The answer can only be found in the principles embraced in the first and second of these resolutions. The former affirms the acknoweledged principle that a ship or vessel, on the high seas, in time of peace, and engaged in a lawful voyage, is, by the law of nations, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State to which her flag belongs, and the second, that if forced by stress of weather, or other unavoidable cause, into a port of a friendly power, she would lose none of the rights appertaining to her on the high seas; but, on the contrary, she, with her cargo and persons on board, including their property and all the rights belonging to their personal relations, would be placed under the protection which the law of nations extends to the unfortunate in such cases.

It is on this solid basis that the rights of our citizens rested. The laws of nations, their paramount authority, overruled, in those cases, the municipal laws of Great Britain, even within her territorial limits; and it was to their authoritive voice that her Government yielded obedience in compensating our citizens for the violation of rights placed under their sacred protection.

Having now established the principle necessarily implied in the allowance of compensation in the cases of the Comet and Encomium, it will be an easy task to show that is equally embraces the case of the Enterprise. It is admitted by the British Minister, that there is no other distinction between it and the other two, except that it occured before, and the others after, the act abolishing slavery in the colonies went into operation; and it must, of course, be equally comprehended in the principles embraced in the first and second resolutions, in virtue of which compensation was made, as has been shown; unless indeed that act had the effect of preventing it, which I shall now show it could not, according to the law of nations.

A simple but decisive view will be sufficient for this purpose. I have just shown that the act of Parliament, for abolishing the slave trade, although it expressly prohibited the introduction of slaves within the limits of the British territory, or detaining them in that condition, when brought in, so far from overruling, were overruled by the principles embraced in these resolutions. If that act did not overrule the laws of nations in those cases, how, I ask, could the act for the abolition of slavery in the colonies overrule them in a case in every essential circumstance acknowledged to be the same? Can a possible reason be assigned? The authority by which the two were enacted is the same, and the one as directly applicable to the case as the other. If, indeed, there be a difference, the one for the abolition of the slave trade is, of the two, the most applicable. That act directly prohibits the introduction of slaves within the British dominion, in the most unqualified manner, or the retaining them, when introduced in that condition; while the object of the act for the abolition of slavery in the colonies, was to emancipate those who were such under the authority of the British laws. It is true, it abolishes slavery in the British dominions, but that is no more than had previously been done, as far as slaves brought into her dominions were concerned, by the act for abolishing the slave trade. And yet we see that act was overruled by the law of nations, in the case of the Comet and Encomium. How, then, is it possible that of two laws, enacted by the same authority, both to the same case, should be overruled by the law of nations, and the other overrule it? It is clear that it is impossible; and that if the one cannot divest the rights of our citizens, neither can the other; and, of course, that the principle on which compensation was allowed in the cases of the Encomium and the Comet, equally embraces that of the Enterprise. Both acts were, in truth but municipal laws; and, as such, neither could overrule the laws of nations, nor divest our citizens of their rights in the case under consideration. In the nature of things, the laws of nations, which have for their object the regulation of their intrercourse of States, must be paramount to municipal laws, where their provisions happen to come in to conflict. If not they would be without authority. If this be so, there can be no discrimination between the three cases, and, in that case, our citizens would have no just claim for compensation in either.— It follows; that the principle which embraces one, embraces all. There can be no just distinction between them; and I shall next proceed to show, that, in attempting to make a distinction where there is no difference, the British negotiator has been compelled to assume the very point in controversy between the two Governments. In doing this, I propose to follow his argument, step by step, and prove the truth of my assertion at each step.

He sets out with laying down the rule, by which he asserts that those claims should be decided, which he says, "is that those claimants must be considered entitled to compensation, who were lawfully in possession of their slaves within the British territory, and who were disturbed in their legal possession of those slaves, by functionaries of the British Government." I object not to the rule. If our citizens had no right to their slaves, at any time after they entered the British territory—that is, if the mere fact of entering extinguished all right to them, (for that is the amount of the rule)—they could of course have no claim on the British Government, for the plain reason that the local authority, in seizing and detaining the negroes, seized and detained what, by supposition, did not belong to them. That is clear enough; but let us see the application: it is given in a few words. He says: "Now the owners of the slaves on board the Enterprise never were lawfully in possession of those slaves within the British territory;" assigning for reason "that before the Enterprize arrived at Bermuda, slavery had been abolished in the British Empire"—an assertion which I shall show, in a subsequent part of my remarks, to be erroneous. From that, and that alone, he comes to the conclusion, "that the negroes on board the Enterprise had, by entering within the British jurisdiction, acquired rights which the local courts were bound to protect." Such certainly would have been the case, if they had been brought in, or entered voluntarily. He who enters voluntarily the territory of another State, tacitly submits himself, with all his rights, to its laws, and is as much bound to submit to them as its citizens or subjects. No one denies that; but that is not the present case. They entered not voluntarily, but from necessity; and the very point at issue is, whether the British municipal laws could divest their owners of property in their slaves on entering British territory, in cases such as the Enterprise, when the vessel has been forced into their territory by necessity, through an act of Providence to save the lives of those on board. We deny they can, and maintain the opposite ground:—that the law of nations in such cases interposes and protects the vessel and those on board, with their rights, against the municipal laws of the State, to which they have never submitted, and to which it would be cruel and inhuman as well as unjust, to subject them. Such is clearly the point at issue between the two Governments; and it is not less clear, that it is the very point assumed by the British negotiator in the controversy.

He felt, in assuming his ground, that the general principle was against him, according to which the municipal laws yield to the laws of nations in such cases; and in order to take himself out of its operation, he attempted to make a distinction equally novel and untenable. He asserts "that there is a distinction between laws bearing upon the personal liberty of man, and laws bearing upon the property which man may claim in irrational animals, or inanimate things;" and concedes "that if a ship containing such animals or things, were driven by stress of weather into a foreign port, it would be highly unjust that the owner should be stripped of what belongs to him, through the application of the municipal law of the State to which he had not voluntarily submitted himself."—Yes, it would be both unjust and inhuman; and because it would be so, it is contrary to the law of nations, which is but the rules of justice and humanity applied to the intercourse of nations; and therefore it is that it interposes in cases like the present, and places under its protection the rights of the unfortunate, even against the municipal laws of the place.

But he asserts that the principle does not extend to the cases in which rights of property in persons are concerned, (for such must be the meaning, or it is wholly irrelevant to the question at issue,) because "there are three parties to the transaction; the owner of the cargo, the local authority, and the alledged slave; and the third party is no less entitled than the first to appeal to the local authority for such protection as the law of the land may afford him." This is the position on which the British negotiator mainly rests his argument; and if this fails, the whole must fall to the ground. It is not difficult to see, from what he says of two parties appealing to the local authority that he tacitly puts aside the law of nations, and assumes the parties to be under the municipal law of the place; and, also that those laws, and not the law of nations, are the standard by which their rights are to be judged; but is it not manifest this is an assumption, in another form, of the point in controversy? Against it, unsustained and unsustainable, by authority or reason, I shall oppose what, to him, must be the highest authority—that of the British Government itself—in the cases of the Comet and Encomium, backed by unanswerable reasons.

If the distinction be true at all, between property in persons and property in things, or irrational animals, it was, to the full, as applicable to those cases as it is to that of the Enterprise. In them the right of property in persons was involved; and the three parties included, to the same extent, as in that. Nor was personal liberty less concerned. As far as British laws could affect the rights of our citizens, the negroes belonging to the Comet and Encomium were as free as those belonging to the Enterprise. An act of Parliament, as has been shown, forbade their introduction, and forfeited the rights of their owners, thereby making them free, with rights to maintain, as far as British legislation could make them so; and yet, after full and mature investigation and reflection for the same rule applied to them, which, it is conceded, would apply in similar cases to property in things, or irrational animals. Now, I ask, if the act for the abolition of the slave trade, which directly forbids the introduction of negroes as slaves, and forfeits the rights of their owners, did not, as we have seen, justify the distinction in the cases of the Comet and Encomium, now attempted to be made between the two descriptions of property, how could the act for the abolition of slavery justify it in the case of the Enterprise? In the former, there were all the parties, with their respective rights, just the same as in the latter; and if the local authorities were not bound to recognise and protect the negroes in the one case, why, I ask, were they in the other? Can a satisfactory answer be given? And, if not, what becomes of the distinction, with all its consequences, attempted to be deduced from it?

The British negotiator, as if conscious of the weakness of the position, attempts immediately to fortify it. He says: "If, indeed, a municipal law be made, which violates the laws of nations, a question of another kind may arise. But the municipal law which forbids slavery, is no violation of the laws of nations. It is, on the contrary, in strict harmony with the laws of nations; and, therefore, when slaves are liberated, according to such municipal law, there is no wrong done, and there can be no compensation granted;" a position pregnant with meaning, as will hereafter appear, but I must say, like all his others, a mere assumption of the point at issue, expressed in vague and indefinite language. If, in asserting that a municipal law abolishing slavery is not a violation of the laws of nations, it is meant that it is not a violation of those laws for a State to abolish slavery which exists under its authority, it may be readily admitted, without prejudice to the rights of our citizens in the case in question, though it is a little remarkable, that the British Government allowed compensation to their own subjects by this very act under which slavery was abolished—authority in direct contradiction to the assertion that no compensation can be granted, when the act is applied to the case of our citizens, forced, without their consent, into its territory.— But if, instead of that, it be meant that all municipal laws, not in violation of the laws of nations, are valid against those laws, when they come in conflict with them, how can the distinction, attempted to be drawn between the rights of property in things, or irrational animals, and in persons, be justified? or how can the allowance of compensation in the cases of the Comet and Encomium be explained? I put the question. Was the law for the abolition of the slave trade, a violation of the laws of nations? And if not a violation, as it certainly was not, how came compensation to be granted in those cases?—Can an answer be given? And if not, what becomes of the distinction attempted to be taken? But another meaning may be intended; that it was no violation of the law of nations to extend the act, for the abolition of slavery in the British territories, to cases such as the Enterprise. If that is intended, it would be like all the other distinctions which have been attempted—but an assumption of the point in controversy.

I have now stated, in his words, every argument advanced by the British negotiator to sustain the distinction which he has attempted between the cases of the Comet and Encomium, and that of the Enterprise, and have, I trust, established, beyond controversy, that there is no rational ground whatever for the distinction. When again pressed on the subject by our Minister, who was not satisfied with his arguments, he assumed the broad ground that Great Britain had the right to forbid the recognition of slavery within her territory; and as our claim was inconsistent with such right, it could not be allowed, and on this closed the correspondence. It is easy to see, if she has such right, in the broad and unqualified sense in which it is laid down, and applied to the case in question, it extends to all rights whatever, whether it be right of property in things and irrational animals, or growing out of personal relations, whether founded in consent or not. All are either the creatures of positive enactments, or subject to be regulated and controlled by municipal laws; and she has just the same right to prohibit the recognition of any one or all of those rights within her territory, as the one in question. But who can doubt that such prohibition, if extended to cases of distress, such as the Enterprise, would be a most flagrant violation of the laws of nations, as understood and acted on by all civilized nations, and even as admitted and acted on by herself, in the cases of the Comet and Encomium?

To us this is not a mere abstract question, nor one simply relating to the free use of the high seas. It comes nearer home. It is one of free and safe passage from one port to another of our Union; as much so to us, as a question touching the free and safe use of the channels between England and Ireland on the one side, and the opposite coast of the continent on the other, would be to Great Britain. To understand its deep importance to us, it must be borne in mind, that the island of Bermuda lies but a short distance off our coast, and that the channel between the Bahama islands and Florida, is not less than two hundred miles in length, and on an average [illegible] that through this long, narrow and difficult channel, the immense trade between our ports on the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic coast must pass, which, at no distant period, will constitute more than half of the trade of the Union. The principle set up by the British Government, if carried out to its full extent, would do much to close this all-important channel, by rendering it too hazardous for use. She has only to give an indefinite extension to the principle applied to the case of the Enterprise, and the work would be done; and why has she not as good a right to apply it to a cargo of sugar or cotton, as to the slaves who produce it?

I have now, I trust, established, to the satisfaction of the Senate, what I proposed when I commenced; that the principle on which compensation was allowed in the cases of the Comet and Encomium, equally embraces that of the Enterprise; that no just distinction can be made between them; and that the British negotiator, in attempting to make a distinction, was forced to assume the point in controversy. And here I might conclude my remarks, as far as these resolutions are concerned, but there are other questions connected with this subject, not less important, which demand attention, and which I shall proceed to consider.

It is impossible to read the correspondence between the two Governments without the impression that the question involved in the negotiation was one of deep embarrassment to the British ministry. The great length of the negotiation, considering the simplicity and paucity of the points involved, the long delay before an answer could be had at all, and the manifest embarrassment in making the distinction between the cases allowed, and the one rejected, plainly indicate that there was some secret, unseen difficulty in the way, not directly belonging to the questions involved in the cases. What was that difficulty? If I mistake not, it will be found in the condition of things in England, and especially in reference to those in power. It is my wish to do the Ministry ample justice, as I believe they were desirous of doing us; but it is not to be disguised that there was no small difficulty in the way, from the state of things under which they acted, and which I shall next explain.

The present Whig ministry held, and still hold, their power, as is well known, by a precarious tenure. Their party is, in fact, in a minority, and can only support themselves against the powerful party in opposition, by such adventitious aid as can be conciliated. Among the subdivisions of party in Great Britain, the Abolition interest is one of no little power; and it will be seen at once, that the question involved in the negotiation is one in reference to which they would have no little sensibility. Like all other fanatics, they have little regard either to reason or justice, where the object of their enthusiasm is concerned. To do justice, without offending such a party, in such a case, was no easy task; and to offend them, without losing the ascendency of their party, and the reins of Government, was almost impossible. The Ministry had to act under these conflicting considerations; and I intend no disrespect in saying that the desire of conciliating so strong a party, and thereby retaining place, when opposed to the demands of justice, could not be without its weight. The course, accordingly, taken, was such as might have been anticipated from these opposing motives. To satisfy our urgent claim for justice, compensation was allowed in two of the cases, and to avoid offending a powerful and zealous party, a distinction was taken between them and the other, the effects of which would be to close the door against future demands of the kind. I mean not to say, that deliberate and intentional injustice was done; but simply, that these conflicting causes, which it is obvious, from the circumstances of the case, must have been in operation, would, by a natural and an unseen bias, lead to that result.

But another question of far greater magnitude, growing out of the foregoing, presents itself for consideration: to what must that result finally lead, if Great Britain should persist in the decision which it has made? I hold it impossible for her to maintain the position she has taken. She must abandon it as untenable, and take one of two other positions: either that her municipal laws are paramount to the law of nations, when they come into conflict; or that slavery—the right of man to hold property in man—is against the law of nations. It is only on the one or other of these suppositions that the act for abolishing slavery can have the force she attributes to it. The former she cannot take, without virtually abolishing the entire system of international laws. She could not think of assuming that her municipal laws were paramount, without admitting those of other States also to be so; which would be to annul the system, and substitute in its place universal violence, discord and conflict. This would force her on the other alternative, which, if it were true, would give her a solid foundation for the rejection of our claim, on the incontestable principle that the laws of nations would not enforce that which violates themselves. Nor are there wanting indications, in the correspondence, (to some of which I have alluded,) that the position she has taken in reference to the Enterprise, is but preliminary to the adoption of that alternative. There are, however, many difficulties to be got over, before she can openly avow it.

It would require, in the first place, no small share of effrontery, for a nation which has been the greatest slave dealer on earth; a nation, which has dragged a greater number of Africans from their native shores to people her possessions, and to sell to others, and which forced our ancestors to purchase slaves from her against their remonstrance, while Colonies, (not improbably the ancestors of the owners of those slaves, to purchase the ancestors of the slaves, for which she now refuses compensation,)—it would, I repeat, require no small effrontery to turn round and declare that she neither had, nor could have, the right to the property she sold us, nor could we, without deep crime, retain possession. We all know what such conduct would be called among individuals, without, indeed, followed by a tender back of the purchase money with ample compensation for damages; and there is no good reason why it should be called by a less harsh epithet, when applied to the conduct of nations.

But there is another difficulty. The avowal of the principle would place her in conflict with all the authorities on the law of nations, and the custom of all ages, past and present; and would bring her into collision with all nations whose institutions would be outlawed by the avowal, and what, perhaps, she would most regard, it would put her in conflict with herself.—Yes, she who refused to compensate our citizens for property unjustly seized and detained under her authority, on the ground that she had forbade the recognition of slavery in her territory, had then, and has, at this day, hundreds of thousands of slaves in the most wretched condition, held by her subjects in her Eastern possessions; and worse, by herself. With all her boast, she is a slave holder, and hires out and recieves hire for slaves. I speak on high authority—the Asiatic Journal for 1838, printed in her own metropolis.

Here the Secretary read the following extracts from pages 221:

Government of slaves in Malabar.—We know that there is not a servant of Government, in the south of India, who is not intimately acquainted with the alarming fact, that hundreds of thousands of his fellow-creatures are fettered down for life to the degraded destiny of slavery. We know that these unfortunate beings are not, as is the case in other countries, serfs of the soil, and incapable of being transferred, at the pleasure of their owners, from one estate to another. No, they are daily sold, like cattle, by one proprietor to another; the husband is separated from the wife and the parent from the child. They are loaded with every indinity; the utmost possible quantity of labor is exacted from them, and the most meagre fare that human nature can possible subsist on is doled out to support them. The slave population is composed of a great variety of classes: the decendants of those who have been taken prisoners in time of war, persons who have been kidnapped from the neighboring States, people who have been born under such circumstances as that they are considered without the pale of the ordinary castes; and other who have been smuggled from the coast of Africa, torn from their country and their kindred, and destined a more wretched lot, and, as will be seen, to a more enduring captivity than their brethren of the western world. Will it be believed, that Government itself participates in this description of property; that it actually holds possession of slaves, and lets them out for hire to the cultivators of the country, the rent of a whole family being two fanams, or half a rupee per annum."

But why dwell on these comparatively few slaves? The whole of Hindostan, with the adjacent possessions, is one magnificent plantation, peopled by more than one hundred millions of slaves, belonging to a company of gentlemen in England, called the East India Company, whose power is far more unlimited and despotic than that of any Southern planter over his slaves—a power upheld by the sword and bayonet, exacting more and leaving less by far of the product of their labor to the subject race than is left under our own system, with much less regard to their comfort in sickness and age. This vast system of servitude carries with itself the elements of increase: nor, it is true, by the African slave trade, but by means not less inhuman; that of organizing the subject race into armies, and exhausting their strength and life in reducing all around to the same state of servitude.

But it may be said, that the East India Company is but a department of the British Government, through which it exercises its control, and holds in subjection that vast region. Be it so. I stickle not for nice distinctions. But how stands the case under this aspect? If it be contrary to the laws of nature, or nations, for man to hold man in subjection individually, is it not equally contrary for a body of men to hold another in subjection? And if that be true, is it not as much so for one nation to hold another in subjection? If man individually has an absolute right to self-government, have not men aggregated into States, or nations, an equal right? If there be a difference, is not the right the more perfect in a people, or nation, than in the individuals who compose it? And if not the subjection of one people to another usually accompanied with, at least, as much abuse, cruelty, and oppression, as that of one individual to another? Is it possible to mark a distinction which shall justify the one and condemn the other?—And if not, what right, then, I ask, has Great Britain to hold India in subjection, if it be contrary to the laws of nature, or nations, for one man to hold another in subjection? Or, what right to hold Canada, or her numerous subject colonies, all over the globe? Or, to come nearer to the point, in what light does it place her boasted abolition of slavery in the West Indies? What has she, in reality, done there but to break the comparatively mild and guardian authority of the master, and to substitute in its place her own direct and unlimited power? What but to replace the overseer, by the army, the sheriff, the constable, and the tax collector? Has she made her slaves free?—Given them the right of self-government! Is it not mockery to call their present subject condition freedom? What would she call it, if it were hers—if, by some calamity to her and the cizilized world, she should fall under similar subjection to France, or some other power? Would she call that feedom, or the most galling and intolerable slavery?

But I approach near home. I cross the Atlantic, passing unnoticed subjucated Island, with her eight millions of people, and only ninety thousand voters, and placing myself on the boasted shores of England herself, I ask, how will the principle work there?

It was estimated by Burke, if my memory serves me, shortly before the beginning of this century, that the British public, estimating as such all who exercised influence over the Government, did not exceed 200,000 individuals. Since then it has, no doubt, greatly increased by the extension of the right of suffrage and other causes. Say that it has trebled or quadrupled, and, to be liberal, that it amounts to seven or eight hundred thousand. In this small portion, then, is vested the supreme control and dominion over the twen-five millions, which constitute the population of the British isles. If, then, it be contrary to the laws of nations for man to hold man in subjection, or one nation another, how can a small part or class of a community hold the rest? Or on what principle, according to that maxim, can these few hundred thousand hold so many millions? If the right of self-government forbids the subjection of one man to another, does it not equally forbid that of a small portion of the community over the residue? And, if so, must not the maxim terminate in the utter overthrow of the present political and social system of Great Britain, and the rest of Europe.

To be concluded in our next.

British Force in the Canadas—A paragraph is going the rounds in most of our city papers, in which it is stated that the military force in the Canadas consists of twenty thousand men. It is not so: the calculation is based on the number of regiments stationed in the provinces, as it is found in a late number of the United Service Journal. To make up the twenty thousand, it is estimated that the three regiments of Guards "are one thousand strong and the foot eight hundred." Now such is not the fact. Not one of the regiments is full, and the entire force in the Canadas, we believe, is not more than thirteen thousand.—*N. Y. Com Adv.*

Another Boundary Question.—The legislature of Ohio has passed resolutions setting forth that Great Britian is making encroachments upon our Territory beyond the Rocky Mountains, and calling upon the general government to interpose for the protection of the interests of the U. States in that quarter.—*Ibid.*

The Indians at Work—Our latest intelligence is, that a train of government wagons, consisting of six, was captured by 12 Indians, between Forts Macomb and Banker a few days ago, and one sergeant mortally wounded. A sergeant was fired on near Fort Pleasant, in the neighborhood of Col. Davenport's camp, and escaped barely with his life: and also, that an Indian camp had been discovered within about four miles of Col. Robert Gamble's residence, where they had left their fires burning, and appearances which indicated that some four or five cattle had been slaughtered. These depredations have all been committed in the immediate vicinity of where the troops are most thickly stationed—in that portion of country which is considered as most securely guarded! How are these vagabonds to be whipped and subdued? We ask for information.—*Tallahassee Star, 23th inst.*

Philadelphia, April 4.—A letter from our correspondent at Harrisburg under date of yesterday at noon, says that the Governor has signed the Bank Resumption Bill, and that the other Bank Bill has just passed the House being shorn of most of its objectionable features.

A large portion of the church of God in every age has been composed of the poor.

Correspondence of the Charleston Courier.

WASHINGTON, April 2

The Cumberland Road bill was again under consideration in the Senate to-day. Mr Grundy proposed to reduce the appropriation from 150,000 dollars for each of the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois to 100,000 dollars, on the ground that money was scarce in the Treasury, and that it would be sufficient for immediate purposes. Mr. Preston thought the same reasons would justify a still further reduction, and he moved to reduce the sum one half. This was carried, 23 to 17. Mr. White, of Indiana, replied to Mr. Calhoun's argument of yesterday and insisted that the Cumberland Road would be more useful than a rail raod, even if the government would aid the States in making one. He spoke also of the glorious destinies of the West, and the impolicy of checking their career, Mr. Clay, of Kentucky, will speak on the aubject to-morrow. It is doubted whether he will support the bill, though he has been considered as the father of the work. A monument has been erected to him at Wheeling, as the author of the road.

The subject of the New Jersey election was debated for an hour.

Mr. Bell's bill to prevent the interference of Government Affairs in elections was taken—the question being, "shall the bill be rejected." Mr Watterson of Tennessee replied to Mr. Bell, and introduced many extraneous topics.

The Pennsylvania bank bill which is about to pass or has passed, gives great dissatisfaction to the radicals, and in fact, to many moderate conservatives. It removes all restrainls of law for the banks of all stationary remedies—leaving them a remedy at common law. It will greatly strengthern these institutitons, and will be followed by an enormous expansion, sudden rise of stocks, &c. The time of resumption is fixed for the 15th of January next. The state and Individuals will by that time be so deeply in debt to them that the suspension must be made perpetual.

APRIL 4.

The Cumberland Road Bill has received its quietus. The system of local and partial appropriation, involved in it, is dead forever.—The Sourthern members, and particularly those from South-Carolina, are much delighted at this result.

The bill came up yesterday, in the Senate, on its third reading. Mr. Southard spoke with much power, in opposition to it, though he has been one of its zealous and sincere advocates. He did not doubt the power of Congress to construct the work, nor did he doubt its expediency or ultility. That Road, he said, has diffused countless blessings not only among the people of the West, but of the whole Union. No one would look at the enterprize and prosperity of that extraordinary race of people who inhabited the country through it passed, without attributing much of their success, to the facilities afforded them by this means of communication, between the East of West. But he had made he his mind to oppose the Bill, on account of the state of the finances of the country. The President had urged upon us economy, and even lectured us upon extravagance, Yes, this administration, that for years had expended 7·000,000 more than the whole revenue of the country, had the impudence to lecture us upon extravagance. The President's design was to throw upon Congress, the responsibility of exceeding the estimates, though he knew that those estimates would not cover the necessary expenditures of the country. Five millions had already been called for to meet the deficiency in the means of the Treasury, and he did not believe, that this would be made good by the excess of receipts in the latter half of the year, on the contrary, we must grant five millions more before the end of this session. Under these circumstances, and with a prospect before us of a collision with England, he could not vote a cent for any work not of immediate and pressing necessity.

Mr. Clay of Ky., opposed the bill on different grounds. He was and always had been in favor of a national and equal system of internal improvements. The distribution of surplus revenue among the States had in part answered this purposes and the plan of distributing the proceeds of the public lands would complete it. In the meantime, he was unwilling to continue a monopoly of their benfits in the hands of the three States of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio—States which had opposed the Land Bill, and supported Gen. Jackson in his veto of the Maysville road. He could see no propriety in continuing to lavish vast sums on those three States. If the work was constitutional, then it would be also constitutional to carry on works on the opposite side of the river. There could not be two constitutions,—one for that side of the Ohio river and another for this. Mr. Clay went on and brought up an array of objections against the appropriation—not the least of which, in his mind, was the extravagant cost of the road, which could only be accounted for by the fact that the money was used to reward party services.

The bill was rejected 20 to 22. If it had passed the Senate the House would have refused it.

Mr. Tallmadge introduced a general bankrupt bill of 60 sections. This plan and Mr. Webster's also are now before the Committee on the Judiciary.

The bill for the suppression of Indiana Hostilities in Florida will come up on Monday—and there will be a bitter opposition to it.

The House has got rid, for the present, at least, of the debate on the Jersey questions.—The motion to print both reports of the Committe of Elections and all the testimony on the subject was passed, nem. con.

The case will come up again about the 1st of May, on the final report of the Committee.

The Government is now suffering for want of the appropriation bills. They have got money, but have no authority to use it. The orders given for the fitting out some vessels' for the protection of our commerce, cannot be executed. How much longer it will suit the House to delay these bils, remains to be seen. Mr. Dawson will probably offer a resolution for the adjurnment of Congrees early in June.

APRIL 5.

The Senate did not sit yesterday, and very little business was done in the House. An opportunity was offered, however, for the Committees to report, and more than one hundred subjects were reported upon.

Mr. Cushing, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported a bill for the adjustment of the claims for French Spoliations, prior to September, 1800. The bill allows five millions of dollars for distribution among the claimants. The whole amount of the claim is undoubtedly a just and meritorious one, and has been favorably reported upon a dozen times by Committees of both Houses. But I doubt whether the claimants will ever get any thing more than a report and bill, It was referred to the Committee of the whole on the Union.

The feverish excitement produced by the late correspondence between Mr. Fox and Mr. Forsyth, has subsided. Little apprehension is now entertained of any collision between the parties, though it is not believed that Great Britain will give up her pretensions either in regard to the incidental or the original question.

APRIL 6.

The two Housss will meet; to-day, to take a new start, in the public business. They have got rid of some of the subjects, which, for a long time, have obstructed the public business; and they may now proceed with more facility, in the despatch of necessary Legislation.

The tone assumed by the delegation from the State of Maine, in regard to the Boundary Question, is not so fierce, nor so unreasonable as has been supposed; and that matter may pass over without any collision. It is said, that Maine will agree to any fair compromise of the disputed territory; in order to keep up a com