

The Edgefield Advertiser

IS PUBLISHED EVERY THURSDAY BY W. F. DURISON, Proprietor. ARTHUR SIMKINS, Editor.

TERMS.—Two Dollars and Fifty Cents if paid in advance—Two Dollars and Fifty Cents if not paid before the expiration of the year. All subscriptions not distinctly limited at the time of insertion will be considered as made for an indefinite period, and will be continued until all arrears are paid, or at the option of the Publisher. Subscriptions from other States must be accompanied with the cash or reference to some one known to us.

ADVERTISEMENTS will be conspicuously inserted at 75 cents per square (12 lines or less), for the first insertion and 50 cents for each subsequent insertion. When only published Monthly or Quarterly, One Dollar per square will be charged. All advertisements not having the desired number of insertions marked on the margin, will be continued until closed and charged accordingly.

Those desiring to advertise by the year can do so on liberal terms.—It being distinctly understood that contracts for yearly advertising are confined to the immediate, legitimate business of the firm or individual contracting. Transient Advertisements must be paid for in advance.

For advertising a Candidate, Three Dollars, in advance.

For Advertising Estrays Told, Two Dollars, to be paid by the Magistrate advertising.

Advertiser.

EDGEFIELD, S. C. THURSDAY, MAY 23, 1851.

Religious Notice.

The Rev. H. C. HERLONG, of the Methodist denomination, will preach in Pottersville on next Lord's day, at 4 o'clock P. M.

"INDEPENDENCE" is assured that "DECISION OF 1850," and "JOHN RANDOLPH" are different writers.

"JOHN RANDOLPH" was received after the other communications which appear to-day. Want of a single spare corner must be our apology for postponing its publication till next week.

We refer all, who are interested to know how our merry maidens conducted their May-day celebration, to our first page, where a full account of the proceedings is published. Mr. St. P. F. L. was the Post-laureate of the occasion, and very little nymph did ample justice to his muse, by the grace and precision of her delivery.

Another feat of the same sort was enacted on the same day, in a different place, by Mrs. McCLESTOCK's scholars, which was equally interesting.

WHAT IS THE TRUE NATURE OF THE QUESTION?

ARE WE, as a State, to do something, or are we to do nothing? Are we to resist the outrageous injustice of the American Government, or to acquiesce in it, and thereby, sanction enactments which have virtually robbed us of our dearest rights? Let the people of South Carolina weigh well this important question, before giving a definite reply. Let not the excitement or fears of the moment hurry them into a decision, which may be regretted through life. First and foremost, let this great question be considered, with reference to the JUSTICE, the TRUTH and the RIGHT involved in its decision. Neither the hope of happy consequences, nor the fear of disastrous ones, should be suffered to bias the judgment.

Regarding the question in this point of view, the following interrogatories may be asked:—What are the propositions that would arise from the first branch of the question?—What would be wrong, in saying that the foulest injustice had been done to the State of South Carolina by the Federal Congress?—Are we right in saying that South Carolina is the best governed State in the Union?—Are we right or wrong, in saying that the Union is a link that connects her with an agent, which has been guilty of usurping authority, contrary to a written and express agreement? Can, or cannot, the right of secession be claimed upon undeniable grounds? Would, or would not, a repudiation of this right on the part of our opponents, be ample cause for the disruption of this Confederacy? Is it true, that there exists, nowhere, constitutional authority for a single State taking steps, for saving her citizens from the palpably vicious and illegal measures of wrong and violence, forced upon her by a combination of a majority of her confederates? In a word, is secession a rightful mode of proceeding, and is the aggrieved State the only proper judge of the occasion that may demand it?

Let every one, who is capable of thinking at all, reflect upon these things, until his mind is brought to absolute conviction, on one side or the other. It is often said, that there is no question as to our wrongs—no doubt as to the bare right of secession. And yet some talk and write, as though they did not feel that they were standing on the broad and immutable foundations of Truth and Justice. We want such of our fellow-citizens to think, until they are carried far beyond a simple acknowledgement of this fact. We wish it to become with them a deep-seated, earnest and everlasting conviction—a conviction that will not "down at their bidding"—a conviction that shall be ever present to the mind, giving color to all its calculations and speculations as to the issue of this great strife. This feature, in all the struggles, hitherto recorded, for justice and for freedom, has been deemed the one of primary and paramount importance. And it has, ever and invariably, predominated over prospective anticipations, whether of evil or of good. Such ought now to be the case; and hence the imperative necessity of a thorough conviction. If this conviction is against us, the present contest may as well be given up—if it is with us, we have an element of strength, that will make one man, a battalion as a regiment, and a thousand men, as "terrible as an army with banners." Because the corresponding conviction of error and injustice in the minds of our opponents, would render their arms comparatively nerveless. Sampson when bearing the gates of Gaza upon his shoulders, and Sampson when whom his locks, does not present a stronger contrast, than enlightened men containing for justice under the shield of Truth, and enlightened men inflicting a gross wrong without even a plausible pretext.

Gentlemen are pleased to ask, as if in mockery, "what will your cry of Justice avail you? what, your claiming of the Right! what your being backed by the power of Truth?" We are surprised to read such cold suggestions, emanating from a child of the "sunny South." It is the very essence of the most frigid utilitarianism. It is giving direct confidence to a code of principles, before which, (if it prevails), all that is good and pure and honorable, must fall, if, in the least opposed, to what is profitable to the present generation of men. It is making present advantage and individual emolument, higher motives than future, permanent benefit and moral reputation. If this were indeed the spirit of the Age, it should be the noble endeavor of those, whose lot has been cast in this genial climate, and whose homes are still made dear by so many hallowed reminiscences of honorable Freedom, to war against its further progress "to the last extremity." Stagnant before the baneful influence, and you lose the strong-

hold, that guards your liberties! Admit that Justice and Freedom are but empty names, and the talismanic spell which sustained the fainting troops of Washington in that dismal retreat across the Delaware—which prompted the generous American to support the falling cause, against hope, with almost profuse liberality—which enabled MARION and SIMPSON and BUTLER and PICKENS, to struggle on against all odds, and with the most heart-sickening difficulties, until the dawn of a better day, gleamed from old King's mountain—this spell, we say, will be gone forever, and with it, the hopes of true Freedom. No—there is a power in Truth—there is a force in Justice—there is a spell in the Right, which has often led the weak and oppressed to triumph, when the prospect was far more cheerless than that which lies before us now. To say that there is not, is to controvert the tenor and spirit of our holy Religion—it is to trample under foot the teachings of Christ himself. His whole example—his every precept was intended to illustrate the intrinsic power and strength of Justice, Truth and Right. If the nations of the earth are prepared, in this boasted 19th century, to adopt as their standard and guide, the motto of a vindictive Robber-chief, in preference to the lessons of that noble Religion, which has made our civilization all that it is,—if the philosophy of a coarse Scottish thief, is to be placed in the scales against the "Wisdom that cometh from above," then have we indeed fallen upon desperate times. Is it not our solemn duty, as Christian men, to meet and to repel these dangerous notions? If the great principles, upon which modern civilization rests, are in progress of subversion, (as has been intimated) then is it indeed time that the opposing forces were marshalled, not only on political, but on religious grounds. Such intimations are well calculated to arouse every thinking mind, to the vast importance of the issue, which South Carolina, the weaker power in point of physical strength, but confessedly the stronger morally, may soon make with a stronger Government, whose rapacity and injustice its own constituent members feel and deplore. It is an issue of principle—it is a question of right, and Christian civilization is to judge between us. And in answering the question proposed in the beginning of this article, (viz: "Shall South Carolina act or not?") these are the most prominent and most important considerations—Is Justice with us? Is Truth with us? Is the Right with us? We therefore reiterate the hope that our people will ponder gravely and conscientiously this branch of the enquiry, until they are brought to a settled conviction. Without this, they cannot properly approach the discussion of the probable consequences of our action.

In the following article, we will venture to give some suggestions as to the rational mode of conducting the second branch of the enquiry.

THE RESULTS THAT MAY BE ANTICIPATED.

There are only three results that seem to be at all worthy of being considered, as in any manner probable. Either South Carolina will be coerced by the strong arm of direct war, or her right to her own unrestricted port will be contested by Federal Revenue-cutters, or she will be permitted to secede unimpeded.

The first supposition coincides with the expectations of a very limited number of intelligent gentlemen. Ask the question, upon what grounds are these expectations based? If it be said that there is authority for this procedure, we should desire to be informed whether this authority is derived from a written Constitution, or gathered by implication from the conduct of our ancestors.

But upon this point, there is no difference of opinion that we have heard of. All of us, who have expressed any opinion whatever, are agreed that armed interference will not have the sanction of Law.

What other ground is there for this expectation? If it be affirmed to you, that the Federal Government will pursue this course, because she has the power to do it, we would suggest the following inquiry as being german to the matter. What have the Northern States to gain by persecuting us with war? What incoming pecuniary or civil advantages can be held up to the calculating people of those States, as inducements to incur the vast expense of such a war? What effect would such a war produce upon Mississippi, Alabama, North Carolina, Florida and even Georgia, (Mr. Cass to the contrary notwithstanding?) Would they support this war by contributions, or men or money? Could their people be restrained from revolution, upon the happening of such an event? We think that candid, and well-considered answers to these questions, will bring each mind to the conclusion, that an armed attempt to control South Carolina, is a distant probability—or, if it should happen, that it will tend directly to strengthen our cause. Others may think differently. Let us all reflect fully and dispassionately.

Another apprehended result is that our right to our own free port will be restricted and contested by Federal Revenue-cutters. What difference between this and armed interference, is the first enquiry suggested. Suppose that troops of war are sent to blockade our port, would it, or would it not be the opening of a military campaign? If so, the same difficulties lie in the way of its being set on foot, and sustained by the American States, as in the case of direct war. But perhaps the Southern States would consent to the experiment, under the assurance that no open act of war would be committed, and that intimidation only was intended. And yet, this point, having to be discussed not only in Congress, but before the people of the hesitating States, would necessarily be known in South Carolina, and to the world, and the experiment would readily be tested, by some merchantman coming to Charleston. Were the attempt made to bring her to with a blank gun, she would sail on her way laughing at the farce. She would then perhaps be chased, grappled with and boarded, or a regular broad-side would be poured upon her, and thus would be violated the stipulation which induced the friends of Truth, Justice and the institutions of the South, to sanction the armament.

The supposition that an armament with such ridiculous restrictions, would be floated to our harbor, may excite a smile. But upon what other terms can it be supposed, that the Government could avoid the reprobation, protest and resistance of several of its constituent members. Is not a blockade supported by powder and lead, war, palpable war? Can any sophistry make it other than war? Would not the object of this blockade be to subdue South Carolina? A portion of our opponents would exult in this deed—but the just and honorable everywhere, and especially in the South, would ask, what do you propose to effect by conquering with a Free State? The precedent would be an imminently startling one. Perhaps it would at once occur to the slave States that emulいた to slavery was the true secret of this invertebrate hostility. Perhaps the desire to settle forever, the question of State sovereignty might be discovered to be the chief stimulant to the passions of our assailants. Perhaps, about the same time, it might

be recalled to mind that this insulted State, had never injured a single sister, while a member of the Confederacy—had never violated the Constitution of the Confederacy—had never failed to do her part with alacrity and zeal, in sustaining the Flag of the Confederacy—and, only when compelled by grievous wrongs, had left the Confederacy, and asserted her original and uncompromised sovereignty. We think that such reflections might cause a very large number of the people of the South at least, to pause and reconsider the question in its true light. Others may think differently. Let Reason decide between us.

But it may be said, that a sagacious scheme can be devised, by which the command of South Carolina can be attained without the appearance of war. What is it? A floating custom-house outside the bar, to intercept and collect duties on cargoes coming into our port. Does its being located on the high seas, do away with the illegality of the act? The illegality consists in defining and exacting duties which it is rightfully ours to define and exact. What if this were done one hundred miles from shore? It does not make the transaction one whit less unjust. It is a gross violation of international law. But this floating custom-house, alone and unassisted by gun-ships, would of course be the merest child's play. Would it be attempted without some such support, either from vessels or forts? Every one will say, no. Here then is powder and lead again. Our enemies must use these instruments of war first; for, otherwise, our trade and commerce would go on cheerfully, with only the additional excitement of an occasional raid between a light trader, and a clumsy, bristling man-of-war. View this matter in every light, and ask yourselves, can it be other than war, and war commenced by the Federal guns.

What then is the true result, into which these several supposed modes of proceeding against us, resolve themselves? Is it not an act of war, which must either be sustained by a declaration of war coming from Congress, or disavowed by that body? The question of war upon South Carolina, must, as a consequence of either of the courses proposed, come up and be discussed in the Federal Legislature, and that too at an early period of the contest. What then is the naked and only issue, that can arise between Congress and South Carolina, in case of interference by the former? We think it is the issue of war or peace. Our minds will then revert to the enquiry, is it probable that the American States will wage war upon South Carolina? We should remember that this, if accomplished, would be done in defence of Right and Justice—in defence of Reason and Expediency—in defence of the doubts and scruples of the good and generous at the North—in defence of almost the entire public opinion of the South—in defence of the great probability of throwing a vast number of American citizens, into the active support of our cause, and of enlisting for us the sympathy, the "moral aid and comfort" of at least, of other Governments, and lastly, in defence of the grand difficulty of vanquishing a hundred thousand brave men, contending for Justice, and their family altars. Is it not a rational expectation that a Government, hampered and staggered by these considerations, would be imbecile and inefficient for any purpose of war upon South Carolina? We are constrained to think that it is. Others may differ from us. Let calm reflection be invoked in deciding this question of probabilities.

The last supposed result, and one which is said to have the sanction and support of many of our opponents in the present Government, is that South Carolina will be permitted to secede unimpeded.

But on a subject like this, an ounce of experience is worth a pound of speculation. Let us look to history. Many of the most thriving and powerful nations of antiquity, and of modern times, have been less in extent of territory than South Carolina. Take, for instance, the Republics of ATHENS, SPARTA and ROME. The territory of ATHENS, including the Islands, of which ATHENS was the Capital, contained only 874 square miles; 135,000 citizens and alien residents; and 365,000 slaves (white), with an aggregate wealth of about \$40,000,000. SPARTA had a small area, with only 150,000 citizens and 220,000 slaves. Its wealth, in the palmy days of the State, was very inconsiderable. Yet the combined army of these little States, not larger than the military force of South Carolina, repulsed 300,000 Persians in a pitched battle, and drove back from their borders, the Persian invader with his million of soldiers. The resolution itself to meet this armed multitude met excite our highest admiration, and teach us an example worthy of imitation.

Editor's Table.

"THE HEIRS OF DEWENTWATER," and "THE SISTERS OF THE FATAL MARRIAGES."—These novels have been sent to us, by the Publishers. The first is from the house of DEWEY & DAYTON, N. Y.—the second from H. LOVELL & BROTHER of the same city. These Publishers announce that they will transmit by mail, to any part of the country, any new works of the kind, upon a remission of the cash. A work of two hundred pages will cost fifty cents, without binding.

These houses, doubtless issue a vast amount of good reading; but we must say, that they have made an unfortunate selection in the specimens we have mentioned. Not that they are uninteresting—on the contrary, they are of much more than ordinary interest. Once begun them, and it is rather difficult to put them down, even for dinner. Their fault, is the fault of Eugene Sue's works.—They are decidedly immoral and corrupting in their influence—more so than any novels we have read for a long time. Villainy, debauchery, robbery and intrigues, are their prevailing features. There are

at the same time, some excellent touches on a pure key. The plot of either work is rather defective and unnatural. But this is partially lost sight of by the reader, amid the varied and hurried incidents of the story. While these novels possess some interest of a thrilling character, they are certainly not worthy of being recommended to a refined community. E. L. BLANCHARD is the author of the first named work—HENRY COCKTON, of the second.

FOR THE ADVERTISER.

BYRNE'S POCKET COMPANION FOR MACHINISTS, MECHANICS AND ENGINEERS, has also been forwarded by DEWITT & DAVENPORT, Tribune Buildings, N. Y.; and this we judge to be an admirable and exceedingly useful work. It is a clear and condensed statement, of all the information requisite for a scientific artisan. It has the appearance moreover, of being eminently practical and simple. We can, without hesitation, recommend it to every one, desirous of accomplishing himself in these different branches of business.—Price of mail Edition—one dollar. Address the firm, as above.

CAN SOUTH CAROLINA MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT?

We are now to consider the ability of the State, under a separate government, to maintain her respectability among nations, and to protect herself against aggressions.

Once out of the Union, what is to prevent? The elements of strength in a state are compactness of territory, union of interest and feeling, pecuniary resources, and men of strong nerves and stout hearts. Some great men have said, that "war has no sinecure but those of good soldiers." And again: "a State to be great, must be of a military race; or both, by origin and disposition, warlike." There is much wisdom in these words. It is equally true, that mere force never yet subdued a spirited and intelligent race of men. A brave and determined people may be whipped, but, if united, they can never be subdued. History does not furnish a single example. It is a remark, worthy of its author, "who overcomes

By force, hath overcome but half his foe." Nor do numbers always constitute the strength of a State. A Territory of moderate size, with a warlike population, affords ample bulwarks for protection and defence. Small States, by a prompt concentration of their power, can always exert a force greater in proportion than large States, and hence usually defend themselves beyond all expectation against large forces sent against them. "It is known," says a great Statesman, "that it takes a much less force, in proportion, to subject a large country with a numerous population, than a small territory with an inconsiderable population." Apply these principles to our case. South Carolina is strong in arms, and rich in soil. She has a territory of 31,000 square miles; wealth to the amount of \$250,000,000; and a military force of 55,000 men, who may be constantly employed in active service, without subtracting very largely from the agricultural industry of the State. And she will have "good soldiers." Are not our men of a "military race?" Are they not warlike both

The above States not only achieved, but have maintained their independence. How do the numberless little Principalities, Duchies and Kingdoms in Germany, many of them not so large as Edgefield District, preserve their sovereignty and independence among the despotic family of European nations? There are the free cities of HAMBURG, BREMEN, LUBECK and FRANKFORT, only third rate towns, that have existed as independent sovereignties for centuries. True, they belong, at present, to the German confederation; but this is a mere league of defence against external powers, not interfering with the sovereignty and freedom of these cities. Yes! these Republics, not one of them having an area over 150 square miles, nor a population above 200,000, have long upheld, and do now maintain their individual sovereignties, enjoying the glorious sweets of liberty, in the neighborhood of large and powerful despots—under the very eyes of tyrants, who have their standing armies of 150,000 and 300,000 men, and who frown upon every semblance of political freedom. Once members of a Confederacy, styled the "Hanseatic League," which comprised some 85 States or Cities, and which, by its wealth and arms, ruled nearly the whole of Northern Europe, these little States have had the nerve to achieve their independence, and to maintain it under all the frowns and threats of despotism.

Yet the people of Carolina, with quadruple their wealth, and military force, and more than centuple their territory, are actually hesitating, whether or not they shall give up their sovereignty, and become the mere tributary allies of a Northern consolidated despotism. O, Tempora! O, Mores!

But in estimating the elements of success for a separate State Government, it is not proper to consider only our physical resources. The true strength of a nation rests, as much, perhaps, on the operation of moral causes, as on the organization of physical power. The Government, which, by its reckless administration and lawless oppressions, has sown the seeds of discontent and faction, need not expect to exert the full measure of its strength or greatness. For this to be done, especially in free countries, the moral energies of the people must be awakened. Among a great and free people, before the national mind can be urged to exert its full power and will, a plausible pretext must offer itself—a prospect of gain, or, at least, of some seeming good. Factions among us may combine for the accumulation of wealth and power, but they will rarely unite to consume wealth by extravagant wars, unless driven to them in self-defence. The Federal Government, by arousing disaffections in the minds of the people, on the great sectional matters at issue before the country, has deranged its springs of power, so as necessarily to cripple its energies, if not entirely to paralyze them, in any struggle it may wage relative to these sectional issues. And while its power thus becomes weakened, a common interest and safety must inevitably urge us, sooner or later, to that union of feeling and sentiment, that concert of will and action, which the desire for self-preservation never fails to inspire, and which are the chief sources of national strength.

But thirdly, we shall have little to excite the animosity or envy of other nations. Our Territory will be comparatively small, and in great part, subject to cultivation only by the African. It would, therefore, scarcely tempt a conqueror, or invite the rapacity of the North. Our wealth, also, is of such a nature, as not to excite Northern cupidity. Consisting almost wholly of land and negroes, it would be of little value to us except those who would own slaves and live upon the soil, while any serious disturbance of our institutions would effectually destroy our produce, which it is so much the interest of others to obtain. Nothing but a spirit of revenge in the Northern mind, could provoke an attempt to conquer our State; and we need have fears from no other quarter. While, then, other States would have little temptation to interrupt us, every consideration of interest and policy would lead them to let us alone; in which case, as shown in our former article, we should enjoy an unexampled state of prosperity.

With our native strength, therefore, and by the operation of the moral causes, we have been considering, there can be little doubt as to the ability of the State to maintain her liberty and independence.

INDEPENDENCE.

I desired to say more on other points where I have been misinterpreted and misquoted, but matters of a private nature are now engrossing my time and my labour.

FOR THE ADVERTISER.

TO THE PEOPLE OF EDGEFIELD.

It would be a reproach to your intelligence, for any citizen, to endeavor to persuade you, that we have not reached a point in the affairs of the State, that demands all your vigilance, judgement, courage, and firmness. Attempts have been, and will be made to deceive and mislead you, by timid men, and by unworthy intrigues. Many of you have already been betrayed into great error. The truth has not been told you, and the true issues for you to decide, have not been fairly presented to your minds. The individual who addresses you, has no ambitious aspirations to gratify, and will win no reputation by what he now has to say; for his name shall be studiously kept hidden from the public. Hear me, then, with patience and confidence.

FOR THE ADVERTISER.

Mr. Editor: That your correspondent "Decision of 1850," should deem me deficient in courtesy has excited my unaffected regret. Fully realizing the difficulties of conducting a controversy in print, and of avoiding every cause of offence, both seeming and real, I endeavored to exercise an unwonted degree of prudence, and to this end actually consulted my dictionary upon the very word to which objection is made. In the books to which I referred, the adverb "happily," means fluently, smoothness and rapidity of speech, &c. In this sense it was used, and when I assure "Decision of 1850," that I have no conception of his real name, I hope and believe that he will resume his good temper and former signature and drop his alias. I suspect that "Decision of 1850," and "JOHN RANDOLPH," are the same, and if so, I cannot object of the latter article as it was an impression that "Independence" courteous. If, however, "JOHN" different writer, I will so far as of "Decision of 1850," as every with the former until he

never asserted "that a State however small, cannot pay for the support of her own government." I said expressly that South Carolina "would be rich enough to entice the cupidity of the world, but too feeble to defend herself," if attacked by a powerful Nation; and secondly, that the assertion, though understood as it was by "JOHN RANDOLPH," is not more "disgusting" than the stipidity of his declaration "that the experience of military men has taught us that it is much easier to take strong positions than to maintain them." Upon this principle it follows, that it is more difficult to subdue a weak man than one who is strong.—But enough; wrangling was never more out of place than at the present time, and I here declare that in whatever I may write, not one word of acrimony or disrespect shall escape me, unless used as retort.

The "Decision of 1850," finds it difficult to reconcile my approbation of the appropriation of \$300,000 made by the Legislature, and my avowed opposition to separate State action, and holds that preparation for an issue that may or may not arise upon some future contingency is an absurdity. The explanation is simply this, that preparation to meet an issue is the most effectual method of averting it. Were the thirteen Southern States to secede in a body, I have no idea that a blow would be struck. But I do not require a coalition of all those States to induce me to advocate secession. The co-operation of any two States with South Carolina would content me and I would then advocate action instantly. I believe that three States would form a nucleus of strong attractive power, which would rapidly increase, and I further believe that such a coalition of a few States would be more likely to result in war than the secession of a single State. By war I mean actual fighting—not blockading. The preparedness of South Carolina under these circumstances, would be a valuable absurdity. Nor does it follow that because I approve of one appropriation of a given amount that I recommend others and each larger amounts. Three hundred thousand dollars judiciously invested in small arms and cannon, in addition to the arms now owned by the State (private rifles included) would be quite sufficient for her wants while looking to the co-operation of Alabama and Mississippi. Every dollar of that amount invested in Steam Ships, built with a view to their conversion into vessels of War, I think will be money thrown away. Towards building a Navy, \$300,000 is but a drop in the bucket. It is not the appropriation which has already been made, but those which are yet to come in carrying out the scheme of separate secession, to which I alluded when I asked "will not the heavy debt the State will be forced to incur in order to put her in a condition of defence, (by land and sea, with her men in the field, her navy afloat, besides the previous debt incident to her organization as an Independent Government) entail a burden of taxation which will depopulate the State?" The sentence as I wrote it was an enquiry, not an assertion as it is quoted.

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The "Decision of 1850," finds it difficult to reconcile my approbation of the appropriation of \$300,000 made by the Legislature, and my avowed opposition to separate State action, and holds that preparation for an issue that may or may not arise upon some future contingency is an absurdity. The explanation is simply this, that preparation to meet an issue is the most effectual method of averting it. Were the thirteen Southern States to secede in a body, I have no idea that a blow would be struck. But I do not require a coalition of all those States to induce me to advocate secession. The co-operation of any two States with South Carolina would content me and I would then advocate action instantly. I believe that three States would form a nucleus of strong attractive power, which would rapidly increase, and I further believe that such a coalition of a few States would be more likely to result in war than the secession of a single State. By war I mean actual fighting—not blockading. The preparedness of South Carolina under these circumstances, would be a valuable absurdity. Nor does it follow that because I approve of one appropriation of a given amount that I recommend others and each larger amounts. Three hundred thousand dollars judiciously invested in small arms and cannon, in addition to the arms now owned by the State (private rifles included) would be quite sufficient for her wants while looking to the co-operation of Alabama and Mississippi. Every dollar of that amount invested in Steam Ships, built with a view to their conversion into vessels of War, I think will be money thrown away. Towards building a Navy, \$300,000 is but a drop in the bucket. It is not the appropriation which has already been made, but those which are yet to come in carrying out the scheme of separate secession, to which I alluded when I asked "will not the heavy debt the State will be forced to incur in order to put her in a condition of defence, (by land and sea, with her men in the field, her navy afloat, besides the previous debt incident to her organization as an Independent Government) entail a burden of taxation which will depopulate the State?" The sentence as I wrote it was an enquiry, not an assertion as it is quoted.

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