Historical Newspapers of South Carolina

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VS. - T~ANING, S. C.. VEDNESDAY, MA Y 15, 1893.NO42 DOWN ON THE LAW. JUdGE GOFF'S VIEW OF OUR ELEC TION SYSTEM. He Holds it Violative of the Federal Con stituttor, and Therefore Vold- The Rich land Supervisor Enjoined--Dr. Pope's Motion Dismissed. COLUMBIA, May S.-Special: There was a great crowd in the Federal court room this morning- drawn there by the previous announcement that tfhere would be announced the decis Ions on all the questions brought be fore the court in the several cases ar gued before the judoes. Every seat was occupied, and ail the available standing room was also used; There were auite a number of negroes pres ent---these being, for the most part, of the more intelligent class. The room was well-filled some little time before the session of the court opened. .Promptly at 12 o'clock Judges Goff anid Simonton entered from their con sultation-room in the rear, and as cended to the rostrum where the seats are-provided for them. The marshal commanded, "Silence in court!' and he wasI '3mcitly obeyed. The -audi ene' wtas 'ttention. Judge Goff, with a short reference to theimportance of the case to be de dided and To the short time which he had had to prepare his opinion, said that he would read his jud ent M the case of Mills vs. Green [teRich land Supervisor of estion], re serving to himself to e additional authorities if he should think proper to do so. The case against Green. it will be remembered, arose out of the complaint on the part of Mills, a col ored man, that he had lost his right to vote for delegates to the Constitu tional Convention, because he had not had a proper opportunity to .register as'a voter, and because there would be.no adequate opportunity for him so to register at any time before the elec tion of delegates to that. convention. He asked that the Supervisor be en joined from proceeding under the registration law, until the roerits of his complaints and charges could be considered.. and determined by the court. The Richland Supervisor, through theAttorney General answered,claim ing that the court had no jurisdiction --ih the premises, and thatif it had, it could not.grant any injunction on the showing made on behalf of the com plainant Mills. The real question in the case, considered by Judge Goff, are these: 1. Has the OireuitCourt of the United States jurisdiction~t pass upon the .zatters set forth in the bill-of cmplainU? -2. Is the registra tion law. f South Carolina in viola tion of the Federal constitution? Af ter a full statement- of the case as set forth in the biliand the return of the Supervisor, together with full quota tions from-the registration law, Judge Goff proceeded: T uestion of jurisdiction is first etermmned. . Defendant insists -that this suit is in effect a proceeding against the State of South Carolina, and that it should not be entertained becatis' prohibited by the Eleventh Ameidment 4b the Constitution of the United States. It is not my intention at this'time to consider separately the many cases cfted by counsel in argu ment bearing on this question. After carefully examining them alL. I con clude-that it is the dty of the''Circuit Court of _the United States to restrain a State officer -from exiecuting an un constitutional- statute of the State, when the execution .of it by him would violate or abridge the rights, privileges and immunities of the comn fainant that are granted by the Con stitutionof the-United States. -So far as this question is concerned, it is imn materiel if the officer so restrained be the sapertisoi-.of registration, the Au -ditor :of 'the state, the Comptroller Genei/al, th'e Treasurer, the Attorney Gensi-al or 'the:Governor. We do not have in this country any class of peo ple, State or national officials, or pri vate cttzens who -are above the law and -who are not compelled to respect it. The Constitution of 'the U~mted States is-the supreme law of'the land, anythin in the Constittition\ or laws of any State to the contrary nbtwith standing. The mandate of the nation'g Oenstitution is addressed to all offi'cers of the United Statesas wellasto all the officers of all the States. The judges of' theFederal as well as of the State courts must respect it,- for it declares that the. judesof everyr State shall be bound thrb. As 1s said by the Supreme Court DnIodge vs. Woolsey, -18 How., 331: "To make its suprema cye more complete, -impressive and practical, that there should be no es cape from its operation and that its binding force upon the States and the m~"iembers of Congress should be un \misakable, it is declared that the Sen ators and Representatives before men tioned, and the members of the-several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the Uni ted States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution. It would bea strange admission, a startling de cision, that the courts of the United States cannot open their doors to the citizens of the Unie States who al legesthat they are byklie unconstitu tional laws of a State deprived of theii -privileges or immunities as citizens ol the United States and denied the equal p rotection of the laws within the juris diction of such State. I am not aware that any court of the United States has ever so held, I trust I will never ,be advised of such a decision, and]I am sure as I now see the law and my duty, that I will not so rule, not es "~~tablish such a precedent. SThe case of in re Ayers, 123 U. S., 8t43, relied on by defendant's counse] does not in my judgment sustain the position taken by them. In that case the jurisdiction of the Circuit Couri was denied, not because the officers oi the State were sued, but because the court found that the act of the Legis lature complained of did not violate any contract, and because the bill did not allege any ground of equitable re lieftainst the individual defendants for .any personal wrong committed oi threatened by them ;.because it did no1 charge against them in their .individ ual character anything done or threat ened which constituted in contempla tion of law a violation of personal oi property rights or a breach of contrac1 to which they were parties. In these particulars the Ayers case differs ma terially from the case now before me. In that case the Supreme Court says "But this is not intended in any wa~ to infringe upon the principle whici justifies suits against individual de fendants, who, under color of the au thm-it of unconstitutional legislatior by the State, are guilty of personal trespasses and wrongs, nor to forbid suits against officers in their official capacity either to arrest or direct their otficial action by injunction or man damus where such suits are author ized by law, and the act to be done or omitted is purely ministerial in the performnce or omission of which the plaintiff has a legal interest." In Davis vs. Gray, 16 Wall., 203, the Supreme Court held that a Circuit Court of the United States, in a prop er case in equity, may enjoin a State officer from executing a State law in conflict with the Constitution or a statute of the United States when such execution will violate the rights of the complainant: that making a State of ficer a party does not make the State a party. althouoh her law may prompt his iction anI she may stand behind him as the real party in interest. That case was a suit by Gray against Davis, the Governor of the State of Texas, and Keuchler, Commissioner of the Land office of that State, and the in junction issued by the Circuit Court of the United States for the western district of Texas, restraining said offi cers from issuing and signing certain land warrants was sustained,as I have mentioned, by the Supreme Court of the United States. In the case of Pennoyer vs. McCon naughy, 140 U. S.. 1, in which the' Supreme Court reviewed the cases bearing on this subject, Mr. Justice Lamar, speaking for the court, said: "But the general doctrine of Osborne vs. Bank of the United States, that the Circuit Courts of the United States will restrain a State officer from exe cuting an unconstitutional statute of the State, when to execute it would violate rights aid privileges of the complainant which had been guaran teed by the Constitution and would work irreparable damage and injury to him has never been departed from. On the contrary, the principles of that case have been recognized and en forced in a very large number of cases, notably in those we have refer red to as belonging to the second class of cases above mentioned." In refer ence to the case just referred to, he .used this language: "The first class is where the.suit is brought against the officers of the State,as representing the State's action and liabilicy, thus mak ino- it, though not a party to the rec or. the real party against which the judgment will so operate as to com pel it to specifically perform its con tracts." -The other classes is where a suit is brought against defendants who, claiming to act as officers of the State, under the color of an unconstitutional statute, commit ACTS OF WRONG AND INJURY to the rights and property of the plain tiff acquired under a contract with the State. Such suit, whether brought to recover money or property in the hands of such defendants, unlawfully taken by them in behalf of the State, or for compensation in dam es, or in a proper case where the remey at law is inadequate, for an injunction to prevent such wrong and injury, or for a mandamus, in a like case, to en force upon the defendant the perform ance of a plain legal duty, purely ministerial, is not within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment an ac tion against the State. Osborne vs. Bank ofthe United States, 9 Wheat., 738; Davis vs. Gray, 16. Wall., 203; Tomlinson vs. Branch, 15 Wall., 460; Litchfield vs. Webster county. 101 U. S., 773; Allen vs. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 114 U. 5., 311; Board of Liquidation vs. McComb, 92 U. S., 531; Poindexter vs. Greenhow, 114 U. S., 270.,' Complainant insists that his case is included in the reasoning of the court in the caseslast cited, and also that he is entitled to present his bill to this court, relative to the matters therein set forth, because of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and patcularly of the Fourteenth and F~fteenth Amendments thereof. To the consideration of this point and of the constitutionality of theregistration laws of the State of South Carolina we now come. Complainant insists that the registration laws of South Car olina are in contravention of the pro visions of the Constitution of South Carolina, and that they also violate the Constitution of the Unte States. his rights as a citizen ot' the United States beingso affected thereby as to entitle himn-to be heamd in this court on the complaint we now consider. The Constitution of South Carolina contains the following pro visions: Article 1. section 31: "All elections shall be free and open, and eveyinhabitantof this commoniwealth possessing the qualifications provided for in thiis Constitution sall have equal right to elect officers and be elected to fill public offices." Article 8, section 2: "Every male citizen of the United States of the age of 21 years and upwards, not laboring under the disabilities named in this Constitution, without distinction of race, color or former condition, who shall be a resident of this State at the time of the adoption of this Constitu tion, or who shall hereafter reside in this State one year and in the county in which he offers to vote sixty days next preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote for all officers that are now or hereafter may be elected by the people, and upon all questions submitted to the electors at any elec tion. Provided that no person shall be allowed to vote or hold office who is now or hereafter may be disquali fed therefor by the Constitution of the United States, until such disqualifica tions shall be removed by the Congress of the United States. Provided, fur. ther, that no person, while kept in an almhouse or asylum, or of unsound mind, or confined in any public prison shall be allowed to vote or hold public office" Article 8, section 3: "It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to pro vide from time to time for the registra tion of all electors. Article 8, section 7: "Every person entitled to vote at any election shall be eligible to any office which now is, or hereafter shall be, elective by the peo ple of the county where lie shall have resided sixty days previous to such election except as otherwise provided in this Constitution or the Constitution and laws of the United States." Article S, section 8: "The General Assembly shall never p ass any law that will deprive any of the citizens of this State of the right of suffrage, ex cept for treason, murder, robbery or duelling, whereof the person shall have been duly tried and convicted." Section 2. article 1. of the Constitu tion of the United States is as follows: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen eve ry second year by the people, of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have ihe qualifications re I isite for electors of the most numer ous branch of the State Legislature." Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend ment is in these words: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or eiforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property wit h out due process of law: nor deny to aiyv person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Article 15 of the amendments to the Constitution reads: "Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color or previous con dition of servitude. "Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this arficle by appro priate legislation." The Congress has given to the Cir cuit Courts of the United States juris diction of all suits to enforce the right of citizens of the United States to vote in the several States. We find now that a citizen of South Carolina is a citizen of the United States residing in that State. The rights, privileges and immunities be longing to him as a free citizen are his as a citizen of the United States, and do not depend upon his citizenship of that State. The plaintiff Mills, a citi zen of African descent, is a citizen of the United States and of the State of South Carolina: by the Fourteenth Amendment lie has been made a citizen of the United States and by the Fifteenth Amend ment he is a voter in the State in which he resides. Previous to the adoption of these amendments the race to which he belongs HAD NO RIGHTS that the white men of this country were bound to respect, and it was not possible for any one belonging to it to be a citizen of the United States. In the slaughter house cases. the Supreme Court of the United States, referring to the time immediately preceding and following the adoption of these amend ments, said: "The institution of African slavery, as it existed in about half the States of the union, and the contests pervading the public mind for many years be tween those who desired its "n:ail ment and ultimate e:inction and those who desired -dditional safe guards for its security and perpetua tion culminated in the effort on the part of most of the States in which slavery existed, to separate from the Federal governr ent and to resist its authority. This constituted the War of the Rebellica and whatever auxili ary causes mi.y have contributed to bring about this war, undoubtedly the overshadowing and efficient cause was African slavery. "In that struggle, slavery, as a le galized social relation, perishsd. It perished as a necessity of the bitterness and force of the conflict. When the armies of freedom found themselves upon the soil of slavery they could do nothing less than free the poor victims whose enforced servitude was the foundation of the quarrel. And when hard pressed in the- contest, these men (for they proved themselves men in that terrible crisis) offered their ser vices and were accepted by thousands to aid in suppressing the unlawful re beilion. Slavery was at an end where ever the Federal government succeed ed in that purpose. The proclamation of President Lincoln expressed an ac complished fact as to a large portion of the insurrectionary- districts, when he declared slavery ablished in them all. But the war being over, those who had succeeded in re-establishing the authority of the Federal govern ment were not content to permit this great act of emancipation to rest on the actual results of the contest or the pro clamation of the executive, both of which might have been questioned in after times, and they determined to place this main and most valuable re sult in the Constitution of the restored union as one of its fundamental arti cles. Hence the Thirteenth Amend ment to that instrument. Its two short sections seem hardly to admit of construction, so vigorous is their ex pression and so appropriate to the pur pose we have indicated: "'1. Neither slavery nor involun tary servitude, except as a punishment for crime; whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction. " '2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate leg islation.' - - "The process of restoring~ to their proper relation with the Federal gov ernment and with the other States those which had sided with the rebel lion, undertaken under the proclama tion of President Johnson in 1865, and before the assembling of Congress, de veloped the fact that, notwithstanding the formal recognition by those States of the abolition of slaves, the condition of the slave race would, without fur ther protection of the Federal govern ment, be almost as bad as it was before. Among the first acts of logislation adopted by several of the States in the legislative bodtes which claimed to be in their normal relations with the Federal government, were laws which imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed 'their rights in the pursuit of life, lib erty and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value, while they had lost the protection which they had received from their former owners from motives both of interest and humanity. "They were in some States forbidden to appear in the towns in any other characters than menial servants. They were required to reside on and culti vate the soil without the right to pur' chase or own it. They were excluded from many occupations of gain and were not permitted to give testimony in thecourts in any case where a white man was a party. It was said that their lives were at the mercy of bad men, either because the laws for their. protection were insuflicient or were not enforced. "These circumstances, whatever of falsehood or misconception may have been mingled with their presentationi, forced upon the statesmen who had con ducted the Federeal government in safety through the crisis of the rebel lioni, and who supposed that b~y the thirteenth article of amendment they had secured the result of their labors. the conviction that something more was necessary in the way of constitu tional protection to the tunfortunate race who had suffered so much. They accordingly passed through Congress the pr-oposition for the Fourteenth Amendment, and they declined to treat as restored to their full participa tion in the government of the union tion until they ratified that article by a formal vote of their legislative bodies. "Before we proceed to examine more critically the provisions of this amend ment (on which the plaintiffs in error rely), let us complete and disiiss the history of the recent amendments, as that history relates to the general pur pose which pervades them all. A few years'experience satisfied thethought ful men who had been the authors of the other two amendments that, not withstanding the restraints of those articles on the States, and the laws passed under the additional powers granted to Congress. these were inade quate for the protection of life, liberty and property, without which freedom to the slaves was no boon. They were in all those States denied the right of suffrage. The laws were administered by the white man alone. It was urged that a race of men distinctively marked as was the nearo. living in the midst of another anl dominant race, could never be fully secured in their person and their property without the right of suffrage. "Hence the Fifteenth Amendment. which declares that "the right of a citi-n of the United States to vote shall wiot be denied or abridged by any State on account of race, or previous condition of servitude." The negro having, by the Fourteenth Amend ment. been declared to be a citizen of the United State, is thus made a voter in every State of the union. "We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events too recent to be called history, but which are fa miliar to us all: and on the most cas ual examination of the language of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the ''oNE PERvADING PURPOSE found in them all, lying at the founda tion of each, and without which none of them would have been even sug gested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm estab lishment of that freedom. and the pro tection of the newly-made freeman all. Ctizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised uin limited dominion over him. It is true that only the Fifteenth Amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by speak ing of his color and his slavery. But it is just as true that each of the other articles was addressed to the griev ances of that race, and designed to re medv them, as the Ffteenth. " *We do net say that no one else but the negro can share in this protection. Both the language and spirit of these articles are to have their just weight in any question of construction. Un doubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it for bids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie system shall de velop slavery of the Mexican or Chi nese race within our territory, this amendment may be safely trusted to make it void. And so if other rights are assailed by the States which pro perly and necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that protec tion will apply, though the party in terested may not be of African descent. But what we do.say, and what we wish to be understood is, that in any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said was the ervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed to remedy, and the process of continued addition to the Constitution until that purpose was supposed _to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law can accomplish it. "The first section of the fourteenth article, to which our attention is more especially invited, opens with a defini tion of citizenship-not only citizen ship of thme. United States, but citizen ship of the States. No such definition was previously found in the Constitu tion. nor had any attempt been made to define it by act of Congress. It had been said by eminent judges that no man was a citizen of the United States except as he was a citizen of one of the States composing the union. Those, therefore, who had been born and re sided always in the District of Colum bia or in thie Territories, though with in the United States, were not citizens. Whether this proposition was sound or not had never been judicially decided. But it had been held by this court, inm thie celebrated Dred Scott case, only a few years before the outbreak of the Civil War, that a man of African de scent, whether a slave or not, was not and could not be a citizen of a State or of the United State. This decision, while it met the condemnation of some of the ablest statesman and constitu tional lawyers of the country, had never been overruled: and if it was to be accepted as a constitutional limita tion of the right of citisenship, then all the negro race who had recently been made fr eemen were still not only not citizens, but were incapale of be coming so by anything short of an amendment to the Constitution. '-To remove this difficulty primari ly, and to establish a clear and com prehentive definition of citizenship whlich should declare what should constitute citizenship of the United States, and also citizenship of a State. the first clause of the first section was framed: '-All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." 'The first observation we have to make on this clause is that it puts at rest both the questions which we stated to have been the subject of differences of opinion. It declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regrad to their citizenship of a particular State. and it overturns the Drned Scott decision by making all persons b)orn within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, citizens of the United States. That its main purpose was to establish the "CITIZENSH IP' OF 'l1E N~:'m.C can admit of no doubt, The p-hrase. "subject to its jurisdiction" was in tended to exclude from its oper-ation children of minister-s, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within thme United States. While it is true that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not add to thme privi leges and immunities of a citizen, and that no new voters were necessarily made by it, it is equally true that it ini eret held that it increased the num ber of citizens entitled to suff'rage uni der the Constitution and laws 'f the States. it also held that in the light of thme history of the late amendments, that there was no dimeiutty in giving a proper mecaning to their provisions. and that the existence of laws ini those States where the emancipated negroes resided which grossly discriminated against them as a class was the end to be remedied byrthem, ndthathbythem such laws are forbidden. It also fully determined that a citizen of a State is now simply a citizen of the United States residng in that State: that his rights as such are those that belong to him as a citizen of the United States, and that they are not dependent upon his citizenship of any State, do not de pend upon its legislation and cannot be destroyed by its power. As I un derstand the decision : die Supreme Court, ther sustain the claim of this plaintiff that the courts of the United States are open for the relief of citi zens of the United States whose privi leges have been abridged by the State in which he resides. Certainly they should be. and I willsurely so hold un til advised by that court that I am in error. Fron those same decisions I find that while the right of suffrage is not a necessary attribute of Federal citizenship, that it surely is such an attribute as is exempt from discrimi nation in the exercise of that right on account of race and previous condi tion, and that while the right to vote in the States comes from the States, that the right of exemption from the prohibited discrimination comes from the United States. While as a rule the rights of a citiz en of a State are such as all citizens of the United State enjoy, yet this plain tiff has also certain rights under the Constitution. of South Carolina, by v'ytue of the act of Congress of June 1868, which was-accepted and act up n by that State, in which it was Rrov ed that the Constitution of said btata iall never be so changed as to de I ' any citizens of United States of t "right to vote in said State who are titled to vote by the Constitution of th same, recognized in said act, ex cept as a punishment for crime. The Constitution there referred to is one from which I have before quoted the present organic law of that State. THE NAIN QUESTION. Are the registration laws of South Carolina constitutional? Do they pre vent the plaintiff and those situated like him from exercising the' rights conferred upon and guaranteed to him? A registration law is not per se uncon stitutional but is the one referred to in the bill, such as should be up held by the courts. Does the State of South Carolina by this legislation de prive the plaintiff of any privileges to which lie is entitled by the Constitu tion of the United States and of that State) Does it deprive him of his liber ty by taking from him a right by which he can preserve that liberty? Does it deny him the equal protection of her laws, by enacting a system of registration which does not protect but destroys his rights? If it does dis franchise him are not his liberty and his property taken from him ? If -it does prevent him from voting (it is shown that he is duly qualified) for delegates to the constitutional conven tion mentioned in the bill which may so change the organic law of the State as to affect his ife, his property, his liberty, his franchise, does it not do him a grievous wrong, and by what authority? As pertinent to this Iquote the words of Mr. Justice Swayne in the slaughter house cases: "Life, liberty and property are forbidden to be taken without due process of law, and equal protection of the laws is guaranteed to all. Life is the gift of God and the right to preserve it is the most sacred of the riohts of man. Beyond that line lies the aomain of usurpation and ty rany. Property is everything which has an exchangeable value, and the right of property includes the power to dispose of it according to the will of the owner. Labor is prop erty, and, as such, merits protection. The right to make it available is next in importance to the rights of life and liberty. It lies to a large extent at the foundation of most other forms of property, and of all solid individual and national prosperity. "Due pro cess of law" is the law as it exists in the fair and regular course of admin istrative procedure. "The equal pro tection of the laws" p laces all upon a footing of legal equality and gives the same protection to all for the preserva tion of life, liberty and property and the pursuit of happiness" It is not my intention at this time to state in detail the requirements and effect of each section of said registra tion law, but simply the result ~that I reach after a careful scrutiny of them all, aided as I have been by the ex haustive analysis of the same made by counsel. THE CERTIFICATE UNwARRANTED. I find no warrant in the Constitution for the certificate required by the registration law to be issued to the voter, the production of which is to be required at the polls or his vote is to be rejected. This is not registra tion which is simply the entering on the books or lists of voters the names of those qualified under the Constitution to vote, but it is an additional require ment to those mentioned in the or ganic law, not intended, I am con strained to believe, to facilitate the full, free and legal expression of those en titled to exercise the right of suffrag'e. Such requirment is unreasonable. burdensome and har'rassing, and clear lv it impedes and abridges the right of the constitutional voters of the State to cast their ballots. The additional re quirement that the voter moving from one place to anothier in the same precinct must surrender his old and secure a new certificate is with out reason, and vexatious. While the mode proscribed for securing a renewal thereof in case of loss is so cumbersome and peculiarly strin gent that it likelv fulfills- its ob ject in deterring the ordinary voter from making the effort. The registra tion of voters closes on the first day of Jutly preceding a general election, which is held in November following. What possible reason is there for this unreasonable course: During the four months preceding an election the period voters generally devote to the examination of q1ueuons then to be determined, and to the placing of their nanmes on the voting lists, when suich lists are required-it is utterly imipos sible for any duly qualified voter to have his nam ie registered, and neces sarily results in depriving many of them of the right of sutfrage. The only parties perm'itted to register dur ing' the four miohths preceding the election are those becoming of age during the period. provided they fur nishi satisfactory proof. The Consti tution says that the citizen who shall have been a resident of the State for one year, and of the county in which lie oilers to vote for sixty days next preeding any election, shall .be entitled to vote at such electior, and yet lie is prohibited by this requirement fronm'so doiug. He has comphleted his one year's residence af ter the first'day of J uly. but hie cannot register because the books are closed and lie cannot vote because his name is not upon the books, and there is no. provision by which he can prove to election officers at the polls, that he is a qualified and legal voter. This en tire provision is most peculiar, with out a precedent, and without defense, even from the advocates of the law. Why the books should be' closed for months before the election and kept open for months after it is over, to the uninformed would be passing strange. and yet in the light of the recent his tory of this State and the discussion of this cause, is easily understood. 'A STUPENDOUS OUTRAGE. A careful examination of the regis tration enactment of the State of South Carolina-excluding the act of 1SS4 brings me to the conclusion that if a voter who was duly qualified and en titled to register in May and June, 1882, did not, on account of absence, sickness, inadvertence or other cause, register when the books were open in that year, he was not only prevented from voting at the general election in Novenber, 1882, but was and has been prevented -under the law-from voting at all elections held in the State subsequent to said election in 1882. This seems almost incredible, yet I think it is correct. The state ment is appalling, the outrage stupen dous, the result close to' the border land thatdivides outrae from crime. It is not necessary to discuss it fur ther-likely the least said about it the better. THE ACT OF 1894. Does the act of 1894-the convention act, with its four sections relating to registration-cure the defects I have alluded to, and render valid the form er unconstitutional laws I have men tioned ? In my opinion it does not. These sections refer to the old law-in fact, are to be considered as a part of it, as amendments thereto-and they contain all the bad features thereof, including the certificates to be pro duced at the polls and the closing of the books many days before the elec tion. They also add to the qualifica tions contained in the Constitution relative to the residence' of the voter in 1he State and county. And they make no provision for the registering of voters between the closing of the books and the election, when their names have been omitted on account of absence or other usually sufficient reason. Again, the applicant for reg istration must make affidavit setting forth his full name, age, occupation and residence at the time of the gener al registration in 1882, or at the time thereafter when he became entitled to register, and also give the place or places of his residence since the time when he became entitled to register. This affidavit must be supported by the affidavit of two res ctable citizens who were each of te agre of twenty one years on the 30th day of June, 1882, or at the time the applicant be came entitled to register. Our most intelligent voters would dread this or deal. This history of their movements for years; that statement of the. differ ent places at which they have lived; this securing of two reputable affiants who must have been twenty-one years - age in .1882, or at the time the appli cant arrived at voting age. With what crushing force, then, must it strike the weaker race which is thus made to suffer by the stronger; how difficult for them to thus write out the books of their lives, and have all the pages thereof attested by two witneses, reputable in the estimation of the reg istrar, who is to judge them. In my opinion the fact that there still remain several days-prior to the election during which the nlaintiff may a pply for registration, does not, in the light of the allegations of the bill,the proofs rendered and admissions made, pre vent him from ) asking for, nore the court from granting, the relief prayed for. I was asked, in case any portion of the said registration laws should be found invalid, to eliminate the part so found and decree that the remaining sections should stand. I have not been able to make the separation, for I find it all so interwoven as to render it impracticable. so far as results are concerned, and I cannot winnow when there is no oeram. In behalf of those so treated, all interested in the welfare of their country and desirous of seeing its laws enforced, should protest, in order that public sentiment should no Jonger be dormant, but may by its ac tivity rouse the community that has long suffered by such outrages to a re alization of their cause, and to an ap preciation of the beneficial results to be secured by the abolishment of the system that has caused them. .AGAD'ST THE NEGRO ? If we may judge of what the in tention of th Leislature was, by the inevitable result of its enactment, as we are assured we can (Soon Hing vs. Crowley, 113 U;. S., 703- Minnesota vs. Barber, 136 U. S., 313.) then the one object that controlled the minds of those who formulated the enact ment I have been considering was how best to abridge and destroy the greatest number of votes of the citizens of African descent, while at the same time interfering with as few as possi ble of the votes of the white race. The fact is that, with a candor that was as frank as it was amazing, this was virtually admitted during the ar gument of this case. It is evid'ent that the effect of this registration system is to fearfully impede the exercise of the right of suffrage by the colored voters of the State of South Carolina. It to a great extent defeats their constitu tional right to vote, and it seems to be the leading, I miust be permitted to say, its only object, the effort being to so legislate as to apparently respect constitutional requirements. but at the same time stab to the death the rights and immunities guaranteed by them. Finding as I do that the registration laws of South Carolina are unconstitu tional, and that their enforcement will deprive the plaintiff, a citizen of the UCiited States, of the rights of a citizen of the same. I conclude that this court has jurisdiction of this case, and that the same is not a proceeding against the State of South Carolin, prohibited by the Eleventh Amenment to the Constitution of the United States: I find that the bill does present a ques tion arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that the plaintiif' has not a plain and adequate reniedy at law: that the bill is sufli cienthy verified and not multifarious. Under these circumstances, it is the duty of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Caroli na to entertain this complaint, an in stance in which duty mingles with in clination. NoT A "FoREIGN' COU'RT. I have noticed durng the prgrs of this case a disposition to regard thie court as a foreign jurisdiction. much to my surprise and my regret. This is as much a court of the State of South Carolina as is the cir cui or ueme- cour of that State. The State of South Car olina assisted - in forming the Constitution and making the laws, by virtue of which this court was or ganized and now convenes. This court is and will be as careful and as jealous of the honor and the interests of that State as any of her citizens can be, and it hopes to merit their esteem by beino worthy of it. A distinguished jurist ofthat State is my associate on the circuit, and the Chief Justice of the United States is its presiding jus tice. Why such a court of the United States, convening in South Carolina, administering the laws of that State, should be regarded as a foreigh court, is wonderful in the extreme and as strange as is the story relative to which it is about to enter its decree. CON' 'LUSION. I will pass an order as prayed for by complainant, restraining and enjoin ing the defendant individually and as supervisor of registration from the performance of any of the acts men tioned and complained of in the bill. Nathan Goff, United States Circuit Judge. THE INJUNCTION. The following is the order of injunc tion passed by Judge Goff in the case of Mills vs. Green: "It is ordered that ths restraining order heretofore granted by this court bearing date the 16th day of April, 1895, enjoining and restraining the said respondent from exercising any duties, or performing any acts com plained of in the said bill of the com plaint, either individually or as super visor of registration for the country of Richland, State aforesaid, be, and the same is hereby continued, subject to the final determination of the issues involved in this case, or until the fur ther order of this court." THE OTHER CASES. In the case brought by Messrs. Cald well and Pope, to enjoin the election of delelegates for the Constitutional Convention, Judge Goff delivered a short opinion, sustaining the jurisdic tion of the court to consider the mat ter, but holding that the complainants had not shown themselves entitled to the injunction that they demanded. The temporary injunction (passed some weeks ago) was dissolved; which leaves the State officers without inter ference as to their respective duties in the matter of arranging for the due election of delegates to the Constitu tional convention-at least so far as the proceedings taken by Messrs. Pope and Caldwell have thus far gone.* ALL OVER. When the last opinion had been de livered, and the injunctions duly signed, the court was finally ad journed. Judge Goff left this afternoon for his home in West Virginia, and Judge Simonton, with the officers of the court, took the afternoon train for Charleston. The Contempt Case. The decision of the court in the pro ceeding against Dispensary Commis sioner Mixon and Constables A. T. Davis and S. G. Lafar, charged with contempt of court in. disregarding the injunctions of Judge Goff and Judge Simonton, respectively-which in junctions forbade the seizure of liquor brought into this State, consigned to private parties, was also delivered this morning. One alleged contempt con sisted in the issue of the following cir cular letter: COLUMBIA, S. C., April 25, 1895 Circular Letter to State Constables: Sir: Enclosed you will find three kinds of certificates to be used only as follows: One to bring goods into the the State, one to carry goods out of State and the other to ship goods from point to point in the State. The latter ones will be used by every one who does any shipping in the State, includ ing shipping from the State dispensary to the county dispensaries and else where, and by the State constables in shipping to the commission here. You will see that the blanks are prprly filled in and you will be priuarly vigilant to catch any ,packages going from place to place in this State not bearing ihe proper certificate and in taking packages shipped into or out of the State, unless properly stamped. You will also find twelve of the certifi cates -for your own use. Send into me any others you may have on hand. E. M. Mixson, State Commissioner. Each of the constables set up that he did not know of the injunction and that he was acting- under the law. In both returns, also, it was claimed that the court was without jur isdiction in the premises. All the partres attached for contempt disclaimed any purpose whatever to disregard the orders of the court, and expressed their purpose to obey them in future. The Commissioner stated that in is suing the circularletter he had no pur pose to disregard any order of cotirt. The decision in this matter was as fol lows: United States of America, District of South Carolina, Fourth Circuit-In the Circuit Court--In re Frank M. Mixson. The respondent in his return to the rule issued against him disclaims on oath any intent or purpose to oppose, disregard or disobey the order of his court. In the special matter of the certifi cates issued by him to the State con stables he says under oathb that this was done in ti't ordinary duties of his olice, that the certificates were pre pared long before the order was issued and although they were marked on the same day on which the order was served on him, he did this with no in tent or purpose of disobeying or disre garding the order. That in his circular letter addressed to the State constables simultaneously with the issue of the certificates he in advertently gave them instructions. His counsel in his behalf stated in open court that this was the result of inexperience in his office. He now knows that lie has no right to give constables anv~ instructions. But he disclaims in so doing any intent or purpose of opposing, disregarding or disobeying the order of this court. Under these circumstances, and in view of these solemn declarations tun der oath by respondent he is held to have purged himself of contempt. The rule is discharoe. Charles II. Simonton, Circuit Judge. May S, 1895. F~or the information of those who have their smokehouse in the West and use quantities of canned goods put up there, we will state that as cattle have increased in price and horse flesh has gone down, a Chicago dispatch re ported that the worn-out horses would be killed and canned instead of being sold for legitim ate purposes. Thfink of "old George" or "obl Lucy'- as WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN! PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ONE CON DITION. As Expressed to Mr. Stephens at Hampton Roads Conference--Agreeing to Union the Confederacy's Demands Would Have Been Granted. ATLANTA, May, 7.-Col Evan P. Howell, of the Atlanta Constitution, adds an interesting chapter to the con troversy over what occurred at the Hampton Roads conferenee betweeen President Lincoln and Hon. Alexan der Stephens, Vice President of the Confederacy. It will be remembered that Mr. Watterson recently stated that at that conference President Lin coln presented a sheet of paper to Mr. Stephens, sayine, "I will write the word 'union' at tie top and you may write what you please on the other." A statement which is taken as mean ino that Mr. Lincoln was ready and w' ' g to pay the South for the slaves. In last Sunday's Constitution John Temple Graves endeavored to show that Mr. Lincoln made no such proposition and he quotes from Messrs. Step hens, Reapon, Hunter and Camp be to sustain him in the issue thus made. . The Philadelphia Times, in an editorial written presumably by Colo nel McClure, throws additional light on the subject claiming that Mr. Lin coln would have proposed to pay the South $4O,000,000 for her slaves, but did not make the proposition simply because Mr. Stephens had stated atthe outset that he could not entertain any .proposition that did not embrace the pe etuity of the- Cnfederacy. 1 Howell's letter gives the details of a conversation he had with Alexan der H. Stephens on the subject under discussion. Shortly after Mr. Stephens was inaugurated Governor of Georgia, in the year 1882, he spent a day as the guest of Col. Howell at his home. Af ter dinner, the talk turned to the Hampton Roads conference, and Mr. Howell asked Mr. Stephens if he ever had any hope that the conference would turn out differently from the way it did, Mr. Stephens said: "I had great hopewben the question was first agitated about the conference. I was always in favor of settling the war and preventing further bloodshed and when the conference was suggest ed by Mr. Blair and others, I took a very active part in pushing it. There was very bitter o sition to it on the part of the frien of President Davis in the Congress, but finally it was au thorized and commissioners were se lected to attendtheconference. Much to my regret these commissioners were given specific instructions which pre vented them negotiating for pi'ace on any other basis than that which guar anteed the independence and autono my of the Confederate States." Mr Stephens went on to tell of his con ference with Mr. Davis, in which he urged that the commission be not ham--_1-_ pered with instr-uctions, but he oot no encouragement; on the other hand, the day the commissioners left, they were pointedly informed that no set tlement could be considered that did not recognize the independence of the Confederate government. Mr. Steph ens told of the meeting with Mr. Lin coln and his associates and the cordi ality of Mr. Lin~coln's greeting of the representatives of the Confederacy. 'After we had returned to the saloon of the steamer,'' continued Mr. Steph ens, "Mr. Lincoln was very talkative and pleaant with all of the commis sioners. He seemed to be in n splendid humor and was in excellent spirits. After a while I joined him and we went apart from the others and sat down at a small table where there was writing material. This was before any formal discussion had commenced. Mr. Lincoln broached the subject o'f the conference and expressed special pleasure at the fact that I was one of the commissioners. . He said to me with great earnestness: 'I believe you and I can settle this matter. I know you and you know me. I have confidence in your integvrity and be lieve you have m mie oo think you would ask me to. do anything im. proper and I would not require your consent to any'thing which I believe unjust.' Picking up a piece of paper and pushing it toward me, he said: 'I will write one word at thetop of this sheet of paper and that word will be 'union,' and with that as a basis, you may write out the terms of settlement and on that I will use all my influence to have Congress settle as we agree.' "I then told him what our instruc tions were from President Davis and when I did a cloud came over his face, his chin dropped to his breast and for several minutes he did not say a word. After a pause he raised out of his seat and said to me with hands uplifted. 'Then Iam not responsible for any fur ther bloodshed. I had hoped the war would end with this conference, but it is impossible to make any .settlement with the instructions by which you are. bound. I trust you will consider confidential what has occurred between us. "If we had been empowered to ne otiate a settlement with the preserva ion of the U~nion as a basis, the South would have been paid for our salves and we would have got an just and an honorable and reasonable recogni tion at the hands of Mr. Lincoln. Of coruse-'our instructions binding us to recognize only the independence of the South, prevented our accomplishing anything, for at the ,threshold of Mr. Linicolns desire for peace, was his de termination that it must be based upon Union." "These are the words, as near as I can remember, which Mr. Stephens spoke at my residenice," says Col. Howell. "W\\ith the exception of my family, the only person present, was the late Mark .Johnston. an intimate friend of Mr. Stephens since boyhood and a neighbor of mine, who I had in vited over to take dinner with me. "I asked Mr. Stephens at that time to permit me to publish the conversa tion, but lie expressed his preference. to have nothing said about it, as the conference was a matter of unwritten history, and lie did not feel even then author'ized to make it public. Since, however, the matter has come up for newspaper discussion. I think it but justice to all concerned that the public be given the benfit of this statement from one of the most important char acters in that noted conference." A Chinaman, be he king or coolie, is devoted to his fatther and mother. When either parenit dies custom or dains that the sous shall resign all honors and emptloyments to repair to the ancestral tomb and mourn there f,- a long neriod.