The Camden chronicle. (Camden, S.C.) 1888-1981, January 16, 1920, Image 13
OK^PF?A^kH,NG'S ST0RY
OR OPERATIONS OF AMERICAN
TROOPS IN THE WORUEHVAR
ST.
mmhrmm' '"*?> ?- r. ?
Raised Delicate Question*.
The various propoauls (luring theoe
conferences regarding priority of ship
ment. often very insistent, raised ques
tions that war* not only most difllcult
but most delicate. On the oue hand,
there was a critical situation which
must bo met by Immediate action,
while, on tho other haud. any priority
accorded a particular arm necessarily
postponed the formatlou of u dlatlno
tlve American fighting force ami (he
means to aupply It. Such a force was,
In my opinion, absolutely necessary to
win the war. A few of the ullled rep
resentatives became convltpod that the
American services of aupply should not
be neglected but should be developed
In the cominou Interest. The success
of our divisions during May and June
demonstrated fully that It was not
necessary to draft Americans under
foreign flags In'order to utilise Amer
ican manhood most effectively.
When, on March 21. 1018, the Oer*
man army on the western front began
its series of ofrenslves, It was by fttr
the most formidable force the world
had ever seen. In fighting men and
guns If had a great superiority^, but
this was toss Importance than the
advantage in morale, tii experience. In
training for mobile warfare, and In
unity of command. Bver since the col
lapse of tho Russian armies and the
crisis as tho Italian front In the fall
of 1017, German armles were being as
sembled and trained for the great cam
paign which was to end the war before
America's effort could bo brought to
bear. Germany's best troops, her most
successful generals aud all the experl
ence gained In three years of war were
mobilised for the supteme effort' '"I
The first blow fell on the right Of
the British armies, Including the junc
tion of the British and French forces.
Only the prompt co-operation of the
French and British general headquar
ters stemmed the tide. The reason for
this objective was obvious, and <<t?fk
Ingly Illustrated the necessity for hav
ing some oue with suillclent authority
over all tin- allied armies to meet sucli
sn emergency.
Reserves Were Lacking. -
The lack of complete co-operation
among the allies on the western front,
had been appreciated and the question
of preparation to meet a crisis had
already received attention by the su
preme war council.. A plan had been
adopted by which ??ach of the allies
would furnish u certain number of dl
6 ..
visions for a general reserve to be uu
der the dlMCttOQ of the militxry repre
sentatives of the supreme war council,
of which <ien. Fcn h whs then Ihe
senior member. But Whtp the time
came to meet the German offensive In
March these reserves were not found
available and the plan failed.
The situation resulted in a con
ference for the Immediate consider
! tlmi of the quostlou of having ID ul
j lied commander lu Chlof. After mueh
, discussion, during which my view f??
! wing such act too wut clearly stated,
j to agreement was reached and den
| eral Foch was selected. Ills appoint
| nent us such wo* made April 3 a ad
was approved for the Hulled States
I by thct president on April 10.
The grave crisis precipitated by the
flrst German offensive caused mo to
make a hurried visit to General Foch'a
, headtpiurtcrs at Boinbon, during which
all our combntunt forces were placed
( at his disposal. The acceptance <>f
this offer intent the dispersion of our
' troops along the allied front and a
consequent delay In building up a dis
tinctive American force In torrnlne.
but the serious situation of the allies
demanded this divergence frdtn uur
plans.
On March 21 approximately 300,000
American troops had reached France.
Four combat divisions, .equivalent In
strength to eight French or British
divisions, were nvullable.
Took C^ntigny Heights.
On April 25 the First division re
lieved two French divisions on the
front near Montdldler and on May 28
captured the Important observation
stations on the heights of Cantlgny
with splendid dash. French artillery,
aviation, tanks and flame throwers
aided In the attack, but most of this
Stench assistance Was withdrawn be
fore the completion of tho operation
In order to meet the enemy's new of
fensive launched May 27 to Chateau
Thierry. The enemy reactldn against
our troops at Cantlgny was extremely
violent,/and apparently he was deter
mined at all costs to counteract the
most excellent effcct tho American
success had produced. . For three day*
his guns of all calibers werp concen
trated on our position nnil dounter<
attack succeeded counterattack. The
desperate efforts of the Germans gave
the fighting at Cantlgny a seeming
tactical Importance eittlrely out of
proportion to the numbers Involved.
The thlrtl German Offensive, on Mrt.v
27. against the French on the Alsn<*
6ooh developed a desperate situation
fur the allies. Theflecoud dlvluhm
waa hastily diverted to the vicinity of1
Mcaux on May 81. and early on the I
morning of June 1 was deployed
across the Clnucan Thlen> Pari* road 1
near Montreuil-aux-IJoni to a ,gap i<*
the Kreuch IIiuk where It stopped the)
German advance on Paris, At the
same time the part lolly trained Third j
division waa ^litreS at French di*
posal to hold the crossing* of. the
Murne. and It* mot mixed machine-gun
battalion succeeded In reaching Chtt*
teit) Thierry In time to assist In sue
ee*sfulty defending that river creat
ing,
The enemy having been hulted. the
Peeonfl division commenced a aeries
of vigorous attack^ on June 4 which
resulted In the capture of Bclleau
wood* after very severe fighting. The
village of Bouresehe* was taken soon
after, and on July 1 Vau* was cap
tured. In these operations the Sec
ond division met with nu?t desperate
resistance by Germany's best troo|Mt.
Our Second corps, under WsJ.1 Gen.
George W. Read, had been organised
for the command of the ten divisions
with the British, which were held
hack In training areas or assigned to
second-lino defenses. After consulta
tion with Field Marshal Ilalg on June
8 Ave American divisions were re
lleved from the British area to aup*
t>ort the French. -?
The Marne salient was Inherently
weak and offered an opportunity for
a counter-offensive that was obvious.
If successful such an operation would
afford Immediate relief to the allied
defense, would remove the threal
against Paris and free the Paris
Nancy railroad. But. more Important
than all else. It would restore the uio
rale of the allies and remove the pro
found depression and fear then exist
ing.
Up to this time our units had been
put In here and thero at critical points
as emergency troops to stop the ter
rifle German advance. In every trial,
whether on the defensive or offensive,
they had proved themselves equa I to
any troops In Kurope. As early as
June 23. add ngaln on July 10 at Bom
bon I had very strongly urged that
our best divisions be concentrated.
anAr American command. If possible,
for Tree as a striking force agtUmd
the Marie salient. Although the pre
vailing view among the allies was
that American units were milfahle
( r ' .;*" v. ; V* ',..V ?';/>* ... ? .v ?
only for the defensive, and that at alt
events they could bo used to better
advantage uuder allied command, the
suggestion^*as accepted In principle
and my estimate of their offensive
fl&htlng qualities was soon put to the
test.
? The enemy had encouraged his sol*
dlers to believe that the July 15 at
tack would conclude the war with a
German peace. Although he made ttnlv
MHNgfcfoft for the operation, he fulled
"When Grandma Com?
the Dirt Mutt Fly"
??ipsfi"ft
: v-'
? j I M J _JWI WBWWWWWI JM
? M fi ??
Grandma's Powdered Soap cut*?the hard
est grease from the greasiest pans.
Just*a spoonful in the dish water?then
millions of foaming, eleansings SUDS that
makes dirt and grease slip right off.
~Wash thefinestpiec?rof enamelor alumi
num ware without fear of scratching. No grit
in Grandma's.
You don't need washing powder nor soap
Whftn ynu use firandma'a Powdered Soapr
goes much ftirther?cheaper to use. \
Don't wait until tomorrow?buy it from
Sour grocer today. Give Grandma a chance to
o the dishes tonight.
y>ptf *'.r"rV>:? j- -' V.?~ n-> V-j rS " ^?'*r. :v*'y
a package from your
Grocer today I
?
? 1 - * - ? ?- ? 1 ?
m &? MX
Trq Thftis Pcwdared SoapTodaij
"Your Oro^epflNfl
W: th* <W* 9ot( Qm^oiui. GncfiWl
Hc?v!
to conceal fully his I lit out ton*, and the
front of atlMck wulf suspected at le?H?
wie week ahead. On the llwiiwmtniw
front the actual hour for tbe assault
vvftn kn^rvn Mini the enemy was checked
witli Ueavy ItiHsfH. The ifrjMjMieeonii
division entered the line near Semitic
l*y Inimedlan ly nu<t 8v? of it* Infau
try battalions and nil of tt* artillery
hecfcme MfiRMl Southwest of Ithcluis
ami along the Marne to the east of
('hatcau-Thlerry the OftuiMrt* were
tit tlrst somewhat ttiwwufwl. o IWH^
trillion of eight kilometers beyond l|i?
river being effected against the French
Immediately to the right of our ThlHl
tllvlslon. TN following quotation
from the report of the comm.tndlng
general gives the result of Ih'e lighting
(III Ills front :
None Crotted but Prisoners,
"Although the rush of tIn? Oprman
troops (iverwhelmcd some of the front
line positions, censing the Infantry end
machine gun coiiipiinlli to suffer, Irt^
eotne eases a 50 per cent loss, no QeV^s
man sohllers crowwl the roa'tl fromj (
Fossoy to Greggus?, except as s pris
oner of war. and by noon the following
day (July 16> there were no Germans
In the foreground of the Third division
sector except the dead."
On this ocean!on a alngle regiment
of theThTrd division wrdte one of the
most, brilliant pages In our military
annuls. It prevented the crossing at
certain points on Its front. While on
either flank the Germane who had
gained a.footing pressed forward Our
men, firing In three section*. met the
German attack* with counter attacks
at. critical point* and succeeded In
throwing two German divisions Into
complete .confusion, capturing 600
prisoners.
Tho selection by the Germans of
the Champagne sector and the east*
em and southern faces of the Marne
pocket on which to make their offen
sive was fortunate for the allies, as It
favored the launching of the counter
attack already planned. There were
now over V.2M.OOO American troops In
France, which provided a considerable
force of reserves, ICvery American di
vision with Any' sort of training whs
made' available for use In a counter*
offensive. ri,
jQfineral Retain'* Initial plan for the
counter-attacks Involved the entire
western face of the Marne salient.
The first and Second Ainerlenn divi
sions. with the First Freneh Moroccan
division between them, were employed
as the spearhead of the main attack,
driving directly eastward, through the
most sensitive portion of the German
lines, to the heights south of Solssons.
The advance began on July 18. wlthofit
the usual brief warning of a prelim
inary bombardment, and those three di
visions at a single bound bn>l<e through
the enemy's defend'* and overran
bis artillery, cuttlnti or interrupting
the German communications lead
ing into f the siiiieni. a general,
withdrawal from ihc Marne was Imme
diately began by the enemy, who still
fought ? stubbprply to prevent disaster.
Took Berzy-le*8ec.
The First division, throughout four
days of constant fighting, advanced 11
kilometers. capturing R^rxyde-Sec
and the heights about Solsftons nnd
taking some 8.B00 prisoners and 68
field guns from the setoeo German di
visions employed against It. It was
.relieved by ? British division. The
Second division advanced eight kllq:
meters In the first 20 hours, and by
the end of the second day was facing
Tlgny. having captured 8,000 prison
ers and 66 field guns. It was relieved
the night of the 19th by a French divi
sion. The result of this couoter-of
fenslve was of decisive importance.
Due to the uiugulficent dash and power
displayed on the field of 8olssons by
'our First and Second divisions, the
tide of war was definitely turned In
favor of the allies.
Other American divisions partici
pated In the Marne counter-offensive,
A little fo Hie south the 8econd dlvl
?don the Fourth was In line with th?
French, and was engaged until July
22. The first American corpa. M?J
flen Hunter Uggeft commanding,
with the Twenty-sixth division end a
Fneio-h division, acted as a pivot of
the uMivement toward Solssons. cap
turing Torcy on the 18th and reaching
the Chateau-Thlerry-Solssons road on
the 21st. At the same time the Sec
ond division crossed the Marne and
took the heights of Mount St. Pere
and the villages of Charteves nnd
Janlgonne. .1/3 ? ?- I
In the First corps the Forty-second
division relieved the Twenty-sixth on
July 25 and extended Its front on the
26th relieving the French division.
From this time until August 2 It
fought Its way through the Forest de
Fere and across the Ourcq. advancing
toward the Vesle until relieved by the
Fourttv division on Atigust 8. Karly
in this period elements of the Twenty
eighth dlvlnlon participated In tbu ad"
vance.
Forced Enemy Back.
Further to the east the Third divi
sion forced the enemy back to Ron
cheres wood, where It waa relieved
on Jnly 80 by the Thirty-second dlrt
sfon frotjj the Vosges fr^pt, The Thirty
second. after relieving the Third god
- some elements of the twenty-eighth
oo tbe Uoe of the Ourcq river, advanced
?st of the Forty-second toward
Teals. On Ang. 8 It passed onder
control of our Third corpa, Major (Jen.
Robert f.. TfuUard commnndlng, wh>eh
made Me first appearance ta battle at
thla time, ifhlle the Fourth division!
took op the task of tfce Forty-second]
division and advanced with tbe Thlrty
secood to the Yesie rlvea^-wbere, m
Aug. 6, the operation for tbe redac
tion of tbe Marne salient terminated. ?
In tbe hard fighting from July 18 to
Ang.. 8 the Germans were not eniy
baited In their advance, but ware
driven back from tbe Marne Jo the
control
ItAtiort
Vwde Mild ?oininlHt'4 wholly (O III*
defensive. The force of American
arm* had been brought to bear in tlmo
to eimbii tUf IjinI offensive of til# cn
?my to he crushed.
The Klrst hih) Third coru&jMW h^ltf
? coiiMuuoiik front o| It kllomet t'l'H
the V*H(* OH Aug. 12 the Seven
ty-seventh division rvlWvnl the Konrt^
division on flic Wish corps front. anT
the following (|n\ (ho Twenty-ct^lith
relieved ilu' Thirty second division in
Itlte fhlrd corps, while from Aug. 6 to
An#. 10 the sixth ipfnntry brigade ?t
the Third division hehl a fee tor on the
river line. The rraQaftl* of the First
?orps to the Woevre was ordered mi
this time. and the control Of thi*. from
was turned over to tin Third corps.
On August 18 Geo, Petaln bogan an
offensive hetween Ithelius ami the
Olse. Onr Third corps participated In
this operation. crossing t i?o Veal? <>n
Sept. -I with tttf Twenty-sight h and
Seventf-seventh divisions and over
coming stuhhorn opposition on the pin
taau south of rhe Alsne. which was
V reached by. the Seventy-seventh <m
8ept. 7. Two days later the Third
corps was transferred to the region
of Vordutv, the Seventy-seventh divi
sion remaining In line on the Alsne riv
er until Sept^lT.
The Thirty-second division, upon Its
relief from the battle on the Vesle.
Joined a French- corps north of Sols
sonh and attacked from Aug. 20 to
81. capturing Juvlgny after' iotne
particularly desperate fighting sad
reaching the Chauny-Solssons rond.
On the British front two regiments
of the Thirty-third division partici
pated In an attack on Hamel, July 4.
and again on Aug. 0 as an Incident of
tha allied offensive against the Amiens
salient. One of these regiments took
Gressalre wood and Chlpllly rldg*.
capturing 700 prisoners and consider
able material.
Emergency Hud Passed.
? The counter omnrslvcB Qgainst the
Marne salient In July and against the !
Amiens salient In August had gained
such nn* advantage that It was up
parent that the emergency, which Jus
tiffed the dispersion of our divisions,
had i >;t ssi.m I. The moment was 'propi
tious for assembling our divisions. Tin*
formatlonoftheartny Inthe -Chateau- ??,
Thierry region and Its'early, hunst'ei
to the sector of the Woovro. which
wns m extend from Noineny. east of
the Moselle, to north of St. Mlhlcl. was
therefore decided upon by Marshal
Foch-and niyself on Ahg, 0. uM ihe de
tails wore arranged with Oeti. retain
^Tater on the same day.
At Bomhon, on .Inly 24. there was a
conference of all commanders In chief
for the purpose of considering ullled
operations. Kaeh presented propos?lr
for the employment of the arttllW un
der his command nnd these formed
x the basis of future co-operation Of
the allies. It was emphatically deter
mined that the allied attitude should
; he to maintain the offensive. As the
first operation of the Americau'army,
the reduction of the salient of St.
Mlhlel was to be,undertaken as soon
as the necessary troops *and material
could bo made available. .
On Aug. 20. a further discussion with
Marshal Foch was held at my head
quarters at Llgny-en-Barrels. At this
meeting It was proposed by Marshal
Focli that the general operations as
far as the American army was con
cerned should ,be carried out In detail
by: . q
(a) An attack between the Meuse
and the Argonne by the Second French
army, reinforced by from four to six
American divisions.
( (b) A French-American attack, ex
tending from the Argonne w^KJojUul
Soualn road, to be executed on the
right by an American army astride
the Alsno and on the left by the
Fourth French army.
To carry out these attacks the ten
to eleven American divisions suggested
for the 8t. Mtble! operation and the
four to six for the Second French army
would leave eight to ten divisions for
an American army on the Alsne, It
was proposed that the St. Mlhlel op*
eratlon should be Initiated on Sept 10
and the other two on Sept. 13 ?fhd 20,
respectively.
1 The plan suggested for the Amer
ican participation In these operations
woe not acceptable to me, because It
would require the Immediate separa
tion of the recently formed flrst Amer
ican army Into several groups, main
ly to assist French armies. Thli was
directly contrary to the principle of
fOrioIng a distinct American army, for
which my contention bad been Insist
ent. An enormous amount of prepara
tion byd already been made In con
struction of roads, railroads, regulat
ing stations and other Installations
Idoklng to the use and supply of our
armies on a particular front. The In
herent disinclination of our troops to
serve nndefr alHed commanders would
have grpwn and American morale
; would have suffered. My position was
1 stated quite clearly, that the strata*'
gleal employment of tbe'flrst army as
a unit would be undertaken where de
sired, but Its disruption to carry out
these proposals would not be en tec
talned. ~
An American Army.
further conference at Marshal
Foch's headquarters was held on S*p
tesnber 2 at which General Pet* In
was pieaent After discussion. the
question of employing the American
army as a unit was conceded. All the
I
(Continued on last pegf)
... At least -800 cases of a ftraaga wd*
i - declared to be ttolkr to that r+
| ported si 8 k L? took and other Oklabom*
are fcelng treated Hi Moakote*,
?eoordin* to phyeiciaai who met Mon
day and disowned meane of oombatiag
Nd deaths have bten rs
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itryptoK"
IV GLASSES XV.
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Jeweler and Optician
Collins Brothers
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j TelepLono 41 714 W. DtKalb Si
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