

The Advertiser.

EDGEFIELD, S. C.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1851.

The Last Opinion of Calhoun.

People of Carolina, hear the last declaration of your great CALHOUN, and let it sink deep into your hearts:

"If CALIFORNIA IS ADMITTED, AND NO OTHER STATE WILL ACT, SOUTH CAROLINA MUST ACT ALONE."

FOR SOUTHERN CONGRESS.

Hon. F. W. PICKENS,
DRAYTON NANCE, Esq.

The Court of Common Pleas commenced its session at this place on Monday last, His Honor, Judge WARDLAW, presiding.

OUR TOWN ADVERTISEMENTS.

We call general attention to the new Advertisements of HILL and of BRYAN. It will be seen by any who choose to call upon them, that their stocks are beautiful and complete.

All our stores are now being filled up with all manner of elegances and comforts. We expect to present the full string of new Advertisements at an early day.

NEWS FROM COLUMBIA.

A highly interesting meeting of the Secession party came off in our capital on Thursday evening last. Ex-Governor RICHARDSON, Gen OWENS, and Mr. CHAMBERS, addressed the meeting with great effect. The meeting resolved upon sending a formal and official challenge to their opponents, to meet them in discussion. We suppose it will be accepted.

"OLD PEDEE."

The mass of recent intelligence from this section of the State goes to prove, that the tide which had, at one time, the appearance of running into submission, has turned its course—and is now become a resistance torrent, carrying everything before it. Co-operationists have discovered their danger and taken the alarm, and are now looking to action as the true Carolina policy.

SONS OF TEMPERANCE.

The following persons were elected as officers of WASHINGTON DIVISION, No. 7, Sons of Temperance, for the ensuing quarter:

EDMUND PENN, W. A.
JAMES SULLIVAN, W. A.
R. T. MIMS, R. S.
ANDREW RAMSEY, A. R. S.
JOHN C. MAYTON, F. S.
R. DURSTON, T.
B. C. BRYAN, C.
S. COYAR, A. C.
ALBERT PAUL, L. S.
C. L. REFO, O. S.

THE ELECTION.

Deputies to a Southern Congress are to be chosen next week. As it is desired to make it a test of the relative strength of the two parties, we hope there will be a general turn-out at the polls. We know that many of the Secession party are indifferent about this election, and do not care to have anything to do with a transaction which looks so much like a ridiculous provision for an occasion that will never occur. But as the Co-operationists will show their full strength at the polls, so let the Actionists also; and let the voice of old Edgefield go forth distinctly, whether it be for doing something or doing nothing.

A CONTRAST '32 AND '51.

It is said, by those who advocate a delay of State action, that "there's a good time coming" when all will be right—when State Co-operation will be ready on all sides. We trust it may be so. But, looking to the history of late years and to the facts of the present, we find cause to doubt the prediction.

In 1832 and 33, only 18 years ago, there was an immense majority of the Southern people who advocated the perfect right of Secession, and maintained that it was a right to be peacefully exercised. And at that time, the opposite creed had but few and comparatively insignificant exponents, among the Presses of the South.

In 1851, the right of secession is becoming not only a disputed question, but a number of organs for the propagation and advocacy of consolidation doctrines, are widely circulated and liberally supported. Does this look like "a good time coming?"

JUSTICE TO ALL.

To correct any misapprehension which may have grown out of certain remarks, made in one of our late numbers, on "Co-operation tactics," we here state that we had no idea of conveying the impression that any formal challenge to discussion had been given the Co-operationists as a party, in this district. We know they would be far from declining any such proposition.

As to any allusion made to the last Co-operation meeting at Capt. DONN'S, (in reference to a refusal to comply with a request &c.) we distinctly say that it was based upon what we (among others) had heard from an individual closely connected with the party. He has said that we misunderstood his meaning, and we cheerfully withdraw the remark predicated upon our own understanding of what was said. We are glad at all times, to give an honorable man's remembrance of his casual observations, a precedence over any conclusion we may have drawn therefrom.

As a matter of course, any comments of ours, suggested by this misunderstanding, are irrelevant, inasmuch as the reason for them does not exist.

We hope our Co-operation friends will accept this as a full amendment. It is intended as such. Though there be divisions, let there not be discord among us.

LAST MONDAY'S MEETING.

An unusually large number of the citizens of Edgefield were assembled at this place on Monday last. The entire mass seemed to be moved upon strongly by the most marked solicitude as to the different policies now urged upon the State.

According to previous appointment, Judge BRYAN ascended a rostrum (prepared in the Piazza of the Planters Hotel) at 11 o'clock, and proceeded to address the multitude. He made a long and a strong speech, taking ground throughout with the Co-operationists. We have never heard the Judge debate a question as skillfully as upon this occasion. Although the bulk of his audience (in our judgment) differed with him in principle, yet all heard him with the most profound respect. All sympathized with him in his defence against certain personal allusions which have recently appeared in print.

We will not pretend to comment upon his arguments until his address is published, which we understand is to be done. We will then endeavor to show and to elucidate the dangers and disadvantages of adopting the course which he has so ably advocated. At the conclusion of the Judge's speech, the meeting adjourned.

In the afternoon, the people were again called

together for a further discussion of the great question before us, and Dr. JOHN LAKES acted as Chairman. The ablest debate we have heard in a long time took place between the Hon. N. L. GRAFFIUS and Col. BASSETT, on one side, Senator BUTLER and Judge WARDLAW, on the other. The audience were deeply attentive and thoroughly interested. Although the discussion, at times, grew very warm, yet we were glad to announce that, after a long and exciting debate, the meeting adjourned, as far as we could perceive, in perfect good humor. We think the result of the day's proceedings was, that both parties were confirmed in their faith.

OUR OUT-SIDE.

AGAIN contains several Co-operation documents in the shape of letters.

Mr. PERRIN'S is a long letter, and well written. In one place he says: "They (the immediate Secessionists) propose to secede 'solitary and alone'—and what then? Clouds and darkness rest upon the future."

We beg leave to reply in a paraphrase upon his own language. They (Mr. PERRIN and others) propose to acquiesce indefinitely—and what then? Clouds and darkness hang upon their future also. If, as Mr. PERRIN seems to admit, there be a balance of probabilities behind the curtain of the future, it cannot be doubted that the Right, clear and indisputable, will be with the State IN ACTION, and this surely ought to make the anti-action end of the scales kick the beam in a twinkling.

In reference to Mr. PERRIN'S stress upon "a change of government," we would respectfully point to him the following question: "Is the simple withdrawal of an independent State from a league, a change of that State's government?"

Upon the point of State pledges we recommend to all, Chancellor WARDLAW'S high-toned view—"With or without pledges," says the Chancellor, "I cannot tolerate the idea of submission."

The letter of Mr. PERRIN, which follows, is brief. He does not pretend to enter into anything like an argument.

But Mr. OWENS does. It is our opinion, however, that a considerable portion of this gentleman's argument goes directly to prove that the Southern States must eventually come to Carolina's side, and form, with her, a slavery confederacy. If, as he maintains, the extinction of our great domestic institution will be the inevitable result of our separate existence, can he or any other rational man imagine that the States, which live by the identical institution, will remain unconcerned witnesses of its overthrow? If South Carolina becomes, by the act of secession, "the peculiar exponent" of this institution, to destroy whose existence the "English Lion" will "spring from his lair," would she be left to hear that shock alone? Would the South permit the immolation? Let wisdom decide. According to Mr. O'S views, our secession will, at the worst, but listen the great struggle with Abolition which some think inevitable. Even upon this ground it is not better to do anything that will bring that struggle about before the chances of maintaining ourselves with success are irreparably lost? Let the far-seeing statesman reply. Reply! did we say. One, who had not his equal in modern times, has answered the question in advance. That very Palmetto, to whom allusion is made, spoke to this effect in one of his latest efforts: "If this opportunity is suffered by the South to pass unimproved, all is lost. And we have it upon the most sacred and unimpeachable authority (the testimony of an intelligent, honorable and devoted son, who watched his death-bed) that one of his latest political expressions was: 'If the California Bill passes, and no other State will act, South Carolina must ACT ALONE.'"

Mr. OWENS remarks in another place, when speaking of certain advantages that might accrue to us in a separate existence: "It is a recent, a very recent discovery, that the Tariff of '36 is oppressive to slavery." This looks something like coming to that platform which says—we are doing well enough now, why change? But did it never occur to Mr. OWENS that a considerable reduction of the Tariff of '46 even, might advance the interests of the Southern farmers beyond their present condition?

Mr. OWENS concludes his letter with some allusion to the taint of treason which he seems to think was hurled against the Hamburg meeting, which our readers may remember, occurred some time ago. We have forgotten the use of any such taunt in application to that assembly. We remember seeing it stated that Mr. OWENS had entirely changed his opinions since last winter's session; that, however, is far from being the definition of treason. It is a right of conscience, which every one is bound in duty to exercise upon conviction of error. But we dismiss Mr. OWENS' letter with the remark, that it is written very well and evinces an ingenuity worthy of a stronger cause.

Mr. BOWEN'S letter is last upon the list (except the short note of Chancellor WARDLAW) and is perhaps the most epigrammatic in appearance of all. Were every "if" a demonstration, his views would be irresistible, on the point of separate nationality at least. But such is not the case, and our old friend's letter must therefore be taken in its true light—as a succession of speculative suggestions. They may have force, but it remains to be proved. No man in the Co-operation ranks is more capable of doing this, if it can be done, than the talented and esteemed companion of our more youthful days. We are constrained to think that even he would fall short of accomplishing the task. We regret to perceive that his aversion to risking separate action is so great that he prefers rather to acquiesce in the wrongs of the past, and trust to the chances of the South becoming united by further aggressions. Such indeed seems to be the fairly inferable position of all the letter-writers we have thus briefly reviewed.

AGITATION—WHAT WILL IT AVAIL?

The mode of action proposed by the opponents of early Secession is to arouse the public mind of the South. Carolina is to become the great agitator. We do not know precisely whether it is intended that we shall, in this character, waste money or wind. We suppose the latter, principally. Perhaps a little steam, to move a power-press or two, may also be called into requisition. These wind and steam operations will not surely be confined to the limits of our own State. This would be the old thing over again. The object must be to enlighten other States as to their rights, and to draw them by moral or intellectual suasion, up to our mark. To effect this, the several expedients of printing and speaking will be resorted to. In other words, our sister States are to be kept continually inundated with Carolina tracts—political colporteurs are to be sent this way and that, with bags of Secession matter, to inoculate as they go—and lastly, some of the High Priests are to go forth and rouse up a rushing crusade in the great Southern breast.

Now that we have been insisted upon of late, that our sister Southern States are very jealous of their claim to equal spirit and intelligence with Carolina—very jealous. Admitting this to be so, how will they look upon South Carolina, when she volunteers as School-master and Rousier-General, to teach and stir up their people? It may be answered, "Oh, we don't intend to present such an appearance of systematic effort as the 'olms'!" No "appearance of systematic effort!" What then? Ah! we see now—a sort of clandestine,

deemed we had the power to act for ourselves—but we have been shown our error—it has been urged before us that utter ruin will devastate our possessions, if we move alone to avenge our injuries or secure our future peace—and now that we are indeed alone, with no powerful appeals to pride and all their glorious recollections, to enforce and vindicate it, with their property and lives.

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Upon each of these points, we will give our views in the briefest possible manner.

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Now we are aware, as intimated above, that there are some Co-operationists who would abbreviate the period of delay, and who are willing to fix a year at the coming of which they will agree that South Carolina shall act on past issues, even though no other State go with her. This indication, we are ready to allow, goes to prove that, though a limited vista of practical submission, a day of determined and hazardous resistance is steadily contemplated by a portion of the co-operation party. Such men we will never term submissionists. We accord to them cheerfully the true spirit of freedom in its fullest signification. But we would most respectfully urge it upon them to reflect whether they are not venturing the suppression of that spirit too far, on a dim and uncertain hope. We seriously fear that there will be but one step from the practical submission of South Carolina (even for five years) to her ultimate and final acquiescence in the late odious compromise. If we could think otherwise, the chief obstacle to a modification of our views would be removed.

Suppose it to be determined, on that South Carolina is to wait five years, with the clear understanding that she will, at the end of that time, act "at all hazards." The question arises, "is there any probability that she will then act?" We honestly believe that she will not, and we submit a few considerations below, upon which we found our belief.

First.—Our Northern enemies, who have always played the game of encirclement with consummate skill, will perceive at once that their true policy is to stay the hand of aggression, for at least the period covered by Carolina's threat. In the mean time, their efforts will be exerted to appease and quiet the uprising of Southern resentment by some sham showing of conciliation and benefit. Their aim will be to fix and confirm those Southern States, which have acquiesced in the compromise, in their determination to accept and abide by its provisions. No one will pretend to say that there will be any difficulty in this, when it is remembered that dominant majorities in all those States have already rendered in their unqualified approbation. Thus at the expiration of the five years, even those who now commend and pray for the action of South Carolina, may be induced to condemn it as ill-timed and out of date.

Secondly.—The people of South Carolina will have borne an "intolerable wrong" for the space of five long years. Time, which wears away the bitter griefs and the sternest resentments, will have done its work towards effacing, partially, the memory of the injustices which has been done. The "deferred hope" of independence will have rickened the hearts of many—the blameworthy of federal patronage will tend to convert resistance to tyranny into devotion to the Union—with the very money paid by the people of South Carolina into the Federal Treasury, the lofty patriotism of the State may be tainted. Thus, at the expiration of the five years, even those who now commend and pray for the action of South Carolina, may be induced to condemn it as ill-timed and out of date.

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It is beginning to be said that the call of the Convention was certainly very irregular, and it is hinted that it borders very nearly upon an unconstitutional procedure. This is a grave suggestion, if there be any force in it. We think there is none however, and are not therefore, much startled at its announcement.

THE RESISTANCE FEATURE OF CO-OPERATION.

We have no objection to admit that very many of our friends of the Co-operation party, design ultimate resistance. And yet, it appears to us to be a point easy of demonstration, that practical submission will be the result of their advice—and we cannot avoid the further conclusion, that ultimate acquiescence will be the "last expression" of the problem they propose to work out. This is the chief objection with us, to the policy they advocate. Of course we have now in view the wrongs of the PAST, and we address ourselves to those good brothers among the co-operationists, who declare that they will never submit to those wrongs.

Upon each of these points, we will give our views in the briefest possible manner.

As first, as to practical submission. Co-operation is founded upon the belief that South Carolina cannot act alone with any prospect of success. The simultaneous movement of one or more of our sister States of the South, is regarded an indispensable condition to action. This has been inculcated as one article of the co-operation creed. A few individuals who belong to that party, have very wisely disapproved of this being made a "sine qua non" to resistance; but judging from the general tone and character of the arguments now used throughout the State, we think we are warranted in saying that the party has laid, as one of its corner-stones, the impolicy of South Carolina, and the consequent absurdity of her seceding alone. The other premise we lay down is equally clear, and it is this: No Southern State will co-operate with us in resistance on the score of past grievances; for they have all so declared in the most direct, unequivocal and authoritative manner. If, then, South Carolina must delay action on past issues until one or more of these States shall agree to join her, is it not perfectly clear that she will delay until doomsday, if no other issues arise. Even though she retained the "animus resistendi" (if we may use that expression), in, *deed* and in *fact* she would be remaining inactive under the perpetration of wrongs which she had distinctly said were unfeared—and what would this be but practical submission?

Now we are aware, as intimated above, that there are some Co-operationists who would abbreviate the period of delay, and who are willing to fix a year at the coming of which they will agree that South Carolina shall act on past issues, even though no other State go with her. This indication, we are ready to allow, goes to prove that, though a limited vista of practical submission, a day of determined and hazardous resistance is steadily contemplated by a portion of the co-operation party. Such men we will never term submissionists. We accord to them cheerfully the true spirit of freedom in its fullest signification. But we would most respectfully urge it upon them to reflect whether they are not venturing the suppression of that spirit too far, on a dim and uncertain hope. We seriously fear that there will be but one step from the practical submission of South Carolina (even for five years) to her ultimate and final acquiescence in the late odious compromise. If we could think otherwise, the chief obstacle to a modification of our views would be removed.

Suppose it to be determined, on that South Carolina is to wait five years, with the clear understanding that she will, at the end of that time, act "at all hazards." The question arises, "is there any probability that she will then act?" We honestly believe that she will not, and we submit a few considerations below, upon which we found our belief.

First.—Our Northern enemies, who have always played the game of encirclement with consummate skill, will perceive at once that their true policy is to stay the hand of aggression, for at least the period covered by Carolina's threat. In the mean time, their efforts will be exerted to appease and quiet the uprising of Southern resentment by some sham showing of conciliation and benefit. Their aim will be to fix and confirm those Southern States, which have acquiesced in the compromise, in their determination to accept and abide by its provisions. No one will pretend to say that there will be any difficulty in this, when it is remembered that dominant majorities in all those States have already rendered in their unqualified approbation. Thus at the expiration of the five years, even those who now commend and pray for the action of South Carolina, may be induced to condemn it as ill-timed and out of date.

Secondly.—The people of South Carolina will have borne an "intolerable wrong" for the space of five long years. Time, which wears away the bitter griefs and the sternest resentments, will have done its work towards effacing, partially, the memory of the injustices which has been done. The "deferred hope" of independence will have rickened the hearts of many—the blameworthy of federal patronage will tend to convert resistance to tyranny into devotion to the Union—with the very money paid by the people of South Carolina into the Federal Treasury, the lofty patriotism of the State may be tainted. Thus, at the expiration of the five years, even those who now commend and pray for the action of South Carolina, may be induced to condemn it as ill-timed and out of date.

Thirdly.—When this period shall have arrived, and we shall find the work of Carolina isolation (which is said to be the steady aim of the North) completely effected—when we shall discover more formidable enemies to have sprung up in our own household—when the days of '52 may have become the theme of common jest with friends as well as foes—what then? The still-indignant spirit of the State may gather around their gallant leaders and say to them: "We remember that you told us, in days past, that