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Proposed Annexation of Hawaii. SPEECH OF HON. JAMES NORTON: OF SOUTH CAROLINA, I In the House of Representatives* Saturday, June 11, 1S98. I The House having under consid- j eration the joint resolution (H. ^ Kes. 259) to provide tor annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United StatesMr. Norton of South Carolina j said: Mr. Speaker: We have listened j with attention to a great deal of learning upon the subject of the j principles which should actuate us ^ in our foreign relations, and it has | been with surprise that we have heard it stated that the policy ol the fathers of the Republic was opposed to territorial extension. One of the first acts after the Re-, public was an endeavor to induce Canada to become a part of the United States. A few years later1 we trebled our territory by the purchase of the Province of Louis-; lana, ana a short time afterwards, j long before we had time to develop j the Province of Louisiana, wc bought Florida. It is contended that these were all a part of the main continents,; which, of course, is true. But as i early as 1S09 Thomas Jefferson' wrote to President Madison con- i cerning the acquisition of Cuba: It will be objected to our receiv j ing Cuba that no limit canthen be 1 drawn to our future acquisitions.. Cuba can be defended by us without a navy, and this develops tht principle which ought to limit oui j views. When the United States was too young and too poor to own a navy, it was a wise policy that liinucu our <104111*1111111 ui icuuuij , to that which we could defenu' without a navy. The early father* believed in an extension of tern-; tory, but did not believe in adding ' territory which, at that time, undei j the circumstances, they could not' defend. Those same early fathers foughi J against a popular demand tor a i general pension system for the soldiers of the Revolutionary wai ffid limited the roll from $65,000 $90,000 a year. They toughi * against all internal improvements on the ground ihat the States would have to provide them, li vjas nearly fort) years after the establishment ot this Government; before a dollar was expended upon rivers and harbors. This polie) of paying no pensions ana making 210 improvements was caused b) j exactly the same thing which; caused the policy of adding no territory that couid not be defended without a navy. The Govern- j ment had no means of raising suttinonf rpucnup I <=>ff/^renn vuanfpn Cuba annexed because the Uniteu States had a sufficient navy to detenu it, and Jefferson, Auams, j Monroe were the greatest lano grabbers this country ever hau, except possibly Jackson and Polk. As cany as 1S43, while the Hawaiian Islands were very lack-1 mg in civilization and before we j owned much of a navy, Mr. Lcgare,; our Secretary of State, said: The Hawaiian Islands bear such ' peculiar relations to ourselves thai we might even leel justified, con- j sistently with our own principles, j in interfering by force to prevent their falling into the hands of one ! of the great powers of Europe, Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote to our minister to Hawaii, Mr. Serverance, July 14, 185i: 1 The Hawaiian Islands are ten j times nearer to the United States than to any of the powers of Europe. Five-sixths of their com- J mercial intercourse is with the; United States, and these considerations, together with others of a more general character, have fixed the course which the Government of the United States will pursue, in regard to them. Two years later Secretary of; State Marcy wrote to Minister | Mason, in France: I do not think the Hawaiian Government can long remain in I the hands of the present rulers or I under the control ot the native inhabitants of these islands, and both England and France are apprised of our determination not to allow them to be owned by or to fall under the protection of these powers or of any other European nation. It seems to be inevitable [that they must come under the control of this Government, and it would be but reasonable and fair that these powers should acquiesce in such a disposition of them, provided the transference was affected by fair means. Secretary Fish instructed Mr. Pierce on March 25, 1873, as follows: The position of the Sandwich Islands, fronting and commanding the whole of our possessions on the Pacific Ocean, gives to the; future of those islands a peculiar, interest to the Government and! people of the United States. It is very clear that this Government can not be expected to assent to their transfer from their control to that of any powerful maritime or' commercial nation. Such transfer to a maritime power would threaten the military surveillance I in the Pacific similar to that which j Bermuda has afforded in the At-; lantic. The latter has been sub-J mitted to from necessity, but we desire no additional similiar out-i post iu the hands of those who may, at some future time, use them to our disadvanage. There has not been a Secretary of State or a President of the United States, except those of the last Administration, during fifty years who have not contended that at some time Hawaii must become a part of the United States. We are not departing from early traditions nor going contrary to the wisdom of the fathers. We are' adopting the unanswerable reason- \ ings of Thomas Jefferson, who j wanted Luba added to our terri-1 tory, and of President Polk, who' wanted Hawaii. Our mode of getting a foothold upon these islands has been strongly criticised. Our minister to Hawaii was waited upon by ceriian prominent gentlemen of Honolulu, who informed him that they intended to establish a provisional government. They requested him - i 1 .1 : c ? [>?? 1.0 lanu me manu? iruw uic .uua- i ion in order to protect the interests ; of the Americans resident on the islands. They formed the provisional government, and the minis ter caused the marines to be landed. It is said that on account of the American sailors being there the Hawaiians made no resistence and it is claimed by the opponents of annexation that the consent of tiie people was not obtained, because if the marines had not been landed there would have been determined armed resistance. In other words, Minister Stevens landed the troops to protect American property, and in protecting the American property he has aiso all property. If his critics are light, he ought to have refused to nave landed the marines and let .he revolution proceed. American property would undoubtedly have oeen damaged and probably American citizens killed if he had adopted .nis course. Stripped of all useless verbiage, ,.ne proposition of the annexation of Hawaii presents a very simple uusiness problem. What are we going to gain and what are we going 0) lose? * 1 ? t a t. _ lhe principal productions 01 tnc islands of Hawaii are sugar, coffee, .ea, rice and bananas. The United states raises some sugar, but the .mportations of sugar in 1S97 amounted to $99,066,181. The United States raises some rice, but die importations of rice Just yeai amounted to $3,517,360. The United States raises no tea, anu .he importations last year amounted to ?14,835,862. The Uniteu States raises very few bananas, and we imported last year ?4,068,320 worth. Hawaii raises no wheat, and no corn for exportation. Its only products are those which are raised 111 the United States or raised in too small quantities to meet the domestic demand. The coffee and tea industries of Hawaii are as yet largely in their infancy, and there are greater opportunities for increasing the area of coffee and tea than in any other line of agriculture in the United States. I'he United States raises a ! surplus of corn, wheat, and cot* ** r c ton, and a cienciency 01 sugai, cuilee, and tea. The Hawaiian Islands are deficient in corn, wheat, and l 7 7 ! cotton, and produce a surplus ot j coffee, sugar, and tea. They need exactly what we want to sell, and they have exactly what we want to i buy. j Tneir lines of agriculture do not ' come into competition with pro ducts raised in this country except! possibly sugar in Louisiana. The : price of sugar, coffee, and tea will ! naturally be reduced to the con-; i sumer, the cultivation of the sugar,1 coffee, and tea lands and the devel-j ! opment of those resources will give remunerative labor to thousands of j others, while the increased de-l mand for manufactured goods will t increase the amount of labor needed in the different States of toe, Union. There could not be a' country where the products come into less competition with those of aii?* Atn*\ r*nAi\l a Ar wlAArn f V\ n Unri n I vj ui vj >> ii kji ?iiv*IV, 11i v. uv*uv*fits derived would be felt so equal-j ly by all of our citizens as Hawaii. The use of sugar, coffee, and tea is universal, and the great increase 1 in home production consequent, upon the annexation of Hawaii; must of necessity reduce the price;; of these staples. It is a very good ; rule for nations as well as indivi j duals that land which produces'; that which its owner can best dis- j ( pose of is the very best property obtainable. That is precisely the ' situation Hawaii occupies toward ' the United States. There has been a great deal said , already concerning the strategic , position oi Hawaii in time ot war, and before I consider that subject' I want to call attention to the! strategic position of Hawaii in! , time of peace. It is on the direct line of five out of six steamship i. companies who operate from Mexi- j1 can, United States, and British*1 ports on the Pacific to poiut in 1 oriental countries. It is twenty- . fiye hundred miles nearer all points ' in the Pacific islands, China, Japan and Australia than any present ! market. It the commerical in-; terests of the United States took, advantage of the manincient posi- v tion of Honolulu, with its splendid' ? harbor, they could, by establishing large houses there, practically con- 3 t-rnl thp fi-lil,"- nf thf* Oricnf ' W4V- v'?~ ? . James G. Blaine stated, after 1 thorough examination of the subject that the territory dependent upon the Pacific Ocean for a commercal outlet comprised an area c of nearly 800,000 square miles .v larger in extent than the German ^ Empire and the four Latin coun tries of Europe combined. Across ll the Pacific Ocean there lies nearly c one-half the world's population, c and the territory of our Pacific ^ States, being the nearest market j i to them, would, if Hawaii was utilized and its commercial possibil-j ities developed, control three-1 fourths of that trade. Jobbing!1 houses situated at Honolulu, em-|c ploying large capital, would find = themselves in the center of distri- j bution between the East and the, West, very much nearer both than any other market; and the possibil-, a lties of such a position are practi- 11 cally without limit. Honolulu, on , v account of its position, could be 1 made a modern Carthage. j a The exports last year of the, ^ countries that could be made de- t peudeent upon the markets of Ha- ^ waii and our Pacific coast amount- I ed to ?2,500,000,000 of which; F we only sold $55,250,000. The ^ importance of our Pacific coast T trom a coommercial point of view I is vastly greater in its possibilities F than that of our Atlantic coast. a And if we can throw our western ^ trontier twenty-five hundred miles a into the Pacific Ocean, thus saving time, distance, and cost of trans- r portation, we will be beyond the v reach of European competition. F The average war ship is built to ^ carry coal for about 5,000 miles;!1 the average merchant vessel does je not carry that much coal. A vessel c starting from San PTancisco to f1 eastern ports is halfway out of coal when she reaches Honolulu. That a hole in her bunkers must be filled. ^ If Hawaii were held by a power r which became unfriendly to the a United States, it would practically 0 destroy our entire trade with the c Orient, which now amounts to 1 $56,000,000 a year and cound very 1 easily be made to amount to at f least ten times that sum. At the a that President Polk and Secretary of State Marcy and Daniel Web- a ster advocated the annexation of ^ Hawaii the population of our ' Pacific coast was not as great as * the present population of Port- j land, Oregon. The islands of the * South Seas were unknown and un- J explored. Not a single line of ^ steamers plowed the waves between 1 the United States and the Orient. : And yet these men with prophetic ' vision saw that the Pacific Ocean 1 was destined to become more im- 1 portant to the United States than ' the Atlantic, and that Hawaii was ' the key to the Pacific. William H. Seward, in address ( ing the United States Senate, said, as to the commercial activities of Europe: They will ultimately sink in im- J portance, while the Pacific Ocean, I its shores, its islands, and the vast ' regions beyond will become the: chief theater of events in the; world's great hereafter. The European nations realized this, and within the last fifteen, 1 ^ IIAP o nnnvwl t' ; years vjciiuauj uuo uuuv.<w |great Marshall group, France the! | Marquesas Island and the Low! i Archipelago, and Great Pritian! Fllice, Phoenix, and otlier islands, j The United States has annexed' none. We are allowing the trade' 1 of the Pacific, which belongs to us j | by all natural right, to be wrested J from us while we discuss the poli- a cies of the fathers when this coun- c try, without a navy, and surround- f cd by hostile tribes of Indians, c keeping it constantly in warfare, c was not in a position to defend dis- c tant territory, and therefore could 1 not conset to take it. v If the Island of Cuba had been t annexed when Thomas Jefferson, I wanted it annexed, we would to- j t day have control of the trade ot the I West Indies and obtain a much t larger share of the trade of South o America, and we would never have s had a war with Spain. If we con- r trol Hawaii, we will control the t Pacific and protect ourselves t against future wars. It we take lUrt r\f An f Kof ?! /*? Ci Lilt: WUIU3 Ul jCiltldUli) mac %1IV. ^ should not control a territory that } requires a navy, we will not annex p Hawaii; but if we take spirit of the s language of Jefferson, which was I that we should annex Cuba because ii we could defend it, we will annex b Hawaii, because we are amply c ible to defend it, I plead with the v Democrats to follow the policy of o Jefferson, their leader, and annex whatever territory it is to the in- n terest of the United States to s possess so long as it is within the S ibility of the United States to de- vi end it. 1 ask the Republicans to w "oll".v Daniel Webster; I ask the a Democrats to follow Thomas Jef- u erson. If these are not the fathers, 7 :o whom belong the paternity of i w he two great political parties? | b And the gentlemen who are d iguring out tremendous costs at- u acheu to the maintenance of these ci slands I refer to our govern- h nent in Alaska, which has cost L is nothing. We have made little s; lirect revenue out of Alaska, but w t has more than paid for itself, k< Are will make but little direct tc evenue out of the Hawaiian Is- tc ands. The time will come when 4< he mineral resources of Alaska n: vill make it another California, i u md the time has come now when J u lawaii, as a commercial outpost I r< md a country for the production j 2' >f those staples which can not be*ai iroduced in the United States, j m :an be made of immense benefit to ! u: * " -- - 1 Oi.t I ne u nweu oiaics. ? Along our Pacific coast, not in- ai :luding the Territory of Alaska, T ve have l,8io miles, and it is 11 vithin the knowledge of all of us hi hat the protection of that coast is ni .bsolutely inefficient. We have pi in the Pacific coast as a usual implement nine vessels, aggre- ei Ration 35,141 tons displacement. U \nd in Asiatic waters we have ei ive more, of 13,846 tons. In order ei 0 reenforce this fleet the Atlan- cc ic squardron must travel over re 4,000 miles of water in which tl he United States has not a sin- j lu ;le coaling station. In case of'al udden war reenforcement for ourjw 'acific fleet are impossible. 1 w t ? n . _r ,0 ' i N japan nas a iieci ui 40 vc;>?ci?, ggregating 173,057 tons displ?&- 01 ncnt; Great Britain has in Asiatic waters 41 vessels, of 97,200 tons; iussia has in Asiatic wat?ps ^ bout 2.5 vessels. Three powers {* lave fleets in Pacific waters double.; hat of the United States, witli l ^ icr long coast line to protect.']sa Tom Hawaii, if any one of these! lowers owned that island, theyj 'u ould 3t any time throw a full l leet upon our coast. With)2' lawaii in our possession we can *c irevent the ships from coaling jl nd we can communicate danger 0 the main coast. There is f1 mother view to take of the question. 111 Without Hawaii our coast m nay be attacked at any lime, vhile with it ft is exceedingly im- ^ irobable that our coast will ever, ^ > .11 tl - 1 ai >e attacked ai an. ine amicxa- , ion of Hawaii would be the great- " st preventive of war thut we cc ould possibly secure, and the ^ naxim "An ounce ot prevention ?* s worth a pound of cure" is very a' pplicable. If we had annexed ^ Juba when we ou^ht to have an- ?| iexed it, we would never have had . war with Spain. It is not a case P1 >f the United States trying to a{ *over the earth or to add to her cc ^rrifnrv: hut with nations, as with c( ndividuals, self-preservation is the m irst law of nature, and we are acting for our self-preservation. w The western line of the States ti; is they originally existed was cc :ndangered| by hostile tribes of 0 Indiaus, and the United States iovernment never stopped for a w noment until that danger to its tl rontier was over, There are no w Indians to the west of us now, rt :>ut there are some dangers over .here which we must guard si igainst, and eight Presidents of d he United States and ten Secre- tl ;aries of State, every Navy officer n ind every Army officer who have si ooked into the question, have r< lgreed that the remedy for the S lunger which threatens our Pacific a :oast lies in the annexation of tl Hawaii. c It has been asserted that tne Hawaiians are incapable of self government and can not, there- u fore, be assimilated with our poli- si ticial institutions. In the same il breath the opponents of annexation ii assert that the reason for the sue- h cess of the present Government t is that it has the moral support of I the United States. If the United jp States can prevent insurrections i li in the Hawaiian Islands by simple I moral support, can it not even p better pjeyent such insurrections v when the entire power of the t Government is exerted in the ti control of the islands? v Now, Mr, speaker, I have tried to consider this question without f iny political bias, and have endeav >red to discuss it from a plain, )ractical, business standpoint, with lue regard to all the principles ol >ur Government and with ali leference to the traditions of our listory, and if any reason exists vhy we should refuse the gift o( hese islands, offered to us by the legislature of Hawaii, which is Un t'/MOA r\f t KA A Af UV* WlllWItll VU1V.U Ul tIJW Wl lawaii, and the only way in which he voice of the people can he officially heard, then I hope that ome member will produce that cason, and that we will give all he consideration which its imporancc may demand. I have obtained from the Bureau f Steam Engineering of the tfavy Department a carefully repared and absolutely accurate tatement of the importance of lawaii in the matter of coal. It ; not based upon any theories, ut gives the actual amount of oal that has been used by the essels named in making the trips UUUJCU. The battleship Iowa under the lost favorable conditions conumes G6o tons of coal between an Francisco and Honolulu, hich left in her bunkers, which rere filled to their fullest capacity t San Francisco, 925 ions. Under sual conditions the Iowa uses 25 tons in going to Honolulu, 'hich would leave 860 tons in her unkers. The Massachusetts uner the most favorable conditions ses 700 tons between San Fran isco and Honolulu, ana would ave 860 tons left in her bunkers, 'nder usual conditions the Masicnusetts uses 750 tons, which ould leave 810 tones in her buners. The Charleston uses 300 >ns in going from San Francisco ) Honolulu, which would leave do tons in her bunkers, under the lost favorable conditions. Under sual conditions the Charleston ses 350 tons and has 38o tons miainir.g. The Monadnock uses T3 tons going from San Francisco, id has n3tons remaining, under lost favorable conditions. Under sual conditions the Monadnock ses 383 tuns going to Honolulu id only has 4 tons remaining, he Monterey can not steam to dnolulu on her bunker capacity, er greatest radius being 2,773 dies, but can reach Honolulu by iling coal on her decks. None of these vessels, which different tvnes of the iJulwvN' "J I ? nited States Navy, can carry lough coal to participate in an igagement at Honolulu of any )nsiderable duration and then turn to San Francisco. In case le Navy could not coal at Honoilu the United States would be jsolutely helpless in Pacific aters. A war ship had better be ithont powder than without coal, o European power can attack ir Pacific coast without coaling, id the United States could conjct no warefarc in the Pacific cean without a coaling station. . war ship without coal is but a slpless bulk of not more value lan a schooner without either dies or rudder. From San Francisco to Honolu is a distance of 2,100 miles; om Honolulu to the Carolines is 00 miles; from the Carolines 1 the Philippines is 1,900 miles; om the Philippines to Hongong, 900 miles. From San Frausco to Honolulu is an easy coal1 g distance for war vessels and erchant steamers; from Honolu to the Carolines is another isy coaling distance; from the arolines to the Philippines is lother easy coaling distance, and ie Philippines are within easy lalingdi.-tance of all Asiatic and ustralian ports. The fortunes war have thrown the Philippines id Carolines within our control; ie Hawaiian Islands have been "fered to us as a gift. With this lain of islands we would be im-egnable in war, so far as any tack on the Pacific Ocean is incerned, and no power on earth ?iM PAmnpte with us in com erce. By accepting the advantage hich has been almost providenally offered us, we will become the miplete masters of the Pacific cean. There is another class of people ho will be greatly benefited by le annexation of Hawaii, about hom but little has been said. I iler to the laboring men. With the development of the igar industry under present couitions in the Hawaiian Islands, le cheap cooly labor of China mst of necessity be introduced to ieh an extent as to very greatly 2(1 uce the cost of raising sugar, lince the discovery of beet sugar nd the successful experiments in liis country, the raising of either ane or beets fur the making of agar employs thousands of people. if these people are brought into ireci competition with Hewaiian ugar raised Sy cheap cooly labor, t must of necessity reduce wages i this country. If, upon the other iand, Hawaii becomes a part of he United States, the laws of the Jnited States forbidding the imlortation or use of this class of abor will be made to apply to Jawaii, and under the doctrine of irotection to American labor, which rill apply in Hawaii as well as in he United States, our sugar proluction will be enormously increased vhile wages will not be reduced. For the reasons I have given, and or other reasons which have beer - set forth most strongly by others, , I believe that the annexation of i Hawaii is the most beneficial measf ore, prospectively, that has been I introduced into Congress for many years. I believe that it will be a matter of which every member will be proud in future years that lie has had the privilege of voting for accepting this territory by the United States, offered now without cost. Mr. Speaker, each member on this floor represents the entire United States, and it is his duty to favor only that which will be of benefit to the country at large. But in addition to this representative capacity he more directly speaks tor his own section of the country ; and for the Congressional district thai, onnfprrprl thp honor of elortion upon him. I have, in a general way, endeavored to outline tha advantages to be gained by the country at large, , and I will now more particularly dwell upon the benefits which will accure to the section I have the honor in part to represent. Mr. Speaker, the great staple of i the South is cotton. The cotton 1 crop of the world increased from 1 2,695,000 bales in 1865 to 6,541,000 ! bales in 1875, to 8,350,000 bales 1 in 18S5, and to 13.157,000 bales in 1 1895, these being the figures given J bv Ellison & Co. There has not been a corresponding increase in the ? consumption of cotton, and the ' prices of that important product ' are now be'ow the costot production , A great and important section isj < suffering from fiuancial depression 1 < on account of the Lock of a market for it- leading staple. Owing to there being no means of transp<?rta , lion to the countries of the East, we have always, until comparatively recently, exported all of our cotton to Europe, and from there it was sent toAsia and Oceanica We are beginning in a -mall whs to eend American cotton directly to these countries, and the effect is marked by the coustant increase of the consumption of .-otton in Asia In 1893 we only exported of cotton cloths to China $1,038,057 Iu 1897 this had increased to $7,438,203 In 1893 we exported to the British East Indies of cotton cloth $144,759. In 1897 we exported $199,880, In 1893 we exported unmanufactured cotton *o Japan to the amount of $68,423. In 1897 j this was increased to $2,345,010. v Of cotton cloth we exported to Japan, in i893, $0,084, 189?, ' $141,264 f Our exports to the other conn- t tries of Asia of cotton cloth increas- ^ ed from $65,654 in 1893 to $355,- ' 540 in 1897. Our exportations of < cotton cloth to British Australia in t 1593 amounted to only $80,626, a while in 1897 they had increased to a $249,310. Our exportatious of cot- t ton manufactures increased to v $290,790 in 1893 to $365,715 in 1897. The imports into the conn- _ tries of Asia and Oceanica for the ( year 1896 amounted to $1,066,557,- 1 653. Of this amount the United ^ fnrniiiVlorl 7KQ 1 ?\*i nr U n kjiutvo A.U1 LklhJUVV* | pvv}4%/ I J w. ?. J I percentage of 5.32. The exports I from the countries of Asia amount 5 to $1,060,243,838, of which the ^ United States received $02,026,272. Since the United States has established a direct trade in cotton goods with China, American trade has constantly increased, while German and English trade has constantly decreased. Be- t] tween 1884 and 1897, ccording to a , table prepared by Consul Fowler, of Chefoo, China, the trade in drills decreased 7,950 pieces of English and Dutch and increased 43,9io of American. _ The number of pieces of English sheet- ( ing decreased 1,005, while the pieces of j American sheetings increased 95.275. t The first manufacture of cotton in y China was announced by the Shanghai [ , Chamber of Commerce on May 20, 1895 ? Three mills were contracted for, one of, \ 40.000 spindles and two of 28,oco spin- j dies each. Another new mill was built at Wuchang, one at Hongkong, and a 12,000 spindle mill at Chang Kee. All J T of these mills have since increased their ^ capacity. The one at Hongkong more ^ than doubled its number of spindles. The demand for cotton goods has increased with wonderful rapidity. The experiments of the past three years in the direct sale of cotton and cotton goods to the countries of Asia and Q Oceanica prove conclusively that all we ; require to control the great and growing trade of the Orient is for us to secure ' just such advantages as would "be af- " forded us by the possession of Hawaii 1 and the Philippines. 1 If we secured these islands in the Pacific, the conclusion would be irresistibly forced upon us that the completion of th? Nicaraugan Canal could be delayed no longer. This canal would save about one-half the distance between the ^ Southern ports and Japan, and would { put the ports ot trie uuu or Mexico nearer the Orient than any of the great markets of the Old World. Our cotton . would be shipped directly from Southern ports through the canal to the island of the Pacific Ocean. China. Japan, and Australia. With the unlimited coal ' supply of the South, and American islands which vessels could coal, the South, which is the greatest producer of cotton in the world, would become the greatest manufacturing center of v cotton, and control the markets of the J world for raw cotton and the manufactures of cotton. 5 Instead of 5 per cent of the trade of j Asia being secured by the United States . there would be fully 50 per cent. This t is the nearest market; it is the greatest , producing country on earth, and the t greatest manufacturing country, so far k ? natural resources are concerned. , With the advantages offered by nature. . there could be no doubt that not less j than one-halt the trade of the East . would seek the shores of the United , States. The South has sold cotton to those northern countries where cotton ' is least adapted to wear. It has not 1 tried to sell cotton to those countries i where cotton goods, once introduced, would be worn almost exclusively. The immediate benehts to the South 1 will be great from the impetus given to j the trade of the l'acific, augmented by [' that of South and Central America, and i if the Nicaragan Canal is subsequently I j bu:lt there will be cities spiinging up i on the South Atlantic coast and Cult i j coast equal in size and importance to those of the North Atlantic coast. Tins policy will benefit all sections, but it will prove to be the commercial salvation of the cotton-growing States, as we introduce cotton goods to new customers in warmer climates. There is no party question entering into this matter: but it is fraught with great good, especially to the cotton grower of the South. The following is clipped from the Philadelphia Inquirer: Washington*, Junk aH, i8!>8. The rapid growth of our commerce with China, a subject just now attracting special attention, Is shown sonuwhat in detail by a series of tables in the latest number of Summary of Finance and I'ommerre issued liv the bureau of Sla listics. These table shows that our exports to China in the year ending will be about lour tin.es as much as in the year 1890. The exports from the United States to China in 181)5 were $3,803,840, and in the fiscal year which ends with this montli promise to be, in round numbers, 111.000,000. But for the fact that there has been ? ri duction during the past year in the values of many articles exported the figures for the present year would be considerably greater than the sum named. Tne exports of mineral oils, for instance, have increased this year more than 4,coo,ooo gallons over last year, but by reason of the decrease in price the total cash value falls considerably below that of last year. In nearly all of the articles exported from this country to China there has been an increase in quantity in the fiscal year I898 compared with 1897 or any preceding year. In bicycles, for intanre, the exports to China for ten months of the present fiscal year imount to $24,006 against $11,444 in the corresponding months of last year. In telegraph, telephone, and other in itruments 01 tins class tne exports 01 me en months are $22,374, against $8,1)40 in lie same time last year. Carriages arid :nr- i'cieased fn.m $1,682 in ;:n tir.-t en months <>f last year to $28,1)' 8 111 the :orresponding months of this year; fruits ind nuts from $13,008 last year to $28,>9! this year; canned beef from 90,984 pounds in ten months of last year to 156,"18 pound- in the am m * '* aeon, f 11 1 ,0o2 jouu .s; h 111s, u hi 4G,o<>? pooini- i<> 58,*09pounds; butter, from I6,8ll pounds ;o 20,080 pounds, and other articles in ike proportion. In cotton cloth there s a reduction of about 12 per cent comjared with last year, though the total lumber of ardsths a ?vil l> louole ha> ?l 8 n lines as u< 11 us 1 3 Our sales to China this y ?r w .1 s.i in increase of more than 8o< p- r rent iver those of 1*89. h it- our iin 1" r s rom that country -iio>\ a., increase 01 mt 85 per cent in ttie same 'im . our ixports of merchandise to China in the ires^nt tiscal year are tenfold those of he fiscal year 1880, the total for that 'ear being $i,Iol,388, while that of i898 s likely to tie $11,000,000, in round nunt?ers. Our to''I e\;>or' t ad \sim his 'ea will am" nil i. . slicing a gain of 10 pe cut .er .-.i.eti nore than donote what they wer til 880, and more than ten times what ttie\ v**re in 1870. Of this t 'tnl of ?4">.ooo.oO'>, ab a! >:? hird gues to China (in part by way ot dongkong), one-third to Japan, and tint Milk of the remaining third to Indiaand he East Indies. In tlii- catcula t n of listnlmtion it is Hssnnt' d tlr-tiie Im-i-, f the import* uto Hongkong, wine ire always heavy, an* tor China, the Statesman's Year Hook saying of the tusiness of that poit that it is '-virtually i part of the commerce of China." The following table shows the leading rticle9 exported form th" United States o China in the last fiscal year compared vitli those of preceeding year: Articles. 1897. '8W>. blocks and watches 1 $31,242 $13,058 'revisions I 45,640 50,191 Vheat flour 1 72,100 45,815 Vood and m'f r's of | 113,498 154.945 robacco, m'f r's of I 229,956 192,130 ron & steel, m'f?s of | 333,00? 84-398 Mineral oils ?I 3.371.937 2,166978 :ottou cloths I 7,43-,203 3.854146 Vll other articles... , 281,30^ 359467 Total 11,916,888 6,921 136 *rl- - tol-,1? chrvuM thf> total 1 lie 1UUU?1I1? IU>/IV WUV..W nportations into China from all parts of he world, by leading articles, in the year 8%: Total imports into China, 1896: Articles. Value. 'otton, raw 1 $1,056,844 'lour j 1,216,56s iinseng 1,308,078 lachinery j 1,668,078 'isli and fishery products... 2,527.623 . ,'oal I 2,663.701 * Voolen goods 4.333420 ron and steel manufactures j 4,981,516 iugar I 5,657,318 lineral oils | 6,751,281 iice I 12,137.759 )pium I 23.150,486 "otton goods I 64.028,692 111 other articles | 39.309.520 Total 170.991,684 The following table shows the value of ur exports in 0 China, Japan, and all tsia since i89o: ear. j China. Japan. All Asia I I 880 $1,101,383 j $2,452,888 $11,645,703 88r 5.447,680 j 1,468,976 12,917.34 882 5.895.983 2,540,664 18.393.671 883 4.080.322 | 3.376,434 16,348,742 884 4,626.578 I 2.528,529 16.913.77W 885 ti.396.500 j 3.057.415 20.739. 72 886 7.520.581 I 3.I35-53.) 2'.980,99!) 887 6,246,626 3.335.592 19.322.172 888 4.582,585 4.214.382 IS.929,152 889 2.791,128 4.619.986 | 18.438,626 890 2.946.20.9 | 5.232.643 | 18,696,820 891 I 8,701,008 ; 4.807,693 j 25.553.308 892 j 5,663.497; 3.290,111 j 19 590,350 893 j 3,900.4:7 | 3,195.494 | 16.222,354 894 | 5.862.426 1 3.986.815 : 20.872.761 "95 | 3,603.840 4.634.717 | i7\325-057 896 | 6.921.933 7,689,685 | 25,03.),02.) 897 | 11.924.433 I 13-255-478 | 30.274.905 Tin- figures tor the fiscal ye ir i898 rill show a decided increase in our ev>ortalion to Asia, especially Japan. That o China may lie slightly less than last ear, for reasons above indicated. The figures given about do not take nto consideration the possibilities of imiroved cotton-goods trade with Hie Cenr 1 and South Amer.can countries vhich must follow improved commercial elations and andvantages naturally growing out of an aggressive policy on he part of the Southern cotton grower ind manufacturer, protected in tln-ir insiness interests as they extend by the >ower of the I'nited States Govern men'. General Woods, who went out as Colonel of the Rough Riders, h:is been appointed military governor of Santiago instead of General McKibbin who returns to his command. No men living arc more worthy to be trusted than those who toll up from poverty.