

A WEIRD STORY

About a Fine Mansion at Newport, Which is SAID TO BE HAUNTED.

Strange Figures Have Been Seen in and About the Garden and the House.

Strange Noises Have Also Been Heard in All Parts of the Big House.

The William Waldorf Astor house on Bellevue avenue haunted?

Impossible! Ridiculous! This is the query and some of the answers that have been floating about the Summer colony at Newport this season, says the New York American.

It is recalled that during the latter part of the Barredas' brief occupancy of the house a young and beautiful Cuban woman had been a guest.

She was a relative of Mrs. Barreda, of Senora Barreda, who was herself a Cuban and one of the handsomest women that ever graced Newport society.

THE SENORITA DISAPPEARED. For some reason that was not explained at the time, and has never since been accounted for, the young senorita suddenly disappeared.

She was not known to have gone away from the city, nor was she ever again seen in or about the house.

Soon after the final collapse of the Barreda fortune came. The family departed and ever after was lost to view.

For a few days she stopped at an unfashionable hotel, visited the old mansion in the guise of a stranger and went to see her old retainer, Gardner Williamson.

Death, misfortune, loss of riches and other calamities have befallen the long succession of residents on this estate during the past forty years.

F. L. Barreda, who built it in 1862, then the finest house in Newport, made a fortune almost in a day in the guano business in South America.

When Mr. Astor bought the estate it was thought that then at last the "luck" of the house and its occupants would be changed.

But the Astors occupied it only three or four seasons and then went abroad. Soon after that Mrs. Astor died at Cliveden, England.

THE SENATOR BRICES LEASED IT for several seasons, bringing with them the \$10,000 a year cost, a big retinue and all the other evidences of ostentatious wealth.

Then Senator Brice died—his reputed millions proved but an illusion, his family dropped from affluence almost to penury.

This and Mrs. Astor's untimely death revived the story of the "hoodoo" that hung over the occupants of the "Barreda Palace," which the prestige of an Astor could not wipe out.

Mrs. Potter Palmer next occupied the house during the Summers of 1899 and 1900. She entertained lavishly and brought her social campaign to a climax by the wedding of Julia Grant and Prince Michael Cantacuzene of Rousia.

This ceremony, performed within the walls of the "Barreda Palace," was one of the most spectacular functions ever seen in America.

Representatives of all the European courts were present in the gold lace uniforms and costumes of their countries.

Yet, while the public was being dazzled by such brilliant displays, it is said that Mrs. Potter Palmer, cool-headed, practical woman of the world, as she was, trembled within the walls of the old "palace."

The ghost of the Barredas, it was hinted, had returned, and was haunting the halls and rooms of its old home.

Mrs. Potter Palmer, it is said, saw a shadowy figure in the hall, after a guest had gone. Every door opening out of it had to be locked at night, as well as every door that she passed on the way up to her sleeping room.

For noises were heard at night like the rustle of silken skirts, as if the unbidden guest of the past were passing in and out the rooms and halls and opening and closing doors.

CROMER IN REPLY.

A Rejoinder to Senator Tillman's Defence of the Dispensary.

The Doctor Discusses His Differences With the Senator in a Calm, Dispassionate Manner.

Hon. B. R. Tillman.

Dear Sir: It was not to be expected that you would adopt my view of the principles underlying the dispensary law, but I desire to assure you that I appreciate the spirit of your letter published in the papers this morning.

A final word in reply is required by one or two passages in your letter. While my own conduct is of small moment and I have no desire to bring my personality into the discussion, let me assure you, in passing, that my moral support has been given to the enforcement of the dispensary law.

When Gov. Heyward expressed a determination to enforce the law in Charleston, I wrote him a letter of warm commendation; not because I was in sympathy with the dispensary law, but because I am opposed to lawlessness and in favor of fostering respect for duly constituted authority.

But I think you miss both the spirit and the letter of Pope's well known utterance. He did not say: "About form of law let fools concern themselves."

That law which is best administered is best. He was not speaking of legislative enactments but of governments and creeds as they affect human welfare, and he said:

"For forms of government let fools contest, Whichever is best administered is best."

If there is inherent vice in the law itself, efficient administration of the law cannot cure it. Referring to the decision of the supreme court, which you say I "quote with great unctious," you say, "The prohibitionists in general and you, my dear doctor, are thoroughly imbued with the belief that liquor drinking is dangerous to the morals, good order, health and safety of the people."

It is not I, but you, who are a fanatic on the subject, though you put me in a class with the "razor and the rigid right corner" who think it is safe to drink rum. As you say that you have not that decision before you, I take the liberty of supplying a full quotation in order that it may be seen that I have argued the matter not as a fanatic but from the point of view of the supreme court.

You will recall that at the November term, 1893, the supreme court decided that the dispensary law was unconstitutional. Mr. Justice McGowan concurring with Mr. Chief Justice McVie in the decision, and Mr. Justice Pope dissenting.

The next year, 1894, Mr. Justice Gary having made a dissenting opinion, the court decided that the law was constitutional. Mr. Justice Pope and Mr. Justice Gary concurring, and Mr. Chief Justice McVie dissenting.

The following paragraph, found in State vs. Aiken, 42 S. C., page 231, contains the ground work of the decision upholding the constitutionality of the law:

"Before proceeding to a consideration of the specific objections urged against the constitutionality of the act of 1893 we desire to state at the outset that, in our opinion, the following propositions embody the principles governing this case:

(1) That liquor, in its nature, is dangerous to the morals, good order, health and safety of the people, and is not to be placed on the same footing with the ordinary commodities of life, such as corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco, potatoes, etc.

(2) That the State, under its police power, can itself assume entire control and management of those subjects, such as liquor, that are dangerous to the peace, good order, health, morals and welfare of the people, even when trade is one of the incidents of such entire control and management on the part of the State.

(3) That the act of 1893 is a police measure. We are frank to say that if we are wrong as to either of these propositions, the act should be declared unconstitutional. We will now cite authorities to sustain these propositions.

Note, then, that the language in which you define the attitude of the prohibitionists is exactly the language in which the supreme court defined the attitude of the law on the subject. That decision fixes the point of view from which the State is bound to regard the question; and from that point of view the State may take control of the traffic to police it but not to profit by it.

And if the view of Hugh Farley, chivalrous spirit, and others who were opposed to the profit feature had been adopted, the result might have been different. I admit that it is wise to "hobble the devil," whom you are powerless effectually to chain; but having hobbled the devil, I protest that it is not right to make him yoke fellow with the spirit of progress for our schools and open the way for our children to embrace him as an angel of light.

Returning to my historical parallel, I am not inclined to press the lessons of the prohibition vote of 1892 unduly. After reminding me that 32,000 did not vote in that election, which you designate a "side show," you say that "this is a government of majorities." True, but it is a government of majorities that vote, and not of majorities that stay away from the polls.

At that election, prohibition received in this county more than 1,000 votes, a majority of the total vote cast. But when they came to the dispensary upon Newberry, it was nullified by a petition of 79 freeholders in the town of Newberry, 34 of whom were negroes.

The attitude of public sentiment towards the dispensary law in this county has assumed three distinct phases in succession. In its earlier stages the law did not have a fair test. For reasons that need not be enumerated public sentiment was resentful, and the law against illicit traffic in liquor was not enforced.

But violations of the law became so serious that the people, in a sentiment of the community, and for years, the law has been enforced. We have now arrived at the third phase, in which the sentiment of the community seems to be crystallizing in opposition to the whole scheme, owing largely, I think, to the fact that the

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Hon. Geo. B. Cromer.

Dear Sir: I was absent from the State a few days after the Anderson meeting, and since my return home Sunday I have been quite unwell, hence delay in answering your "rejoinder," which appeared in the newspapers of the 18th.

I have read what you say carefully, and with all due respect it seems to me you are begging the question. I quote Pope's couplet from memory and it is lucky that I misquoted it, else you would have had little to reply to, but I cannot agree with you that "I missed" either the "sense or the spirit."

I charged existing conditions in dispensary matters to mal-administration and to legislation in changing the law and depended upon the best of conditions to sustain my contention. "That law which is best administered is best."

Of course your quotation must be verbatim and it is even stronger in sustaining my argument than my own recollection of the words, for "whatever form of government," an autocracy, limited monarchy or a republic is better than any other when it is "best administered" it seems to me that you must be wrong in claiming that there is inherent vice in the law itself, efficient administration of the law cannot cure it.

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"The county dispenser shall execute a bond in the sum of \$3,000, from which suit for damages may be brought for a violation of the provisions of the act by any person, parent, guardian, employer, or other person. A majority of the voters in a township may prevent the establishment of a dispensary. The county dispenser shall take an oath therein prescribed. A printed form of written request must be presented for permission to purchase. The sale shall not be made to a minor, a person intoxicated, a person in the habit of drinking to excess nor to a person unknown to the dispenser. It prevents the establishment of club rooms, where liquors are used. One of the beneficial results of the law is brought about by selling only by case."

In the face of this language how can you declare that "the State may take control of the traffic to police it, but not to profit by it?"

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BARS OUT NEGROES.

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Syracuse is the Name of the Place Where Negroes are Not Allowed to Spend a Night.

F. U. O'Killen, in the Independent, says in the town of Syracuse, Ohio, on the Ohio river, four miles above Pomeroy, a town of about 2,000 inhabitants, no negro is permitted to stay in the town over night under any consideration. This is an absolute rule for several generations. The enforcement of this unwritten law for keeping the negro from staying in the town over a single night is in the hands of the boys from twelve to twenty years of age, while the attempt of a negro to become a resident of the town