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Why the Confederates did not Advance After the First Manassas--The Truth of History Vindicated.

From the Savannah Republican.

In the second volume of Mr. Stephens' "History of the War between the States," the author declares as a fact that President Davis "was responsible for the failure of the Confederate troops to advance after the first battle of Manassas." We have no doubt of Mr. Stephens' belief that he is incapable of wilful misrepresentation; but that he was mistaken in this statement when he wrote it, and depended more upon rumors current at the time and set afoot by persons unfriendly to the President than upon sound authority, we did not doubt when it first fell under our eye. We also feel quite well assured that Mr. Stephens will be prompt to correct the statement as soon as he shall become convinced of its error, which is now placed beyond all dispute, and by the very highest authority--the General who commanded the Confederate army at the time.

The Jackson (Miss.) *Clarion*, edited by the able and talented Barksdale, contains the following correspondence, which is conclusive of the long debated issue. It will be seen that General Joseph E. Johnston takes the entire responsibility of the failure of our army to march on Washington after the signal victory and rout of the Federal army at Manassas, and that he bases his decision on the military situation at the time:

RICHMOND, VA., Nov. 31, 1861.

Gen. J. E. Johnston, Commanding Department of the Potomac.

SIR--Reports have been and are being widely circulated to the effect that I prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the enemy after the battle of Manassas, and had subsequently restrained him from advancing upon Washington City. Though such statements may have been made merely for my injury, and in that view their notice might be postponed to a more convenient season, they have served to create distrust, to excite disappointment, and must embarrass the Administration in its further efforts to reinforce the armies of the Potomac, and generally to provide for the public defence.

For these public considerations, I call upon you as the Commanding General, and as a party to all the conferences held by me on the 21st and 22d of July, to say whether I obstructed the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or any other active operation which it was feasible for the army to undertake.

Very respectfully, yours, &c.,
JEFFERSON DAVIS.

HEADQUARTERS, CENTREVILLE,
November 10, 1861.

To His Excellency the President:

SIR--I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 3d inst. in which you call upon me "as the Commanding General, and as a party to all the conferences held by you on the 21st and 22d of July to say:

"Whether you obstructed the pursuit after the victory at Manassas.

"Or have ever objected to an advance or other active operations which it was feasible for the army to undertake."

To the first question, I reply No. The pursuit was "obstructed" by the enemy's troops at Centreville, as I have stated in my official report. In that report, I have also said why no advance was made upon the enemy's capital (for reasons) as follows:

The apparent freshness of the United States troops at Centreville, which checked our pursuit; the strong forces occupying the works near Georgetown, Arlington and Alexandria; the certainty, too, that Gen. Patterson, if needed, would reach Washington with his army of more than 30,000 sooner than we could; and the condition and inadequate means of the army in ammunition, provision, and transportation, prevented any serious thoughts of advancing against the capital.

To the second question I reply that it has never been feasible for the army to advance farther than it has done to the line of Fairfax Court House, with its advanced posts at Upton's, Munson's and Mason's hills. After a conference at Fairfax Court House with the three senior officers, you announced it was impracticable to give this army the strength which those officers considered necessary to enable it to assume the offensive. Upon which I drew it back to its present position.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,
(Signed) J. E. JOHNSTON.

A true copy
G. W. C. LEE, Colonel and Aid de-Camp.
To the President.

MR. DAVIS AND GEN. JOHNSTON--THE FIRST BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

From the Louisville Courier-Journal.

The Mississippi *Clarion* has commented upon the second volume of Alexander H. Stephens' great work, pronouncing as untrue the statement therein made that Mr. Davis "was responsible for the failure of the Confederate troops to advance after the victory of Manassas." Probably the Vice President of the Confederate States is as good authority as the editor of the *Clarion*. And the assertion of Mr. Stephens is true. The *Clarion* publishes a correspondence between Mr. Davis and General Johnston, in which the question is asked whether Mr. Davis "prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the enemy after the battle of Manassas," and had subsequently restrained him from advancing upon Washington City. To the first clause of course General Johnston responds No. To the second clause there is a qualified answer, which is not generally understood. With your permission I propose to throw a little light upon this subject, and to give some information which ought long since to have been known.

The writer recollects distinctly when Mr. Davis came upon the battle field. General Beauregard was miles away in the pursuit of the enemy, and therefore, after the battle, there was no prohibition. But before the battle was fought Mr. Davis and his agents had done things and left other things which established the truth of Mr. Stephens' assertion, that Mr. Davis "was responsible" for the failure to reap any benefits from that victory.

When General Scott took command at Harper's Ferry he subsequently assumed the position of "man-trap," verified in capturing the entire Federal garrison of 12,000 men. The tart correspondence inaugurated by General Whiting, on the subject, in May 1861, was no doubt the cause of renewed dislike from Mr. Davis toward General Johnston, because it demonstrated that the President was not infallible upon military affairs, and that his policy of attempting to hold that position was unwise. The first day after General Johnston's installation there as commanding general it was determined by him to evacuate it. He then read the movements of General Scott's mind, and stated in official documents exactly what manoeuvres would be subsequently made by the Federal

general. He was urgent upon Mr. Davis to allow a junction of his forces with those of Beauregard at Manassas, and the permission to do so was not given until General Patterson had marched down within five miles of Winchester and it was deemed certain a battle would ensue. Skillfully General Johnston then slipped from that place, and was enabled to get a portion of his army over to Manassas. The few thousand men thus added to Beauregard's forces were the means of preventing a Federal success. But Mr. Davis' obstinacy had periled the safety of the army under Beauregard, only one-half the number of the troops of McDowell; for the Confederate forces were stretched over a distance of twelve miles, in order to hold the various fords of Bull Run. Bee's, Bartow's and Jackson's brigades, fatigued as they were by the long forced march under a boiling sun, had only just arrived, and were placed on the extreme left, where they bore the brunt of the battle and were cut to pieces. Many of the distant forces of Beauregard could not get up in time, and but for the opportune arrival of Kirby Smith and his two brigades, which ended a long march by a desperate attack, the battle of Manassas would have been exactly what McDowell's telegrams described it up to 3 1/2 p. m.--a resistless and sweeping Federal triumph. Joe Johnston's troops were fatigued by the march, and yet they fought nobly--nearly one-half being killed or wounded. It was impossible for them to move upon Washington, and it was equally impossible for the troops of Beauregard, miles away down the creek, to do so. Whilst urging the President to carry out the views of General Johnston about their junction, or that Johnston should move across the country, interposing the mountains between himself and Patterson's forces, and attack the army of McDowell in the rear, Gen. Beauregard had mapped out a plan by which Washington was to be taken simultaneously with the defeat of McDowell. He had in pursuance thereof demanded certain supplies from the commissariat and ample transportation. Both were denied him. When Arnold Harris came to the camp, a few days after the battle, he expressed the general astonishment in Washington that our forces had not come right in with the demoralized Federal troops. And when the writer repeated this to Gen. Johnston, he said: "It would have been madness in us to have attempted it with our fatigued troops, because there were heavy defenses, which we had every reason to suppose were manned by at least 20,000 reserves, fresh and undemoralized. And, besides, we had neither transportation nor supplies."

Gen. Beauregard, in his report, alluded to the denial of his demands, and in unmistakable terms placed upon the Administration the failure to capture Washington. Congress resolved itself into a secret session, and debated a resolution to expunge the clauses which reflected upon the President. This debate was long and acrimonious, and the resolution was carried by a small majority to emasculate the truthful report which Beauregard felt constrained to give to the world, and to deny him the right of publishing the reasons why Manassas was a barren victory.

There is a significant clause in General Johnston's letter, now published by the *Clarion*. "After a conference at Fairfax Court House with the senior general officers, you announced it to be impracticable to give this army the strength which these officers considered necessary to enable it to assume the offensive. Upon which I drew it back to its present position." The army had been menacing Washington. The senior Generals alluded to were Johnston, Beauregard and G. W. Smith. They had reconnoitered the entire country. They had discovered a spot above the city, and had prepared the methods of crossing their army. There were no defenses around Washington. McClellan had his army on the Virginia side, disciplining them, and drawing rations of three days at a time from the city, leaving all his supplies there. These Generals sent Mr. Davis their report, and said: "Take from Norfolk, from Charleston, Pensacola, and other places which are not even threatened, twenty thousand troops, and send them here to hold our camp and cover our absence. We will march in the night, and the dawn of day will find us in Washington, which will fall without a shot being fired. McClellan, without provisions or artillery, must surrender, and the war will be over." The plan was magnificent, it was feasible. It would have established the Confederacy.

But Mr. Davis would not listen to it, and he left that camp foredoomed to be the instrument, more than the Federal armies, of the non-success of the Southern people. Those three Generals were then impressed that it was the turning point, and they drew up and signed a tripartite document, stating their plan and its rejection as a vindication of their military reputation in the event of their death during the war. That document states what each of those Generals still religiously believes--that Washington could easily have been captured and the war gloriously ended but for Mr. Davis' action. Mr. Davis was thus twice responsible for the failure to take Washington. A third time he refused to allow the attempt.

After General Butler had attacked and captured a portion of the defenses below Drury's Bluff, General Beauregard assumed command. He had 12,000 men, partially demoralized by the previous attack, and Federal success. He studied the position. Grant was facing Lee only a few miles off, and Butler, with 30,000 men, covered his flank. Beauregard sent for Mr. Davis, who rode nine miles down to his camp. "Mr. President," said he, "there is my commission. Give me the 5,000 troops you hold in Richmond. Detach 10,000 more from Lee and send them to me. If by to-morrow night I do not then capture Butler's army, you may tear up my commission. Before Grant knows Butler's defeat I will attack his flank, whilst Lee attacks him in front, and we will go into Washington with him." Mr. Davis positively refused, but said Beauregard might have the 5,000 Richmond troops to attack Butler with. Beauregard answered that the President was very complimentary in supposing that he could whip Butler's 30,000 men with 17,000. But he would not undertake it. Mr. Davis then gave a peremptory command, which Beauregard executed the next day, driving Butler pell-mell; and whilst in the actual pursuit, one-fourth of his original force being killed or wounded, Mr. Davis recalled the 5,000 Richmond troops, and of Mr. Davis: "Not only has he been in no condition to engage in combat, but he has been restrained to silence by other motives, which ought to have protected him from misrepresentation, if not criticism." If Mr. Davis' friends injudiciously break that silence by inferentially attacking others, such explanations will become as thick as blackberries from those who have no desire to attack Mr. Davis.

ONE WHO KNOWS.

Asking a lady what her accomplishments are, is generally speaking, harmless enough. Still, in these days, it might, in some cases, cause embarrassment to put the question, "Do you paint?"

Letter from General Kershaw.

To the Editor of the Banner of the South.

SIR: You have seen fit, in the exercise of your responsible position of a public journalist, to brand me with the imputation of deserting my principles for the greed of office. Your paper finds circulation chiefly among those whose good opinion I value next to the approval of my own conscience.

Hasty and uncharitable as has been your attempt to degrade me in the estimation of your readers, you cannot, as a Christian, decline to give me the poor privilege, wholly inadequate though it be, to repair the wrong you have done me, of recording in your paper a simple statement of the facts, that my friends may draw their own deductions.

There never has been an emotion of my mind, not entirely in accord with the principles and opinions which caused me to advocate the secession of South Carolina in 1850, to vote for it in 1860, and to offer my little all for its support, from April, 1861, to April, 1865. That it pleased God that I should survive the war, indicated to me that I had still duties to perform, and to them, as responsible to Him and not to man, I have been, am now, and shall henceforward address myself. I could see but one object before me, and that was to alleviate, in any and every honorable way, the sufferings of my countrymen. It was this sentiment which induced me, in July, 1865, to accept the parole of President Johnson as a prisoner of war, and to take, with my brother officers at Fort Warren, what is known as the "amnesty oath." This oath, which was taken by every voter and every officer under the provisional government established in the States by President Johnson, pledged the affiant, thenceforth, "faithfully to support and defend the constitution of the United States and the union of the States thereunder," and, in like manner, to "abide by and faithfully support all laws and proclamations which have been made during the existing rebellion, with reference to the emancipation of slaves." When I had taken that oath, I regarded that as a citizen duty required me to deal with emancipation and the surrender of the right of secession "as accomplished facts, having the force and obligation of law."

When the reconstruction acts imposed negro suffrage upon the people of the South, I believed that it would be fastened upon us as a permanent feature of the American constitution, which required that to bring them in harmony with the Republicanism of other lands. Believing that, I then advocated the policy of acquiescing in the inevitable, and seeking to direct the newly created power into just and proper channels, to bring it in harmony with the social and material interests of society as measures do you, sir, invite us, as means of maintaining the "Principles of Right, of Justice, of Truth, which we practiced and upheld in the past?"

The people of South Carolina made no effort to avert or to control the progress of the reconstruction acts. They contented themselves with denouncing their iniquity and their unconstitutionality. Alas! alas! this has not arrested their progress. An appeal was made against them to the people of the United States, in the late Presidential election. In common with other Democrats, I appealed to the colored people to vote for their own disfranchisement, but, sad to tell, they wouldn't do it. They had not yet reached that point of sublimated magnanimity. The majority of the white people of the country, too, deaf to the appeals to their pride or prejudice of race, affirmed the policy and principles of the reconstruction acts. The Supreme Court recognized them as law, and all the South "accepted the situation." The fifteenth amendment to the constitution, however adopted, has acquired the force of law--has been accepted as law in the practice of all the States, and can never be reversed but by revolution or repeal. To which of these measures do you, sir, invite us, as means of maintaining the "Principles of Right, of Justice, of Truth, which we practiced and upheld in the past?"

What were those principles? The right of secession? Undoubtedly it was a right, but we lost it by the war, and surrendered it when we accepted life, property, and civil law, conditioned with the amended oath of allegiance.

The justice of self-government under the constitution and laws of our fathers, as construed by Calhoun? When the perfection of human reason is attained in the age of millennium, I believe we may hope for a restoration of that justice.

The truth that human slavery is consistent with Christian morality? By the constitutional enactments of the people of South Carolina, in convention assembled, in 1865, that has been rendered a mere abstraction, which I care not to discuss.

I know of no party in the South whose banner is inscribed with the watchwords "Repeal or Revolution," and because I see no hope for South Carolina to escape from groveling ruin, poverty and despair, in any other way, I have aided in elevating the bloodless banner of "Union and Reform," and have at my side, thank God! the best and bravest of those who uphold the Conquered Banner, until God and reason bade them hurl it. That my friends abroad may judge of the justice of your criticism, I have traced my thoughts in connection with the events of the past few years, that they may comprehend my course in the late convention. My friends here know that I went into aid in preserving the ancient landmarks, while promoting the proposed reform.

In order to do so the more advisedly I have endeavored to put in writing what I believe to be the principles upon which those who approached the subject from our standpoint could invite the co-operation of the colored people, without whose assistance the whole movement was an impracticable absurdity.

[Then follows the resolutions which General Kershaw introduced in the convention on the evening of its organization, and which have already been published.]

If I know what truth is, these declarations embody truth, and thus believing, neither the tongue of slander, misconception, the falling away of friends, the vituperation of enemies, the gibbet, or the stake, can make me unsay them.

You, sir, can find in these resolutions that which justifies you in *in foro conscientie*, in imputing to me a conscious desertion of principles, impelled by "the greed of office." Will you have the goodness to explain to your readers how that greed of office was to be satiated by a resolution, which, by its terms, looked only to the exclusion from office, not only of myself, but of all who held similar opinions? When you have done that to your own satisfaction, I beg you to consider, with what complacency you may, that your pen has plumed the most malignant shaft that ever rankled in the bosom of a true, as consistent, as faithful, as disinterested, as devoted a son of the South, as any who has endured the agony of her subjugation.

J. B. KERSHAW.
Camden, S. C., June 28th, 1870.

Immigration is rapidly filling up Texas.

President Grant and the Southern Emigrants to Brazil.

When the war closed a large number of Southerners--downcast, disheartened, and, it may be, deceived--abandoned their old homes and sought a refuge in the South American States. It needs not to tell how miserably they fared. In a land of strangers; with scanty resources; regarded, too often, with jealousy or downright dislike--they toiled on wearily, month after month, winning only disappointment, and earning nothing but regret. Too many of their women and children laid their bones on the shores of Brazil; and the hopeful, sturdy colonists who deserted the South when its crimson flags were furled, were speedily changed into a care-worn band of feeble and heartbroken laborers, whose sole remaining hope was that, one day, they might be able to drag themselves back to the South. The more fortunate did work, or beg, their way to the Southern States. There were many, however, who were wholly destitute. Their own people could not aid them, and but for the humane and generous conduct of the United States Government, they must have dragged on in life, without the faintest expectation of relief.

The facts connected with the condition of these poor Southerners were brought to the attention of President Grant, and an order was at once issued directing the officers of the South Atlantic Squadron to extend a passage to the United States to all "deserving voluntary exiles"--as they are tenderly called. This order was in some way misunderstood, and a second order was issued, as follows:

"Instructions have heretofore been given to the commanding officer of the South Atlantic Squadron to extend passage in any vessel returning home to destitute voluntary exiles from the United States, who desire to return, and who are approved by the minister to Brazil.

"The department renews these instructions, and you will please regard them as embracing such exiles, whether in Brazil, the Argentine Republic, or other States of South America within the limits of your station--they being approved by the United States ministers respectively.

"You will also consider the instructions as applying to the vessels of any squadron touching on the Brazilian or Argentine coast en route to the United States."

The order is, we need hardly say, obeyed in spirit and in letter. This, indeed, is shown by the manner of the treatment of the destitute men, women and children, whose arrival at this port from Brazil, in the Quinebang, has already been noticed.

The conduct of the Administration in regard to the Southern emigrants to Brazil is worthy of all praise, and the humane generosity of President Grant, in enabling these unfortunates to return to their homes, will be appreciated as warmly as it deserves by the whole Southern people.--*Charleston News.*

THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK.--The Philadelphia *Age* (Democratic) has been looking over the political field, and takes the following hopeful view:

A glance at the political condition of parties in this country at the present time shows the drift of the current decidedly in favor of the Democratic organization. The Radicals are demoralized at the centre and the circumference. They are worn-out, with corruption, overlaid with jobs, and paralyzed by the inordinate ambition of bad men in all sections of the country. Their President is wedded in all kinds of schemes which promise golden results, and their Senators and Representatives are bold, blatant defenders of misrule and tyranny in the States and nation. This condition of things has produced the usual results. The party are dissatisfied and are letting that dissatisfaction be seen in their actions in various localities. In Alleghany county, in this State, several hundred Radicals signed a call for an independent movement and convention. "The time has come," say the signers of the call, "for a reform of our party organization." Again they say: "We invite the cordial cooperation of all honest Republicans who wish to rescue their organization from the corrupting domination of selfish, unprincipled politicians." Such bubbles as this rising to the surface of party politics, show that there is a lively fermentation going on underneath. Judge Kelly will have an independent candidate to face in his district, and Mr. O'Neill in a like predicament. In Indiana the Radical soldiers complain of being cheated by the wire-pullers of that party, and threats of vengeance at the polls are heard in all portions of the State. The Boston *Journal*, in speaking of the political can, in Massachusetts, says: "In all probability the Republicans will have as their standard-bearer Governor Claflin, the Democrats will again rally round Colonel John Quincy Adams, and the Labor Reform party, if they desert Mr. Chamberlain, will put up Mr. Colby of Newburyport. There are evidences that the contest will be exciting, and without doubt, it will in some respects be a close one. Much will depend upon the action of Congress and the acts which it can consummate to bring relief to an overtaxed nation." And it adds: "The Democrats purpose making a strong effort to carry the two Boston districts, and in one of these districts an effort will be made to induce a third candidate to run. The re-election of Hon. Henry Wilson will depend upon the result of the State election, and the prizes therefore of the next campaign will call forth the best energies of our opponents." These are a few matters observed from the outlook, and they are both significant and cheering. Each day weakens the Radical party. Their lead is too heavy for them to carry. On the other hand the Democratic party is in splendid condition for the fight, and must win the coming political battle.

LIVING BEYOND THEIR MEANS.--Bulwer says that poverty is only an idea, nine cases out of ten. Some men with ten thousand dollars a year suffer more for the want of means than others with three hundred. The reason is, the richer man has artificial wants. His income is ten thousand and he suffers enough for being dunned for unpaid debts to kill a sensitive man. A man who earns a dollar a day and does not run in debt, is the happier of the two. Very few people who have never been rich will believe this; but it is true. There are thousands and thousands with princely incomes who never know a moment's peace, because they live above their means. There is really more happiness in the world among the working people than among those who are called rich.

This living beyond one's means, is the cause of more demoralization and woe in the human family than any other of those indiscretions in which it seems man is inclined to indulge. Especially is it so in the cities of the world where vicious temptations in so many varied forms abound. Bulwer, more than any other of the popular modern writers, seems to understand what poverty really is. He is poor who lives beyond his means, while he who lives within is well. And this will apply to the millionaire as well as to him who has to labor for his daily bread.

Strength of European Armies.

In view of the despatches from Europe, it is interesting to know what military force the nations concerned can put in the field. France has 414,632 soldiers on the peace footing, and 647,271 in the field, a total of nearly 1,100,000. Of these, 370,000 men are ready to march on the tap of the drum.

Austria has 278,470 men on the peace establishment, 338,700 of a war strength, or 300,000 fully prepared to move. Could the South German Confederation, or group of States, be secured on the same side, they have 66,540 men on the peace or 184,406 on the war footing, with 107,000 of these prepared for instant service. Such a coalition would give France the control of 777,000 fighting men at once, with a reserve of 1,596,106 trained soldiers.

On the other hand, Prussia has 726,000 men on the peace or 1,266,000 on the war footing, with 300,000 now ready for operations on her western frontier. North Germany, going with Prussia, 315,623 on the peace, 551,993 on the field or 944,321 on the war footing, of which 546,000 are instantly available. This would place at Prussian disposal 846,000 men for the first moment and 1,364,321 in reserve. Thus she would have, instantly, 69,000 men more, and, hereafter, 231,785 less than the French alliance. Should she be able to manage Southern Germany for her cause she would have 1,053,000 men, or 176,000 more than France, to move at once, or quite enough to cope with her and Austria together, for the time being, with all the advantages of a common language and position. This would leave Prussia still a reserve of 1,441,727 men, or only 154,379 less than that of France and Austria coalesced, a difference swamped to the extent of nearly 90,000 men by her superiority of immediate force.

Italy, out of a force of 376,721 on a war footing, with 197,000 of a reserve, or 573,721 in all, could spare, possibly, 200,000 men to operate on French frontier or hold a hostile corps in check. The direct and open participation of Russia is hardly to be expected unless circumstances should force her into the melee. In that case she could dispose of about 250,000 men from about 700,000 composing her army in Europe, including the Cossacks. She could take no other course by family alliance, position and the recollection of Crimean wounds than to aid Prussia. Sweden and Denmark would, if they dared to move at all, have to go in the same direction, with about 50,000 men. Thus Italy, the Sax and Scandinavia would bring King William 500,000 men--a force that, with South German aid, would place him 430,000 ahead of France, allowing England, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland to remain neutral.

THE NATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND NEGRO SUFFRAGE.--The New York *World* expresses our ideas of a liberal and progressive Democracy in the following article:

"In the forward movement of the great Democratic army, it seems to us that the Democracy of New York are in the van, and that the patriotic Democracy of Kentucky linger in the extreme rear and refuse to march without a great burden of camp-kettles strung upon their shouldered muskets or inverted upon the points of their flag staffs. When the fifteenth amendment was declared adopted, the Democracy of New York at once concluded that the negro question was, for any effective political purpose, at an end. Our Democratic Legislature, then in session, immediately passed an Act repealing all the State laws that discriminated against persons of color; and we carried the State election which soon followed by an unprecedented majority. We felt some doubt whether the Democracy of other States would immediately approve our course; but there was no dissent among ourselves, and we were willing to trust to results for our vindication elsewhere. We have since watched Democratic movements in other States with much interest and some solicitude to see how far they were likely to follow our lead. Except in Kentucky we have found nothing but encouragement. The Democratic party of Ohio has since held a State Convention, and adopted a platform in which further opposition to negro voting was silently withdrawn. What is more important and significant, the Democratic Senators and Representatives in Congress have recently held a consultation, and issued an address, in which not a word is said on the negro question, and the party is counselled to waste no effort on dead issues. The great body of the party is marching up to the position taken by the Democracy of New York, who lead the advance, with the single exception of Kentucky.

"Even in Kentucky, the Democracy are by no means unanimous as to the expediency of re-baptizing themselves as a 'white man's party' and protracing a bootless fight against the negro. By far the ablest Democratic paper in that State, and one of the ablest in the country, the *Courier-Journal*, of Louisville, has steadily protested against a hide-bound, short-sighted policy, which, if the whole party adopted it, could result in nothing but continued defeat and disaster."

CLAY AND PRENTICE.--John Russell Young, of the New York *Standard*, who attended the Associated Press Convention in Louisville, thus writes of two Kentucky celebrities:

"We saw much of Louisville, which is an interesting city, with its substance and shadows. The shadows of Clay and Crittenden and Tom Marshall, and the men of '98, and all that race of fine gentlemen who once stalked these streets and made Kentucky a power in American politics. Here Clay lived his noisy, bubbling, rapturous career--the same Henry Clay about whom we so loudly sang--actually dead, and never a song to his memory--his work over and forgotten--poor foolish day-dreaming work as much of it was--and he--drifted far into silence and night, the gaudiest sea bubble that ever caught the sunshine--so long on the crest, ever gaudy and shining, only to break at last into foam. No party, no policy, no one living speech, no one hearty deed, only his bright, cherry Kentucky smile, a bubble once and only foam! We stood in the room where Prentice worked and slept--a kind of journalistic monk; where he cooked his steak on a ramrod until it was half done, and baked potatoes in the coals. We saw the cupboard where he kept fresh bread and raisins and nuts; where day and night he lived and labored, in the aroma of ink and dampened paper. We stood by his grave on Cave Hill, the greenest and sunniest spot in Kentucky, sweet, quiet and peaceful, but a grave quite forgotten, for no cherry stone marks his tomb. A simple, soiled mound, with fresh June roses straggling over it, and only known to the eyes of affection and friendship as the resting place of George D. Prentice."

"Two men in New York attempted to poison themselves the other day," says an exchange, "but they were saved by the timely arrival of medical aid." That's always the way with these confounded doctors--when a man wants to die they won't let him, and when he wants to live they don't care a pinch of Peruvian bark whether he dies or not.

Regulations for Fruit Distillation.

Mr. C. H. Baldwin, Assessor of the Third South Carolina District, has furnished the *Columbia Guardian* with the following brief synopsis of the requirements of the internal revenue laws, in respect to fruit distillers, as modified by recent regulations of the Commissioners of Internal Revenue. In addition to the charges mentioned below, it will be remembered that there is a tax of fifty cents per gallon on all brandy produced:

1. They must register their stills and give notice of their intention to distill. The Assistant Assessor will furnish them with the necessary blanks for this purpose.

2. They must execute a bond, with at least two approved securities. The penal sum of this bond must not be less than the tax on the brandy that can be distilled at the distillery during a period of thirty days, and in no case less than \$500.

3. They must provide themselves with a book, (prescribed form 25,) in which a record must be kept of the hours of running, material used, number of boilings made and quantity of brandy distilled. From this book, monthly reports must be made to the Assistant Assessor.

4. They must have a place of deposit for their brandy (which may be any house or building near the distillery), and all brandy made must be put into casks, holding not less than ten gallons, and placed in said building, until the same is gauged and the tax paid thereon.

5. On or before the 26th of next month the distiller will notify the Collector of the probable number of packages he will have on hand to be gauged at the end of the month; at which time the Collector will order the gauger to gauge and mark the same. The gauger's fees, which will be about \$1 per cask, must be paid by the distiller.

Fruit distillers pay the following taxes:

1. A special tax or license, at the rate of \$50 per annum, to be estimated from the first day of the month in which distilling is begun to the first day of May following; and, in addition, a tax of \$4 per barrel on every barrel of brandy produced in excess of the rate of 100 barrels per annum.

In addition to the above requirements, the Assessor, upon receipt of the distiller's notice, proceeds, at the expense of the government, to make a survey of the capacity of his distillery, which fixes the producing capacity of the distillery at so many gallons for every twenty-four hours. Then, at the end of each month, the Assessor ascertains from the reports of the distiller the exact number of hours the distillery was run during the month, allowing for all stoppages and suspensions, and, by means of the survey, estimates the capacity of the month.

If the actual quantity produced is less than eighty per cent. of this capacity, the distiller is assessed for the deficiency at the rate of fifty cents per gallon. The distiller, however, by skillful management can always avoid this deficiency or make it so small as to be of no consideration.

Parties intending to engage in fruit distillery should give notice to the Assistant Assessor, as soon as possible, so as to give ample time for effecting all preliminary arrangements with that office.

The Survivors' Association.

The following circular is now being sent to soldiers of the Confederate army, with a view of gathering statistical information from such sources as are now plentiful, but which in a few years will disappear from the stage of action. We trust that the appeal of Gen. Hampton will not go unheeded, but that all will feel it a duty to promote this object, in itself praiseworthy, but of incalculable value to the future historian and deeply interesting to posterity:

The State Survivors' Association desires to collect, preserve and publish the personal history of the troops furnished by South Carolina to the Confederate service. The Association desires first to publish the names of all entitled to a place upon that glorious roll, and next, as far as possible, the history of each and every one so enrolled.

Taking up the work commenced by Professor Rivers during the war, the Executive Committee proposes to go on with it--to obtain and perfect the rolls of companies, the records of regiments and the history of brigades for immediate publication; also, to collect the rolls of the general and staff departments, to-wit; general officers, adjutant, medical, quartermaster and commissary departments, engineer and signal corps, etc., etc.

The first step in this work is to obtain correct company and staff rolls. Few, it may be, of the originals remain, but, as the companies were each formed in distinct neighborhoods, it is believed rolls very nearly correct can now be made by the survivors from memory; if they will only seriously undertake the work.

The Executive Committee of the State ask that you will make out from the original rolls, or from memory of your comrades and yourself, rolls of your company or staff department, upon the blank forms furnished herewith; and when completed, transmit the same to Colonel Edward McCrady, Jr., Chairman Executive Committee State Survivors' Association, at Charleston.

I appeal earnestly to all who were in our service to co-operate with the association in the object it has in view, as it is a matter of great historical importance, and should be one of pride, that the name of every man given by our State to the Confederate service should be enrolled and preserved. Several of the Southern States are now preparing similar rolls, and it will be a subject of emulation among all to ascertain which of them gave most freely to our cause.

If the information now sought by the Association is given generally by those who are able to do so, our State, it is believed, will show a record surpassed in honor and brilliancy by none other.

I am, very respectfully,
WADE HAMPTON,
President Survivors' Association, S. C.

The popular whine, "Where are the Websters, the Clays, the Patrick Henrys?" is answered in this way by the *Chicago Times*. "As man become more enlightened, as education becomes more universal, the talent of men becomes more equalized. There is not the chance now that there used to be for one man to rise far above his fellows, and thus compel the homage and obeisance of those about him. There are heroes as great as ever there have been. But there are so many of them that individuals are forgotten, and ideas are becoming supreme. This is a mark of true progress, and just as fast as the person is merged into the project, so much nearer do we come to complete culture and refinement."

An old lady being late at church entered as the congregation were rising for prayer. "La!" said she, courtseying, "dont rise on my account!"