

Consolidated Aug. 2, 1881.

SUMTER, S. C., WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 1891.

New Series—Vol. X. No. 50.

The Watchman and Southron.

Published every Wednesday,
BY
N. G. OSTEEEN,
SUMTER, S. C.

TERMS:
Two Dollars per annum—in advance.

ADVERTISEMENTS.
One Square, first insertion.....\$1 00
Every subsequent insertion..... 50
Contracts for three months, or longer will
be made at reduced rates.
All communications which advertise private
persons will be charged for as advertisements.
Obituaries and tributes of respect will be
charged for.

REMOVAL —AND— NEW GOODS.


To accommodate my largely
increased and increasing busi-
ness, I have removed to the
handsome and commodious new
Brick Store next to John Reid's,
opposite my old stand, where I
can now be found with a stock of
DIAMONDS,
Watches, Clocks, Jewelry,
Silver and Plated Ware,
SPECTACLES, &c.

surpassing in brilliancy, extent
and variety any stock of the
kind ever shown in this city,
with daily additions of new at-
tractions.

Thinking my friends and the public
generally for the very liberal patronage
bestowed on me at my old stand, I hope
to merit a continuance of the same, and
I hereby extend to all a cordial invita-
tion to pay me a visit at my new stand,
where, with a larger stock and increased
facilities in every way I am better pre-
pared than ever to cater to their wants.
Don't forget the place,
**REID'S BLOCK, MAIN ST.,
SUMTER, S. C.**

Yours, anxious to please,
L. W. FOLSOM.
Everything in the line of repairing done as
heretofore.
Oct 8

H. A. HOYT,
Successor to
C. I. HOYT & BRO.



Gold and Silver Watches,

FINE DIAMONDS.
Clocks, Jewelry, Spectacles,
MERIDIAN BRITANIA SILVERWARE, &c.
REPAIRING A SPECIALTY.
Feb 1



Down to a fine point
—that's where the making of
corsets has been brought to.
Kabo for the "bones"—it
can't break or kink.

Loops of corset lace
instead of metal eyelets—they
can't rust or cut the laces.

The Ball Corset for ease
and comfort; the Kabo Cor-
set for unyielding strength.
Each is the best of its kind.

If you don't think so, after
wearing for two or three
weeks, return it to us and get
your money back.

J. RYTTENBERG & SONS.

HOLMAN & LEMASTER,
CONTRACTORS AND BUILDERS,
SUMTER, S. C.

WILL MAKE BIDS ON ANY WORK
in City or County, and will do all
work with dispatch and in best of work-
manship.
Calls by mail or otherwise responded to
promptly. Can be found at present at build-
ings on West end of Calhoun Street.
E. H. HOLMAN,
G. F. LEMASTER.

HONEY FOR SALE.

I have on hand a fine lot of
CHOICE EXTRACTED HONEY,
for sale by the gallon or less quantity.
ALSO, HONEY IN THE COMB.
Orders filled at residence, on Republican
Street. Samples can be seen at Watchman
and Southron office.
N. G. OSTEEEN.

CHILD BIRTH . . . MADE EASY!

"MOTHERS' FRIEND" is a scientific-
ly prepared Linctus, every ingredi-
ent of recognized value and in
constant use by the medical pro-
fession. These ingredients are com-
bined in a manner hitherto unknown

"MOTHERS' FRIEND"

WILL DO ALL that is claimed for
it AND MORE. It Shortens Labor,
Lessens Pain, Diminishes Danger,
and is a safe and reliable remedy
to "MOTHERS" in all cases. Con-
taining valuable information and
voluntary testimonials.

Sent by express on receipt of price \$1.50 per bottle
BROADFIELD REGULATOR CO., Atlanta, Ga.
SOLD BY ALL DRUGGISTS.

Castoria

For Infants and Children.
Castoria promotes Digestion, and
overcomes Flatulency, Constipation, Sour
Stomach, Diarrhoea, and Feverishness.
Thus the child is rendered healthy and its
sleep natural. Castoria contains no
Morphia or other narcotic property.

"Castoria is so well adapted to children that
I recommend it as superior to any prescription
known to me."
H. A. ANCKER, M. D.,
111 South Oxford St., Brooklyn, N. Y.

"I use Castoria in my practice, and find it
specially adapted to affections of children."
ALEX. ROSSIGNOL, M. D.,
1027 24 Ave., New York.

"From personal knowledge and observation
I can say that Castoria is an excellent medicine
for children, acting as a laxative and relieving
the most distressing and general system very
much. Many mothers have told me of its ex-
cellent effect upon their children."
DR. G. C. OSOON,
Lowell, Mass.

THE CENTRAL COMPANY, 71 Murray Street, N. Y.

Are You Interested?

Are you suffering with any of the following
symptoms: Loss of, or irregular appetite,
loss of flesh, a feeling of fullness or weight in
the stomach, acidity, flatulency, a dull pain
with a sensation of heaviness in the head,
riddiness, constipation, enlargement of kid-
neys, heart trouble, nervousness, sleepless-
ness, etc. Dr. Holt's Elixer will cure you.
W. A. Wright, the Comptroller General of
Georgia, says, "The bottles I cured him after
having tried almost everything else."
Judge R. F. Izlar, Macon, Ga., says, "Holt's
Elixer accomplished what all other remedies
failed to do, a perfect cure."
J. B. Paulin, Ft. Gaines, Ga., writes: "I
have no hesitancy in recommending it, as it
cured me of dyspepsia."
For any further information inquire of
your druggist. For sale by all druggists.

THE SIMONDS NATIONAL BANK, OF SUMTER.

STATE, CITY AND COUNTY DEPOSIT-
ORY, SUMTER, S. C.
Paid up Capital \$75,000 00
Surplus Fund 9,250 00

Transacts a General Banking Business.
Careful attention given to collections.
SAVINGS DEPARTMENT.
Deposits of \$1 and upwards received. In-
terest allowed at the rate of 4 per cent. per
annum. Payable quarterly, on first days of
January, April, July and October.

R. M. WALLACE,
Vice President.
L. S. CARSON,
Cashier.

THE BANK OF SUMTER, SUMTER, S. C.

CITY AND COUNTY DEPOSITORY.
Transacts a general Banking business.
Also has
A Savings Bank Department.

Deposits of \$1.00 and upwards received.
Interest calculated at the rate of 4 per cent.
per annum, payable quarterly.

W. F. B. HAYNSWORTH,
President.
A. WHITE, JR.,
Cashier.

DR. E. ALVA SOLOMONS, DENTIST.

Office
OVER BROWNS & PURDY'S STORE.
Entrance on Main Street,
Between Browns & Purdy and Duran & So.

G. W. DICK, D. D. S.
Office over Bogin's New Store,
ENTRANCE ON MAIN STREET,
SUMTER, S. C.
Office Hours—9 to 1:30; 2:30 to 5.
Sept 8

Dr. T. W. BOOKHART, DENTAL SURGEON.

Office over Bulman & Bro.'s Shoe Store,
ENTRANCE ON MAIN STREET,
SUMTER, S. C.
Office Hours—9 to 1:30; 2:30 to 5.
April 17—

AGENTS WANTED

FOR SUMTER COUNTY FOR THE NATION-
AL CAPITAL LIFE ASSOCIATION.
The right man will earn \$75.00 per week.
This Association is receiving the support of
Farmers Alliance.

W. S. MONTHEITH,
Manager, So. Division, Columbus, S. C.
June 10, 2

Sample Copies Free!

The Sunny South, our great Southern
Family Weekly, should be taken in every
household. The price is only \$2 a year, and
a present which is worth that amount or
more is sent for every yearly subscription.
A sample copy will be sent free to any
address. Write at once to
J. H. SEALS & CO., Atlanta, Ga.

Dr. Westmoreland's Calisaya Tonic.

The Great Southern Remedy, Will Cure Chills
and Fever, Dyspepsia, and all Liver and
Blood Diseases.
Rev. W. H. Hunt, of Atlanta, Ga., writes:
—From the benefits I have received from a
single bottle of Dr. Westmoreland's Calisaya
Tonic, I have no hesitation in saying that I
consider it an excellent remedy for indiges-
tion, and General Debility.
Col. H. P. Hammett, Prest. Campedown
and Piedmont Mills, Greenville, S. C., says:
—I had contracted Malaria, and suffered greatly
in its various forms for near two years; tried
two or three Mineral Springs—the most ki-
netic Physicians, but was not relieved. Was
cured with five or six bottles of Dr. West-
moreland's Calisaya Tonic.

John R. Keels, Esq., Sus- pended.

JUDGE IZLAR'S RULING.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
COUNTY OF SUMTER,)
Ex-Parte—The Bar of Sumter against
John R. Keels

Rule to show cause why he should not
be removed or suspended from his
office as Attorney at Law.

On the tenth day of June, 1891, a
Rule was issued upon the application of
the Bar of Sumter, in this State,
against John R. Keels an attorney at
law and a member of the said bar, to
show cause why he should not be
removed or suspended from his office
as such attorney? This Rule to show
cause was based upon the affidavits of
A. F. Cousar, James D. Blanding,
Henry Stuckey, Mark Reynolds, R. M.
Wallace and R. D. Lee. The charge
against the said John R. Keels is fully
set forth in the affidavit of A. F. Cou-
sar, as follows:

"On or about the 13th day of March,
1891, I went to the office of John R.
Keels as attorney for Celoung Williams
in what is known as the Bishopville
Bribe Case, said Williams being one of
the deponents, farm laborers; that said
John R. Keels agreed to accept depon-
ents note of hand payable in the fall
of nineteen dollars; that deponent did
make his said note dated same date
and payable November 1st, 1891, for
said sum of nineteen dollars and deliv-
ered the same to the said John K.
Keels; that on or about the 23rd day
of May, 1891, deponent having been
informed that Marion Moise, Esq.,
held a note against deponent for the
sum of three hundred and nineteen dol-
lars, deponent went to Mr. Moise and
examined said note and found that Mr.
Moise held the same against him
and ascertained that the note so held
by Mr. Moise was the same note that
deponent had delivered to John R.
Keels above referred to, but which had
been raised from the sum of nineteen
dollars and nineteen cents, by inserting
"three hundred and" in front of the
word "nineteen" in the body of the
note, and in the upper left hand corner
thereof the figure "3" after the \$ and
before the figures "19," which words
and figure had been inserted in said
note after deponent had delivered the
same to the said John R. Keels as
aforesaid and without deponent's knowl-
edge or consent; that deponent gave
to the said John R. Keels a note at any-
time; that the said John R. Keels told
deponent in the presence of several
members of the Bar of Sumter, that all
writing in the said note, except depon-
ent's signature, including the alleged
alterations thereof was the writing of
him the said John R. Keels, and all
written before deponent signed same."

The affidavits of R. D. Lee and Jas.
D. Blanding go to corroborate the alle-
gations contained in the affidavit of
A. F. Cousar.

The A. F. Cousar note was produced
at the hearing and inspected by the
Court. The note bore upon its face
the distinctive marks referred to in the
affidavits of A. F. Cousar, R. D. Lee and
James D. Blanding, as alterations.

The affidavits of Henry Stuckey and
R. M. Wallace, as also that of R. D.
Lee, tended to show the alterations of
certain other notes endorsed by Henry
Stuckey for the said John R. Keels, and
discounted at the "Simonds National
Bank of Sumter, S. C."

The hearing of said Rule was fixed
for the 17th day of June, 1891, seven
days being deemed by the Court ample
time for the Respondent to prepare his
answer, and to meet the charges pre-
ferred against him.

On the day fixed for the hearing the
Respondent by his attorney, John T.
Green, Esq., asked that the hearing be
postponed until after Respondent had
been tried upon the indictments for
forgery upon which the Grand Jury
had found "True Bills" at the present
term, growing out of the same state of
facts alleged in the affidavits upon
which the rule to show cause had been
issued. This request was refused.

The counsel for Respondent was then
informed by the Court that the Respon-
dent could not be required to answer
under oath—that his answer might be
under oath, or not, as the Respondent
chose—and that Respondent could in-
troduce such evidence as he desired
tending to disprove the charges and
show his innocence.

The counsel for Respondent then
submitted the following answer, which
was subscribed and sworn to by the
Respondent: "That he denies each and
every allegation in the affidavits of
A. F. Cousar, R. D. Lee, Andrew E. Cou-
sar, Mark Reynolds, Esq., and Jas. D.
Blanding, Esq., made in support of said
Rule to show cause, and charging this
deponent with forgery."

No testimony other than this general
denial under oath of the Respondent,
was offered or tendered, tending to dis-
prove the allegations contained in the
Rule, or to show that the Respondent
was innocent of the charges thereby
made, or by way of explanation.

After argument the case was submit-
ted upon all the affidavits and papers
read in the cause.
That this Court has the power to dis-
bar or suspend attorneys for professional
misconduct, or for any matter showing
their unfitness to practice in the courts,
there can be no doubt. As this power,
however, is not questioned I shall not
consume time in discussing it, but tak-
ing it as conceded, proceed to the main
questions in the case.

"The power to disbar is not an arbit-
rary and despotic one, to be exercised
at the pleasure of the court, or from
passion, prejudice or personal hostility,
but it is the duty of the Court to exer-
cise and regulate it by a sound and ju-
dicial discretion whereby the rights
and independence of the bar may be
as scrupulously guarded and maintained
by the court, as the rights and dignity
of the Court itself." Ex-Parte Seaborn
19 How., 13, per Taney, C. J. "In
disbaring an attorney the Court simply
determines whether the attorney is a
fit person to be allowed to practice law,
and not whether he is guilty of the
commission of a crime, the latter being

a matter for a criminal court of pen-
tent jurisdiction under due process of
law." In re-Treadwell, 7 Pac. Rep.
721, the cases for which an attorney
may be disbarred or suspended are nu-
merous. Any conduct which gravely
affects his character as an attorney, and
shows him unfit to be entrusted with
his high and responsible duties whether
done in a professional capacity, or not,
is cause for disbarment or suspension,
and sufficient to call into exercise the
power of the Court. There are many
authorities in support of the doctrine
that where the misconduct complained
of was done in the private, and not in
the official capacity of the attorney, re-
lief can only be obtained by prosecu-
tion in a proper tribunal, at the suit
of the injured party, and not in this sum-
mary manner. But while this is the
general rule it is not an inflexible one.
There may be cases where the miscon-
duct of an attorney in his private cap-
acity would be of so gross a character
that the Court would not hesitate to
exercise the power of disbarment.

Perse vs. Appleton, 44 Am. Rep. 816.
In the case of the State vs. Winton,
50 Am. Rep., 489, the court say: "The
question which has presented the most
difficulty, and out of which there has
grown some difference of opinion, is
where the facts charged against the at-
torney are indictable, but are in no wise
connected with his professional capacity
—acts done in his private, but not in
his professional capacity. In such cases
it has been held by some courts that
where the misconduct alleged, though
done in his private capacity merely, and
not in his official capacity, is of such
gross character as to gravely affect his
standing as an attorney, they will exer-
cise the power of removal or disbar-
ment. This seems to be an exception to
the general rule as held by other
courts, which confines the exercise of
such summary jurisdiction over an at-
torney to cases where the misconduct
was committed in his professional cap-
acity, or was in some way or in some
manner so connected with his profes-
sional character as to be the direct result."
"But there is no doubt much authority
for extending the rule to misconduct for
acts which are indictable, and commit-
ted outside the professional relation,
when the misconduct alleged against
the attorney is so gross as to seriously
impair his standing and integrity."

This whole subject is very ably dis-
cussed by Mr. Justice Bradley in ex-
parte Wall, 107 U. S. 266. After re-
viewing all the English cases on this
subject he deduces the following as the
English rule: "That an attorney will
be struck off the roll if convicted of a
felony, or if convicted of a misdemeanor
or involving want of integrity, even
though the judgment be arrested or re-
versed for error; and also (without pre-
vious conviction) if he is guilty of gross
misconduct in his profession, or of acts
which though not done in his profes-
sional capacity, gravely affect his char-
acter as an attorney; but in the latter
case, if the acts charged are indictable,
and fairly deduced, the court will not
proceed against him until he is convicted
by a jury; and will in no case com-
pel him to answer under oath to a
charge for which he may be indicted."

After a review of the authorities in
this country he states the result as fol-
lowing: "That whilst it may be the gen-
eral rule that a previous conviction
should be had before striking an attor-
ney off the roll for an indictable of-
fense committed by him when not set-
ting in his character as an attorney,
yet that rule is not an inflexible one.
Cases may occur in which such a re-
quirement would result in allowing per-
sons to practice as attorneys who ought
on every ground of propriety and re-
spect for the administration of the law,
to be excluded from such practice." In
this case Mr. Justice Field filed an able
dissenting opinion.

Mr. Freeman in a note to the case of
the State vs. Kirke, reported in the 95
Am. Rep., 338-455 gives the cases
which hold that there must be a regular
indictment and conviction before the
court will disbar, and those which hold
that such previous conviction is deemed
unnecessary. From this note it ap-
pears that a majority of the States in
which this subject has been discussed
hold the latter view. See also Law-
son's Rights, Rem and Pr., vol 1 §
133 and note. The case of Watson
vs. Citizens Savings Bank, 5 S. C.
159, is given by Mr. Lawson in sup-
port of the doctrine that a previous con-
viction is not necessary when the act of
the attorney is criminal, though not
done in his official capacity. This case
is certainly authority for the rule where
the offense alleged against the attorney
is "deceit, malpractice or misdemeanor."
(Gen. St. Sec. 2164.) The
power of the Courts of Common Pleas
and General Sessions to strike the
name of an attorney from the roll is an
inherent power. I do not think the
common law powers of these courts are
restricted to cases where the offense al-
leged is either "deceit, malpractice or
misdemeanor," but that these courts
have power to suspend or disbar for
other causes than those mentioned in
the Statute. The case of Watson vs.
Citizens Savings Bank, supra, goes
very far in my opinion to support the
doctrine that an attorney for criminal
acts may be suspended or disbarred with-
out previous conviction. "But in cases
of this character" (as was said in the
State against Winton) "it is admitted
that the power ought not to be exer-
cised without great caution, and never
except in clear cases of misconduct
which affect the standing and character
of the party as an attorney."

We are now to consider whether such
a case has been presented as will au-
thorize the court to exercise the sum-
mary power of suspension or disbar-
ment.
The office of an attorney is a valu-
able one, and the consequences which
necessarily flow from suspension or dis-
barment are oftentimes very serious,
even in a pecuniary point of view, to
say nothing of the humiliation and dis-
grace which must inevitably follow.
Was the misconduct alleged against
the Respondent done in his private cap-
acity? Or was it committed in his
professional character? Or was it com-
mitted in some way, or in some man-
ner so connected with his professional
character as to be the direct result? The
judgment in this case hinges upon the
answer to these questions. How

then, does the case stand? On the one
hand is the testimony of six reputable
witnesses tending to sustain the charges
against the Respondent, while on the
other is nothing save the bare denial of
the Respondent. The charges con-
tained in the affidavits of A. F. Cousar
and others are specific. Under this
state of facts I am forced (reluctantly,
it is true) to say that I do not consider
the acts charged against the Respon-
dent as fairly denied by him. The denial
is unsatisfactory. There should have
been something more by way of defense,
or explanation—something in rebuttal.
I must, therefore, hold that the charges
as contained in the affidavits of A. F.
Cousar and others are sustained by the
evidence adduced in support thereof.
Upon the facts proven, however, I am
not prepared to hold that the offenses
charged were committed by the Respon-
dent in his official capacity, or in
some way, or in some matter so con-
nected with his professional character as
to be the direct result. But I am pre-
pared to hold, and do so hold, that the
misconduct charged and proved is of
such a gross and serious character as to
grossly affect Respondent's standing as
an attorney. The acts complained of
were a gross abuse of the confidence re-
posed in the Respondent by A. F. Cou-
sar and Henry Stuckey, whether com-
mitted by Respondent himself or by an-
other with his knowledge and consent,
and whether the alleged alterations were
made in said notes before or after they
were signed and delivered. A. F.
Cousar agreed to sign a note payable at
a certain time for a certain specified
amount, and Henry Stuckey agreed to
endorse for the Respondent for certain
specified amounts. They respectively
entrusted the Respondent with the pre-
paration of said notes. If he, in viola-
tion of the confidence reposed, drew
them for larger amounts, and they rely-
ing upon his statements, and trusting
in his integrity, carelessly signed and
endorsed them, and were thereby de-
ceived, would not the amount to a gross
abuse of confidence, and show the respon-
dent unfit to be a member of the legal pro-
fession? Would not such acts satisfy
any one that there was wanting in the
moral character of the Respondent, that
integrity and trustworthiness which re-
directs attorney's safe persons to manage
the legal business of others? The acts
of the Respondent, viewed in either
light, whether as involving an indictable
offense, or a gross abuse of confi-
dence, show a lack of that integrity and
trustworthiness which should always
characterize the conduct of those engaged
in the practice of the law. The doings
of such acts by an attorney is a grave
wrong against an honorable profession,
and proves him unfit longer to take part
in the administration of the law. If mis-
conduct of attorneys such as this is to be
condoned, then the prestige of the
profession for integrity and trustworthiness
is destroyed; then the reputation of the
bar for fidelity and honesty is blasted
forever. The facts alleged against the
Respondent involve an indictable
offense. Upon these facts two indict-
ments for forgery have been preferred;
and true bills have been found thereon
by the grand jury. "The proceedings
not being for the purpose of punish-
ment, but for the purpose of preserving
the courts of justice from the official
administration of persons unfit to practice
in them," I have determined that it
would be best, under all the circum-
stances of the case, not to make an order
disbarring the Respondent, but to protect
the court, and the public, by passing
an order suspending and forbidding the
Respondent from appearing and prac-
ticing in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged,
that the Respondent John R. Keels be
and he hereby is, suspended from his
office as an attorney, solicitor and coun-
sellor in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State, during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged,
that the Respondent John R. Keels be
and he hereby is, suspended from his
office as an attorney, solicitor and coun-
sellor in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State, during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged,
that the Respondent John R. Keels be
and he hereby is, suspended from his
office as an attorney, solicitor and coun-
sellor in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State, during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged,
that the Respondent John R. Keels be
and he hereby is, suspended from his
office as an attorney, solicitor and coun-
sellor in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State, during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged,
that the Respondent John R. Keels be
and he hereby is, suspended from his
office as an attorney, solicitor and coun-
sellor in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State, during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged,
that the Respondent John R. Keels be
and he hereby is, suspended from his
office as an attorney, solicitor and coun-
sellor in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State, during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged,
that the Respondent John R. Keels be
and he hereby is, suspended from his
office as an attorney, solicitor and coun-
sellor in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State, during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged,
that the Respondent John R. Keels be
and he hereby is, suspended from his
office as an attorney, solicitor and coun-
sellor in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State, during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged,
that the Respondent John R. Keels be
and he hereby is, suspended from his
office as an attorney, solicitor and coun-
sellor in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State, during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged,
that the Respondent John R. Keels be
and he hereby is, suspended from his
office as an attorney, solicitor and coun-
sellor in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State, during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged,
that the Respondent John R. Keels be
and he hereby is, suspended from his
office as an attorney, solicitor and coun-
sellor in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State, during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged,
that the Respondent John R. Keels be
and he hereby is, suspended from his
office as an attorney, solicitor and coun-
sellor in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State, during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged,
that the Respondent John R. Keels be
and he hereby is, suspended from his
office as an attorney, solicitor and coun-
sellor in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State, during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

It is therefore ordered and adjudged,
that the Respondent John R. Keels be
and he hereby is, suspended from his
office as an attorney, solicitor and coun-
sellor in the Circuit and Probate Courts
of this State, during the pendency of
indictments against him growing out of
the facts upon which the present motion
is based, with leave to the bar of Sum-
ter to renew the motion to disbar at the
termination of such prosecutions.

The Ocala Platform.

A great deal is being said by pub-
lic men and in the public press about
the Ocala platform. It is quite prob-
able that a great many who talk and
write about this platform do not
know its provisions, and we feel sat-
isfied that many who read do not
know all the planks. In order that
every one may know just what that
platform is we reproduce it here.

Some of its demands are all right
and there is little doubt that the
members of the Ocala convention,
who were interested in the success of