Historical Newspapers of South Carolina

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I 9 fi f I , i V* Jt GERMAN SIS HAVE NErOHDEKS NO UMIEDIATE BREAK EXPECTED TWO VIEWS ON CONTENTS OF UTEST TEUTON ANSWER Germany Says Action Is Entirely In Self-Defense and Is Aftalnst Inter national I-aw Only Decause Great Drltaln is Illegally Exercising Her Sea Power. President Wilson and the cabinet have carefully gone over the German note aa transmitted in news dis patches from Merlin. A first feeling that It was unsatis factory was somewhat leavened by the text of the new orders to sub marine commanders, although It was foreseen that the reference to Im munity for "merchant ships recog nized by International law" might admit of some dispute of Interpreta tion. ^ So much depends upon words and their shades of meaning Involved In translation from German to English that no decision can be attempted until the official text Is In the presi dent’s hands. Ambassador Gerard cabled that he had started It on the cables Thursday night. Two views were current In offi cial circles. One was that Ger many bad declared her intention of abandoning her “present meth ods of submarine warfare" as de manded by the president and the American government might have to wait to see whether the aban donment w ill be effected. The other was that the I’nltcd Htatee, having already attempted to hate Great Itrttaln give up Its Interference with neutral com - metre and having told Germany that It cannot discuss with tier (In negotiations with Great Hritnln, has no course hut to break diplo- mtllCJCtkAlvui with Germany. -- Although the general tone of the therefrom. "In connection with the c&Ke of the Kiissex the government of the United States made a series of state ments, the gist of which is the asser tion that the incident is to be con sidered bu>. one instance of a delib erate method of Indiscriminate de struction of vessels of all sorts, na tionalities and destinations by Ger man submarine commanders. “The German government must emphatically repudiate the assertion. The German government, however, thinks it of little avail to enter into details in the present stage of affairs, nnrt-e paritriilarly as the government of the I nltcd Mtstes omitted to utih. stantiate the assertion by reference to concrete facts. "The German government will only state that It has imposed far- reaching use of tne submarine wea pon, solely In consideration of neu trals’ Interests, In spite of the fact that these restrictions are necessarily of advantage to Germany’s enemies. No such consideration has ever been shown neutrals by Great Britain and her allies. "The German submarine forces have had. In fact, orders to conduct the submarine warfare in accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels recognised by In ternational law, the sole exception being the conduct of warfare against enemy trade carried on enemy freight ships encountered In the war zone surrounding Great Britain. warfare to three rules. "Several attempjr made by the government of the .United States'to prevail upon the Ilrltlsn gavernmem to act accordingly failed -because of flat fefusal on the part of the Brit- tab, government. Moreover, Great Britain again and again haa violated International law, surpassing all bounds In outraging neutral rights. The latest measure, adopted by Great Britain, declaring German bunker coal contraband and estab lishing conditions unoer which Ehg- llsh bunker, coal alone Is supplied to neutrals Is nothing but ao unheard- of attempt by way of exaction to force neutral tonnage Into the ser vice of British trade war. "The German people know that the governrtient of the United Statha has the power to confine the war to armed fqrces of the belligerent coun tries, In the Interest of hvMhanity and maintenance of International law. The government tof the United States would have been certain of at taining this end hAd it been deter mined to Insist, against Great Bri tain, on the incontrovertible rights to freedom of the seas. ' “But as matters stand, the Ger man |>eople are under the impression that the government of the Lnlted States, wliile demanding that Ger many, straggling for existence, shall reslrnin (lie use of nn effective wea pon and while making compliance with these demands a condition for maintence of relations with Ger many, confines itself to protests against illegal methods adopted by (Germany's enemies. Moreover, the German people know to what consid erable extent its enemies are sup plied with all kinds of war material from the United States. "it will, therefore, be understood that the appeal made by the govern ment of the United States to senti ments of humanity and principles of international law cannot under the With regard to these.no assurances i . . have ever been given to the govern- 1 c * rcunjs * ance ® A' 1 ® same hearty ment of the United Stales. No auch' r ® 8 P? n8 « from th «. German people assurances are contalne In the dec laration of February 8, 191g. “Tho German government rnnrfot admit any doubt that these orders wefe given or are executed in giMMl which an appeal otherwise always Is certain to find from her. "If the German government, neverthe'ess. Is resolved to go to the utmost limit of concessions. It has against an ^netny resorting to all kinds of ruaei, whether permtasable German note created an nnfavorable or llltclf. Impression, officials Look the position-- "But apart from the possibility of that tho language was Immaterial If errors, naval warfare, just like war- the guarantees were real. Germany's declaration that she haa laxueil new orders to submarine com manders not to attack without warn ing "merchant xesaela recognized by International law the point. faith. Errors actually occurred. They 1 * > ®® n guided, not r'one by the friend- can In no kind of warfare be avoided connecting the two great nations altogether Allowances must be made [° r p™r one hundred yetra. but also In the conduct’ Of naval warfare by the thought of - the great doom 'WHIPir IhrCalehs' lh'«' entire civilized world should the cruel and sanguin ary war be extended and prolonged scions of Germany's strength, twice fare on land. Implies unavoidable I w **!'*° !*•* f®w tn°ntha announe- dnnpers for neutral persona and goods entering the fighting zone. Even In cases where the naval action Is confined to ordinary forma of was ronskJerrd cruiser warfare neutral persons and | goods repeatedly come to grief. The German view of merchant vee-' "The German government has re sets. as defined In Its declaration of heatedly and expllcltedly pointed out February 8 of Its purpose to a(nk the dangers from mines that have armed ships without warning, and led to the loss of numerous ships, tho American view, aa defined In the "The German government has armed ahlp memorandum, made pub- made several proposals to the gov- 11c recently, differ In several points, eminent of the United States In Some officials believe that for this order to reduce to a minimum for reason the controversy had now come American travelers and goods the In to the point where Germany's future herent dangers of naval warfare. Un action would determine the course oi fortunately the government of the the United States. 1 | United States derided not to accept The refusal of the German govern- the proposals Had It accepted the ment to openly admit the attack on government of the United States the Suaeez was considered only (net- would hsve been Instrumental In pre dental to the main Issue. I venting the greater part of the sect Until President Wilson himself do- dents that American citizens have ddea whether the German note la ac ceptable them will be no announce ment of the attitude of the govern ment • When the cabinet meeting broke op Secretary l-anslng met all In quiries with this reply: "I cannot discuss It at all at this time." All the other members of the cabinet made similar statements. It was made plain that President Wilson would decide after studying the offi cial text While final derision on the atti tude of the American government walls on the official text tome Cabinet members Indicated that the German assurance* probably would be accepted and that diplomatic re lations would not be broken un lees the order to submarine com manders was violated and Ameri can lives endangered. The private view of officials sp inet with In the meantime "The German government atlll stands by Its offer to come to an agreement along these lines. "As the Ormaa government rxv pentedly declared. It cannot dis pense with the use of the sub marine In the conduct of warfare against enemy trade. The German government, however, haa now do- elded Jo make a further conces sion, adapting the methods of sub marine war to the lulrresta of neutrals. "In reaching this derision the Ger man government Is actuated by con sideration* which are above the level of disputed question. "The German government attaches no less Importance to the sacred principles of humanity than the gov ernment of the United States. It again takes fully Into account that both governments for many years co- parently was that the new orders to OT’ er ® te( l developing International submarine commanders apparently * aw ‘n conformity with these prifici- met the demands of the United States 1 P * *’ ul * lmat ® object of which unless an interpretation were placed I ,,as ahvay ® l bpe '? t t0 confine warfare on them to lend to attack on mer-! on - Bea and ,and to armed forfes of chant vessels armed for defensive ' bel'lgerents and safeguard as far as purposes. '-Tho general tenor of the German note, however, was consider ed unsatisfactory. There was some disposition among the president's advisers to believe no drastic steps will be taken unless the new orders to submarine command ers are violated or modified. As tho cabinet members left tho White House several indicated their j (;^ ril! .', n view that the United States would have to wait arid gee whether the new possible non-combhtants against the horrors of war. But, although these considerations aro of great weight, they alone would not under present circumstances have determined the attitude of the German government. “For In answer to the appeal by the government of the United States on behalf of trie sacred principles of humanity and International law the government must repeat I once more, with all emphasis, that it i was not the German, but'the British ... , government which Ignored all aecept- ( wcre c Rr ried out. * cd rules of International law and cx- Following is tho text of the nolo of tended this terrible warcio.tho lives the German Government In reptftOj aml property of non-combatants, the American note respecting subvna-j having no regard whatever for the rine warfare delivered on Thursday by Gotlifckjyoiy Jagow, tho foreign geceratary to Ambassador Gerard: j "The undersigned on behalf of tho Imperial German government has tho . honor to present to His F.xcellency, tho ambassador of tho United 1 States, , Mr. James W. Gerard, the following ..reply to the note of April 20 regard ing the conduct of the German sub marine warfare. "The German government handed over to the proper naval authorites for early Investigation the evidence Concerning the Sussex as communi cated by the government of the Unit ed States. Judging by the results that the investigation has hitherto yield ed the German government Is alive to tho possibility that the ship men- Tldued Jh the note of April 1 & m Sav- Ing been torpedoed by it German sub marine la actually indentlcal With the Susaex. “The German gpyeniment hep to reserve further comm miration on the mailer ntrtil certain point* are ••certain»d. which are of decisive Importance (or wUhliahlac the facts •f the ease. Shuld It turn out that the commander was wrong In an ise reeeel to he a ntAO-of-war a a fo vent aient will not Cell draw the ib—hiutu maaltlM method of warfare have been severe ly Injured. “In self-defense against tho illegal conduct of British warfare, while fighting a bitter struggle for national existence Germany had, to resort to tho hard but effective weapon of submarine warfare, "As matters stand, the Oermarr government cannot hut reiterate re gret that the sentiments of humanity which the government of the. United States extends with such fervor to the unhappy, victims ot submarine warfare are cot extended with the c an’.o warmth of feel/ng to manv mil lions of wometj and children, who. according to the avowed intention of interests and rights of neutrals and non-combatants, that tlmmgh ^his+djcctrln the \vay~of ni utuaTro-opera- ed before the world Its readiness to maku peace on a basis safeguard ing Germany's vital Interests, thus Indicating that It Is not Germany's fault Is still withheld from the na tions of Europe. "The German governrpeQt feels all the more justified In dWdarteg thdt responsibility could not be borne bo- fore the torum of mankind and In history It after twenty-one months of the war e duration the submarine question under discussion between the German government and the gov ernment of the United States were to take a turn aerloualy threatening maintenance ot peace between the two natlona. “Aa far aa lice with the German government. It wUhes to prevent thing* from taking such a course. The German government, moreover. Is prepared to do Its utmost to con fine operation* Of the war for the reel of Its duration to the fighting force* of tlte belligerents, thereby also insuring freedom of the seaa, a principle upon which the German government believe*, now ae before, that It is In agreement with the gov ernment of the United Htatee. "The German gorernment, guided by this Idea, notifies the government of the United Statee that German naval forces have received the fol- folowlng order: “In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant ves- Iwls recognized by International law auch veasels^ both within ami without the area declared a naval war zone, shall not tie sunk with out warning and without saving human lives unless the ship at tempts to escape or offer resist ance. "But neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to fight for exist ence. shall, for the sake of neutral Interest, restrict the use of an effec tive weapon If the enemy Is permit ted to continue to apply at” will methods of warfare violating the rules of international law. Such a demand would he Incompatible with the character of neutrality, and the German government Is convinced that the government of the United States does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the govern ment of the United States repeatedly declares that It Is determined to re store the principle of freedom of th seas, from whatever quarter la has been violated. '^Accordingly the German govern ment Is confidi nt that In conseguencte of the new orders issued to the naval force the government of the UniteU States will also'now consider the im pediments removed which may have IHEWARLAST WEEK BRITISH MESOPOTAMIAN CAM* PAIGN ENDS IN FAILURE * > i RESULTS OVER ESTIMATED Now York Times Expert Reviews Yarions Phases of Campaign— Turks at First Defeated Disast- trously But When British Army Retreats Rear Guard is Cut off and Captured. The most important news of the week's war is the surrender of the British force under General Town- shend, at Kut-el-Amara, to the Turks. As this campaign, if It may be called a campaign, is definitely closed, a brief review of the British move ments since the first landing was made at Kao on the'Gulf of Persia to the time of capture may prove In teresting, or The campaign, as far as we are able to Judge, was one which was really never planned by the British war office In any degree of detail, but was an Inspiration of Sir John Nixon, who alone seemed to have ac cepted responsibility for it. The operations were begun by.tjihf India office, and were not xBrected by the British war office until abeiut January of this year, after General Townshend had retreated from Ctesl- pbon to Kut-el-Amara, and been be sieged. The purpose of sending a comparatively small force from India up the Persian Gulf to operate In a field completely detached from the other fighting areas has never been satisfactorily explained by th* Brit ish government. .We can but pre sume and guess. The first consideration is the con trol of the Persian Gulf. This has been a favorite British tradition for a great number of years. Ever since the UrttlirTr gM I foothold In India they have regarded the gulf as really an English waterway, and Th* German -government, eon- hasa reseated - and resisted ntt st- tion toward restprntion of the free-, dom of the seas during the -war,. as suggested in the note of July 23, 1015, and it does not dcubt that the government of the United States'will now demand and insist that the Brit ish government shall forthwith ob servo the rules of the International law universally recognized before the war as aro laid down in the notes presented by the government of the United States to the British govern ment-December 28, 19.14, and Nov- embonrt, 1915. ll "Should .steps taken by the gov ernment of the United States not at tain the object It desires, to have the laws of humanity followed ,by all bel- ahall ha Uo.rent nation*, the German govern- ■retiring to the starveod and who. by sufferings shall force t! e vlctdrlous armies of the central powers Into Ignominous ca- pttulatloh. "The Gcnnaa jgpyrnmct J^f thn rm^rlnnilv renew agreement with the German perm !•*frei'Jpjin axnh.-re->rtnr nE-ricnnre* nfl— *rtni ment would then be facing a new sit nation In which it must reserve to Itself complete liberty of decision. "The undersigned avails hlmtolf petm pie, fails*'to underrixed tht* dj*. rrinilnctb », all the more a* ftvuifc rcftestedlr and expliritly^ dreUnxl Itself ready Co u-e the eubm.xrtnw weapon la irtrirt conformity with the rale* of International law a* reraralresf befare the outbreak <4 th* way. it Great Britain likearts* was ready to adapt the conduct af highest consideration.” ,' Report Naval Activity. Berlin reporis the capture and loss, of Br ti- - aerophrus aid the elnklnr it the Prifbh sib R-Kl. London wjs two naval aeroplanes are miss ing but tlea'M the alaktag of E-21. tempts to encroach on this right The Turks, who had moved down from Bagdad and occupied Basra with a force estimated at 20,000 men under German officers, were looked upon as threatening this traditionally English sea by controlling all inlets to It. Another Important consideration ts the oil fields, which are some hun dred miles north of the bead of tho gulf. England not only paid the Shah of Persia many minions for the concessions In these fields, but also Invested heavily In plant and equip ment for their development. Oil would be a very desirable commodity for all of her enemies, particularly the Teutons. And every financial blow that the Teutonic allies could strike England would be of the great est advantage. Then there wa* tho character of the Arab tribes. They have a great contempt for tho Turk himself. They have always challenged the title of the Turkish Sultan to rule In Islam. Moreover, they are notorious oppor tunists. They have always been ready to take advantage of any chance that might be offered, no matter from whom It came. If the Brltb.h were successful In reaching the city of*the Caliphs a serious revolt against Turkish rule was a strong possibility. Syria, too, would move against the Sultan. Syria, w hile its people are more thor oughly organized than the fierce no madic Arab tribes, has. like the Arabs, wanted freedom from the Turkish yoke and haa-atmng lean ings toward autonomy. Had the HritlNh reached Bagdad, therefore, both Arab and Syrian would, in nil probability, have joined the invader and then have declared themselves free. An Arab state thus created would have for all time dis missed the possibility of a German attack on India, anA-wtowid have re- ntoved to the distant future the pos sibility of an Egyptian campaign, which, was then being thbeatened and widely advertised by the Turks and the Teutons. There was, finally, the Gallipoli operations, which were then In full swing and held great promise. A successful move in Mesopotahiia would force The Turk, by exerting pressure from n'l sides, either to break with his Teuton Allies or to witness the loss of the more Impor tant of bis Asiatic provinces. These were the many considera tions that could and may havo-moved the British to launch a campaign jwhose objective was Bagdad. Just which of the.m, if any, wfis the prime motive in the British decision no one can say< although it is true that In one of the speeches in tho British parliament by a Ijigh officer in the government, both the ,oil fields and flung flanking movements, whose ob ject was to envelop long lines of front. No such Indefinite extension of action Into the marshes of either the Euphrates or th# Tigris, nr into the 4 deserts of Arabia, can be made. There Is, therefore, much greater sebpe for skillful tactical disposition of troops and a wider strategical scope. Also, a successful action could obvioilsly bring more decisive results than iu either the French or the Rus sian war areas. Defeat In such case means a rapid retreat If not a rout, and If cavalry be present to take ad vantage of such conditions, defeat might readily mean disaster. Again the line of operations is practically limited to the line of the Tigris IJiver, where co-operation could be had with tKfe gunboats of the river fleet. The Tigris was, more over, ttte principal if r.ot the only line of communications by means of wlnrinsupplies and muuitirs ».oubl be sent up to the front. Ih regard to the difficulties of ter rain and of climate, It n;: y he sail that they .consist principally o* i\ren- sive floods and overpowering heat. The heat of the country border,i g on the Persian Gulf is notorious, and. Indeed, Is a greater obstacle to suc cessful operations than the diff.cuU nature of the ground itself. To return to the military on*ra- tlons, the British advanced agUimt Kurna, following up The Turkish re treat, and occupied that town early in December, 1914. There was n.> fighting for its possession. The floods were In progress, the rivers (jut of their beds, and the country for some miles about Basra was under water The forts at Kurna, constructed after their retreat to that place, were thus made untenable. From Kurna the Turks retreated to Amara. about fifty miles up the Tigris. From this force at Amara there was a further detachment of a large body of troops to Kut-el-Amara, still further up the river. This force was ultimately sent by way of the canal Shalt al Hal to Nasiriyeli. It seems that there were about 20,0011 men and some light artillery in the Turkish force, which met the British a little further down the river near Shaiba. The Turks were disastrously de feated, and on July 24 retreated up Shaft al Hal to K handicapped th* British but Imposed, conditions on them which made suo- cess Impossible. Finally, the Kut forces were starved Into an uncondi tional surrender. ' " -< 1 It Is difficult to account for the r British military conception that led . this expedition so far from the Per son Gulf, from which their supplies had to come. If the orlrlnnl pur pose was, as stated in parliament, to protect the gulf and maintain It as a British waterway, and to guard the oil fields, there was no necessity of proceeding beyond Amara. f Once Kama and Amara fell Into i British hands, these two objects were 1 accomplished. Without Amara, the Turks were absolutely unable to send troops Into the oil fields, as the only practicable route for such reinforce ments was from 'Amara to Ahwaz. | It Is highly probable that the Brit- \ ish, at the time the campaign was begun, never contemplated any move j against Bagdad. The latter was prob- I ably^n afterthought, brought into . being by the success further south. | Intoxicated by this success, and see- | ing the possibility of a far-reaching ! result In the capture of Bagdad, and I further led on by success to believing that they would have no difficulty in 1 defeating the Turks all along the line, the British evidently considered that the opportunity was too great to be passed up. The British force was in no sense equipped for any such ex- ■ tended campaign. Transportation, food and general supplies were en tirely Inadequate, the available numbers were totally insufficient. The whole thing has been another British blunder, more serious and with a more disastrous ending than any other move they h^ve a:tempt ed, not excepting Gallipoli. The losses In the latter campaign were. It Is true, very much greater. But It is characteristic of human na ture that reports of a given number i of men killed or wounded in battle . do not create Hie same feeling of dis aster as when a much smaller num- | her has been forced to surrender. • Th oft-repeated blunder of under estimating an antagonist has marked British military history In every war, great and small, slnre before the Na- | poleonie era. The most mottwrrr FG - ,-•« i • ba| #h«HT •» \ul f! , Knj el Amara. ^Tlm [ n prL.,r i„ »i. a British then advanced upon Amara In filet was the war In South Africa. order to secure that point, whose Im-1 where the original estimate of the portance lay in the fact that from It i British w-rrUfflce was but one-tenth ttre fork* e©*:!d ^nferttmte nrntnsH of the forrrs Bri-taHr neer*.-< *. ^0 them either at Ahwaz or Kurna matters were brought to a conclu- Amara also was quickly evacuated by | B ion. th* Turks, who retreated up the Tigris and Joined their fellows at Kut. « The British, however, were still In danger of being attacked in flank and rear. The Turks had done It at Shaiba because of their ability to use Shaft al Hal'and this way was still open to them. In order, therefore, to sontrol the waterways leading,to the gulf and ao prevent ttila attack. It became necessary to take Kut It self, as It la from this point Giat Shalt al Hat leaves the Tigris. Continuing up the river, the Brit ish reached the Turkish position at Kut the latter part of September. Although the Turk* greatly outnum bered the Itritlxh, they were able to drfetid Kut for only twenty-four hours when they retreated to Gtesl- ption, only thirty irtle* from Bagdad. Apparently they goi away clearly and retreated In good order, although suffering heavy losses. The British pursued them up the Tigris and late In November struck the first line of Turkish trenches. Here General Townshend found serl- our trouble. At the beginning of the battle Indications pointed to another complete success. But the Turks had evidently become alarmed at the proximity ot the British troops to Bagdad, and had concentrated at the latter point a very strong force of which, apparently, General Town- shend was not aware. This force moved down the river to reinforce the army at Cteelphon. Townshend renHr.ed before ft whs too late that he was hopelessly out numbered and that defeat was Inevi table. Moreover, his water supply gave out, and as there was no possi bility of reinforcement.* reaching him for some time ho declde^to retreat to Kut. The retreafwns conducted with comparatively small loss, hut a* matters have turned out. Townsjiend made the vital mistake ot standing firm at Kut with n rear guard of only 10,000 men. while his main h-xly pushed on further down the river. The Turks made a wide detour, cut In between the rear guard and the main body, and Townshend found himself with his rear guard troops completely Isolated and In a practical state of siege. 'That was on December $ and since that time the siege had been con stant. The Turks made little effort to force Townahend's defenses by at tacks. They knew he could not e s - In the present war the British did finally furnish what had been esti mated would be their rontlnental contingent. But this number has already b.et multiplied by thirty, and. If we may Judge trom the eon- scriptlon act. has not yet been found ■ ufflrlent. No nation In lil«t!»ry baa mi ron*l*fently'blundrred through Its war*, and no nntl- n haa been mi con- hWtrntly suere*-ful In hring'ng Its wars to a happy ronrin«loo through the a«»l«tanre of others. In thla wnr. however, the greatest war of history for the greatest stak* In history. England has outdone her self. It Is not the KnglMi Mdiiler. All thing* ronMldered, he I* piolmhly the l-e** Mildler In Europe. It Is always with the higher command. Up to a few months ago the asser tion was frequently made that Eng land was not yet awake. It Is as If one were speaking of Kuaaia. Eng land ts awake at leant to the print of feeling the shame of her rou*l*tent failure*. But England la. an i« *hown by constant method of belittling her opponent*, thoroughly Mdf-oatl-Aed and self-righteou*. and what she doe* not appreciate In the fart that of all the nations in the world war. Eng land and England alone has not met the rrlsi*. England has done much .It la true: more probably than at the out-* set she was expected to do. But so have her allies. Immeasurably more. But even #0, she haa not plaved hqr park H#r navy ha* emtbbri th* Entente to control the markets of the world. Her money has bolstered up both Russia and France. But her omnipotent navy has not prevented the Germans from raid- - ing her coast*, nor has It been able to best the Gorman submarines. Since the war began the British army has not a single glorious achievement behind It. England's mill:ary leaders have failed, and, in their failure, they have paralyz ed the geulus of the leaders of her allies. There Is a tendency to overesti mate the extent of the Kut surren der. Needless do say it has no niili- tr»rv rm-rnlng. IVhnt do *o-> thou sand men mean In this war? The only thing to consider at a l is tba po'-sib’e political-ftffoel. ‘ Even this may be largely offset by the Btisslan drive through Mrs; plot am hi. whieh # G Cap?, so they *at down to starve him! promises to swec;v through and over out. The British, as soon as they Bagdad well Into Asia Minor. discovered that there was no hope of Townshend ^e*ting out. that it was either a case oFsurreuder or starve, But Kut may be an indication of the future, Every little bknv that England receives in the Fast, near or■ the mastery of the rcrsian Gulf were mentioned.' As to the campaign Itself, It bev gan, like so many other '^British Movements have begun, very pros perously. Fao, at the head of the Persian Gulf, was taken on November 10, 1914, and Immediately the march was begun toward Basra. Basra Is situated at the Delta of the Euphra tes, and if defended by capable troops should have been susceptible to a prolonged defensive. The town is called the Venice of the East because of the waterways which, like those of'Venlce, offer the cnly nears of social movement. It wras protected by walled defenses and held out only a few. days, the Turks ng to the Xlrttatf of Khirna. A t this pornt, I thrnk, a diversion Is necesrary In order to ohtaiata clear understanding of the Thllitary prob- '•ms and (4be elements that affect . Tfca.coiuaflr.ua lu. Me- imotamta are essentially different from those pre- 1 ailing In any'territory In w hich the various belligerents luire been en- /aced. The. fiiffienjtlts of terrain and. eMmete. th* characteristics ard fighting ablltles rf the enemy were drff-reat.. la th* first phe*.'eonc*a* ♦ *at!on is an absolat* nc-wsdty. Da other fronts there bar* b*«o widely nt once planned ^relief for.ee of In-. f :l r, means' so much crumbling of tho dinn trorms, to witch was added traditional .English prcatno<-«. Em-. . a Se „ O l f T 7r h0r . 1 ’ S . 0T ' n T ny wh0 f 7 had retrr-ten soiun from Kut. | nor any other success of the part! nnnoo’r 'in noo° rre ^ If 0,0 " ant " tn of this war nO’OOO to 100.000 men. The size of. with her traditions preserved and her the Turkish force Is not known, but preriige untarnished. I ondnn it must have been considerably great er. Within a few weeks after start ing the British force wis within eight miles of Kut, and It seemed that the rellefjvf Townshend wa$ at hand. Moods and-lack of equipment, however, forced a retreat nnd ali hope of reaching the beleaguered force at Kut was killed. The attempt at relief'was not Im mediately abandoned.- The British Jorpe was fqelrased by a large body of colonial troops, .many, of whom had seen service In Gallipoli, and the m list do ’css talking and more intelligent planning. In times like these, 'the pcbplo need for tj^cir peace of mind occa sional brilliant strokes., on which to-, feed- their loyalty and 'Strengthen their patriotism.- They will -not al ways be willing to go to the sl rugh- ter breaustvof the blundering of those in authority. France has many bright pages in this and other wars; Bu‘«ia In-this war has her victories ” to think alwiut when temporary ad- marrtl UP the river begin. Several 1 ' r M., Great- BeUri* ha* successful engagements were fought, i ° "hindering failures. This Is and eaily In April tho relieving ! ,n 1 Fran "* * n(1 U'lf'k' if not troops wm-e within twenty miles «>f'! n *" p ' " nd - H Br.tflstnd hopes Kut- The Turks, however, had also I !°^ P, u frofn u th ® ,n ^ vtc- strcngly re'nforced their hesiecirg L :? r5r th ' t "'b'ch has been hre usual sawiy. whith hsd-rpT*»8<rfttJ both' r****® 1 ' •hv- mi.vf cease to believe that s <*t the river-below M- e town and held *® rr ® av '' , 'rtnr soxel will swere over strongly Intrenched positions. I , ® Germans beans* of their In'q'ii-- Severe flrhtlnp took place. thsM 1 ”’ and do aomo 0 * fighting rritizh making every ef'ort to rearb k®***'*- * , the army at Kct bat. although they * ♦ s were able to make smaU n'n*. noth- f Admits I*** of AireMp. *s[L 0 * Ck, £Li de,ri w.''v r * art ‘- "irons U>* lo‘* of airship f* **"**"- G-T. wh'.-h “h*s tot retire**! ‘ ls>Z •** H* *I> r »fi I® tW» caqntry. •tala; don yrevUxstly reported th* their apjxaraac* and not ot.j um of th* axreiay at **«. "S 1