Historical Newspapers of South Carolina

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THE WAR LAST WEEK LULL IN FIQHTING ON VERDUN LEADS TO SPECULATION WHAT IS ITS MEANING Military Expert of The New York Times Says Germans Have Already Paid a Price Too Great for the Capture of the French Fortress, Which la Not Worth Losses. Much has been written about Ver dun and Its strength. Always It Is mentioned as a fortress In these arti cles as well as In the press reports. This term Is a misnomer, and Its present use Is due entirely to the ten dency to follow historical precedent., Verdun Is not a fortress as the term Is usually understood. The forts which surround the basin In which the city is situated have little or nothing to do with the military strength of the position. Due to the geographical situation of neutral states, an attack on France from the north or south has not been possible in times past, and conse quently the only line pf otiensive at tack was approximately along that followed by the railway from Verdun to Met*, that is, from the west. Verdun was constructed in the days of short-range artillery as a barrier to the plains of the Cham pagne, and therefore a barrier to progress toward Paris. The Ger mans. however, were undeterred by the neutrality of Belgium, and came down from the north, where the French, relying on the protection of a buffer state, had no defence. The plain of Champagne was occu pied and Paris was threatened. Ver dun had.lost its usefulness. To-day it Is no more than Houl. Nancy, Bel fort, or any of the other barrier ferte. aiwt H As<mVy-a plare in the French line. It is a very strong sector, to be sure, strong for several reasons. Topographically, the Verdun sec tor is as well suited to defensive operations as any other point on the 11 we. perhaps better. This Is due. In the first place, to the broken charac ter of the country north of the city. Jutting out of which are a number of Isolated hills which the French had occupied and Intrenched as ad vanced posts. This Is true of the . _ . - . country both east and west of the lh * ar 10 * ucc «“ fu, eon - >■ elusion. primarily to hold Verdun: Verdun has no such enormous value to the French.as to Justify an expenditure' at all measurable With the German cost tor this purpose. The thing simply has no military meaning from* this point of view at ail. Verdun is not a beleagured for tress nor an isolated force. Its caji- ture by the Germans can mean noth ing more to the French military com manders than tjie loss of so many acres of ground. And France, speak ing from a military point of view, has no objection tc --ermany occupy ing all the acres of French soil she can take, provided that Germany is made to pay the price in men and shell for so doing. The French prob lem, to put it brutally, is merely to, kill Germans, as many of them as she can, and to be sure that in the process the German dead greatly out number her own. In other words, utterly regard less of the number of acres that may or may not be occupied by the Germans as a result of their attack, defeat or victory will find its measure in the relation that exists when the fighting is over between the French and thw Ger man casualty lists. ~ If, after the battle, Germany holds a line from the Argonne to the sali ent at St. Mihiel; if she is able to make the “strap meet the buckle” and eliminates Verdun, and further, if her losses in doing so exceed the French losses by fifty or a hundred or two hundred thousand, the French have won the tattle.. Occupation of territory means nothing. It Is the destruction of armies that counts, and It Is the only thing that does count. It the occu pation of territory was the deciding factor Germany would have been vic torious the day the Serbian campaign was concluded, in fact, when the Rus sian retreat was halted long before. This brings us to another question which 1 have beea asked a number of times. The Allies on the weetern front greatly outnumber the Ger mans; they have an abundance of men for counter attacks and counter offensives In other fields. This being so, why have not these attacks beeu made? It Is again a question of numbers. I bsve stated a number of tlmeu In these revlgws. |n4 cysritmu..JgllH4 Justification of thia point of view, that the issue will be decided by numbers and numbers alone; It Is merely a question ss to which bel ligerent hss the greater la reserve tn man power. And German man power Is of necessity declining, at a rate at least equal to that of the others. If France, as one of the belligerents, can create a disproportion la tbe rate of decline in her own favor, she is distinctly on the right path toward which ended April 15. 6n April 17,^ 18-and 19 the line between the vil lages of Douaumont and Vaux, on the east bank of the Meuse, received marked attention. Attacked on April 17 with two divisions on the short strength of line in the Haudromont woods, the Germans little by little crept forward, and- finally on the 19th had taken possession of sn Old quarry on the edge of the.forest. It is the same soft of yard by yard advance which has for so many months marked the whole western front. The smashing attack of late February and early March Is no longer able to batter Its way through for any material gains. In this fight ing for the quarry, a few prisoners were taken, bpt the effort waa utter ly immaterial. Later the attack spread westward to Pepper HU1, where, the French report, men of four different divi sions took part in the fight. The ef fort was a great one, and was hard pressed. The French claimed no gain at all and the Germans did not re cord an advance. This Is part of the main French position on the east bank of the river, and any gain that the Germans make against it is a dangerous one. Pepper Hill Is particularly important, as from its crest .the French line on both sides of the river could be enfi laded. It is worthy of note, how ever, that since April 2 no gain has been recorded east of the river except the capture of the quarry. Indeed, the date of the beginning of stagnation In this section goes back to the latter part of February, for It was then that the French were driven back to the line they now hold. Incidentally, as before men tioned, it Is the main defensive line north of Verdun, and If the Germans succeed In driving the French from it the operation is almost sure to mean that the French will have to retire west of the river. No two names In German history have ever meant as many German lives without result as Vaux and Dou aumont. The attack* have been made at times with fifteen men to the yard of front. The French quick-firing artillery has surely taken Its toll of such a mass attack. On the west bank the attacks have been more frequent and harder push ed even than those against Vaux and Douaumont The sector of attack has CAN ait H VILLA ■ » ■ 11 ■ ENGLISH EDITOR SAYS USE PLENTY OF AEROPLANES . AN INTERESTING VIEW O. G. Grey, Editor of Tbe Aeroplane, of London, Shows Why He Believes Good Aeroplane Fleet Can “Clean l p” in Mexico—Suggest Bombs, Steel Arrows and Machine Gnns. Naturally we people in Europe, having a war of come considerable importance of our own to hold our at tention, are not over well supplied by our newspapers with information about the doings of the United States army, but wo have a general idea that the straightening out of Mexican affairs is not going to be quite a military promenade followed by a little financial argument round a table. Those of us who make our living out of aircraft in one way or an other are particularly anxious to see hov/ American aeroplanes arc going to work out In practice under the peculiar conditions of such a war ar, that now in hand in Mexico. If ever there was a chance for air craft to score It is In this Mexican affair, rnd I should Judge that the United States army administration must be kicking Itself pretty hard for not being more prepared to take such a chance. That is of bourse, unless the people at the top. like a good many of our own senior offl cers only a few months before our war began, still do not realize the policies of aircraft. To-day even the most hide bound dugout in any European army has a pretty fair respect foj aeroplanes as scouts, bomb drop per* and artillery observation ve hicles, and even thinks rather highly of airships for certain llmtt- Meuse river. Immediately In the rear of these advance posts runs an unbroken crest on which the main fight for control of the sector must come. East of the Meuse It Is knowq ss the ridge of Louvemont. This ridge runt from the river Just north of the vil lage of Bras. In a large fish-hook, over the Cote du Polvre. through the village of louvemont and acroaa ths plateau of Douaumont. It continues across the Mouse— the only break being the valley of the river—through Charny and thence aouthwest through the I'ois de Bourrus. All of thia country l* guarded by a maze of trenches, wdih have to be literally blasted *n tore the main position Is rrt.b--!. In the second place, no oth-v print on the French line la so well vq I'p* ped with transportation facllUi•vaid lines of supply. Before ths v-ar broke out there was a doub'i irx^k railroad of usual guage fr > u , 't. Menehould, coming from Paris iliero was tbe double track road fmm ttW- vigny and Bar le Due from the s >u:h, connecting with the road from Paris, and two single track roads also com ing from the south, all focusing on Verdun. Since tVe beginning of the war, however, these have undoubted ly beqn Increased, at least the num ber of branches which leave the main lines. When one realizes the dependence of modern war operations on rapid ^communications and supply lines for ammunition and shell, as well as food supplies, the inherent strength in this system of roads is apparent. These two tilings, then, make Verdun a strong point, and, as can be seen, are entirely independent of the arti ficial fortifications vtliich crown the ruin of the Verdun basin. The position has, however, in the eyes of the French, a sentimental value which has been transmitted down the ages. This has placed entirely fictitious value on the sector, a value pretty generally accepted throughout Europe. There would then he an enormous political effect both in France and among the other nations of the world were Verdun to fftll. This, of course, Germany is well aware of. X. • Just what politics are involved no one is in a position to state absolute ly. The probable considerations, however, have been • mentioned in previous reviews and need not be re peated now. It is becoming more and more obvious every day that tho German object is political. There are absolutely no military considera tions that would for a moment justify any such expenditure of men and material as Germany has already dis bursed for the slight advantage she lias won' Havigg begun the attack, Verdun has become a two-edged sword. Not- to take It after such a tremendous effort will do the Germans more harm than taking it would have done them pood. It will be a true military defeat, a defeat inflicted on the very ’best Germany had to offer. , The French method of defense la built up on this theory? Tbe French conception Is based on a compara tively thin first line and strong re serves. They attempt to bold a given poaltion with the minimum number of men In the Oral line, trusting to the genius of the local commander to send forward his reserves at psycho logical moment when the maximum result can be obtained. There la. of course, a distinct ele ment of danger In this, as It precon ceives a very accurate calculation on the part of the local commander as to both men and material. If an errqr Is made It means a larger pro portion of prisoners than la ordinari ly the case. It might, indeed. In some cases almost. If not quite, bring disaster. On the other hand. It makes resist ance possible with minimum loss, and, if the Judgment of the local commander be accurate, it reaps a rich harvest in the punishment that is inflicted on the attacking troops. The German conception is exactly tho reverse. Their first line is always much more heavily manned than Is the French, their reserves much smaller. This la shown by .their fondness for mass attacks, for shock action. Tho French defense, there fore, is admirably adapted for inflict ing a maximum loss on their oppo nents, wlille sustaining a minimum loss themselves. Moreover, the French realize tho lack of importanco of territorial gains. They know that that side will eventually win which can first exhaust Us adversary. And everything is being sacrificed to this end. To counter attack means heavy losses In men ahd great expenditure In material. They do not, as a rule, regard the expenditure as wgpth while. Consequently, French ^coun ter attacks have been few and far be tween. Where the French have counter eked at all, they have been In- flueheml by a local German success, which figs threatened a position of some tacuca.1 or strategical Impor tance. For example, in the early days of the Ver<frm fighting, five days In fact after the battle had begun, the Germans took the fort of Douau mont and gained a footing on tho pla teau of Douaumont., X. -This latter gain threatened ttfxjut- flank the entire French position of the Meuse river. The French there fore drove them out. The same thing happene,d_at Vaux, and at Avocourt, and at Le Mort Homme a little later. Each time the French countered and drove the Germans from tho threat ening positions. As a result of all this, ons thing may be safely ’Counted on. The French are dot going to start an of fensive of any proportions until they have very good reason to believe that it will be successful. By successful I do not mean an other Champagne or Loos affair. But an offensive that will break the Oer- __. , .... . man lines at a point that has atrate- Tbe PMttXof attack was her own gie^t tklue. thaTwrU cht an absolute- selection: she had ample time to con centrate all the men and material •he could find. All the advantage of ly neceasary line of communications and force a retreat from a consider able section of territory that Is now W3S If* then^ the occupied, and the consequent a ban plies. Whether the French will really be able to accomplish thia or not ta an other matter, one In regard to which la-aa admt««tom4o-U»e world (hat Franco haa a match for the very beat Germany haa to give, an admls- sioir tfrab-Oermnny cannot win. at beet can only draw. Tbe real prob ed work, such as night Bombard- been limited ■Imeet eutlletyfli ttlllT " ffiOnf.^sea'acoWUng and submarine catching. There la. In fact, r. ther a tendency to overrate tho possibllltiea of aero planes. and to expect them to fly In Impossible weather, when clouds are so low that the machines have to come down within rifle range If the observer Is to get any Information, or to expect them to go up In the dark and hunt for mar*udlng rlrshljn which the crow could ace only If they had a first claas aearchllght in their machines to help them. Of all the European countries Ger many waa by far the best prepared with aircraft at th* beginning of the w.vr, and her ctrchlnea were superior to all others in nurbera and In liability, though tha British possessed a few amall scouts whkh wwre faster th.-.a ths average German Taube. or even the big German biplanes which appeared with the German army soon after war began. Germany’s lead In these respeeta was due to the fact that for years before the war the German govern ment had encouraged national enter prise in aircraft building In every possible way. Big prizes were offer ed officially for tbe best aeroplane engines, and the winners of these prizes were barked up with orders for similar engines in numbers which would have aurprised the people of other countries—If they had had the gumption to know that such a thing aa an aeroplane existed. Similarly, prlzea well worth tho having were offered by tho German government for flying competitions, especially place-to-plare races. This naturally Improved the breed of Ger man aeroplanes, by encouraging the makers to produce the best possible machines. Moreover, officers of the German army and navy were encouraged' to compete in there races, which raised the standard of flying In the services, w her ear, in England, at any rate, it was regarded as "had form”’ for an officer even th land at a public aero drome during such, hours as a “gate” might bo expected. Consequently, although the Brit ish, French and Russian flying ser vices had a certain number of pilotr, superior to tho best of the Germans In sheer skill, the Allies have been "catching up” the Germans tn num bers and also In the reliability of their engines ever since; and so far, as Mr. Tennant, the British under secretary for war, had to admit re cently, they have not quite caught them yet. . * These facts, which have been per fectly well known to tho United States military and naval attaches In London ever since war broke out nineteen months ago, should have been a warning to tha American gov ernment to prepare something like an adequate aerial force in case of war. I assume that the possibility of war with one or other of the Mexi can parties has been evident to all Americano for the last couple of years, for it has Seemed so to me, even from the little bits of Mexican news which has appeared in the Brit ish papers. Therefore, if the United States army is not properly equipped with aircraft, it is obvious that some one in the administration Is seriously to blame. Seeing how much American aero plane and aero-engine manufacturers have learned from watching the de velopment of -aircraft In our war. there should be no difficulty in ob taining the right kind of aircraft'for use in Mexico, for, although the con ditions of war in the air are very dlf Inn that fares Germany, therefore. Is | would not attempt to prophecy. Bat •ot taw to toko Vredan, tat how to ths attempt will not bo mads until forfstUag tho tha Preach feel that they are able to trying t*akm *4 tho The Preach tod. la mach Mi so tha other r. It ta Mt carry It. to a saceaaafal Tka last review of the Vardaa bot tle eoeorod tho Cghtiag ta tho wook r' of Le Mort Homme and Hill 304 The main French position on the west bank la the Charny Ridge, aome four mlleo further to the south than these two crests. In order tp be able Id cross the approaches to this ridge—tha ap- proaches are for the most part level and without any particularly strong defensive position—It Is an absolute nerreslty to take first what Is known as the Hill of the Gooso or tho Goose Crest, which runs from Le Mort Homme toward Regntevllla. Tbe eastern part of the Gooes crest hss already fallen, the Gormans hav ing scrupled It by cutting across Juat north ot Cumtersa. This part of it. however. Is of little value without the dominating point, from which the ground slopes from west to east This point Is \jb Mort Homme. The Germans have tried every con ceivable way to take it. They have driven frontal attacks against its slopes again and again; they have tried, by driving from the sides to create the familiar double salient by moans of which they could squeeze the French out; they have tried to envelop the entire sector by driving east from Avocourt. Hut they have gained nothing ex cept to pile op their list of dr. d and expend vast stores of ammunition. They have now resorted, it snenia. to the method followed abort lens, after the French success of last Sep tember, of creeping along grednally, taking one part of a trench and then the other until finally the summit is reached. This is, however, a tedltfiis opera tion and apt to prove a costly one. Its success, Just as the success of the bat.tje as a vyhole. is to. be measured largely by the relation between cost and ultimate value. It la entirely conceivable, from what has already taken place, that If Germany does finally succeed in taking It, tho prlco will be so exorbitant that the mili tary gain will be entirely offset. Southwest of Le Mort Homme is Hill 304, the highest crest In the entire district. It has also received a fair amount of attention during the two weeks past. Tho Germans have tried to render it untenable by driv ing east from Avocourt. They appar ently had the French not a little wor ried, for the southern point 6f the woods of Avocourt lias been the scene of one of the few counter at tacks the French have .made. It was successful, too, in driving the Ger mans in the .woods a few hundred yards, so that now it Is a difficult matter for them to debouch in the face of the'French artillery fire. Tho net result of the, two weeks of fighting on this side of the river has therefore been the same as on the east bank—nothing. The lines are generally in exactly the same loca tions. except for minor French gains of a first line trench here and there. The period has been marked by com parative quiet. Attacks have come Uh nothing like the frequency that characterized the first, month of the fighting. Whether this portends any thing more than a temporary exhaus tion is not yet apparent. It may mean that a period of reaccumulation of shell supply from hogie bases has come, and that a greater attack is soon lo come. Tbe Germans certalnljF have a keener realization of their problem nq'Wxthan when they started. They know that tfyey underestimated thb- strehgth^of the French resistance. The logical answer then, if they mean to persist In the attack, is to make a greater effort with more adequate shell aupjflf. Again it may mean quite the re rerse. It is s well known fact that the German big guns were concen trated In a number never before beewa and that they have been fir ing almost incessantly since the flght- Ing began. It la also known through our experience In this country that the life of a li-lnch gun ta only about 200 shots It U potable, there fore. that many of thaoo guns have had to be eeat home to ta reltaed and that there are oot rztvfh Uft to carry oa the ftght. It la aiao pc settle tkat the Oer- Owing to fhe. Mexicans having no aircraft of their Ow n there in nw need for .'the, American army to liave tho small, foM fighting machines, like the German Fokkcr, the British Bristol, sopuith, do llavlliniid and Martin- syde “destroyers" of the Frepch >|<>* ranfe,'.nnd .Meuport “aeroplanes de i h'aldr - Tbcsq are built solely to hunt down and destroy hostile recon naissance or bomb-dropping aero planes and to drive off rival "de stroyers” which are sent up to inter fere with their own reconnaissance machines. '* „ In Mexico an aeroplane crew can go out on a reconnoitering jaunt happy In the knowledge that so long as they keep out of range of rifle fire from the ground—which means a height of eight thousand meen—they ore absolutely safe from any hostile action, and that, barring bad weath er or engine failure, they are bound to get home again—provided, of course, they they arp fairly good at finding their way across country and do not get lost. I should judge that except for certain sections of the country which have been carefully explored by mining prospectors. Mexico has not been thoroughly sur veyed, and therefore maps showing details of the topography are scarce. This is going to make matters dif ficult for the United States arm> aviators, for even with ’considerabk training in cross country flying and when provided with maps showing every river and round in a thickly populated country, aeroplane pilots manage to get fairly successfully lost on occasion, and where definite points on the map are few and far be tween the aviator's only hope is to depend on his compass and his hom ing Instinct. Good cross country pilots are born and not made, but any fairly intelligent Vouth can be taught to follow a map. From what I know of the United States aeroplane service I should judge that there are very few trained cross country flyers therein, and It does not appear that there wilt be much time available tn which to train any number of men for-such work. Therefore, it will be better, quicker and cheaper to try. to discover the born cross country pilots without spending time In training others. The Jobs the United States army flyers will have to do seem to differ considerably from those of ovr Boro P<-in aviators On the western Front the longest reconnaissance flight Is a matter of only thirty or forty miles behind the enemy's lines, end the majority of the flying is don* on short reconnaissances, which, thougL they may cover fifty or sixty mltee st s stretch, penetrate perhaps only ten or fifteen miles behind the lines, so that If an engine shows signs of go ing ''groggy" the pilot hss s chance of getting bark to hla own lines be fore the engine glees up th* ghost— provided, of course, that he Is not brought 'down by hosti'.o "dc-j •troyers«" On the eastern front the German avtatnra. trusting to their wonderful ly reliable engines, hare recently been penetrating to aa much as • hundred miles behind the Russian lines In an endeavor to find out where ths big concentrations of Rus sian troops ure taking place, so as to form sn Ides of where the Russians Intend to make their great push when good weather comes. Their tosh, flying over miles of practically trackless forest. Is much more like the task of tho American aviators fly lag over des ert. Jungle and mountain looking for guerilla hands of Mexicans, hut even then the Germans have to be ware of machine guns and anti aircraft guns, which the Mexicans are hardly likely to possess. On several occasions, on both the western sod eastern fronts In Europe, considerable execution has been done by daring aviators swooping down close to tbe grounds st unex pected points'well behind the enemy's lines and engaging the enemy with machine gun. This is likely to be successful only with a machine of the "pusher" type—that is to say. with the pilot and gunner in front ami with the engine pushing from behind. The "tractor’’ type, with the engine and airscrew pulling In front Is less handy for such a Job. In one case a British aeroplane wrecked a German armored car by attacking It from above and behind and killing tho driver, with the re sult, that the whole thing ran off the road and turned over. In another case an aeroplane stampeded a cav alry camp. In another. In Syria, an aeroplane from Egypt attacked Turk ish cavalry, on the march and put them to flight. In another a French aeroplane flew down alongside a train conveying German troops and raked It from end to end, causing many casualties. Such oiHTations should have excel lent effect In Mexico*-especially if Mexican bands can l>e caught on the move across open country, where rover Is scare. From what I have heard of Mexican shooting thej^e If not much chance of their hitting {he’ men in an aeroplane moving at sev enty or eighty miles an hour, It seems unlikely that the Mexican rebels will have, any strongly forti fied positions or heavily protected buildings to Y e blown up, nor are there likely to be railway junctions or bridges in the hands of the rebels to be destroyed, Therefore there should he little use for the big two hundred pound, three hundred pound or even-four hundred pound bombs which are used in Europe. It rather seems as if in Mexico bomb-dropping will be- fiscful In breaking up ramps, firing villages in whirl) tbe rebels are known to be located, and In dispersing bands of rebels on tbe march. For such work small bombs and plenty-of them, are of more use than a few OBREUON ROPES AMERICAN. TROOPS WILL WITHDRAW General Pays Ho Will Convince Scott Hist His Army U Able to Control Bandits. ' Gen. Alvaro Obregon, minister of war of the de facto government, will submit his assurances to Major Gena. Scott and Funston at their coming conference in Juarez or El Paso that the Carranza forces now are fully able to cope with the Villa bandtta operating In Southern Chihuahua Me sah! he hoped to arrange for an <v > retirement of the American tro*. Before his departure from r'»- huahna Thursday night for Juarez, Gen. Obregon, who was accompanied by Gen. Jacinto Trevino, Carranan commander at Torreon^ outlined to the Associated Pres* the official pro posals that he Intends to submit; to Gefift. Scott and Fupston. Incidentally the Mexican minister of war emphatically denied report* that there was friction between him self and Gen. Carranza. Regarding the coming conference, Gen. Obregon said: - • "I am going to Juarez to convlneo the American representatives that our army Is more than amply suffi cient to control the small groups of Villa bandits, which are at large and outside the law. "I hope to arrange the prompt re tirement of the American troops Into their own criuntry.” 4 FEW TEUTONS IN BALKANS German Force Greatly Reduced Be cause of Verdun Operations. The German forces around Salon- ikl were greatly reduced during March owing to the operations at Verdun and on the Russian frqgt, according to a Bucharest dispatch to the Havas agency. There remain only two German divisions defending the Vardar Gorges. The Bulgsrs number twenty- five thousand men, and there Is • small force of Austrian Infantry with Austrian artillery. TURKS CLAlVliAIN IN EAST ' Report TeOs of Successful Advance on Tigris. Turkish troops made a sncceealnl advance on the Mesopotamia front, along ths Tigris, the official Turk ish announcement of April 22 saya They regained loet advanced posi tions. the announcement stated, and captured fourteen machine guns, on* major, two othsr officrs and thirteen soldiers It Is said that la tbe re cent fighting thu British bavs lout more than four thousand men. ferenT in ETrrojw; Tbu'same quatttlex big bombs. Tn Tact, ordinary hand- are required in the aeroplanes them selves, except that certain types used In Europe will not be wanted in Mexico. biabi Are Urlng ip let koi tbit Titrf tzlng the dlffirnltleu ainT ttur wore fry losses in a continuation of the battle, they are willing to permit It to lag and finally ta die out. Tbeee are the potabllltleu I will make no attempt to say which one Is more re- spoosthlo for tho slowing up of tho lAhtteg. • ♦ * I State Warehouse Mart. Senator J. A. Banks, president ot the State Warehouse Association, hao Issued a call foy a meeting of tho association to M*held la Colmahtn Wednesday. May 3. Important mat- Gaordlag Wireless. A military guard has beea placed at the United 3tales wireless station at San Juan. P. R . for reasons tho authorities refuse to divulge. grenades are as good as anything, and when It comes to attacking a line of men marching along a bhsh P«fh nothing Is raurh brttor than the Tittle steel arrow*, dropped to nt.flftg t* a hundruid M in "W. II tho Frewch need so soecreefully daring tho 00 II coming. Sprinkled plentifully over n patch of hush la which the enreny waa known to be biding, they would probably do exerutloa. The woe of small I* bomba to fire forests In which tho enemy In encamped la aleo to ho recommended. So far as getting aeroplanes is con cerned. the United States army should have no such difficulty as those which confronted the Alllee to 1914. Thanks to orders from tho Allies ther* are now many flourish ing American aeroplane factories, and moat of these have learned from European experience how an aero plane has to be built to stand cam paign usage, and what such an aero plane is expected to do. The Curtiss Company of Ham- mondsport, N. Y., whose early tractor bipjanes were too slow and unreliable for war work, have now redesigned -tho whole machine-, have fitted big ger and more reliable engines, and so have produced on our experience and at our expense, if you please, % really reliable reconnaissance ma chine and bomb-dropper. Tho Thomas Bros, of Ithaca also have turned out a very useful fast scout with a reliable engine of their own make. Tho Burgess Company^of Marblehead are making a pusher with a big Sturtevant engine, which is just the thing for a gun machine for use in the open. * ^ The Sloan Company of Boston have a useful tractor with a Hall-Scott engine, which should make, a useful bomb-dropper. Then there is the big Canada ty|>e Curtiss, with its two huge motors, which maid carry three or four machine guns at a time and take on pretty well a regiment \pf rebels -by Itself. Besides these there are Benolst, Curtiss and Thomas flying boats for roast patrols, to prevent gun running by South American or Asiatic sym pathizers with the rebels. T mention merely the aeroplanes frith which I am personally acquaint ed and which I know to 6e capable of tackling the jobs indicated. Prob ably there are others as good. If so, and if the (United States government tackles the Mexican situation prop* erly hy using aircraft to the best ad vantage, there ought to he little dif ficulty in squashing the trouble promptly. ■ The best ehvtlry cannot oarer more than thirty miles a day, all told, and keep It up. Any decent aeroplaae will cover the thirty mile* and get tack again in an bonr. M regiment of cava fry working fkirfir r enemy troops inside a thirty A down eeroptanes feet or ee. i that thirty : to *i