The Barnwell people. (Barnwell, S.C.) 1884-1925, April 18, 1918, Image 7

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CRISIS JJNGLAND LLOYD GEOROE FOR CONSCRIP TION LAW FOR IRELAND TO. SETTLE' HOME RULE Accorded to them. i "Owing to the growth of the strength of our Armies in 1917, when this bAitle began the combatant strength of the whole of th* German army on the west was only approx- mately though not quite equal to the total qombatant strength of the allies In infantry. They were sllght- y inferior in artillery. They were inferior in cavalry, they were un doubtedly inferior in aircraft. "The Germans, therefore, organ ized their troops so as to produce British rPemier Boldly Grapples With Man Power Question as He Sewds 10 Year Old English Youths to the Front-—Premier Makes ^ufisox^iui pun 2uor] David Lloyd George, the British prime minister Tuesday made the boldest stroke of his career by coup ling home rule for Ireland with the conscription of Irishmen. This unexpected disclosure in an address by the premier in the house of commons in presenting the new conscription bill to parliament swept aside all interests in the details of the conscription scheme which al ready had been forecast by the news papers. Ireland Is the only Mibjeet talk ed of. The only queMtion aeked is how will the Irish parties and their British *)mpathi/ers take to the new polir). There was a test of strength In the house of common* when Joseph Devlin. Nationalist, made a motion to adjourn. The government then moved and carried cloture on bis motion after a brief debate by vote pf 310 to D5, and Xlr. Devlia s motion was defeated by a vote of 333 to AO, This prelim I AAry tote mean* lit tlo Kverythiag on the nature ef the protaosads for self-got ernmewe for (reload to be adopted, as the premier said, "wttkooi v olent ran trovemy .** The skepticism as DM WHEAT CROP tween our third and fifth armies, and there was a serious gap. and the situation was retrieved, owing to the magnificent conduct of our Agrtcultiirista Enthused at Proopect troops. They retired in perfectly good order. ^ "The house can hardly realize and certainly can not sufficiently thank —nor the country—our troop* for their superb valor and the grim ten acity with which they faced over whelming hordes of the enemy. They retired but were never routed. "I am referring to the whole ar of the sMghtly smaller number of infantry and slightly smaller num ber of guns. They had fewer battal ions in a division and fewer meh in a battalion. That is entirely a question of organization and yet re mains to be seen that their organiz ation is better than ours. It is nec essary to explain that, in order that the house should realize why ap proximately the same number of men the Germans have a larger number of divisions on that front. '"The Germans had, however, one or two important advantages. The first which is always commanded by the offensive, is that they knew where they meant to attack. They choose the ground; they choose th*3 location; they knew the width of the attack, they know the dimensions of the attack; they know' the time of the attack;- they know the met hoi of’ the attack. All that invariably gives the initial advantage to th*? offensive. "The defense has a general ad'-ia- tage owing to air observation con cealment Ts difficult. As sometimes, ti. spite of al| that, owing to ’he prwer of moving troops at ni;i*t. which the German wserrlsed to a very large extent, there |s a large margin for surprise even la spite of our observation. "1 should like to say one «or«! here as to the difficulty which the allied generals were confronted w *li la this respect Before the battle (He greatest German concentration was in front of out troops That ees no proof that the full weight of the at tack u©•Id fall oa os There was a impresekM was Ivory large courentratio* opposite the whether the war I Preach Uaee There was very coa- a larger number of divisions out my, general, officers and soldiers. I mean the whole army and I draw no distinction. Their conduct has been one of incredible courage and great coolness under the most try ing conditions. I am referring to the British army and that means all. "And I specially refer to what one brigadier general did. Some refer ence has been made in the press al ready to it where at one point there was a serious gap, which might have let the enemy Into Calais. (Section Missing Here' "Until the whole circumstances which led to the retirement of the Fifth Army and 'it£ failure to hold the line of the Somme. ... it would be unfair to censure the general in command of the army, General Gough, but until those circumstances are cleared up. it would be equally unfair to the British army to re tain his services in the field. After the retirement of the Fifth Array, the French reserves came up with remarkable rapidity when their posi tion before the battle la borne in mind. . . . "But It Is clear that the Germans having gained an initial success, are preparing another and perhaps an even greater attack. "Tp to tbe present the eo«-my has utwloutw frili f^talwevl a great Initial n*fve^». There Is wo good I* wot arrefWlog the fart. It Is fmsn that basis vre »»w*i hegla to balld. Hat hr has fafleri so far la his taaia objmlir*. ... > abiaet could frame a measure wblcf would stood that teal a ad tbe fear that lb# rowatry might be plaagod sgaia leto the old fury of the Irtah quarruf Lloyd George, however, la dor mg ■oough <fe at tempt to halaueo hath debts by great lag ken rale oud • afortiag causrnptfte* Pram ter Lloyd George mid "Wo hovs wow rwfeted the most rmral phoee of thto terrible war There la a lull I* the •’<«r ku*itc**e le Uat evtr •Ideraklo rouceutrsiloa —»f am refer- nos to the German re«e r ves va the eoribem port of oar Hue "After the bottle begs a or tm dlately before the bottle tbe Germouv by eight brwegkt «their dlrWiouv from the oerlbera port of the pelet ©here tbe attaak took place They alee tdok aovorat dtvVeioos from op pooHo the Preach lu the seme way aad brought them to our frwai I am referring to that I* order to eb«* but * he | a (mb ev rood rut ty dtffVwtf N le f er co wei gamerei* tm the offeoaive to deride as wot ©apart more ftovre eat breaks | ©merity wberw. ta thotr judgment, the ere it Is finally evkaoeted tbere .attack le rumtog •****• ** rT . - I "I may just my a oori here ThH The fata of tbe etnplre. tug hRDo |omblom woe ouoaDdoewd ears ciuoely -®***hk fpDd the fum uf hhefty I ^ mGMnry atnff • *«uie« and I tbmh it right m jeetie© to them a very rldee "The eartay hat raptured value* ] bio groaud which Is too aeer kmiens I for com fan ov security aad ho had j aorreeded for the time hetug lu cr*p pllug oue of our great arm tea **| will now toll the hoeeo aomo* thiag of the mea*ares adopted by the ruhtnet to meet the eui<rgeory "At the omergonry a as grwut H was twipoasiute tw aVWsw the mow who werw »wmmeoed to Prunre the aeuol leave to vbdl IhHr relatives It wwe with the greatest regret that we •ewod It wereuoory to euurol this per mioiiou aod usdhlag hut the gra»ity uf the puottkm uemM have justified •n ha**h a prueeedtuu ft *t the tenons of Big Yield Forecast by tbe department of ag riculture of a winter wheat crop of 560,000,000 bushels this year brought optimism to the food ad ministration and the prediction was unofficially made that if the spring wheat crop maintained the same ra tion the next harvest will furnish sufficient wheat to take care of the needs of this country and the allies next year. The forecast indicated an increase of 1 42,000,000 .bushels of w'nteir wheat over last year’s winter crop, which was 418,000,000 bushels. As suming the spring wheat crop will yield the same ratio of increase, there will be a total crop of 850,000,- 000, or an increase of about 200,- 000,000 bushels over last year when the entire crop was estimated at tVT»T ;000,000. In addition, there is an increase of 26,000,000 bushels in the pros pective rye crop or a total pros pective increase over last year of about 225,000,000 bushels of bread grains. There is also hope of an. increase over last year in Groat Britain and France, and also an increase in In dia. The necessity for rigorous saving between now and harvest time ts however, in no way relaxed by har vest prospects, the public is warned Winter wheat, sown on 42.170,001) acres, the largest area ever plant ed. entered tbe winter with the low est condition of record on Decem ber 1. in its December forecast the department of agriculture estimated tbe crop would be about 540.<tOO.ooa bushels Tbe government bad aimed to have a crop of (72.0oi».o»p bush els of winter wheat and relied upon farmers to plant enough spring wheat to bring the rowntry's wheat prodwctlon this year to more than I .ogg.gao.oaa hushels Weather condition* throwghowt the wrlnter have not been adverse to the u inter grain crop* and early DISCUSSED PEACE CZERNIN REPLIES TO STATE MENT OF CLEMENCEAU TELLS OF NEGOTATIONS Austrian Premier Says It Does Not Matter Who Started Peace Fonfer- enees In Switzerland and Points Out That France Admits Having Broken Them Off. EAT nTATKS JUS •POTATOES FOR AMERICA, WHEAT FOR EUROPE/* report* indicated wheat aad rv© I •prlag in better I been ev per ted I indientlon© that the prodnrtbm fore- woetd he letter than tho*e that the taipler ref* hod began lbo condition t ban hod wa* felt from these • a* eel I rewwi be lie* ear tbrowgbeat lb# world me* 'bo soeroos with whtrh mi tbene attack* It resisted cowntarwd The govern mew t. •kerefwre. pro pose in submit tn parliament cer tain recommendation* m order tn asomt this conn try and the alitna tn •ember the storm They will In- snlvn I regret eat feme •ncr'fVrea on the port of large classes of the peg slat km aad ombiag would justify them hut the must •s'rem# oooee •Ity and the fun tbm me are fighting fur alt that Is ©seeatla! and mest so •red In ear national life hefor*- I ram# to the ctregm- •tanooe vhlch led up to our submit ting tbewe proposals tn parliament. I ought to soy one word as tn vhj parliament was not . aimed to tel y rftace tbe battle began it ngi tn point nut ibat aftei study of tbe German poslito* and Inf tbe pmhnbtl It lee mi the moo. they • •p'nt *b« «>- which In watt by uf tk •Miron© and patriot Mas rival hoy s he ent» cy. We f«4» tw >i* ! stow ns her condHIwno Hye screens loot antnmn *b pmni a is per conL increase ever the prr• oo* year nlth A.ItPeso ne*ew e"*' ' r< t Tv- - »n4 't<>n of tbo crop tn tfeemmher I was ft# I per rent or normal and the forecast of p*odwc- tion made at that time waa ft3.and.- ana bo* hois l^- •o tbe ftU the mi Jonooc DeSooscy tbot tl of kfWOn; Ibel H sery wide j ■ tsonld be mm otlork oa ewoe yet ■■■ sited. tbs' I tbe Germans would aerwmwlate k'|g u n*Wr jdivisions far tbe pwrpooe of maktbg ' tbot they would tbron wf their resource* and |^|| vnoo tvhof hrimptH servvoe an Itbeir *tre*gth lata brenktag the hri-| a , rMII r mm4mrm4 In thu ban l tlsb line at tbot point and that tbeir | -YW* nevt «4rp «*Mvb I •ivoold labjestlvo would bo tbo rapture of jut, 9m 9k , n* i Xmlen* * nd 'he •• ■ c r 4 r. ▼ f ' h <• Url- ^ an«1 dmnsoilc ©*• I that attack I tbe w bole •* Is In tbo tans ©ad machine gone I which were loot. the warn her* are I grossly evaggera*ed by the enemy || ntonmd that they has© al*n *1 j oted eery mnsftdecnhly the I f prt*oners taken *Owr alrvrau streagtk Is grwater ban he*wee tbo battle and we fteftva###g#oe#ae AtrULS TO TIE SftlTC **| partftrwlarlf appeal la tbo farmers of tbo Paaih to plso^ abaadaat foodat affv aa nett o© rattan They enn sbon tbeir pmrtmftsm m nn better or mere ego storing nay tbeu by reatst lag the grwut temptatftwa mi tho peeuoat price of **<t help ng helping wpea a great ©ml©. feed the Naiian and the people verynbere wba are ftgbtian far tbeir liberties and fur our an* Tbe variety uf tbeir crops nllt be the ©tsihi© measure of tbeir romprebun- ttvk and F reneb forrev "Thai wa* tbe c«Hir)u*loa dir Hen ry Wilson, tchief of tbe imperial staff’came to and which was vubmit-1 ted at that time, two or three mowtk* aco. god 1 think that it was one of the aosi remarkable fore%g«t« of enemy Intentions that * wg* ever made **1«M«tJ»*»r nrmerkahl© prediction wa* that H might probably creed to the evteul of penetrating the Bri- fkh line to the rvtrrt of half the dlMam© of lIk* front attw* k. "There was another advantage. There was. first of all. the advan tage which the German had from having the initiative. There was a further advantage they had and this, undoubtedly, was the greatest ad vantage from having a united com mand opposed to a dual one. "It was reported to me on good authority that the kaiser informed ex-King Constantine: ‘I shall beat them, for they have no united com mand.’ Which shows that that was what they were relying on in the main, that although their numbers were slightly inferior, they knew the importance that was to be attached the fact that here was a perfect- mnited command. ^And that is an obvious advantage or, ifMhe risks in one particular part of the line are great, and in another part^of the line are great, but substantially^less than In the former, with one command there is not hesitation on the rirtud of the commander in chief as to wlrieh he makes the greatest provistoir "In the separate command problem is a difficult one; "The enemy has another inciden tal, but as it turned out, very im portant advantage—that of weather. Exceptional weather favored his de signs. It was both dry and misty. " A wounded officer told a friend of mine, a general, that under or dinary conditions no one could walk across the part which was traversed by the Germans at this tim* of the year. But it just happened to be ab solutely dry and firm. "Not only that, but the fart it wav warm increased the mist sad the <»em>an* were actually In *ome part* . . . within a few yard* id our front Hne •II r*crt«lB*ltoB »t tbli hour mo*l | ^ ^ kntm ^ lhrir ^ b. that o«L araarh. It quite impoutble to .\<*aMh.laa<Mac the he«n r —»- ob'rrrr the* Tbit »»l • tparUI dlt- to MM 'he •rm, la IVaare tto*!^,^, up. inasmuch as oar hetne of urgaaitatioo lb that pur part of . tbe line depended •Aon oi • t - s< Woe mo! d 1 w w n tbe government have bora engaged ml most every hour in roocefttmg with the alllev the mere*vary men*- jre to anolst the armies to deal with the enemy "The proposal* which we intend submitting to parliament required very close and careful examination and I think there is this advantage in our meeting, rather jthan immedi ately after the impact of the Ger man attack, that we shall he consid ering the*c proposals tinder condi tions which would he far removed from any sugge«tion of panic. "I shall now come to the circum stances which have led to the pres ent military position. It is difficult at this time to present a clear, con nected and reliable narrative of what happened. There has been a great battle on a front of 50 miles—the ?atest battle ever fought in the hist dry of the world. Enormous forces have been engaged; there was a considerable retirement on the part of the British forces and under these conditions it will ivqt he' easy for some time to ascertain^wjiat actually happened. "The nouse wiii recollect dif ficulty we experienced with regal to Cambrai. lt was difficult to piece together the story of the event for some time and Cambrai was a very trivial event compared with this gi gantic battle. "The generals and their staffs are, naturally, engaged and have to con centrate their attention upon the op erations of the enemy and-untij-Uie strain relaxes it will be very dif ficult to institute the necessary in quiries to find out exactly what hap pened. ^ - "However, there are two Op three facts which stand out, and in stat ing them I should like to call at tention to two things which I think above all must be avoided. The first is that nothing should be said which could give information to the ene my;* nothing should be said which would give encouragement to the enemy and nothing should be said which would give discouragement to our own troops who are fighting so gallantly at this very hour. "And the second question is that tu be es _ ob-erve DTonre mo* 1 Z ■ ** .. - 1 autso.ag© |^lttM9pr nn 1 be ftek uf I I mu, Uvon on ike fkm IOi: Ip to tm?—up «•» *n> \ 111'^b re lA*r ft V«U>e M» ©* «* Tbsm *h* m-A ftUbry notMgww mi >u«*M. ©*4 •*© Gutibnan bupwml up (Rom MUkenswi * * *itr~ 1 ~t~t mmi 1 — Uf T* * 4 * MM e evsNnn nuno^’w PRwtt tmiiar Urgety u* 1 t »* - ttMDiMw Id*. ' •pen Tb# «roov line fir* 1 gone and aet-Ber* TWy iwinan g eeey *pe*iai sdvon nbsrb tttrf nsoAv tJbe tnttnai V 1. ■ .in ■ bf Fie^IttnM m +mm . . . one of tbe moot Important d«*« l •ion* in the war In fact, tbe IsstH of tbe bottle might very well be de termiaed by tbis deri*ion "In Am«*ttea there are a very »ldwrsbie oumber of mm in . rourve of training and tbe * looked forward to havfng a large American army in Fran«e In the spring. It has taken longer than an ticipated to turn those soldier* into the necessary divisional organiza tions. If America walled to complete these divisional organizations it would not be po«a!hle for ihome fine troops to take part In this battle, although it might be very well the decisive battle of the war. "This was, of course, one of the most serious disappointments from win h th*- allies had suffered We depended upon it largely to make up the deflection of Russia. For many reasons—reasons, perhaps of trans portation—it was quite impossible to put into France the number of divisions every one had confidently expected would be there. "Under the circumstances we therefore, submitted to the president of tbe United States a definite pro posal. We had the advantage of hav ing the secretary of state of war in this country when three days after the battle had commenced. Sir. Bal four and I had a long conversation with him upon the whole situation. "On the strength oi^ the conversa tion we submitted proposals to Pres ident Wilson to enable the combat ant strength of the American army come into action during this bat- tleHqasmuch as there was no hope of it coming as a strong separate army. By this decision American bat talions will b«M*rigaded with those of the allies. "This proposal submitted by the Earl of Reading on behalf of the British government to PresidetH Wil son and President Wilson assented to the proposal without any hesitation, with the result that arrangement* now are being made for the fight ing strength of the American army to be brought immediately to- bear In this struggle. "Another important decision taken by tbe allied governments I mutt also call to the attention of the house ft became. more obvious af ter the battle tbaa over before that tbo allied armies were vaffenat from tbo fact that they wore flghtag as tun separate armve© and had tn ae- gntiate swppnft nub ©a*b otbor l tbe Versailles decisions ci I Thl* to ant tbe time tn li "I respectfully suggest house that ao aood wool ow< I ff quire tn t be 1 come at TbO .sbervsi ♦ 4 » ’ f o *bo ftnCThv r or f •MsatC U OfltS tod# mmmm ttbt ot—m I <■* ****** tJbosmgtt no Ins ting tun no tbeo© erpur fttb 1 00 ♦a* aco ahmoHC mMmrtpnnnin ba« and tt «on gw •pea 4*m. m mu ft* done n 4* turn* 4 * * »• •a»a •«* uf eu this *tago la dlocnasiag this qaes- vtnn Bur tf aay one uee< ifed ronvfr- tlovi as to tho wisdom of that poli cy thla hattio must have supplied tt. The peril we passed through by es tablishing the conviction without challenge, may 1 think, be worth the price we paid for It. We were so convinced^ and the same thing ap plied to the French—of the Impor tance of more complete atarteglr unity that they agreed to the ap pointment of Gen. Foch to the su preme direction of the strategy of all tbe allied armies on the western front. * "He Is one of the most brilliant soldiers in Europe. Foch Is the man who. when we were attacked atid were in a similar plight at the first battle of Ypres, rushed the French army there by every conceivable ex pedient—buses, cabs, lories, anything he could lay his hands upon. "There is not doubt about the loy alty and comradship of General Foch. "I entreat the nation as a whole to stand united for the united control of the strategical operations of our armies at the front. We know how much depends upon unity. We arq fighting a very powerful foe. When an emergency had arisen which made it necessary to put men of 50 and boys of 18 into the fight for liberty, Mr. Lloyd George de clared it was not possible to exclude Ireland from conscription by a par liament in which Ireland was repre sented and which, had ’’ommitted the country to the war without a dissent ing voice. The character of the quarrel in which the country was engaged, the premier said, was as much Irish as English. ^Wb^n Lloyd George referred to Ireland Alfred Byrne, nationalist member from Dublin, shouted; "We won't have conscription in Ireland *' • ^ An uproar followed. It vrould be some weekf before en rollment In Ireland began, tbe pre mier continued One nationalist cried oni "It wrlll never begin V Michael Flavin, nationalist mem ber from Kerry, *a»d "Ton come arrow aad try tn take aa ** Tbe report of tbe Irtab coo venue# f pat- wa* adopftod by a majority ©al« sag armies tn ’ becedoe* tbo gov era moot would tube tbe fwwgwmnigilmy eoni tb© prom we, ftor ©orb pc*ftnnJ t»* #* ' posnem* oe I m*nf *0 wv* |o*i end ***» »d Ins one tad uni omRsna uanbrne ummimmpmr The statement of the French gov ernment and ex-Premier g > alrflove that it wag 'Austria, not France, which took the initiative resulting in the conversations in Switzerland con cerning the possibility of opening peace negotiations are denied by the Austrian government, which insists that France took the first step. An official statement, i sued in Vienna says the accounts given by Premier Clemenceau and M. Pain- love of the meetings in Switzerland between Count Revertata, an Aus trian representative, and Major Ar- mand, representing France, deviate from-the facts in many important partirulari. 1’ asserts the initiative was taken by the Intermediary act ing in the name of the French gov ernment. The official Austrian statement aays: "In contrast with the first brief declaration of Premier Clem- euceau. in which be gave the He to foreign minister Cjornin* It la ob served with *atl»fa< non tbot M Clemeuceau s statement of April ft admits that discussion* lu regard to the qoestloa of peace took piece be tweea two coafldeatlal ageats of Austria-Hungary ‘a#d Franco. Tbe sc roue! given by M t'lemencenu of tbo latl let lea and re u res of tbo os negotiation*, aad likewise (be stale meat by M Palnlnve wa tbe same subject, however, deviate In many important particulars and tn sorb a degree from tbo facts tbot a 4 tailed « orfevtio© mi tbe French muwirwtjbn a©peers tn be asrawanry "In Jaly IftlT. Count Rovoetoio wa* req seated by an in* * rm ©diary la tbe name mi tbe Frvo'b toveramsai tn state whether bo was In a pnoft lion to receive a cemmootcoftoo from tbot gwucfomcot tn 1 be gswevom mi a pet uo-Hungary tft ben t oant Revertntn. after bo* tag abtotnod tbo so act Inn of tbo 4 e*4 ro- Ha op* cmn gwsemmont re piled tu tbo affirmative tn tbfta In qotep* sfn tbo so ms month July tftl” major Arm aod one r target aitb •ecb rwmmuolca'.oo b? * a< D'f»o* h premier Ho arrtsei A eg eel t, I ft is el Count Hove© tain's privet# rdMdsoee In Freiberg Tbe engpt being distantly related tn him 'Major Armeod tbop add'eased In Cnupt Its verts to a question ao in . obetber d 1 va**inn# betoeon Franoo (and Aeemo Heagary wore possible Tbno tbo inHftallve fur those dioruo-j I too* nos token from tbo l^reorb i sin© Ceeot itevertato repnrtsd tn tbo •teeCro-Hongariun f .reif n miadetor that this qooetinu bud bees put on tuotrwrtinna mi t be Fenrb govern- meat and tbo mi outer tberenpun reqnooied Coont Hcverto’a tn enter min dlecwselon* with lb# Fre Orb ron- fidnnlal agent and ta tbo enuroo of thee* discuss toe* to establish ©both er by tbfta moons a has is for bring* lag about gnneral pence coaid be scoured Oa Aagust 23*23 Couat Rover* tala catered late discussions with Major Armaad. obisb. as Premier t Irmcncrau quite correctly declares, yielded no result. Tbe aegotiatioas thereupon were broken off. "The Clemenceau verslou thht tho discussion between Kevertata and Armand were proceeding on his en try Into office It incorrect Not until January. 1918, did Armand this lime on instructions from Clemen- "real, again pel into touch with Re vertata. "From this fresh contact there result the (Gtcusslon* referred 4n tbe official communique of April 4, 1918. It is. however, correct that Count Revertata handed Major Ar mand on February 23, 1918, the memorandum regarding which Pre mier Clemenceau only cites the first sentence and which confirms that in the discussions with Armand, which had taken place in August, 1917, Revertata was charged with the task of finding out whether proposals were obtainable from the French government which had addressed to Austria-Hungary an offer of a basis for a general peace and also wheth er they would be such as* Austria- Hungary could bring to the knowl edge of its allies. Taber la Splendid Food and Gap bo Prepared In Many Trwqpling Ways. By eating potatoes instead of wheat bread, the people of South Carolina can help win lYaz war ap well as by purchasing Liberty bonds and contributing to the Red Cross. With this statement, the conserva tion* division i6f the Food Adminis tration for South Carolina, an nounces the "Potatoes for America,. Wheat for Europe" campaign in.thin State. The existing situation calls for further curtailment of wheat con sumption, and tbere is no better sub stitute, and no substitute for wbeat bread that is to be had in such quan tities as potatoes. We have not enough wheat for our Allien and ourselves, but we have an abundance of potatoes—an excess of 9d,0b0.- 000 hushels over normal tfmna. If we are to'win this war the Alfled armies and the Allied peoples must hive wheat. The potato cannot quite come up to wheat In food value, but It does come about as close to taking the place of wheat as any other food. By eating more potatoes, there fore, the people of South Carolina ran save more wheat to send tn Eu- ropn. j Americans first reavzed how Ion- ppriPPt s part of their daily food tbo potato played when last year a scar city of this vegetable drove tta prion almost to prohibitive belgbta. planting time came again, every planted potatoes The farmers were particularly urged to plant potaAoeo as a patriotic doty, aod accordingly tbere was aa abundance of point pee produced. At a time wbea tbe world fta mo sorely in need of food only In America la there an would be criminal to vasts *0 important aa tbo potato tgtoi ■ raised tbroogb shoe Id • ** eaten 'hroogh psti so bet Mated for w beet brand In an great aa ©stool ao powslbls. wbsot tbns saved aont to bo s j*# wb le the people 1 .• * owntrWo ^unsvmv la times a boot twice tbo amount of po int eea per raptto ao do tbe poopfte of America, shipping fariittion are so limited tbot H is sbtp tbo surplno of eotog tn tbntr bulb; a Mo bp mi tbo fart tbm putai< •o wet! as tbe emit potatoes needed an merb for tbo Al- tiao no obaot. m«o4 and lain N sbon Id tb era fore bn arrordod a prt vtiogo tbm 00 may tbs smy and tbo look Lag nrrwua tbo son tn no. log on ns for tbeir doily Potato©© boro boon aocb ai port mt tbo dinner dim tbt I Rye mi tbem. nor mi monotony 10 sorvt am more tbaa a of serving ©of •slag aomo of tbo swrptoe a *t use of potato broad wbeat brand Many eld f breed-amhors still cling In mast, and sioco tbo route I ftn Starrb. lee* wheat floor la aory to order tn form a stiff Tbo breed made fron» It somewfbat darker la more mots! tbaa that wbeat floor, bat by using It as aa admltturr. at least. It would uootrl- buln much tn tbo coasorvntloo mi about If tho ••Potatoes for A mortem Wheat for Europe" campaign fta tn succeed, the planting of swum po tatoes become a very important mat ter at this time, for sweet potatoeo like Irish potatoes, may bo subatitut- ed for bread to help win tbo war. REASSURES SLAVS WoMhingion Thinks American rtnew May Help in Siberia Landing of the American at Vladivostok is expected to baun a reassuring effect In Russia. With Americans joining the British and Japanese naval forces In protecting life and the stores of war material belonging to the allies at tbq Sibe rian port the enterprise is gfyoa a distinctly international character which it is believed in Washington should quiet fears of the Russlanu aroused by German suggestions that a Japanese invasion had been begun. No details are available to tho number of marines landed. In fact, the navy department had not been officially informed of the landing though American warships are at !t"thereforeTentlrely correspond- aDd the step wa ® not utt ' IV ImugttMm «um ns a mgR I ngdl • da n* ini d be* • maun * * sown gftt ed with the fact when Count Czemin in his speech April 2 last declared that ‘Premier Clemenceau fiad some time before the beginning of the Western offensive inquired of me whether I was prepared for nego tiations and of what basis.’ "The accusation of lying brought against Count Czemin by M. Clem enceau can not, therefore, be main tained, even in the restricted sense made by the present .communique of the French government. "Nothing is known to the Austro- Hungarian government of entreaties for sn alleged separate peace with the Austro-Hungarian government worried the governments of Rome. Washington and London When pf. Clemenoeau asks the Aurtro-Huu- garlan foreign minister whether he remember* that two months before tbe Revertata affair—that la. about a year ago—an attempt of a like nature vat made hy a porwoaage of far higher rank. Count Csuratu do** not hesitate to reply la tbo affirma tive Bat for tbo sake of r - aoso aad oattro *orroeraooo H sho.id b» added tbm tbis attempt also jnd In Bo rwoob - ■’•o much Car tbo vstnbGsaaftoac of tbo tneaa. Foe tbo root It ft»© pas poos monad «u dM*j tt g m tbas m It would be a fair proposition'— and, one that we favor,—to make the men who do not fight pay for the war., Our government only askn them to lend money, however, and not give it, which should be readily agreed to. "Potatoes for America, Wheat for Europe." he bad taken the Initiative because, in contrast to M. Clemenceau, bn believes It can not be a matter for reproach for a government to attempts to bring about aa ble pear- which would Ifberuto all people* from the terroni of tbo ent war ’Tb© dispute raised by M ©•©ooa bus. moreover, tontlnn from tbo real heraol of , MAteOMM tv MM M «r