I limitations imposed by the Constitu
j tion. Thc Act now under considera
: tion seems to us so clearly in viola
I tion of the Constitution that it is oui
i boundeu duty to so hold."
In this last case from Minne
the Supreme Court of that St
reversing the lower Court, comes
the rescue of constitutional "<
government,'* as we have ha<
handed down to us as a preci
legacy, and together with the I
ana Court has clearly defined
limit of the police power for
Commonwealths of this country.
FOURTH PROPOSITION.
The State cannot in any tr
establish a monopoly either for
individual or for itself by engaging
ii, though it may restrict, r?gulait
prohibit it altogether under the pc
power.
The Slaughter House cases in
S. Supreme Court reported in
Wall, 36, are claimed to support
doctrine of power in a State
create trade monopolies, but
State Acts were there upheld by
Court not on the ground as susta
iug a trade monopoly, but simply
the ground that the State had
right to define a "locality wh
slaughtering should be done."
161.)
j The Court, by Justice Miller, ps
I 51, 16 Wall, takes care distinctly
j deny that it is a monopoly, and
! disaffirm the power of the State
create a trade monopoly. The Co
says, "it does not, as has bt
asserted, prevent the butcher fr
doing his own slaughtering. 1
butcher then is still permitted
slaughter, to' prepare and to sell
own meats." And the Court den
j that the Act operated to "depri
? the butchers of the right to labor
j their occupation." (Page 61.) A
declared that the "Act did i
destroy the business of the bute!
ov\ seriously interfere with tl
pursuit," but was simply a "restrai
and regulation" within the poli
power. 16 Wall, 61-62.
This is vastly different from t
usurpation and monopoly of t
trade which the State here h
attempted under the guise of t
police power.
i The principle of the " S laugh t
House" cases is the strongest arg
ment against the monopoly by t
State, for itself or individuals,
trade under the guise of the polii
power, or the granting of exclusr
privilege of trade under the pr?tent
of the exercise of that power, ai
confirm the doctrine that if there 1
trade at all it must be by tl
individual under restrictions ai
regulations common to all in view
the common good and welfare.
The original question in tl
'Slaughter House" cases cou
never have arisen under the Constit
lion, because all forms of inonopolii
are distinctly forbidden in Sectk
12, Article 1, of our Constitutio
which provides that "no person shs
be subjected in law to any oth<
restriction or disqualification in regal
to any personal rights than such i
are laid upon others under lil
circumstances."
And Section 41, Article
reserves the rights and powers II?
delegated.
These articles of our Constitute
as interpreted by our own Supren
Court, allow no exclusive privilege I
any person from the State, and tl
Acts of the Legislature authorizin
the cities to go into private businei
and give exclusive privileges, or tl
attempts of the cities with or withot
the authority of the Legislature to g
into private business, have bee
adjudged unconstitutional and vok
See Feldmann vs. City Council, 2
S. C., 57 ; Mauldin vs. City Counci
33 S C , p 1.
And in Feldmann vs. City Counci
23 S. C., p. 63, the Supreme Com
referred to Article 1, Section 41, c
the Constitution as an express restric
tion upon the power of the Legish
ture to exercise its power for privat
business and to the duty of th
Court to declare it void.
So that the Constitution of thit
State is clear and fall to the poin
against the authorization of an;
monopoly or private business create<
by or engaged in by the State.
Under it monopoly in trade by th<
State in behalf of itself or in favor o
an individual cannot lawfully exist.
FIFTH PROPOSITION.
The liquor trade, as to the exercise
of police power, is like all other trade,
and employments
Finally, the liquor trade is as tc
this question no different from an\
other trade as to which the State may
exercise its police power. Tht
attempt to make it exceptional is not
founded in law or fact.
"The restraints on the sale ol
liquors are but the ordinary police
regulations such as the State may
make in respect to all classes oi
trade and employments," is the
language of Judge Cooley. (Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, pages 725
726.)
The United States Supreme Court
has said : "Ii the State can
prohibit intoxicating liquors it may
also exclude tobacco or any other
article, the use or abuse of which it
1 may deem deleterious." (Bowman
j vs. R. R., 125 U. S.,404 )
i j The fact is that the States, in the
! j exercise of the police power, actually
: at this moment do regulate in this
and other States the trades as
follows, among others : Drugs,
tobacco, meats, coffee, all articles of
. food, fertilizers, flour, butter, public
markets, fruits, vegetables, by de
daring the places where and th
hours within which they shall b
sold ; . in providing. for the ii
spec tion and destruction of ui
sound articles; in providing fe
a chemical analysis and branding c
fertilizers; in* providing for th
exclusion of diseased cattle, and i
many other ways restraining an
"regulating" the trade as to th
quality of articles to be bought am
sold, and as to the times when am
the places where the articles may b
bought and sold by individuals
This is admittedly "regulation." Ii
however, the State can lawfully, ii
the exercise or under the guise o
pretext of the police power, add t(
the system of existing regulation am
restraints trade, another system ot
engaging in or of exclusive monopoly
of buying and selling by the Stat
itself of all these articles, then w<
may have, constitutionally, exclu
8ively conducted by the State
(brough its officers and agents, witt
the public funds aud absorbing thc
revenue, the following trades : Thc
State fertilizer dispensary, the State
tobacco dispensary, the State butte)
dispensary, the State fresh meal
dispensary, the State salt meal
dispensary, the State drug dispen?
sary, the State fruit dispensary, thc
State nour dispensary, and so on
through every trade in which in thc
exercise of the police power the
State could make regulations, and
thus practically the whole business,
trade and commerce of the State
could be constitutionally turned into
a system of official conduct of busi?
ness, with an army of officers and
State agents ; and thus instead of
the individual citizen conducting
trade with private capital and private
enterprise, under the protection and
restraints of the Government, the
Government would be conducting
trade' with public funds, through
official employees ! To state this
result is to demonstrate the falsity of
the principle, for this result js simply
socialism and paternalism and com?
munism run mad, and destroys the
very purposes, and transgresses all
the bounds of "civil government"
founded by our Constitution.
The trading by the State in liquor
being against the Constitution it is
void/ and cannot be upheld by resort
to tlie police power for the police
power cannot be exercised in acts
"repugnant to the Constitution."
Cooley Const Limitations, p. 714, 5th
line from bottom.
So also the Supreme Court of the
United States say : "Under guise of
exerting police power a State cannot
pass an unconstitutional law." 138
?. S. 82.
In the light of these principles the
exercise of the police power cannot
be by the State itself engaging in
the trade. Whether it be the liquor
trade or any other trade the constitu?
tional principle equally applies, aud
j is fundamental aud vital. To lose
sight of this principle because the
liquor trade alone is now under dis?
cussion is to surrender one of the
mightiest constitutional bulwarks of
our Government, and to return to the
absolute governments of the East or
Continental Europe, where any and
all trades, arts and industries might
at any moment be engaged in,usurped
or monopolized by the monarch.
Let us preserve the State from en?
gaging io any and all trade. Ii the
trade be hurtful unless controlled, let
the State regulate it by proper re*
strictions. If trade be noxious per
se, and inherently endangering the
health and morals of society, then let
the State prohibit it and abolish it
entirely, thus applying aud exhaust?
ing the whole police power of the
State in protection of society. But
when, under the public policy of the
State, the trade is not noxious, (and
in this instance intoxicating liquor is
not only permitted, but poured
out in sale by the State by
thousands of barrels each year),
let not the State appeal to the
police power for the State itself to
engage in this trade, for the police
power does not, as we have seen, io
! elude the power of the State itself to
engage in any trade.
Fatal have been the consequences
to any trade, and corrupting also to
the State and its citizens, when the
absolute monarchs of the Continent
have attempted, by an army of paid
retainers aud officials to conduct a
trade-so all the political economists,
from Adam Smith down, tell us. In
the light of this warning of history,
dangerous indeed is the experiment,
corrupt and corrupting to the State
and its citizens must the end be of
the attempt to conduct exclusively,
by public funds, aud a host of paid
officials, the trade of the magnitude
of the liquor traffic, offering in itself
so manifold and strong and subtle
temptation with public money and
multiplied public trusts.
The highest public policy of civil
eociety is against such a system.
The strain of civil government, pure
and simple, is surely severe euough
in our day. To add to the high and
solemn functions of civic rule the
business or the temptation of any
official trading and trafficking is a
grave threat to the whole fabric of
"civil government." The political
i and social safety of these American
! Commonwealths rests on the strong
! foundations of the past. Those time
honored principles which have been
\ bought with the price of blood and
! long struggles and sacrifices and
j tested with severe experience are the
j precious political heritage of the
j Anglo-Saxon race.