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

AMERICAN TROOPS AT SANTIAGO CONFRONTED BY AMERICAN BARB WIRE.

When the Cuban revolution began, one of Spain's heaviest purchases in the United States was barb wire. Thousands and thousands of miles of it were purchased and used by General Weyler in making the approaches to his trochas difficult. When General Shafter's troops reached Santiago, they were confronted by nine American barb wire fences, through which, as they noted with considerable dismay, a charge must be made under a galling fire before the city could be taken by a land attack.

Miscellaneous Reading.

THE SURRENDERED TERRITORY.

Cities, Ports, Natural Wealth, Industries and Population of Eastern Cuba.

The territory in eastern Cuba, surrendered last week by General Toral, embraces about one-third of the province of Santiago, certainly its most valuable part, if one considers its marvellous fertility as a sugar and coffee district and its inexhaustible deposits of iron ore and manganese iron.

The harbor of Santiago de Cuba is one of the largest in the West Indies. Its extent and beauty are too well known to require any new description. Its importance from a naval and military standpoint is of the highest order. Whoever holds that harbor commands eastern Cuba. The harbor is to eastern Cuba what the harbor of Havana is to western Cuba. It is the key to the district at all times. The Morro and La Socapa if modernized, can make for any fleet the entrance to its harbor an impossibility. As a coaling station, as a refuge in the hurricane season, its perfectly landlocked harbor holds first rank. That old-time city, properly fortified, could bid defiance to many a modern power. Its value and future will depend on who possesses it. If left in the hands of the laissez-faire, Cubans, it will be, as it has been the land of manana, or of or of tomorrow.

Its geographical position makes the harbor an absolute essential to the province for six or seven months of the year, when the soft and imperfect roads of the interior and coast sections are wholly or nearly impassable, owing to the copious tropical downpours.

The city of Santiago during the rains is almost cut off from the interior, save by a short and unimportant section of railway. It communicates by sea with neighboring ports on the island, and ships to the world without, sugar, coffee, dye and other woods, iron ore, manganese, and fruits. To that outer world she looks for her daily bread, her foodstuffs, canned goods, and the articles of everyday life and commerce. They come to her by water and have so come for nearly four centuries. Until railways develop the interior and communicate with the other ports the highway to Santiago will still be by the open sea.

Santiago before the war had an estimated population of 71,000, of whom more than three-fourths were Spanish Negroes and their descendants, the whole being the descendants of the African slaves sold in Cuba, the last of whom were freed about 12 years ago. The black element in eastern Cuba is in a vast majority. Some thousands of the whites hitherto have been Spanish officers and soldiers, naval officers and sailors, and the rest merchants and planters. While the majority are of Spanish or Cuban descent, many are English, French, Germans, and Americans. Many Spanish officers married Cuban wives, and many, upon retiring on their pensions settled in Cuba and became land owners and planters.

To pass briefly to its other ports or harbors proceeding in an easterly direction by water, some 30 miles away, the bay of Guantanamo is reached. The mere hamlet facing the bay is named Caimanera, the port and terminus of the railway leading to the interior city of Guantanamo. The city is on an inland plateau, situated in the centre of the richest sugar district in the world. The old time city is quaint and essentially Spanish. It is the supply centre for the many sugar and coffee estates. It in turn receives their crops and ships them by rail to the port already described.

Many of the vast estates belong to foreigners. The Messrs. Brookes, of Santiago, own several of the largest sugar properties. Mr. McKinley, a Scotchman, owns one; Dr. Wilson, an American, another; Mr. Ramsden, a coffee estate. His father, F. W. Ramsden, a partner of Brookes & Co., is the British consul at Santiago. Mr. Robert Mason of the same firm was vice consul for the United States before the war. Many of the estates are owned by Spaniards, Cubans and Frenchmen.

The rich alluvial soil of eastern Cuba has made it its chief sugar producing centre in Cuba. The black soil has a varying depth of from 12 to 16 feet. Sugar cane has been growing there without replanting from 10 to 20 years, and two yearly crops of fine cane are raised with a minimum of labor and expense. Coffee does very well. A plantation matures in six years. Once producing, it is a small gold mine to its owner. Cattle do well and have proved very profitable. The many possibilities with such a soil and climate do not need description. The province needs intelligent enterprise and push, and it will blossom with crops and prove one of the richest and most productive spots on earth—a new Klondike.

The forests of eastern Cuba are almost unexplored. They cover its mountain sides and abound in the choisest of tropical mahogany, hard cedar, lignum vitæ and dyewoods. The minerals of eastern Cuba deserve special mention. In the olden days much copper was got not far from the city of Santiago. That industry seems to have been abandoned for the more profitable one of iron ore and manganese iron. The first exists in practically inexhaustible quantities. The capital invested in the mines is largely American. Strangely enough, much of that manganese iron today will be found in the armor plating of our men-of-war now on the Cuban station.

But to return to the bay of Guantanamo and continue in one trip around the eastern end of the island. The extreme eastern point is Cape Masi, the well-known lighthouse station facing the Windward Passage. The terracing of the island there is very noticeable. The land rises in steps or terraces from the sea until it reaches the foothills. Back of the latter are the lofty mountain ranges for which all eastern Cuba is noted.

Leaving Cape Masi on our left, having rounded the point, we are on the northern coast of Cuba or that facing the United States. A number of minor harbors are passed and Baracoa is sighted. It is a large fruit exporting centre, and the outlet for that section of eastern Cuba. The sea outlet seems to be nature's only one so far. When American enterprise develops the interior by railways like Jamaica's, then productiveness will be quadrupled.

The next and last coast town in the district surrendered is Sagua de Tanamo, on the river and bay of that name. A line on the map from Sagua de Tanamo to Santiago de Cuba represents the western boundary of our newly acquired territory. Its area is over 10,000 square miles, with about 130,000 inhabitants.

A few words in conclusion on the climate of eastern Cuba. The old-time Spanish discoverers divided climates in mountainous sections in the tropics into three classes. First, the tierra caliente, or hot lands—all lands on the coast, and extending about 2,000 feet above the sea leve.l From 2,000 to 4,000 feet the tierra templada, or temperate climate; from 4,000 to 7,000 and 8,000, feet the tierra fria, or cold climate. The coastal climate produces all the fruits and vegetables of the tropics. The temperate climate, potatoes corn, and many vegetables, including valuable fruits and woods, not forgetting certain kinds of coffee and cane. The cold climate, woods, the vegetables of northern climate, wild hogs, and mountain game.

The coasts are hot and generally unhealthy. The acclimated natives stand it, having their bouts of malaria, tropical dysentery, and other ailments. Occasionally yellow fever ki''s them.

The temperate zone, with the hill climate of Cuba, is the place for all unacclimated whites. Acclimation, properly so called, is a matter of years.

SPAIN'S NAVY IN CUBAN WATERS.

Notwithstanding the total annihilation of Admiral Cervera's squadron off the harbor of Santiago de Cuba by the vessels of Admiral Sampson under command of Commodore Schley, the Spanish navy has not altogether disappeared from Cuban waters, and if that government could mobilize the cruisers, gunboats and mosquito vessels now in the numerous keys and small bays on the Cuban coast, possibly it could make some trouble for the fleet of Admiral Sampson. Spain has now four torpedo gunboats, eight cruisers, thirty gunboats of various sizes and a number of small yachts and tugs of various sizes and armaments, which were converted into war vessels at the beginning of the Cuban insurrection in 1895. The list of the more important of these vessels is as follows:

Torpedo gunboat Filipinas, 750 tons; built of steel; speed, 20 knots; armament, 2 4.7-inch quick firing, 4 1.5-inch and 4 m. guns; 4 torpedo tubes.

Sloop Jorge-Juan, 935 tons; built of wood; speed, 13 knots; armament, 3 4.7-inch Hontoria, 2 2.8-inch Krupp and 2 m. guns.

Torpedo gunboats Galicia, Marquez de Molins and Martin Alonzo Pinzon, 571 tons; built of steel, speed; 19 knots; armament, 2 4.7-inch Hontoria, 4 2.2-inch quick-fire and 1 m. guns; 2 torpedo tubes.

Cruiser Marque de la Ensendado, 1,030 tons; built of steel; 15 knots armament, 4 4.7-inch Hontoria, 5 quick fire and 4 m. guns; 4 torpedo tubes.

Cruisers Isabel II. and Conde de Venadito and Infanta Isabel; built of iron; 1,130 tons; speed, 14 knots; armament, 4 4.7-inch Hontoria, 2 7.7-inch, 3 quick firing and 4 m. guns; 2 torpedo tubes.

Also the cruisers Hunan Cortez and Pizarro, which are not in the naval list.

Among the minor vessels are the gunboats General Concha, Magallanes, Alceo, Cuba Espanola, Contramaestro, Vasco Nunez de Balboa, Diego Velasquez, Ponce de Leon, Alvarado, Sandoval Alerta, Ardilla, Cometa, Fradera, Gaviota, Golondrina, Legera, Flecha, Estralla, Linda Satelite, Vigia Centinela, Relempago, Bardoe Esperanca, Intrepidio, Mensajero, Almendares, Baracoa, Criollo, Santocildes and Cauto.

Besides these there are many small vessels, corresponding to the mosquito fleet of the United States, in the keys and bays along the coast of Cuba and Porto Rico. These were put in commission at the outset of the Cuban insurrection by the minister of marine, Captain Aunon, and have since then been cruising between Cuba and the United States coast, principally on the lookout for filibustering vessels. Since the opening of the Spanish-American war, however, they have done considerable damage to our forces. Even before the arrival of Admiral Cervera's fleet in Cuban waters they were the principal defenders of the northern coast of Cuba, where they were then concentrated.

MODERN FIELD TACTICS.

What astonishes all who have made a study of modern field tactics is the large number of officers among the killed and wounded at Santiago. In the first official list 10 of the 17 killed were officers and the percentage among the wounded is hardly less.

No battle in any part of the world, probably, could have furnished a better test of the new tactics, made necessary by the improvement in firearms. There were the rough ground and the long range magazine rifles, and there also were the trained soldiers. One of the main objects of these tactics—or "drill regulations," at they are called, except when they are applied on the battlefield—is to preserve the officers uninjured as long as possible. More reliance is now placed on the intelligence of the privates, and particularly of the non-commissioned officers, than in the old days of shoulder-to-shoulder formation. Conduct that would have fastened the name of "coward" upon an officer in the Civil war is, in a sense, made compulsory to-day; that is, while he is still to inspire his men by example when occasion demands, he is for the most part to maintain a fixed position with relation to his subordinates, and is to keep behind shelter if he can. Thus all movements can be intelligently directed—a knowledge of which fact is more encouraging to the men than the physical presence of the officer at their elbows. The non-commissioned officers have immediate charge of the men, and opportunities are open to them such as never were dreamed of in the old days. An eminent English writer said, at the time the new regulations were adopted in his army, that in actual warfare, after the men, the non-commissioned officers would be most exposed, the lieutenants next, the captains next, and so on; which is as it should be.

To illustrate the idea of the present battle formation, take one company alone. The principle is the same for the battalion, regiment, etc. In each company there are four "sections," each under the immediate command of a sergeant. The sections are divided into squads which are under the immediate command of corporals. At the beginning of the formation, for the offensive, one of these sections is designated as the reserve, another as the support and two as the firing line, or in any other proportion as may seem best. The first lieutenant commands the reserve, the second the firing line, and the captain's post is near the support, with a bugler beside him to give signals, also the first sergeant and any who may be designated to carry messages. If he quits that post for a moment, he leaves word where he can be found.

A few scouts are sent forward first. After they have gone 150 feet, the firing line advances, the sections gradually separating and widening the intervals between them till they subdivide into squads and the squads in turn separate into skirmishers, who are about 6 feet apart when on the firing line proper. The support at the outset is about 150 yards behind the first line, ready to deploy and advance to the skirmishers, and the reserve keeps about 100 yards in the rear of the support, ready for flank attacks or to reinforce the first line. Every man is taught to take advantage of rocks, bushes and the like for cover. One object is to get as near as possible without being discovered, then to locate the enemy's fire and to deceive him as to the strength of the attacking party. The wide intervals save the men from being mowed down by the enemy.

The firing begins at an order from the captain. The skirmishers halt when they fire. Gradually now, as they advance, they close in toward the centre to make room for the support on the flanks. The support meanwhile draws nearer till it joins the first line. Then there is a rush forward. The lieutenant, giving the instructions while the men are lying down or are behind cover, commands: "Advance by rushes; third section, fire two (or three) volleys; second section, forward!" The sergeant of the third section gives the command for the volleys. As soon as the first is fired and under partial cover of its smoke the chief of the second section orders his men forward at double time. When they have gone about 15 yards, or to cover if there is any, he causes them to lie down and fire two or three volleys. On the first volley the third section rushes forward 15 feet in advance of the line of the second section and fires. The second section advances as before and so it is continued. When all the men are on the line, each lieutenant takes position behind his own platoon, and the captain is in the rear of the centre. Having chosen a suitable position from which to make the assault, the captain commands: "Rapid fire!" The lieutenants thereupon order the men to fix bayonets and to lay down the sights of their pieces, after which they give the commands for the firing. To charge, the captain signals to cease firing and commands: "To the charge, march!" The men rise and advance in double time. When they are about thirty yards from the enemy, he commands: "Charge!"

The exact details of the fight at Santiago are awaited with interest by students of modern warfare. Rough ground, long range of the Spanish guns, rapid fire—all these things were reckoned with when the new regulations were drafted. Of course, there were those who said that, with any kind of formation, three men out of five would be killed in an engagement where modern weapons are used, and it is true that there can be no very safe place on the field nowadays for either officers or men. With what we know at present of this fight, only one thing can account for the disproportionately large loss of officers—which, indeed, may not be borne out by the final returns—and that is that their "dash" constrained them to rush onward and expose themselves without regard to what they had learned in their books and on the drill grounds. If it shall turn out that the engagement was fought tactically, faith in the new regulations may be so newhat shaken.—Hartford Courant.

CAVALRY IN MODERN WARFARE.

A good man on a good horse is the superior as an attacking force of three good men on the ground. This is a matter of common knowledge in the European capitals, wherein mobs are dispersed by cavalry using the flat of the sabre only more quickly than they are scattered by the bullets of militia in America. There is something in the speed, weight and size of a charging man and horse that shakes the nerve of the most stout-hearted pedestrian. The uncontrollable instinct of the footman is to get out of the way. A cavalryman learns to love his horse with a love surpassing that of woman. He learns to depend upon him. He absorbs confidence from every swell of the giant muscles between his knees. The man and the beast conjoined furnish a mutual support that is admirable, and in battle of incalculable value. Dismounted cavalry are the most difficult of troops to dislodge, for the reason that the riders, deprived of their horses, do not know when or how to run.

Military experts believe that the invasion of Cuba by the American army will furnish exceptional opportunities for the use of cavalry. It is, for the most part, a good horse country, of wide fields and level spaces. It is believed, too, that this picturesque arm of the service will demonstrate that its usefulness is not ended by modern arms and projectiles, though many theorists incline to the opinion that the days of cavalry as cavalry were ended in the times of Gravelotte and Sedan. The celebrated and fruitless charge of the French cuirassiers, where men and steeds went down in heaps and the watching Wilhelm said, "It is magnificent, but it is not war," sticks in their memories. That charge was Balaklava over again. Somebody blundered. The general efficiency of cavalry under proper conditions is not discredited by it, nor is the centuries-old record of a remarkable arm to be stained by an individual failure. Men who remember what the cavalry was and what the cavalry did in the war between the states demand something more than the crumpling of one column before they surrender the beliefs of years.

The Napoleonic maxim that cavalry cannot charge unshaken infantry was due to Napoleon's experience with rundown forces. His mounted men were badly drilled and his horseflesh was poor. The great Frederick understood the high value of this branch, and his campaigns give many instances of the value of mounted troops in almost all kinds of warfare. The records of all great wars bristle with the achievements of the troopers. Even in the Franco-Prussian struggle the actual damage wrought by the Uhlans was far out of proportion with their numbers, and the value of the fear they produced was immeasurable. At Salamanca, Le Marchand's British "heavies" were sent over bad ground against the steadiest of French infantry. Men and horses fell in swaths 20 yards from the line. The rear line did steeple-chase jumping over piled corpses to get to the front. Le Marchand was instantly killed, and many of his officers, but the infantry was broken and the position carried. The Peninsula campaigns furnish repeated proofs of the fact that infantry will not stand against well handled cavalry. Prince Frederick Charles, one of the greatest of modern warriors, was a steady believer in the efficacy of cavalry, and so, too, was Von Wrangel.

The opponents of the trooper arm and prophets of its utter effacement are used to instancing the failure of the brilliant Austrian cavalry at Sadowa when sent against breechloaders. These were troopers seasoned by long service and so drilled that 30 squadrons of them were manœuvred in mass with the ease and certainty of one. They were, however, led over ground that sloped up three degrees. It was sodden with rain. The horses were so wearied that many of them fell from exhaustion when the charge began. The infantrymen who received them had been selected by five hours of savage and continuous fighting. All faint hearts had gone to the rear. It is safe to say that there was not a Prussian on the west ridge of Chlum that day who did not wish to be there. Even under these conditions the charge came very close to success, though all Europe was shouting that cavalry was useless against breechloading fire.

The French got their chassepots in 1868 and 1869. No German officer believed that his troop would be of any good against them. Yet at Vionville the first line of the German cavalry halted under heavy fire on the plateau, took intervals by passaging, went off the plateau at a walk and wheeled up to the front again as steadily as if on dress parade. This, too, was magnificent, and it was war. It was done to encourage the young troops, cost only 70 men and horses, though the chassepots were barking in thousands, and it was worth what it cost. Again at Vionville Bredow's six squadrons went over two lines of "unshaken" infantry as if they were paper. In another charge the troopers went over the French cannon, losing only 50 men. They came so fast that the artillerymen found it impossible to depress their pieces with sufficient rapidity and accuracy. In this battle 36 squadrons of German horse proved that the French line of foot lacked the strength of cobwebs, yet this same French infantry was so good that two days later it took an entire division of the German footmen three hours to go through them, at a cost of 4,000 lives, or 30 per cent. of the attacking force.

There will never be any finer or steadier or more "unshaken" infantry than these French. They were privates and non-commissioned officers who, to quote Von Moltke, "sought to redeem with their life blood the errors for which they were nowise responsible." The Franco-Prussian war was thick with similar instances, which are carefully eschewed in the writings of anti-cavalry doctrinaires.

Our tactics differ from those of the English army in only one important particular. With the former, when it is necessary to advance support and reserve and prepare for the charge the first line falls back and the others deployed pass to the front through the intervals in the retiring line. The theory there is that the first line may be too exhausted to go on the charge. With our army the first line remains at the front, the reserve joining it in the intervals and on the flanks.

In the old days troops were safe when held in reserve 500 yards back of the fighting line. Now for 2,500 yards behind this line the ground is torn with bullets. Consequently troops are held 3,000 yards back, and even at this distance there will be occasional casualties. To take part in an engagement the reserve force must be moved entirely through this wide and dangerous zone. Infantry cannot do it in less than 25 minutes, and another 10 minutes will be used in getting them into line. Cavalry can cover the distance in six minutes. The rapidity with which their range alters makes them a difficult target, and the moral effect of their thundering and swift advance is great. It is estimated that the cavalry loss in a charge should not exceed one-third of the infantry loss. American military men of the more advanced kind expect service of the highest value in heavy engagements from the splendidly composed and equipped volunteer cavalry that has gone to the front. Of their worth in scouting, reconnoissance and as media of communication there can be no question.--Chicago Times-Herald.