The telescope. (Columbia, S.C.) 1815-1818, August 20, 1816, Image 1
THE TELESCOPE.
[Vol. I.] COLUMBIA. (8. C.) TUPSDAY, AUGUST 20, 1H1G. [No. 35.}
niRUMIB WklRU
BY THOMAS W. LORIIAIN.
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IJTKKAHY HKVIEW.
Thf finbstancc of fume fatten written by an
Engtitiiman resident at Paris, during the last
reign of the /Cmperor JVupoleon t wUhanJlu?
jirmli.v of original Documents. Two vols.
Hvu. pp. 1)50. London, IblG.
COMTIXVr.ll.
AVe cannot help observing, tliat tl?o anecdote
relating to a plot proposed to tlio duke of Or
leans, tint! disclosed by thui prince to the king,
does not appear to us probable, and at any rate
ought not to havo been inserted by our author,
upon such information as disappointment and
jenluusy are too likely to have furnished upon
tiucli a subject.
The (itli letter contains a concise and interest
ing account of the progress of Napoleon from
Porto Fcrrajo to Paris j and the 8th describes
the royal court in its expiring moments.
A question, by no means uninteresting, sug
gest* itself at the close of this period, viz. Whe
ther a successful resistance could Imvo been
made at any, and at what moment, to the ad
vance of Napoleon. It is manifest, we think,
from the facta and observations contained in this
work, and from subsequent events, that neither
?ho popularity of Napoleon with the people, nor
the. attachment of the army, would ofthemselves
hove been sufficient to givo him so conspicuous
n triumph over u rival in possesion of the crown
and the capital. If any one will call to mind the
opprobrious usage Bonaparte met with hut one
year before in the very provinces which now
nailed his return, he wdl be convinced that ha
tred to the royal house which now governed
them, rattier than attachment to their ancient
chief, obtained from the people of France their
ready acquiescence in his designs.?The exis
tence of a previous conspiracy in his favour is
Ho longer asserted } and the government of
France has inelleetually attempted to givo the
colour of hucIi a charge to any one of tho trials
which havo already taken place at Paris. As to
the army, it is notorious that their allegiance
had been ottered to other persons, and that the
conspiracy of Drouet and l?efevre Desnouettes,
(the only one which broke out during tho eleven
months,) hud not only no connexion w ith Hona
Eirtc, but had avowedly another chief in view.
y comparing dates, it will be found that nei
ther did the commanders swerve, nor the regi
ments revolt, until the conviction of the perfidy
and imbecility of tho government which they
had served when it most needed their assistance,
had become irresistible in the whole body. It is
true the disgust was universal { but, on the first
intimation of the approaching danger, the lea
ders of the constitutional opposition, among
whom our author particularly cites M. Constant
and the author of the Cenmtr, rallied round the
tln one, from a conviction, no doubt, that liberty
had more to fear from the power of Napoleon,
than from the feebleness of the Bourbons j and,
in the hope of profiting by tho difficulties of the
severcign, to extend the rights, and to confirm
the lil>erticM of the people.
Wise and liberal councils were undoubtedly
rccommondod ; and the unimpeachable virtue of
Lafayette and D'Argonson was ottered to medi
ate between the king anil his people. It may be
doubted, indeed, whether this reconciliation
would then liuve been an available defence, but
there is no question, that although a seeming ac
quiescence was given in tho councils proposed,
and although the king was made to appear eager
to embrace a constitutional system, yet no act
of popular conciliation?no sympton of rcpen
tanco appeared. Chateaubriand prayed?and
Lalluy Tollendal wept-?and I,nine recanted ?
but the insincerity and weakness of the court
counteracted tho eflfect of their protestation,
and paraly/.ed the efforts of their more able and
patriotic supporters. With us, indeed, it is a
matter ol serious doubt, whether tho priest* and
nobles, and, in general, those who surrounded
the person of the monarch, did not, upon calcu
lation, prefer flight, and the chance of return
with foreign arms, to such a reconciliation with
the people as would have alono secured iU co
operation in that terrible crisis. There, arc,how
ever, among those who displayed tho most no
ble energy in that moment, persons eminently
qualified to satisfy the world upon those trans
actions | and to them we look with confidence
foru narrative, illustrating the character of the
nation, which demanded liberty, and of tho court,
which hated it too much to purchaso its otvn
safety at such a price.
In the night of the 19th of March, tho king
leaves his capital ? and on the follow ing oveninu,
.Napoleon arrives.
" Paris, on the entry of Napoleon, presented
but a mournlul spectacle. 'Ihe crowd which
went out to meet the eni|>eror, remained in the
outskirts of the city i the shop* were shut?no
one appeared at the windows?the Boulevards
were lined with a multitude collected about tho
many mountebanks, tumblers, &c. which, lor
the two last days, had been placed there in grea
ter numbers than usual by tlio police, in order to
divert the populace. There was no noise, nor
any acclamations j a few low murmurs and whis
pers were alone heard, when tho spectators of
thcsQ open shows turned round to look at tho
?tringof six or eight carriages, which preceded
the imperial troops. The regiments then pas
sed along, and cried out, vive I'empcrcur {-?not
ii word ftom any one. Tlicr tried tho more po
pular and ancient exclamation, vivo Bonaparte \
atl Htill nilent. The patience of the* dragoons
was exhausted f some brandished their swords,
other* drew their pistols, and rode into the al
loy** amidst the people, exclaiming," Criedonc.
vive I'omporcur V' but the crowd only gave way,
and retreated, without uttering a word. 1. p. 179.
True it is, that although tlio Bourbons fled
from their palace, unpiticd and unrcgrettcd. yet
tho return of tho adventorer was marked by
gloom, and ho wan saluted by fewer acclamati
ons than had greeted him iu tho smallest town.
It was difficult t> any, that the royalist faction
i was tho |)rcdoiniiiant one in Paris ; lor never did
a sovereign recoivo less consolation than did
Louis, when lie invited the national guard to
defend his faithful city. Hut passion had since
given way to reflection. The fugitive dynasty
appeared by ita weakness to offer more satisfac
tory chances to the lovers of freedom, than the
return of a conqueror, strentliened by a popula
rity to which he hod long been a stranger, and
who, by the unauthori/.ed resumption of a title
which he had forfeited, and by the violent tenor
of his proclamations from Lyons, seemed to seek
the recovery of his throne,* in tho same spirit
which had formerly deprived him of it.
Our limits prevent u? from entering into any i
detail of the public acts of thnt short lived retell,
or following our author in those numerous dis
positions with which he has, we think, some
what overloaded the narrative of that interesting
period. Suffice it to say, that his style, ratifr'
wordy and diffuse-?his arrangement prejudicial
to the story?and an eagerness of opinion, ra
tlier dangerous in tho historinn, ore amply com
pensated by the able and honest spirit of liis po
litical views, and, above all, by nis industrious
and impartial relation of the measures and faults
of the imperial government, during the hundred
days of iU dotation. Tho usurpation of power
?the return to despotic passions?Hie appeal to
public feeling and national vanity on tho part of
tho monarch?the menial vassalag* ?nd submis
sion of a corrupt aristocracy?the crouching re
pentance of the miciemw noblest? on tho one
hand ; on tho other, the resistance of popular
feeling?-the manly spirit of tho public bodies??
the license of the press?the unanimous devoti
on of literary men to the cause of liberty?the
republican spirit, the constitutional jealousy of
the people, and the .submission of the crown?
tho desire of peace, even iu the ariny?and the
general will in the nation to be free, are alter
nately offered in the great picture which no com
mon industry or skill have here presented to our
observation.
We shall offer but one or two remarks upon
the character of tho government an?l the nation,
during that unparalleled cruris.
Confidently oh we maintain the privilege of
discussing the character and conduct of all those
who fill the eye of the world, and influence it*
destinies, we desire not at all to enter into com*
petition with thoso of our contemporaries, who,
in a loathsome recapitulation of private vices,
endeavor to complete the portrait which they
sketch in ignorance nod passion j nor can we acl
inii e their patriotic distrust of the national feel
ing, which they seem to think cannot ho made
sufficiently adverse to a defeated and degraded
monarch, without henping on his head imputati
on* of a nature only to be gathered in converse
with the basest of human being*. For us it is
sufficient that lie was ambitious, and a hater of
liberty ; and by all that we can collect from this
work, and from other sources of information, we
doubt whether his disposition was in tho smal
lest degree altered, in this respect, by his year
of mortification. Like manv others, corrupted
by high station, he kcciiis always to have been
willing to extend the promise of' frenriom on the
peril of the moment; but never to have been sa
tisfied of its actual advantage to the people, or of
its being compatible with the existence of a pow-i
erful government. In all (he conversations
which he held with the einiuont persons then la
bouring to extort from him concessions to the
people, he is said to have manifested a total in
sensibility on this point. And in the council of
state, held to discuss tho subject of confiscation,
he was so irritated at the attenpt to deprive the
crown of this power, that he exclaimed,44 Je vois
bien co que vous voulc/., Messieurs j main cein
lie sera pas. II faut encore le bras, le vieiuv
brasde f'Kinpcrcur !?et vous lo sent'ire/.."
Neither had his misfortunes destroyed that ell
tire confidence in himself, nor that belief in thu
superior intelligence which guided him, and
made it impitssible for him to share hi a power.
His insensibility to reproach can only be ac
counted for by this favourite belief, which, in
deed, appears at all times to have relieved his
conscience from the torment of self-accnoation.
It is reported, and, we believe, with perfec t
truth, that when tho suicide of Uerthier was re
luted to him by one of his minister*, he replied,
" See the power of conscionce ! Uerthier left
France with his family, and nil hi* fortune ; but
lie had betrayed me, and lie could not survive it
?while 1 liuve never for one night been depri
ved of sleep !*'
Ily far tho mo^t interesting and important
part of this book, is the account given of the last
of the threo periods into which wo divided it, in
the commencement oi'ihi* article *, and it would,
we presume, be difficult to obtain a more acu
rate, detailed, and impartial narration of tho
uuparallelled crisis which took place after the re
turn of ltonaparte to l'nris, than is given by thin
anonymous writer, who seems, indeed, to be
eminently qualified, by his general accomplish
ments, the opportunities he enjoyed, anil the
time he ha* sinco hail to correct lih first impres
sion*, to settle our belief at to the leading event*
of that memorable period. We have already
Mated, that there arv mmy matter* of" opinion
unon which v/e entirely disagree with hiin ; anil
although we give him credit Tor a most faithful
relation of all the outward acts of the French
authorities during thin strugglo, must be allowed
to dilVvr with him in the confidence with which
it would rather seem that certain characters had
inspired him. We own, that several of those
norkuiih, to whom our author inclines to attri
bute virtues of a higher order, appear to us to
have been feeble or treacherous f nor can we
join with him, in attributing great merit to Lan
|uinais, the president of un assembly, which is
so well described in the following passage, that
we cannot refuse to insert it.
Thus the king, amongst the other benefits
which must make liis name dear to Fieuchmenv
muy join that of having brought to a close the
labors of a representation us moderate, as en
lightened, and as truly national, an it iH possi
ble to assemble in France; a representation less
tinctured, perhaps, than might be expected
with the fuuits incident to popular bodies?and
developing, each day, in circumstances of un
parallelled difficulty and danger, qualities both
of the head and heart, which will reflect honor
on their labours, and, however unsuccessful, will
not be wholly lost ; for they will serve as an in
citement nnu example for those whose future ef
forts shall meet with a more deserved and abet
ter fate. The king himself, us well ns his nati
on, must be considered infinitely their debtor,
as the resolution of the secret committee, on the
2'2d of June, compelled Napoleon to abdicate,
and saved his capital, if not his crown. It re
dounds, however, to their glory, that none of
them made any merit of this action, as if per
formed in his favor, or from any other motive1
than that of saving their country from extremi
ties. 'Hie royalists would not have had the re
quisite courage, which, in France, is to be found
only r.mongst the friends of freedom. These
partisans insult them with surviving their func
tions, and ridicule M. Manuel's quotation from
Mirabeau, with a spite which shows how happy
they would have been to witness the extirpation
of the patriots. Their spirit has been already
sufficiently displayed, i'hey did not die on
their curule chuirs, it is true $ but personal ex
posure is rendered respectable and useful by tho
time in which it is employed. The senators of
liomo who were massacred by Hrennus had a ve
ry different fate with posterity from thosu who
were whipped naked in the squares by the Ger
man Otlio, yet tho courage of both and their
cause were tho same. The representatives
would not have been shot, but sent to jail."?
Vol. II. p. 1G8.
I We believe a mor*> accurate investigation
would have informed the writer of these IrtterB,
that great suspicion attaches to the character oi
Laoiuinais, for having adjourned the assembly
on the 7th of July, contrary to the remonstran
ces of many of its members ; and by tho?e who
had formerly most confidence in his fidelity, it
is generally believed that he was informed of the
determination to obstruct their reassembling.?
llut the chief point uimhi which wo would warn
our readers against the uxcessive charity of this
acute writer, is the character of Fouche, duke of
Otrnnto, the rent sovereign of France, during
that eventful time, and to whom he gives credit
for many more virtues than, upon a luir exami
nation o! the facts, we can ever think him enti
tled to. His repeated reflections on this subject,
indeed, and the very prominent liguro which
the personage in question makes in this extra
ordinary crisis, have induced us to attempt a
short sketch of his life and character, taken from
a pretty carcfui observation of his public acts
during the manifold changcs of the lust quarter
of a centurv.
lie plunged into the revolution at an early
age } ami, either from enthusiasm or fear, very
hooii became attached to the violent |?nt-fy in the
convention?assisted it in overturning the Gi
rondine faction?and finally executed, and
boasted of huving executed, against that portv
and the royalists at Lyons, cruelties wliicli
would have done honor to robcxpicnc himself,
to whose ruin, after the murder of Diinton, he
especially contributed, on tho 9th Thcrinidor.?
From that hour, Fouche seams to have sought
recoliciliation with the moderato party?hut in
vain. lie wax, with tho rest of the jacobin*,
expelled the convention?his arrest nan decreed
?anil ho OHcaped only by flight. In his con
cealment, ho published an address to the con
vention, whicli, in nloce of justifying himself,
accused that asseinoly of having authorized and
provoked all the violent measure* of which he
liaU been tho organ.
From that |ieriod to (lie year 179(5, ho wan an
object of suspicion as a terrorist. Whenever a
jacobin conspiracy wan discovered, he uniformly
disappeared from the scene, and only reappear
ed when the attacks of the royalist party urove
the directory to seek aid from'the jacobins. In
every such crisis, ho resumed their principles,
and sought eagerly for einplm-inent, from wliicli
he was only excluded by his former bad renuta
tion. In 1797 he was sent oil a mission to Italy
?reappeared on tho IBth of Fructidor, and
was proposed for the ministry of police??but
again rejected j and it was not until the revolu
tion which took place in the directory in 1798,
that he obtained that ministry, tfyeve* then
prevailed through the aid of tlie jacobins, but
immediately became their enemy | and Fouclte,
who, as in 1794, hoped to reconcile hitnsolf with
the nation, gave to his administration a very
mild character, although ho secretly protected
the jacobins, and with difficulty escaped himself
from tho vengeance of tho wily director. Upon
the return of lionaparte* whom Hyeyei unwil
lingly associated to his designs of overturning
the directory, Fouche conducted himself with
I such address, that, although known to be the
fitend of the jaccbius, ana himself under the
surveillance of Thurnt, his chief secretary, who
had order* to arreat him upon the first symptom
of treachery, ho outrode tne storm | and, upon
the 18th llrumaire, ho remained in office, and
without delay attached Inmseff to Honapartc.
Now, for the first time, hi* repentance could
manifest it sol I in an effectual manner}?tho mi
nister supported his master in organizing a mi
tigated despotism; and, profiting by tho vio
lence of llonaparte, he obtained lor hiniHelf the
reputation of a protector of all parties, and,
Kpito of hi* former crimen, hi* namn became uni
versally popular in France. Nothing, indeed,
was mo easy as thin munuuivro to those who
know llonaparte. The emperor issued a violent
decree?Pouchc made tho nature of it known
before it wan promulgated?blamed it in conver
sation?then only half executed it. The empe
ror wan angry?the minister executed it entire
ly llut in the mean time lie wuh known to
to ha\o blamed it, and to have retarded its exe
cution. Sometimes, too, the emperor was per*
Hiiuded, in the interval, to mitigate its severity,
ho that, even by the delav, Fouche, no doubt,
contributed to preserve the lives and fortune*
of many of his countrymen.
Bonaparte noon perceived his minister's gaino
?but the fear of Ins influence, and the power of
his agent*, was such, that he did not send him.
away till tho end of three years. At last the
blow was struck. Pouche <|uitted his first min
istry, and although he had transported one hun
dred and thirty republicans for 11 conspiracy, irt
which ho declared thov were not concerned, and
conducted to the scaffold four Frenchmen for n
filot of which he denied the existence.?although
ic had let many royalists be shot, nod had ban
ished many more,?-lie Imd universally, on hi*
retirement, the. chaructcr of being a staunch
friend both of the royalists and of the repubUt
cans.
The government of his successor, Hegniei,
was distinguished by the trial of I'ichogru and
Moreau, and the murder of tin* duke d'hugheiu
In that season of gloom and terror, Pouchc was
again longed for ; and Napoleon, in spite of his
suspicions, found it prudent to replace him.
lie continued to practise spin hi? old game?
delay?bold and mysterious conversation?
blame of his master's plans?which he neverthe
less executed, when resignation was the alter
native.
Ill I RIO, Bonaparte suddenly abused Itini in
council; obliged liim to accept the government
of ltomu; then dismissed liim from the mi nil
try ; sent liim from Paris), anil arrested him on
the road. Fouchc threatened discoveries, and
c*ca|>ed into banishment and obscurity, where
he remained until the first abdication of the em
peror. Fouc.ho nt first dreaded the counterre
volution; but seeing M. do Talleyrand in pos
sesion of the government, he not only took
courage, but nspired to complete his whitewash
ing, by becoming the minister of Louis XVIII.
1 lirt conduct during the eleven mootlws of that
reign was conformable to this project. To the
patriot*, he insisted on the necessity of a popu
lar ministry. To the princcs, with whom he
continually intrigued, he promised the consoli
dation of the monarchy, us he had effected that
of Napoleon, and expressed sincere contrition
for the death of Louis XVI. To thu jacobins,
In? declared his adherence, and promoted their
projer.U and conspiracies, llis conversation
was of a piece. He abused the Bourbons?then
said they might be saved by making him a min
ister ;?occasionally announced a plot?which
he assured the royalists he endeavored to pre
vent for the sake of the king,?and the jacobins,
to save their heads. A little treachery toward*
all nartics heightened thu zest, and proved tho
authenticity of h'u communicViins?and in
creased thu anxiety which wus to make his as
sistance valuable.
When Napoleon landed, Fouchc offered him
self to the court. Tho princes negotiated with
him ; but after the first conference,orders were
given to arrest him. Home lave thought that
this arrest was a stratagem, to insure the em
ployment of Fouchc by the usurper : und tho
conduct of the former to Bonaparte, and the
indiscretion of the royalists, who never ceased
to count uiion him, and to quote the proofs of
iheir intelligence with him, might seem to war
rant this notion t but we are more apt to attri
bute to thu habitual distrust and weak nets of
that family, an act which, after all, could nev
er conceal from Napoluon the constant in
trigue* of Fourhe with the discarded dynasty,
(t is well known that he had said to one of tho
emigrating royalists, *? Hauvez Jo Monarque?
Jo rcpomls do la monarchic." This, it is true,
may be attributed to the habitual lightness of
bin conversation, which is so great, that it i*
well known that when the duke of Wellington
reproached him with hnving assorted to the
chamber, in his message from tho government,
that the allies insisted on the restoration of the
king, and challenged him to provo the truth of
the assertion, ho replied, " Que voulez vou? do
plus ? he Itoi, n'est-il pas dans sou Palais ?
C'est toutcequ'il faut."
Honapnrte, dependent and timid as he was at
his last return, had no option about employing
Carnntaud Fouchc ; and tho conduct of the lat
ter from that moment became problematical.
On the one hand, he used all means to attach to
the imperial government, all those whose popu
larity gave strength to it. Itlsouualiy carton,
that if fie meditated at that timo the overthrow
of Napoleons he did not confide hie project, to
those fi'ends of liberty whom hi Had tallied
round the eagle, although many of thorn wen
his intimate friends. On the other hand, ho did
not fail to revert to hit old tactic*, fa ?o?v?r*
sation, he blamed and treated with ridicule a fid
contempt the projects of the omoeror, whose go*
terotn?u?i he aaW^ran great n?u. Ha Alloy. *1