The Barnwell people. (Barnwell, S.C.) 1884-1925, January 11, 1917, Image 4
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GERMANY’S POSITION -
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RESPONSIBLE STATESMAN AN
SWERS ALUEB REPLY
Inf t bit nnftTOWftd Idftft wm tk«a to
fotad ft Bftw Rhine Bund.'*
As to Small Nation*,
tft thft free ftzlstenoe of Oman
nation i. Dr. Ham man n said:
"This Idea, too, ha* found a ▼«ry
• strange Illustration during the war.
Only a few weekV/have elapsed since
THE WAR LAST YEAR
-•—a
a leading English minister termed
the misfortune of the Roumanians
plainly a 'gross blunder.’ By this
’blunder' a whole nation has been
dragged into a great war by all sorts
of dark machinations.
"And then lobk at Greece. There
the Entente, has occupied the ports,
railroads, cable and postal stations
and the whole districts of the copn-
try, all against the law of natiohs.'
There the Ehtfente has simply taken
what it needed and by blockade and
hunger has forced the Greeks to sur
render those things which the En
tente was uribhle to take."
A* to British Proposal.
"What -about the reproach that
MAKE SOME COMPARISONS
- ♦ ■
Former Official of Intelljfeee* I>o-
partmcnt of Foreign Office Gireft
Out aa Interview by Wireless
~ Hntepte Dwells on Belgium's Mis
ery and Treats Greses in a Worse
Manser.
The Germas impressloa ef the En
tente's reply to the peace proposals
#f the Central powers was reflected
Teesday in a statement made to the
eeml-offlclal Overseas Newe Agency
by Dr. Hammann, who until the
turn of the year was director of the
Intelligence departments of the Ger
man foreign office. This comment
was not based on the offleial text of
the Entente's reply, as thiu_.lar~anljr
tbs version sirppttsd by Ihe HiVas
Agency, from Paris, has besn re
solved in Berlin. 4
Dr. Hammonn, who collaborated
in the important work of the foreign
office last month, said that consid
eration by Germany and her allies
of a peace offer dated back aa far as
October. At that time the intention
was entertained by making an hon
est and sincere attempt to prevent
further useless bloodshed. Being
asked as to the general impression
ere&ted by the Entente reply, he
said:
"If I am to express an optnipn tft
a few words, it is this: Instead of
taking place around a peace table,
the Entente’s deliberations took-
place on a judge's chair. Apparent
ly the Entente forgot nothing that
could possibly influence neutrals
against us.
"The point of the accusation,
however, to which the largest space
Is allotted in the Entente note is
*the martyrdom of Belgium' one
must speak beforehand regarding
’neutral and loyal Belgium' and, this
Belgium had eeased to exist long be-
fere the war.
"I do not want to speak about the
documents which wf found in Brus
sels and which have been published.
They can be read by everybody. I
only wish to single out one point
which up to now haa not been euffl-
elently considered—the report made
by Baron Greindi, Belgium minister
at Berlin, dated December 23, 1111
Entente's Plan.
"This clear sighted statesman
then explained forcibly that already
at that time the Entents waa in
spired by nothing but the one
thought of encircling Germany from
the north. As proof of this Baron
Oreindl quoted the outcry in Paris
and London a ahert time before
when the Dutch plan to fortify
Flushing had become knows. Baron
ftrelndl then said:
"‘The reason why they- wished
that the Scheldt remain without de
fense was not concealed. In this
they admitted their purpose to be
able to transport an English garri
son to Antwerp without hindrance,
thus creating in Belgium a basis for
eperatlons in the direction sf the
Lower Rhine and Westphalia.’
1917 SEES ALLIED PROGRESS
.. SAYS MILITARY EXPERT
GERMAN LOSSES HEAVY
New York Times Writer Believes
Allies Have Lost Fewer Soldiers
Thaa Kaemy am All, Front Save
. Oft* an* !■ Every Straggle of the
150.000 RoumMlani •Ull exUt «nder yfl SM PLANS NEW APPEAj,
arm., to that. l«nortnf the queation
of territory, the balance it eUU
against the Teutonic allies.
, In jMdiUon to these well defined-
battles and campaigns, there hay©
been numerous enguguments, in both
France, end Russia, of much less im
portance; but, because they Aft*®
been practically unceasing, the' total
additions to the casualty,UsU of both
belligerents have been considerable
■ ||H There has never been a period of
?« r w m “ y .,' a 1 th ® TRfwar when It haa appeared more
July 41214) declined . th# British ^
proposal of a conference and thus
mads war unavoidable?"
To this Dr. Hammann replied:
"The proposal for a conference
waa mads July.26 by Grey. .The
meaning of It waa that delegates
of France, Italy and Germany should
meet with Gray In confersnce and
try, to find a way out of a difficult
interesting or more profitable to take
stock, as it were, of the various bel
ligerents than now. Germany is at
the height of her power and accom
plishments. She ha* reached out
and taken all that is within the pos
sibility of conquest. She had fail
ures during the year, but crowned its
close with a brilliant success. <.
On this basis she has sent out
*5* “ r ‘‘ c ° n . dltl °“ mak - peace call, enlisting In the support,of
ing the hold.ng of such a conference this effort-•--pragtlpiltv all neutral
PQiftlble ahould have beeir thAt the ^ practically^ an neutral
Russian cabinet declare tW"1fcaftsehTr
Fla* Clianged.
"Baron Greindi reported that the
plan was then changed In such a
siasnsr that the English auxiliary
army was not to be landed on the
Belgian coast, but in the adjoining
French ports. This same plan of an
Inglish landing in order to threaten
Germany waa iqually hinted at aa
Imminent by Lord Roberts during
the last Moroccan trials.
"In such circumstances It most
certainly would have been an easy
thing for Belgium, after the German
question in 1914 (whether Belgium
would permit the passage pf German
troops) to take her armies back to
Antwerp and then let the Germans,
undtr protest, mareh through the
eountry.
"How little sich action would
havo violated the epirit of existing
eonditions may be understood if one
recalls the secret clauses of the trea
tise of 1831. In then, certain agree
ments from former times were main
tained which reserve as well to Eng
land as to Germany, the right to oe-
cupy a Belgian fortress. In 1S87 a
great English newspaper—if I am
not mistaken, it waa The Standard
—still declared that employment on
the part of Germany of the right of
way throu&h Belgium could not be
taken aa in violation of Belgian neu
trality."
Principal of Neutrality. ~
At this point the Interviewer eaid:
"In addition to this the question
of the principle of neutrality plays a
largo part in the answer of the En
tente. What importance must be at
tributed to ttrts^ principle In the
present situation?" '
In his reply Director Hammann
emphasized every word he said.
"No nation," declared Herr Ham
mann, "is better able to understand
the principle than the German, for
no great civilized nation has suffer
ed so mu^h, has been forced to
struggle so greatly because of being
suppressed art'd dismembered by
‘ neighboring racoo. »
"Equally, no single great nation
has less to f^ar from the application
of this prin-Iple of nationalities than
the German Germany would abso
lutely consent f this principle of na
tionalities w* re carried out in Egypt,
India, Moroco,. Ireland, by the coun
try in power, not to speaJt of Rus
sia's national-ties.
Brutally Treated.
"Germany baa been brutally treat
ed for centuries by her neighbor*,
desp+te this principle of nationali
ties. Yet in 1 ^6 exactly fifty years
ago, that is, in the Nikolsburg peace
(closing the war between Prussia
and Austria) a clause waa Inserted
upon the demand -6f Napoleon III,
4rhlch left open for” the Southern
German States the conclusion of, a
ee pa rate confederatloa. The lead-
hut it answered July 27 in an eva
sive manner and referred to conser-
sations with the Austro-Hungafian
ambassador in St.. Petersburg
(Petrograd) as having been under
the most favorable auspices.
The fellowing day prey agreed
to the German propOs&l that direct
understanding between Vienna and
St. Petersburg would result in quick
er and better action. Thus Grey on
July 28 telegraphed to Goshen
(British^ ambassador at Berlin):
" ’But as long as there is a pros
pect of. a direct exchange of view#
between Austria and -Russia I should
suspend every other suggestion, as I
entirely agree that it is the most
preferable method of all.’ •
Read the Blue Book.
"I can only advise every one to
read th* English blue book If*'he
wants to be informed about *hese
matters. BiiUto my mind It.seems
to be altogether wrong to look for
the real causes of the war in the
events during the last weeks of July,
191‘4. Then, perhaps, the last im
pulse for war waa given, but the real
cause must be found a considerable
time back.
"Since the Auglo-Freneh treaty of
1904 a complete literatur*-hart
sprung up in France, in which open
ly and loudly the conquest of Al
sace-1 ^or rain e" was discussed and
everything said in order to suggest
to the French thq idea of Germany’s
inferiority. The Entente’s note
points out that at the last peace con
ference Germany treated the proposi
tion to disarm with distrust. But
Germany knew then pertinently that
the proposition was mainly .directed
against her existence.
Russia's Preparation.
"Russia, after the economic regu
lation that followed the war with
Japan, had worked with increasing
seal for tbs preparedness of her
army. When Germany einployed
the surplus of her youth for military
service Franc#, 1a order to surpass
us, introduced a three-year service,
thus sapping her capital of vital na
tion&l ftrcee.
"Six months before the beginning
of the war the French military spe-
eiallats published opesly discussions
regarding the reasons for billione
and . billions of French money
streaming into Russia and the condi
tions under which France had loan
ed this money. France had asked in
return for her loans the eonstruc-
tlon of strategical railroads in Rus
sia.
"In this literature it was explain
ed. with all the circumstances, that
not Warsaw but Grodno and Kovno
would be the base for Ruseiaa de
ployment because from there the
Prussian army corps in Koenigsberg
and AUenstein could most quickly
be relied up an* thua the road to.
Berlin could be opened.
"In August, 19L4, the attempt
was made at least to make things go
this way. And to-day they want to
persuade the nations of the world
that. Germany prepared herself, not
for protection against an aggressive
coalition but in order to annihilate
France.
Conquest ef Constantinople.
"The tame people who., premised
to Russia the conquest and posses-
alon of Constantinople dare to assert
that Germany has aggressive inten
tions. Of course the conquest of
Constantinople, which waa an
nounced by Trepoff (the Russian
premier) is the Duma, la passed in
silence in the Entente note, just as
they, in a discussion of diplomatic
events is July, 1914, elegantly slid
over the decisive dvent—that
brusque intervention in all attempts
at mediation by the Russian mobili
sation, which was even repeatedly
dissuaded by the English ambassa
dor at 8t. Petersliirgr' ^
Do you think that under these
circumstances the moral indignation
in the tone of the Entente note is
sincere," was asked.
^lost certainly I dp," replied
director Hammann. "I am of the
■Line opinion as ilernard Shaw and
consider the sincerity of this moral
indignation as a new instance of the
providential harmony between the
interests and moral and political
Ideas of England. We know this
moral indignation from history.
When the Prussians and Aus
trians marched into Schleswig-Hol
stein, in order to assist their coun
trymen and fight on the side of the
Schleswig-Holstein irredenlsts for
the independence of the (rerman
race, then Lord Palmerston and
I/ord Shaftsbury In the lower and
upper houses manifested the same
moral indignation. They also im
mediately found the same sincere
words as ‘outrage.* ‘violence, ‘most
cowardly,’ and ‘frightful atrocities.’
Edward Grey’s Yndignstion.
Sincere was Sir Edward Grey’s
Indignation when onOuly 29, 1914,
he received from the German chan
cellor the suggestion that Germany,
powers. There is a certain cagCtfieBe
for peace, a certain pertinacity in the
German effort to obtain & confer
ence leading to a peace discussion,
that is apt to make neutral powers
suspicious as to whether all is ad well
with Germany as her victories would
Indicate. From a German viewpoint,
therefore, a study of present condi
tions as compared with those of i
year ago may prove interesting.
The Allies, during the last year,
havs had no strikingly brilliant
achievement till WhictT to base
claim to a year’s success. They have
rather plugged their way, not bril
liantly, but with consistent effort,
tending to wear down the Germans
rather* than to defeat them.
But they have given no sign of
dlacouragement, no indication that
they are in the slightest degree
doubtful of the outcome, although
realizing that before the end comes
they will probably suffer defeats in
subsidiary fields.
American criticis,'when Roumania
entered the war, foresaw a speedy
defeat for the Central powers. They
had been confident that the stupen
dous resources would eventually
bring victory to the Entente without
Roumania, but because of the excel
lent strategical position of Rou
mania, jonce slm> entered the war, its
speedy close was regarded as almost
certain. , But Roumania has been de
feated, and they mow declare tfiat the
Entente cannot win, that the beat
they can hope to do U to turn the
war into a drawn battle.
And yet we find the Allies scorn
ing the German peace proposals,
stating clearly and uhmistakably that
peace under the present condittWHi Is
Impossible, and threatening, in the
event of peace, to impose upon Ger
many terms which only a victorious
outcome of the war could warrant
To begin this inventory of the
year’s fighting it is necessary to men
tion briefly what each side has done,
and at wh&t cost. The latter we can
only estimate. On the whole, how
ever, it is believed that the*estimates
are conservative and will bear inves
tigation on the basis of soudd rea
soning.
The year 1916 closed with the bal
ance sheet strongly* againct the
Allies. The Gallipoli venture had
just been abandoned, Serbia had just
been conquered, while the Allies had
stood by and looked on without the
power, apparently, to make an offen
sive move in any direction.
All laurels went to the Central
powers.. It was generally under
stood, was widely advertised by the
Allied press, that a gigantic offense
waft being planned that would begin
as soon as conditions of grounds in
th* spring would permit. Rut Uer*
many seized time by. the forelock
and, before the Allies could fire an
opening gun, took the initiative
and launched a terrifying and devas
tating attack at Verdun.
A great stock of Germany’s beat
- i. ■ i. i i —..i i. dfc. . i
teed, would enter into an obligation
not to aspire to territorial extension
at France s cost. At that -time also
Grey declared this proposal as most
shameful.’’
"And the reproaches that the Ger
man peace offer contained nothing
tangible," was suggested. >
"The tangible point," said Dr.
Hammann, "was that Germany de
clared her readiness ts communicate
her peace conditions in conference
with her adversaries. The Entente
has declined this proposal. To me
it seems evident that the Entente,
when doing this, felt seriously con
cerned and greatly depressed on ac
count pf the impression this refusal
of the* German peace offer must
make on the neutral world. -
"This is clearly indicated by the
tone of the Entente note. It is ex
actly as If the Entente were in a cer
tain sense afraid to listen to *the
conditions of the Central powers.
Are those men who gave to the En
tente note its particular tone per
haps afraid that these conditions of
the ^Central powers are much too
sensible and moderate for them’be
fore their nations, who long for
peace, -to undertake the responsibil
ity of declining these individual con
ditions?
"At all events our adversaries
would have acted mors frankly if
they had flatly and plainly -said:
'We will wait because we still hope
that we need not negotiate, but can
dictate the terms of peace.’ In order
Lto avoid this awkward avowal the
Entente now takes the attitude of
the judge of the world.
"But all that the Entente obtains
by this proceeding is that its guilt
for the continuation of the war un
mistakably In the eyes of the whole
world is not* diminished but in
creased^
"And what will the Central powers
reply to this note?’’ was asked.
Dr. Hammann answered: "I am
no more in office*; I do not knolr the
official peace plan. But I do know
what every German, what every citi
zen ki the countries allied with us
feels at this hour, however—to such
we* put Into this effon. But the
battle of th* MarneP#Sft the death of
German hope* for a western victory,
the bettls of Vsrdun was thsrlntsr-
msnt. Defeat was complete. , And
In every eense, moral,. politiral,"-ln
men end material, it was bur-fttHl*
short of disastrous.
It is difficult to flgurs net profit
and loss of Verdun. Data are in
complete and estlmfttea.can be based
only on past performance. We can
see a positive result in territory,
which shanged hands. This was
about 110 square miles. As to loss
of men by the v Germ
the former lose was certainly much
greater. Solid reasoning is behind
this assumption.
Germ ah artillery was not ao effec
tive as French. As a matter of fact,
the French artillery has proved itself
in the latter days of the war far su
perior. The preparation was not
thorough, as was shown by the fre
quency with which Gertnan infantry
attacks wers thrown back after the
artillery preparation was considered
complete. The inevitable result was
severe loss In men/ •
Considering the length of the bat
tle and the character of the fighting,
it is not exaggeration to place the
German losses at between 600,000
and 700,000 men. French losses on
tbli basis were between ,450,000 and
600,000 men. This leaves a balance
against the Germans of-100,00#~men;
and in their faror ot 110 j?qu»re j
railm of nreteM territory. ^ JlUdlLanian cani-. ,
' * r paign —T-r-r-^ 166,000 250,000
TO BELLIGERENT NATIONS
If Reply of the Allies fa Unfevt
President Will Elncid&te P<
Cion in Second Note.
If the Entente reply to PresfdJS
neiiigerenis nave — * a^.,
The figure of 200,000 for both sides Wilson’s note fails to meet his^pro-
would probably not be an ©xaggera- pgsal for an early occasion for an
vw tion There is also the Russian cam- avowal of terms, the president will
ans and French, paign in the Far East, again the no t let the negotiations drop but will
* ‘ Turkish positions in the Cmcasus re- make at least one more move. •
gion and in Northern Mesopotamia. if another communicatipn is sent,
This campaign has produced some position of the president as it is felt
individual instances of great brll- that as a result of comment abroad
llancy and promise. Nothing is known an( j the United States and in the
in detail as to the resulting casual- debate in the Senate, more or less
ties, although the territory occupied confusion»dias arisen as to just what
by. the Russians has been consider- .li
able in both theatres. Considering
only the casualty lists of the year,
then, we may make up a comparative tions is known t© lie in his sugges-
he interiffeL
, President Wilson's chief hope in
the ultimate success of the negotiar
table somewhat as follows:
. Germany.
German .Verdun '
operations . . 666,999
French Verduii : \
operations . . 75,069
Italian opera-.
tions , . . . . 300,699
Russian opera-
„Uona_..^-4 T 7-aO,im#^l.000,000
Somme battle . . 560,009
Qntente.
476,600
XS.OOlf
*00,#00
tion that a means be Found for main
taining peace in v the future. If an
agreement on that, point can be
reached the president is said to feel*
it would constitute the "guarantee
for tlje future," demanded by the
Allies. It was generally Indicated
that the president has no present in
tention of asking Col. E. M. House
te go to Europe on a peace mission.
Tfi# president has never publicly
■sadsMMM
The subsequent French offensives
at Verdun,, delivered In the last days
of 1916, increased the percentage
against the Germans, taking from
them every point on the east bank of
the. Meuse possessing any military
value,' end Inflicting casualties num
bering at least 75,000 more men,
while themselves suffering almost
inconsiderable losses. -
The next event of importance was
the Austrian effort against rtely hr
Trendno, followed by the Italian
counter offensive and, later, by the
offensive in the Carso region, by
which they occupied Gorizia and
gained a foothold on the Carso Pla
teau. These combined operations
cost the Austrians at least 300,000
men, the Italians probably at least as
many. * ’! . - *
But the Italians, in their counter
move in Trentino, took back almost
all ground they had Iqst as the re
sult of the Austrian effort, and, in
addition, gained . valuable territory
on. the Isonzo front. Gere, again,
the balance, although slight, * Is
against the Central powers.
While the Italian campaign was at
iCs height; the Russians, under Brusi-
loff, struck against the Austrians in
Yolhynia. Nothing like this blow
had been witnessed up to this time
on the eastern front. The Austrians
crumpled up under it completely, and
the Germans, from the northern part
of the line, were compelled to hurry
south to their beleaguered ally.
In' a very short time, compara
tively, the Russians had captured, the
enormous total of 480,000 prisoners,
had reconquered almost all of-Vol-
hynla, had taken all of Bukowina,
and had advanced their line in Gali
cia many miles until they were at
the gates of Lemberg.
The fighting spread up a!ong the
Stokhod, in fact up as far as Baran-
ovitchi north of the Pinsk marshes,
but gradually died out. Losses on
both sides were terrific. In thip and
subsequent operations the Russians
must have tost a million men. But
the Central powers again suffered
more heavily. .
The capture of so many prisoners
indicates a loss of at least a million
and a half, to which must be added
the German Joss in the fighting
along the Stokhod, which would add
another 200,000 to the total. The
Austrian loss in territory was ilso
very great and has almost'counter
balanced In square miles the Rou
manian territory occupied by the
Germans, Austrians, and Bulgarians.
The fighting on the Somme, which
began on* July 1, was the groat and
only material effort of the western
Allies during the year. Here, * y all
odds, was the" best example shown of
Miscelalneous . . 200,000 200,000
■l.ii imdleftted -vrHHnguess lu act IF
medium for exchange pf terms se
cretly between the belligerents, and
if is known that he would prefer th^t
it be dond publicly, American diplo
mats and other sources of confiden
tial Information have been looking
into that point. The negotiations
will be'of a highly confidential char
acter, it is said.
President Wilson’s friends say he
ts ubfconcerned over efforts to con-
_ fi . overbearing language there need be
if English neutrality were cuaraxi- no discussion.’*
the possibilities of modern artillery.
The German artillery fire at Verdun
was not comparable to it in volume,
accuracy, or in that co-ordihation
between artillery and infantry which
enables the offense to minimize its
own losses while inflicting the maxi
mum loss on the defense. -———-
.lh the first days of the oTfedse,
the Allies’ losses were undoubtedly
greater than those of the Gertbans.
As the attack proceeded, however,
twQ things became noticeable. The
first was the fact that the number of
prisoners captured in each attack
grew larger, and the second was that,
wliRe in the first days the advance
was measured in yards, later it was
measured In miles. This shows cer
tainly a decline in the effectiveness
of the German defense and a loss of
morale.
Tb© Intensity of the AlMes’ artil
lery preparation was maintained
throughout and, as the Germans
.went back, their field works afford
ed less protection. The disparity in
losses consequently decreased and
the balance shifted tq the other side,
so that when the last blows were de-
ivered German losses were greater
than those 4 of the Allies. This is
shown by the number of prisoners
captured and by the relation, estab-
ished by a study of the German cas
ualty lists of the first two years of
the war, between the number of
prisoners and the total casualties.
In the Somme fighting alohe, ex
cluding the' isolated actipns about
Verdun, the German losses in prison
ers were 75,000 men, making the
total casualty lists about 650,000
men. German authorities claim that
the Allied losses were about 650,000.
This is a conservative estimate of the
losses of the battle of# the Somme
and-, if it errs at all, does so in favor
of the Germans. The gain in terri
tory was not large, only about 125
square miles. > ♦ But it has all been
held. v .
Finally, we come to the Rouman
ian campaign. The entrance ot the
Roumanian army added considerably
to the available resources ^ of the
Allies. This addition has, however,
been decreased nojt a little by the
Roumanian defeats.
It is probable that this venture has
cost the Roumanians at least*250,*-
000 men. It is also probable that
the Central powers have not achieved
their success with a loss if f jwer
than 160,000 men. But at Isast
Totals .. >.3,625,000 2,890,000
The balance is thus seen to be de
cidedly against the Central powers.
But this discrepancy io even greater
than the figures make it appear. The
relative losses, comparing the losses
to totaj r©sources in man power, are — -
actually much greater .than those H6Ct his note with the German peace
offnr,* nronosulfi. Fee line that his snl* tAL
shown. Germany cannot afford to
exchange man for man, or .anything
like it.
As to territory occupied^ consider
ing only the European theatres, the
situation is about a standoff. The
efforts of Germkny have been much 1
more spectacular: and much more
widely advertised.
It Is not Belgium, Se?bi*, or Rou
mania, however, that will exert the
great Influence In the military, set
tlement of the war. These are pure
ly incidental and must-be rooked
upon as" subsidiary n flelds. The Ger
mans in Roumania, for example,
have used at the outside 200,000 of
their own troops for this purpose.
Is It possible that such an insigni
ficant number of men as *his can
bring a decision which up to' the
present time over twenty times thkt
number have been unable to effec ?
Is it logical that the Central powers
can attain victory with only 5 per
cent, of their forces?
It has been considered probable
from the moment that the Germans
fixed the west as the scene~df their
greatest activity the* if decision
came, it must come on the western
front.
But a golden opportunity opened
in the east to cut Germany off from
her Moslem ally, break the alliance,
and defeat the constituent parts in
detail. This was the meaning of the
Roumanian thrust . Thfa thniet wa*
skilfully parried and th© situation
was restored to its previous condition
with tli© exception, of course, that
Germany was freed of the danger of
anything further threatening from
Roumanian sources.
This made It inevitable that the
war must be decided, if at all, on tfie
western front. If the Germans are
defeated in the west, the eastern sit
uation will be solved. The Teutonic
alliance will fall like a house of
cards. The present map of Eastern
Europe, were it-to be the guiding
element In a discussion of the pres
ent situation, would show Germany
the complete victor. But the rfllap is,
after all, a poor guide in such a case
as this.
Space docs not permit a detailed
analysis of conditions and probabili
ties on each of the various fronts.
An opportunity for this may, per
haps, £e afforded in subsequent arti
cles. But there are conditions af
fecting other than the element of
numbers to which I have just re
ferred.
proposals. Feeling that his solo ob
ject In sending the note was to learn ’
just where each side stands,* he is.
known to believe tkat in the em
Allies as well as the Central pj
realize that his move wes not
ed against either.
_ PREMIERS IN SESSION
- '. ♦ r
Allied Statesmen Hold Very Impor-
tent Conference at Rome. .
’ . The conference of the Entente
statesmen, including Premiers Lloyd-
George, Briand, and Boselli, was in
almost continual session Saturday,
according tp a Havas dispatch from
Rome. Premier Boselli presided at
the meeting, which was the first of a
number at which the general situa
tion will be discussed by representa
tives of Great Britain, France, Italy
and Russia. In honor of the'event
the Italian government declared the
day a holiday.
Just how bad the situation is we do
not know, but there is a-serious
shortage of these necessities.
The next element in the existing
situation is the relative shell pro
duction of the Central Empires as
compared with that of the Entente.
The situation a year ago is well
known. Germany’s superiority then
is recognized. Biit the Allies have
turned their entire manufacturing
energies toward war materials.
England is produefing at a rate
that is almost inconceivable. The
neutral markets of the world are
shipping enormous quantites to the
Continent. Japan has been turned
into a mighty arsenal, manufactur
ing entirely for Russia. .... _
The result has been shown in re
cent fighting, when the Germans in
the west were entirely unable to
match the artillery fire of the Allies,
either in the number of guns used,
the volume of metal thrown.'or the
effectiveness of the individual shell.
The German artillery fire at Verdun
was, as 1 have stated,, far inferior'
to that of the Allies on the Somme.
The German'* artillery fire on the
Somme was inferior to that 4t Ver
dun. •
On the whole, thes, there has
been a steady decline in the Teutonle
fighting ‘paraphernalia during
and an equally steady rise of
the Aliiei. The Entente, afti
war in the west settled dowm
There Is, first, the general eco- tr*nrh* 0 rr “3
n otqi c c ond it I p B. T are WlClrf^^V w0 , r _ ki . B, L_ o
better off in this respect. Exactly
what the food situation Is in Ger
many we do not know. We do know
that there has been more -or less
trouble from this sources. It may be
much graver than most of us think.
l - First, it must be agreed that Ger
many and the Allies are destroying
as absolutely as by emptying in mid-
ocean available assets of the nations.
The destruction is complete. There
theory of attrition. In a waj
feans the death of strategy and of
military genius. At the same time,
when sufficient resources are behind
such a plan, the result is inevitable
If the war lasts long enough. It is
simply a question of arithmetic to
tell which side must win eventually.
There, is, finally, the question of
the quality of the men* left to do the
fighting. Kitchener’s first hundred
* no uoBurucuou is complete, mere j > — .
is no salvage. There is plenty of i? ousa ? u d h * ve lour since passed.
J _ _• ... . . . r rom t h pm >1 n vo a r. v, nr ♦ c AAA
money in Germany, it is said; there
must be, since Germany is living on
herself. She is In the position of a
From them have sprung the 5,000,-
000 men whom England now has un
der arms... These were an unknown
quantity until the battle of the
bear which, during the period of hi- battle of the
bernation, lives on its own fat. ” bomme. There they received their
bernation, lives on its own fat.
To draw a more exact parallel, let
ua aupppse an island cut off from all
the rest pf the world. _Jn that Island
there Is, say, $1,000 In money, what
ever the medium of exchange may
be, and the same amount of wealth
baptism of fire and we have seen the
result. t
Once he knows the game, there Is
no better fighting man in Europe
than the British Tommy. And he
knows th© game now. He has learn-
ue, ouu mw same amount or weaiin „ . .. . 1,L;ar ‘
in other forms. Suppose that of this , l .5 )n the ba ttl®field, the only
money $100 be expended for an P ,a< ;® that Gan Kive the necessary ed-
equal amount of another form ef Alth °ugb the great major-
weaRh, and that this be destroyed. I, 7 ° r these men are in reserve sta
ll* cannot be replaced, of Bourse, J 0I J S * a Kreat proportion of them
because, being Isolated, there is no part .* n battle <Jf the Somme -
one with whom to barter. There or other. -——~-r-
still remains $1,001) in modey, fiTuf" . German s. on the other hand,
only $960 of wealth In othef forms. 5\* ve bn } few “e 11 ln reserve stations.
Continue this > process aird—the tlemands on them have been such,
amount of money existing will be that have had to kqep practically all
many times tke value ol the things °r their men in the field. These
to be bought.
If, while this is ioing on, labor be sapped
employed at a fixed rate of pay per thrusts
Look at the two French
at Verdun apd note the
n ^ e
iD0 aay 8 w&gs wiil uuy notolDg. number of nrlsonerR tuVAn a w
This is somewhat the situation which before ■<i?rh athfnJ-n,,M h.k I
existed in the South during the lat- |m D088 iWe The Vermin.
nii" hasi” 1 w { le fl n ^ never have surrendered In such num-
l n be L s and rapidly.
money Tell to the point where many
thousand dollars were required to
buy a pair of boots. This is the con
dition which Germany is facing and
its effect on the mass of the civilian
population may readily be imagined.
There are certain kinds of proper
ty which, have totally, or almost
totally, disappeared from • Germany
since the war began, and this .proper
ty is absolutely necessary for the
continuation of the. existing situa
tion. Among these may be mention
ed cotton, rubber, copper, and fats, reasonftble
The quality ot the German trofipft
is rapidly deteriorating. .They
lost confidence in the impregnj
of their defense system. The]
seen the British and French
grind Intfr powder their carefully
constructed defenses Just as their
own guns did the defenses of Lieg* "
and Namur. >•
Will they man these trenches then*
with the same spirit of confidjnc*
which marked their conduct a year
ago? Possibly, but it does z»t seem