The Bamberg herald. (Bamberg, S.C.) 1891-1972, April 24, 1919, Page 2, Image 2
MAJOR GEN. I
THE THlh
1
In the operation against the Hin-1
denburg line, which was pierced on |
September 29, 1918, the Thirtieth i
-.(Old Hickory) division, consisting of
National Guard troops of South Carolina,
North Carolina and Tennessee, i
augmented by thousands of selective
service troops from the States of Indiana,
Illinois, ' Iowa. Minnesota,
North Dakota, North Carolina, South
t
Carolina and Tennessee, advanced apnrn-yimatpiv
.1.000 vards on a front of
3,750 yards "against the strongest
position on the western front," and
in addition forty-seven officers and
1,432 enlisted men of the enemy
were captured, according to the official
report of the operation made
by Major General E. M. Lewis, commander
of the division.
Fog of Great Assistance.
The advance on what was considered
an impregnable position was
greatly facilitated by a Ijeavy fog,
which was smudged by exploding
smoke shells. "While the fog was a
very great hindrance to the maintenance
of order and cohesion," said
the report, "on the other hand, it
was of great assistance in blinding
the enemy's machine guns and field
artillery. On a clear day, and against
a comparatively unshaken enemy, behind
broad belts of comparatively uncut
wire, against nets of machine
guns and minewerfers, it is difficult
to see how any troops could ever have
taken the position."
The following is the official order:
Preliminary Movements and Dispositions.
This division was ordered to move
by 'bus to the Beauquesne area to
the Tincourt area on September 22.
j On the nights of September 23-24
> ; the Fifty-nifith brigade relieved the
First Australian division in the line,
taking over what was known as the
V, Guoy-Nauroy sector, in front of the I
strongest part of the so-called Hin- j
V- ^ denburg system. The 118th infantry;
took over the front line of approxi- j
f ? mately 3,750 yards, with the 117th
| i > infantry in support; the Sixtieth bri;
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LEWIS' STORY
\TIETH SMASh
gade was held in division reserve.
During the interval between the
night of September 23-24 and night
of September 27-28 the llSth infantry
was subjected to constant harassing
artillery fire, and during that period
repulsed two hostile raiding
parties. In a minor operation on the
night of September 27-2S this regiment
extended the front line in several
places, with the object of improving
the jumping off line for the
contemplated attack of the enemy's
line.
~ ? ? * ' u ? o r o o \ I
Un A-x nignt isepiemuer
the Fifty-ninth brigade was relieved
by the Sixtieth brigade, the two regiments
taking over the front held by
the 3 18th infantry; this latter regiment
was withdrawn to divisional reserve,
while the 17th infantry remained
in support, it having a special
mission in the contemplated attack.
Divisional headquarters during
this period was in the Bois de
Buire.
Description of Enemy's Position.
The position occupied by the enemy
in front of the Thirtieth division was
not only of great strength, but possessed
many unique features. Begun
in 1914 and improved further in
more recent periods, it formed one i
of the strongest positions of the famous
Hindenburg system. In addix
* kolf c? nf w 1 ro i
IIOI1 to scvciai ilea?; utuc vi ??I
and a very complete trench system, j
skillful advantage had been taken of'
the great natural obstacle of the St. I
Quentin canal to make the position
as nearly impregnable as was hu- i
manly possible. As this canal had j
a most important influence on the:
plan of attack and upon the battle j
itself, it is believed that it merits
some special description.
The cities of Cambrai and St.
Quentin are connected by a continuous
waterway. From Cambrai to
Le Catelet this waterway is the Canal
de Escaut; from Le Catelet to
Bellicourt it is the Canal Souterbrain;
from Riqueval (just south of
Bellicourt) to St. Quentin it is the
0 \
rHEN I go fishin'
fish that bite, and
t don't."
' 10
bacco comes eithe
wrong "ripening."
DLVET only the finest ]
e don't stop there.
s of pounds of this tobai
wooden hogsheads, for 1
ind mellow.
#
cker ways, but they le;
I
7 makes
1 of tort
with
Roll a VELVET
Cigarette
.VET'S nature-aged
1'ness and smoothness
e it just right for
irettes.
OF HOW
\ED THE LINE
Canal de St. Quentin. From a point
1,200 yards west of Le Catelet to
Riqueval the water runs under
ground, and is here generally known
as the Bellicourt tunnel. This tunnel
runs for five and three-quarters
kilometers at a depth under ground
carrying from fifteen to twenty meters.
It is ten meters wide at the
top, eighteen meters wide at the water
level and is strongly built of masonry.
There are blocks in the center
and at each end of the canal,
which, in effect, are special types of
concrete machine gun emplacements,
and contained two machine guns
each. There were several lateral approach
galleries, with entrances 30
to 4 0 steps down on the road. About
half of this tunnel, the southern
mouth of Riqueval and some 500
Qt On pnti?i canal were
j a* uo ui tnu x^v* ? ??. .. ? _
in the Thirtieth division sector of
attack.
Tunnel of Large Proportions^
The canal and tunnel together are
of particular interest as an obstacle.
The tunnel itself could provide absolutely
safe shelter for a division,
while many underground tunnels
connect it with the various trench
systems, thus permitting reinforcement
at any time of any portion of
the trench system. A long spoil bank
or heap runs above ground upon the
line of the tunnel which contained a
series of. dugouts and numerous concrete
machine gun emplacements.
The canal, after leaving the tunnel,
has banks from 75 to 100 feet high,
the water being from 5 to 6 feet
deep. The western bank furnished
emplacements for numerous machine
guns and mineweriers.
In addition to the canal and tunnel
this portion of the Hindenburg
line included a system of trenches,
generally three, interlocked by communication
and approach trenches
placed at frequent intervals. Wide
belts of strong German wire protected
the entire system, even the communication
trenches being heavily
wired; forward belts were frequently
..jj
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ioothest
mokinc
3bacco
t
I
y
/ want I
tobacco
r from
Kentucky
sco away
Mature to
ave some
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in the form of deep triangles HO to
150 yards in depth. Along the line
of the tunnel these communicating
trenches led back into the tunnel
exits, while the entire front line
system was provided with concrete
dugouts at 4 0 to 60-yard intervals.
The outpost line was also strongly
fortified by trenches and wire, particularly
at Bergy wood. Sentinel
ridge and Quarry ravine. In the rear
of the main Hindenburg line was the
Le Catelet-Naurcy trench system, also
wired and well organized. This
tronr-li evstpni and the town of
Xaurcy were included in the objectives
of the attack.
It is believed that there are few
positions as well adapted for machine
gun defense as the sector just
described. The enemy had taken full
8,00(
HORSE
A1 J'
FARMERS
Keep this advertisem
nearest you, or attend the
AT ONCE! If you need 1
Sales At 1
Camp Whe<
Macon, Ga.
April 25
400 Cavalry Horses, 750 I
, Horses, 350 Draft Mi
For information write Lt. Cc
Jones, Remount Depot,
Wheeler, Macon, Gi
Camp Hanc<
Augusta, Ga.
April 30
300 Cavalry Horses, 450 .
Horses, 75 Draft Mu
For information write Ma;
Price, Remount Depot,
Camp Hancock, August;
Camp Gord
Atlanta, Ga.
May 5
177 Artillery Horses, 330 (
Horses, 160 Draft Mi
For information write Lie
Evans, Q. M. C., Remount Dej
Camp Gordon, Atlanta.
Other Sale
April 25?Camp McArthur, Wac
April 28?Camp Upton, Yaphan
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a-?ii on?r.amn Dodae. DesMoi
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For further Information writ
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I
advantage of the natural features of e
i
the ground, and during his four j i:
years' oceurancy had improved thern J d
to such a degree as to render thejh
position apparently impregnable to a i
frontal attack. t
Orders for the Attack. ^
v
x The orders for the attack were .
x t
based 011 orders and instructions
e
from the Australian corps and the
r
Second American corps. That, instead
of the convential field orders,
they consisted of a series of battle ^
instructions issued from time to time .
I
during the few days prior to the at- ,
tack. This method of issuing orders
r
was rendered necessary by the fact
that orders front higher author'*y
were constantly changing, and ma.
it was of importance to get any in- .
formation down to the troops at the (
) Goverr
IS and .
k y y ^in
lULJ
I?BUYERS?AT
ent. Remember the dates! J
m all. Over 11,000 well cond
ine farming or draft stock, you
rhe Folio win
iler Cam]
Sp
Lrtillery 400 Ca^
lies, Hoi
>1. H. C. L. For inforii
Camp dett, (
i. Camp Wa
ock
c
Artillery 575 Ca>
les. Hoi
jor T. E. For infor]
, 308 Overme:
a, Ga. r Depot, Ca
ion Emba
M _
n on
Cavalry 30 Cav
lies. Hoi
ut. L. L. For infoi
pot, No. 316 Ka!b? (
, Ga. Depo
is Will Be Held I
o, Texas. May 1?Camp
k, Long Island, May 1?Camp
May 2?Camp
nes, la. May 5?Camp
ntonlo, Texas. May 7?Camp
prll 30?Camp Dix, Wrlghtstown, N. J.
e Commanding Offl cer, care Remount
e all prime, fat and in goo
iting stock. Sales will
tin or shine?under cove
on grounds.
ASH OR CERTIFIE
irs, or car lots, to suit pure]
its will be on the grounds.
arliest possible moment. Had the
ssue of orders waited until complete Y
ata was in the hands of division
eadquarters, it is most certain that
t would have never reached the
roops in time for execution; if by
ny chance it had reached them it .v
lould certainly have been too late
or thorough explanation to the low- ,
r units and for the personal reconlaissance
so necessary in such an
iperation. i
Briefly, the plan of attack was as
fitf
ollows: From zero minus 60 hours '
o zero minus 4S hours, an artillery
lombardment with gas: from zero .
ninus 48 hours to zero minus one
our. a very powerful bombardment
ih shell and high explosives. This
iivision was to attack with the
Continued on page'3, column 1.)
LiyimmiBMMi
. i ~
S
iment 1
MULES I
ION
TENTION! 1 j
Attend the sale or sales
itioned animals to be sold
will get bargains.
ig Camps: ||
p Wadsworth
artanburg, S. C, .
April 28 !|
ralry Horses, 900 Artillery
:ses, 450 Draft Mules.
nation write Capt. P. S. BurM.
C., Rempunt Depot,
dsworth, Spartanburg, S. C.
imo Sevier
Ireenville, S. C.
" ^al
May 2
ralry Horses, 550 Artillery f
ses, 350 Draft Mules. Imation
write Capt. Oliver L.
per, Q. M. C., Remount
Lmp Sevier, Greenville, S. C.
\
irkation Depot
h Charleston, S.C.
May 7. Igj
airy Horses, 350 Artillery
rses, 250 Draft Mules. '/
mation write Major Albert
i. M. C., Embarkation y <
t, No. Charleston, S% C. '
f
\s Follows: I
i Funston, Fort Riley, Kansas,
i Shelby, Hattiesburg, Miss,
i Devens, Ayer, Mass.
> Sherman, Chillicothe, Ohio,
i Taylor, Louisville, Ky. ,
Depot, at the foregoing camps.
d condition. They are
be held always at RE?
*ai?Aaoni?w anrl tn ,
I j 11 n^vwooai j j unu ^
}
:d check 1
haser. Halter with each
Come!' It's your last
r
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