Historical Newspapers of South Carolina

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WAR SI 'Why Hood's Campaig liam's Shameful Dis News and ??Jndertbe head of "Thc Lost Op portunity at Spring Hill," the fol'ow na?g piper by Congressman Elliot waa iread at ihe reunion of Confederate "\S'eter?D8 in Charleston: In tho latter part of November, JISW, Gen. Hood's army was at and isear Columbia, Tenn., on its way to .^Nashville. It had started on tho ?axopaigo from Palmetto Station, Ga., on the 2Uth of September, had made attacks on Aokworth, Big Shanty, A?tvon? and Dalton; had destroyed ibo railroad track and bridges wher .iver practicable, then struck across dbe country to Gadsden, theo towards .Florence, had crossed the Tennessee JBiver, and was now confronting Scho field's forces, which had evacuated (Columbia on November 27, and had entren ched themselves on the oppo se ?ide of Duck Uiver. Gen Hood's anny consisted of three corps, Stephen I>" .Lee's, Cheatbam's and A. P. Stewart's, each consisting of three divisions aud numbering (on the 6th o? November,) in all, staff, escorts, engineer troops, artillery and one di sdsion of cavalry, 30,599 "etteotive total." Gen. Schofield's foret? con unsted of the 4th army corps, under ?Geo. Stanley, and a part of tho 23d ttorps. On the 14th of November he ?reported his "effective foroo was 18, 01)1) infantry and four brigades of cmvaJry," to whioh must bc added a brigade and a half, which subsequent Bysspoited to him at Columbia. Gen. Schofield's orders from Gen. Thomas were to delay Gen. Hood until .Thomas's reinforcements reached Nashville, and to avoid a general tattle nnlesB it oould be fought on ifavojable terms. The reinforcements ??:CD moving to Gen. Thomas, were A. S. Smith's oommand, about 8,000 affective, from Missouri and Steele's aommand, about the same strength, Stow Arkansas; and Gen. Hood's glan was to crush the enemy before rois junction could be made. If this ?Dam be done before S ii ur ?mm bsd abos to repair the railroad from Chat tanonga to Atlanta and collect suffi csrient supplies for his march through ?eorgia it waa hoped that Sherman would be compelled to return to Ten nessee i to protect his connections, ?en. Hood had, however, most un fortunately, been delayed at Fiorenoe igr lack of supplies and continuous -fains. Sherman had started on his anarch on November 15 and the Trana - Mississippi troops commenoed arriving at ^ashville on November 30. Under ibis slate of affairs there was but one Ohing for Gen. Hood to do-force {Schofield to fight at a disadvantage. *5?e situation Was exceedingly favor able for this plan. Wo were but two days' march from Nashville.' Gen. untaros s V appeals to Schofield to de Bay Hood were Urgent and oft repeated; oven on the 30th ho appealed, to Scho field to bold Hood at Franklin -for obree days longer, and Gen. Sob ofield 2ms lately stated to mo that this posi I Moa was one of great peril? but that., ic felt impelled by Gen. Thomas's appeals to take every risk. Gen. Schofield had but one road by which io fal) back on Franklin, twenty-one aoiles distant, and if Hood could get an bis rear on. this road. Schofield's main seemed inevitable. Our army was. in fine spirits, ns was splendidly ?jp-jOYcd the next day at Franklin. v,?an. Hood selected Spring Hill, bine ?utas in tho rear of Schofield, as the* ipttbt at whioh to strike. His plan* was to cross tho IDuck River, five seules above Columbia, with Cheat Saas1? and Stewart's corps and Joh n \MS?B division of Lee's corps, leaving . ILeevi?t?i two divisions, to faou ^cbo. fioW-ftfCTofumbia andengage bis atton l6e?&y a?kibg demonstrations ss if to (cross that point. Etrly on the morn 5ns of the 29tb, oerfcainly by half-past '.?o'c?oc?, Hood commenced crossing Thia- infantry at Huey's Mills, being , BTGoadad by Forrest's cavalry, whioh was greatly superior to the enemy's. Sb was thou but twelve miles from S^?i&gv Eiii; was uucscueibeife? by l$Wmejy and wagon B, while Schofield, mmatt bis artillery and trains and f wjtb all bis infantry was. at 8 o'c?o^ ?. ss. , still opposite Columbia; ntfle : ' n&laa ' Irom Spring Hill. Hood's wjaeatag bad been unopposed, and ; ?rmyts?ng looked bright ana promis Sag for ibo sucooss of tho movement. 3 will jcause for a moment in my ?&v? ' en say that Gen* Schofield and Geo. Wk?i knew each other well; baying toro classmates Rfc Weat Point. "*?e*w Schofield tells tb? following i-'?*Bry ia bis ^Forty-six Years in the 'Atraj:'0 While-bsfoxo Atlanta g-?avd an Atlanta xi*ptrt giving an .?WttoU?t ot. Gen. Johnston being re S^?#;by Goo. Hood. "I stopped," c?ys' Goo. Schofield, 1 'until Sherm Ari [ npV.'.and;handed him tho paper.'.j [ORIES. ;n Failed-Gen. Cheat obedience of Orders. Courier. 'Schofield, do you know Hood? What sort of a fellow lb he?' I answered: 'Voa, know him well, and I will tel! you the sort of man he ia. He'll hit you like h-1 now beforo you know it.' ''Soon afterwarda," continues Scho field, "the ounfl of battle to our right gave indication of the heavy attack Hood'? troops made on Thom as's advancing columns that day, which failed of serious results, as I believe all now admit, mainly, if not entirely, because Thomas himself waa near the head of the. column which received the first blow." Gen. Schofield's first assignment, by the way, was at Fort Moultrie io September, 1853, and I must add what he says about us, which, even after the lapse of almost, half a cen tury, ought to make UB foe* pretty good: "It had been a yellow fever summer," ho says, "and the cottages on Sullivan's Island were even moro fully occupied than usual, mostly by families of planters from the rice plantations from South Carolina. Hospitality was unbounded and of the most charming character. Noth ing I have experienced at home or in the great capitals of Europe has sur? passed or dimmed the memory of that first introduction to Southern socio ty." But I must return to my story. Stephen D. Lee, always on the alert and as ready to obey the orders of his superior's as he was to haw his obey ed, faithfully exeeuted Gen. Hood's inatruotiona, and, after keeping the enemy in his front at Columbia busy all day on the 21)th, had his two di vision a aoross the river before day light next morning and on the march to Spring Hill, to attack Schofield in the rear, as was the plan of battle. ?8 the enemy bad certainly not left our front anti] after dark we felt as sured that by no possibility could he escapo Hood, and we experted to have the pleasure in an hour or two of attacking Schofield in the rear. An daylight came, however, Vnd. then sunrise without tho sound ol' ? ' r,un in front, Gen. Lee became alarmed lest there should bs some miscarriage, and ordered me to take the cavalry escort and move forward as rapidly as pos sible to find out what was the matter. For some miles we rode without meet ing anyone and without hearing a sound of battle. Finally we spied someone on the turnpike. Who is he, friend or foe? Were we at last on Soli ofield's rear guard? Could lt bo true that Hood's plan was at last ta succeed? Alas} No. This was no picket. Although in uniform be did not even have a gun, and exhibited *\ very peaceable disposition to all man kind, but not including chiokon-kind. He was that wonderful creature whom we all learned to know so well-the Confederate foragor-^ho fellow who could scent a supper a mile away who, the instant he got into camp -, would strike out on his campaign who in five minutes was on terms of intimate and loug-continucd friend ship with the inmates of every farm house-who, by superhuman knowl edge, was never lost, and Could tell by instinct just where Ms command would next march. Well, hero he was, with tho ino vi table smooth tongue andsednotive smite. f' What's, the matter?" I asked. "Well, noth ing," he answered. "Where's the \ enemy?" "Ob, they are tfoneV they - were marching by all night." "Why didn'jt yon attack them?" "Well," he ' answered; "I don't rightly know. ( We wera righi by * the road, fand they ? were marching close to us ali night, but we never fired a shot." So it waa all over, and Schofield ha^ Ck- ? caped. ' :, Being in advance ot Gen.. Lee, 1 , concluded to rido forward, report to , Gea. /Hood and get orders for the \ corps, t /finally fonnd. him snperin- ? tondiog tb? movement of the troops. ; He looked. tired and worn ? end ils ? faae .-.wag '. indescribably oad. ? te- , ported to him how ? was there and asked rf he. had any orders for Gen. Lee. "Tell Gan. Lee," be said-? am quoting his exact wordsi ihe memory of them was indelibly fixed in tay mind by tee fear f ol even ts j e!*h*i day-"Tell Gee. Lee that tho J wacie pian Was mi Boarded by ibo UQSV I diegraceful dioobedicnoe of . order?, I bot to move forward rapidly> that X will attack the enemy whenever; I meet bim." We all know the rosoli ; bow sra* followed tba enemy in his harried and disorderly reheat to Franklin, arriving there aimOct on bis heels; boa tho aUack was. made most gal lantly at 4 o'olock and the onemyV breastworks carried with a rush; how ho. rallied and held his ground until midnight; when ?i<reiVeated to Na ih yil! ? 0 - .. i : : i'. ; iii j-OSi-, ' .? .) ?':?)?'. Four thousand five hundred of our splendid men killed, wounded and missing! Among the killed five gen erals- Cleburn, our own Gist, John Adams, Strahl and Granbury. Gen. Adam's horse was found dead astride the inner line of the enemy's works. Gen. Manigualt was among the woun ded. As we marohed through the I town on our way to Nashville I aaw our dead lying four feet deep at the foot of the enemy's entrenchment!. What is the truth about Spring Hill? That a great opportunity was there loBt is abundantly proved. Gen. Hood says in his report: "About 4 p. m., our infantry forces, Major Gen. Cheetham in the advance, commenced to come in oontact with the enemy about two miles from Pjtring Hill, through which the Co lumbia and Franklin pike passes. The enemy were at this time moving along this pike, with some of theil troops formed on the flank of theil column to protect it. Major Gen. Cheatham was ordered at once to at taok the enemy vigorously and gel possession of this pike and althoogl these orders wero frequently and ear neatly repeated, he made hut a feebli and partial attack, failing to reach th point indicated. Darkness soon cami on, and, to our mortification, th enemy continued moving along tin road, almost in earshot, in hurry an confusion, nearly the entire night.' "ThuB was lost the opportunity fe striking the enemy for whioh wo ha labored so long,--the best which thi campaign has offered, and one of th best cv lorded us during thc war." Again Gen. Hood sayB: "About 12 p. m., ascertaining thi the enemy waB moving in great 001 fusion-artillery, wagons and troo] intermixed-I sent instruction? : Gen. Cheatham to advance * hca\ line of skirmishers against him at still further impede and confu.se h march. This was not aooomplishe The enemy continued to move alot the road io hurry and cenfusio within hearing all the night. "Lieut. Gen. Lee, left in front the enemy at Columbia, was instru? ed to press the enemy the moment abandoned his position at that poii Tho enemy did not abandon 1 works at that place till dark, she iog that bis trains obstructed t road for fifteen miloo during tho c and a great part of the night." Major Gen. Chalmers says: "When I crossed the Colum pike I learned, to my great astern ment, that tho enemy's whole coln had passed up that pike, andwithi very short distauoe of our isfsn lines, during the night." Our own Gen. Capers, the coloi now Bishop, gives in his report fullest statement of the condition things. His ..regiment,, the .2 South Carolina, was a part of Ch ham's corps. He says: "We arrived before Spring }} about sunset and were formed in of battle, facing the town and ap ontly; ; about a mile - distant, enemy scorned to be in confusion we con|d hear the noise of pul ?pkii fences , and houses and the t?ieg of wheels on the pike, troops were fighting on our xi and we were expecting moment) to be ordered forward. No. c came, however, and. as dark ^eim? the General (GiBt) and myself out toward the enemy, within p sb?ti This ' state of affairs was, still is inexplicable to me, and na a 'groat disappointment. X&te io the night we could hoar tho ro of whoola over the pike, as the my's artillery and wagons moved < Franklin* After : an anxious niel waiting and watching, wc moved morning on - to the pike and mai after Stewart's corps, towara ;#J lin. Burnt wagons and dead, r were passed on the pike and ovidenesB of a hasty retreat o? Bnemy." ^Vhat is the testimony fron: other aide? Major Gen. St : I*?8 night closed we could se seamy . rapidly, extending hi? and by 8 Vcjook it was ovidout at least a carps of Hood's arms formed in lino. -of battle, faoia turnpike and at a near 4feu but little more iban ha?* a mile it. Gen. Schofield arrived fron lembia .'el* o'cloek ir. ^?a?j raith Buger*? division. He fpun Btserny. c*? tM':-P?k??A?? skirmish ia driving; t?Sra of? pickata ^reported seeing eolumns passing east o! oar po; ss if to get poBSession oe; Mrs I ?hempson'? Staion, and tke ai question aros? ?a io whether we Toroa our tb^ugbi f te Fra It wu determines to 'a^emp?ta? Ul ea. Schofield pushed 'tm ?it ger's division to ascertain.the tioa e? affairs. He found tb Bnemy di? aofc attempt to ko road , ti was ab* ?1 u^e?oek at md Cox's division bad' inst j from in front of ???amhiah th; sion pushed en Rt, onjfa for lin." ; Farther ou Gao. Sooley say: "So close was tho enemy Banfe th&V. wilki a enlatan..w passing, ii y?aa ' duli cult for..'. ?'ir?'v? or ?vu ?y. U riv ic tie! th? 1........; out of the way, and the train com inenced to pullout ?tl o'clock on \\ the morning of the 30th. The num ber of wagons, including artillery and ambulances, was about 800. At the very starting point thoy bad to .tart singly over a bridge, and it was exceedingly doubtful whether the train could be put on the road by daylight. Unless this could be done and the corps put in motion, we were sure of being attaoked at daylight and of being oompelled to fight un der every disadvantage. I was strongly advised to burn the train and move on with the troops and such wagons a? could be saved, but I determinadlo make an effort to save the train. My staff officers were busily employed hurrying up team sters, and everything promised well, when we were again thrown into de spair by the report that the train was attaoked north of Thompson's Sta tion and that the whole train had stopped. It was now 3 o'clook in the morning." Another report says: "Gen. Schofield fofees bis way into Spring Hill with Huger'o two bri gades and establishes communications with Stanley." This was long after dark. We add tho following telegram from Gen Schofield to Gen. Stanley, cent from Franklin shortly before the battle: "Your dispatch of 10:25 a, m., is received. I am satisfied that I have heretofore run too much risk in try ing to hold Hood in oheok, while so far inferior to him in both infantry and cavalry. Thc slightest miatak on my.part, or failure of a subordi nate, during the last three days might have proved disastrous.. I don't want to get into so tight a place again. * v' * . I. fear the troops whiob were stationed on the river below Colombia will be lost." . WHY *WA3 NOT THE ATT??K MADE? .ys?;^*- .. \'."V\'*}x / ' ". ? " 1 v>:"'? . '. K'? ,*/ We find but little to answer the question. Gen. Oheatham made no report on the subject, so far as we oan find, and Gen. Cleburn, the next J in command, was killed on tho next day -at' Franklin. All that appears in the official record io the following from Gen. Hood: "Major Gen. Oheatham bas frank ly confessed the great error of which he was guilty, anet attaches ali blame to himself. While bis error lost so muon to the country, it bai been a severe lesson to bim, by which he will profit in the future. In consid eration ' of this and of his previous conduct I think it is best that "ho -Iv-IJ _:itt... nu.A?? iiia. DUVUIU I WalU >'IVl' V*?V> y.vovuw . *S>'V command he now bolds." Was there ever a more magnani mous act? . Gen. Hood also, later on,, wrote tho following note to Gen. A. P. Stewart: "I wish yon and your poople to underBtaod that I attach no blane to you for the failure at Spring HUI; on tho contrary, I know if I bad bad you there that attaok would have been made.". That -a splendid opportunity to orusb Schofield wac lost at Spring Hill no.-one can douU. If Gen. Hood had accomplished this, what would bave been the effect on the war? I lately put this question to Gen. Schofield, and he said: "Well, there would have been nothing left to oppose him, and be would have overrun Tennessee and Kentucky and gone to the Ohio River. There, of course, he would have been stopped." But whatever would have been tho effeot on the general result, it would Certainly have accomplished these two thing'.. We would have been spared Franklin and Nash ville and the name of a noble soldier would forever have been linked with victory instead of defeat. I cannot close without saying somet tbing in vindication of Geo. Hood, for whom I have always held great admiration. As to his general plan of campaign -leaving Sherman's front and get-' ting in his rear-it may be said that it received the endorsement of every ono of his superiors, and I believe of the entire army. I will not weary you with . any. extracts from the record except the following signi ficant deolarahcn from Gen. A. ,'P,V Stewart: v "J deem it proper to say that after the fall of Atlanta tho condition of the array/and other considerations rendered it necessary, in my judg ment, that an offensive campaign should be made, in the enemy's rear ?ad on his line of Communications. It is not my purpose, nor doos it pertain to me, to .explain the reasons, which prompted the campaign, but simply to ospreas thy concurrence .in the views which determined the oper ations of the army." .Coming down to. the details of his Campaign in Touncssee, the follow ing orders from iW. Beauregard show that Hood was "repeatedly urged to make a forward movement: "Headquarters1,/Military j/ivisiOn of tho West, Tuscumbia, Ala., No vember 17?' 1864. Gon. J. B. Hood, Commanding Army of TenneesseT eta..-General? Gea. Beauregard di rects rae to say* that he desires you will take the offensive at tho earliest practicable moment, and deal tho enemy/.rapid and vigorous blows, striking bim while thus depressed, abd by this means distract ShermaVs advance into Georgia.'! - "Mac?n,.Ga., November 21, ?864 Gen. JV B. Hoed:: Sherman's move ment is progressing, rapidly toward Atlantic coast, doubtless "to reinforce Grant. It is essential you should ? take"offensive and crash enemy's force in Middle Tennessee soon a? t-raotioable, to relieve Lee. "GK T. Beauregard., General." SHOULD GENERAL KOO? HAVE' MABU THE ATTACK AT FftANKLitr? In answer, yes; that everything justified bim in doing so-his supe rior force, the disorderly retreat, as I was apparent to everyone of ne, and his being right on the heels of tho I enemy, thereby not giving bim time to prepare elaborate fortifications. From Major Gen. Cox's report it ap I pears that breastworks bad been thrown np that * morning after the arrival of Schofield's army at daylight. iThat they o'j??d be carried io the first oharge, and my belief ?? that our dreadful loss was incurred not so emoh then as later on in the oonfueion and darkness. I will add Gen. Schofield'* judg mont on this point: -'Hood's assault at Franklin has been severely crittoieed. Even so e a man as Gen. J. E. Johnston characterises it as a 'useless butchery.' These criticisms aro founded upon a misapprehension pf the; facts and are eeseotially erroneous. Hood must have been fully aware of our relative' Weakness in numbers at Franklin, and of the probable, if not certain, con 'Centration of large reinforcements at Nashville; He could not hope -to have at any future time, anything like so great an advantage in that. respeot." 1 It is ? great pleasure to mo ito say 1 that* throughout this most arduous campaign the South Carolina troops ?in Hood's army behaved most admit; ably. I quote again extracts ; from Gen. papers' report. Speaking- of Franklin, be says; "As we were pressing back the enemy's advance torces Liout. Col. J. S. Jones fell mortally wounded in front of the right, of the regimont. Gen. Gist, attended by Capt. H. D. Garden and Lieut. Frank Trenbolm, of his staff, rode down our front and roturning> ordered tho'charge, in con-j cart with Geri. ^?uOn? In passing\ from the left to the, right of the reg?- j aient thc general waved hts hat to us, ' expressed bis pride and confidence in the 24th, and "rode away ia the smoke of battle, .never moro to be seen hy VIM r.^.' mau y nemS'^'jniis nor?o WSB BUO&? ?WU j dismounting, ho was loading tho right of the brigade, when ; he foll, pierced throng!* the. heart.5": *,* "Giet and Gordon's brigades charg ed on atd reached the ditch oz tho work, mounted tho work,' and met the' enemy ilk- close combat. Thc colors, of the 24th wc planted and defended on tba parapet, and tba enemy retire \ oar froat some distance, bat sooa rallied and came back? iuytoro, to charge ua. He never 8ueGeide<L^g retaking thc Uno we held. ? * "Major B. Burgh Smith, of th* brigade staff, who waa eommandiag . the 16tb South Carolina Volunteers, was now alao the een?or op?ce?. o! tia brigade, every auper?or ofSeor haviag ?j been killed or wou&daoV Major Smith established tho linc on the works, and maintained aa effsotiu ; fire, until 9 o'clock by having the mea in tbee ditch, many of wbom ym wounded-, to load and pasa np ^ I mutkete to the men on the work, ?. ? * . . "I waa abet down before teaskin? tho last work, A^ 'tne elo?ia o! % battle Capt. Gillie, of the 40ih Giorgia, waa the eaoior onioeroftae brigade; of the general staif. Capt. H. D. Oarden alone remained. ' A*ain Gen. Capera aaye; "From Palmetto to Franklin toa. regiment mafoaed. over five hundred mile?, ^e aufteced muon darlu November from the bad weather ans from ibo wau ii of clothing, shoes 4*4 bkukots, Once during the campaign the men received aa a ration three ears of coin to each mau, and fre quently wo , bad nothing bat ooral meal. But t am happy io report thtt no inan deserted the-flag of his t?$? ment, and no command of tbe army fought with more spirit and hcrow determination at Franklin than tnt Sith South 'Carolina Volunteers, " \ So eade Gen. Capers' admirall? report.1 For the benefit of the Song of tit? Veterans I will add that in the P?: nihsular campaign-o? 1BG2 our regi ment, Kersa*w's, was marohed np?i?! a eom''Or?h. and. two-- not threb (om rations, it edema, improved later oi? Cara of corn on the cob were isaw to each mani including, of coaras^ officers. Parched in a frying pan vii a little, a very little bacon grease,! waa not bad. . > ?j Comrades; I oloso with tho fellow^ tribute from Gen. Lee tc the ol? South Carolinians in the army: J 1 'Brigadier Gen; Manigault, ca mandiug a brigade of Alabamos and South' Carolinian?? was aern^ wounded in the engagement iii gallantly leading bin troops to fl fight, and of his tv?0 suoocssorsj command. Col.-Shaw was killed ti Gol. Davis wounded. I baye, net seen greater evidences 0? galM than was displayed by this divuit iindcr command of that adtnirab ?*** ?.?.11**1*. uAlil??r.':' Miiinr Geo..IL Johnson." , It ia a source ol1 ?teat eatiafact^ to us all to reca?! (i tho fact tttig targe ?bare of this high oompHoej falls to tue gallant leader ol? 10th South Carolina regiment,*? 1it?i^siH^b^^.^icr general 7jg urenunir,~KXOIr -v?~xrvmo ? aiung - Bad luck ia reasonably /fcbme??o^ ~- A woman's voice Beldon; s vents her from believing that saes sine. ^ .-^^^ /VOLUME