Historical Newspapers of South Carolina

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TfrTlfe HOV.'JOH* QUINCY ADAMS. % WASHINGTON. - Mv dear Sir, I propose to say a few words on the ques ion whether tbe Banks should resume spe lie payment? in May next. I do this be cause my position seems to justify, if not require it. For niueteen years I have been connected witn the institution which caused the last resumption, and during all that pe riod mv efforts have been directed to secure to the country the benefits of a sound cur rency, and to banish from circulation every thing but the precious metals and notes al ways convertible into them. I think that no other currency is safe or tolerable ; and that we should now return to it at the first mo ment it can be dene permanently. F or this purpose the institution to which I belong has made great efforts. Since the suspension in May last it has bought and added to its vaults nearly three millions of dollars in gold and silver ; and now, with a capital of thirty-five millions, its notes in circulation are six mil lions, while its specie, after paying more than haif a million to the Government of the United States, amonnts to nearly four mil lions, and it has eight or ten millions of funds in Europe. Our principles therefore in cline us to an early resumption ; our prepa rations would justify it ? and if ..we were at all influenced by the poor ambition of doing whaf others cannot do so readily, or the still poorer desire of profiting by the disasters of others, the occasion would certainly be tempting. ? ? But the Bank of the United States makes common cause with the other Banks, and the character and prosperity of the country are identified with its banking system. ~ They must stand or fell together ? and it is of vital importance that the banks should act wisely and act harmoniously, and above all they should not suffer themselves to be driven, by the dread of being thought weak, into rash and hazardous enterprizes. The great prerogative of strength is not to be afraid of doing right; and it belongs to those who have no fear that prudent counsels will be mistaken for timidity, to examine calmly whether the general interests of the country recommend the voluntary resumption of spe cie payments in May next. I say the volun tary resumption, because there is not now, nor has there ever been, any legal suspension of specie payments as there was for more than twenty years in England. The suspen sion is wholly conventional between the banks and the community, arising from their mutual conviction that it is for their mutual * benefit. In truth the banks are but the mere agents of that community. They have no funds not already lent out to the people, of whose property and industry they are the representatives. They are only other names for the farms, the commerce, the factories, and the internal improvements of the country -?and the enquiry whether the banks are rea dy to resume is only another form of asking whether the people are ready to pay their debts to the banks. Tbe true question then, after all, is, wheth er tht time has arrived when the hanks should announce that the causes of the suspension, which then satisfied the community, have ceased to exist, and that the suspension itself, with all its necessary attendants of restriction, need no longer be continued. To that en quiry I now proceed. And ? , L What were the causes of the suspen sion? They were the Specie Circular, which forbade the receipt of any thing but gold or silver at the Land Offices ? the mis management of the deposites, which scat tered them to the frontiers ? the clamor raised by the Executive against bank* notes, which alarmed the people for their safety, and caused a run upon the banks for specie. Now has any one of, these causes ceased ? ? Oft the contrary, have they not acquired ten iold force 1 - The Specie Circular is not re pealed. Ob the contrary, it has been exten ded, for bank notes are proscribed, not mere ly from the land offices, but from all pay ments of every description to the govern ment. The distribution of the surplus is over, because there is no longer any surplus to distribute; but the great disbursements on the Southern and Western frontiers ope rate as injuriously by requiring the transfer of so much revenue from the points where it is collected. Lastly and mainly, the alarm about bank notes propagated by the govern ment, has been deeply spread throughout the country, till what was at first a passing out cry, hi settled into an implacable hostility. So man, I think, can doubt for a moment that the Executive of the United States seeks to maintain his power by exciting popular passions against the credit system ? and that the whole influence of the government is employed to infuse into the minds of the people, distrust and hatred of all banks. ? For this purpose, the most insane ravings are addressed to the cupidity of the ignorant, who are taught that gold and silver are the only true riches, and above all, that these shrewd metals would enable us to outwit the paper dulness of England. "Sk^T said lately one of these politicians in the 0? S. Senate, "Sir, a man loses all by any circumstance that bat for that circumstance he would hare made. ? Although England is a paper country, yet if toe were exclusively a metallic country toe should make more out of our in tercourse with her. And why should we, be cause she chooses to maim herself by her paper system, follow her example!" The government, it may be said, is comparatively harmless, because its expenditures exceed its income. It* regular incomew no doubt but while it can pledge the public credit for treasury notes at a high rate of interest, by which every man's property is mortgaged, and buy specie with them, there can never be wanting the means of oppressing the banks. There, is therefore no one circum stance which occasioned the suspension sufficiently removed to justify a change, and t he-most prominent cause remains with in creased intensity. Accordingly ? If. We credit system of the United States and the exclusively metallic system are now fairly in the field, face to face with each other. One or other must fall. There can be no other issue. It is not a question of correct ing errors or reforming abuses, but of abso lute destruction; not which shall conquer, but which shall survive. The present struggle too must be final. If the banks resume aud are able by sacrificing the community to con tinue for a few months, it will be conclusively employed at the next elections to show that he schemes of the Executive are not as de tructive as they will prove hereafter. But ,{ they resume and again are compelled to suspend, the Executive will rejoice at this new triumph, and they will fall in the midst of a. universal outcry against tlieir weakness. This m perfectly understood, and according ly ail the influence of the Executive is di rected te drive the Banks, by popular out rage and clamor, into a premature resump tion? not a business resumption general and jasruianeat, but a political and forced re sumption, which may place them at the merry of those in power. They who have special charge of these interests must then beware of being decoyed from their present position. Thev are now safe and strong, and they should not venture beyond their entrenchments while the enemy is in the plain before them. It they resume, one of two things vviil happen their notes will not be received by the Government or they will be received ' If they are not received, the Government, to the extent of the revenue, will force the hoiders of the notes to draw specie from the Banks to be deposited with the collector of the revenue. For the differ ence between the revenue and the expenses, the Government will issue treasury notes to be sold for Bank notes, and converted into spe j cie, and as the disbursements are made at points on the frontiers, remote fro u the i ^ places of collection, it will not return to the ; Banks issuing it except circuitously. But if the notes are received, they will not as for merly be deposited in Banks and drawn out again, s? as to enter into the circulation, leaving the public creditor his. choice of spe cie or notes, but they will be left iD special deposite with the receivers. When warrants 3 re drawa on these receivers they will call on the Banks for specie to pay the favored pub lic creditor, selecting of course the Bank on whom they will draw according to its servility or opposition to the Executive, and -thus placing tfcem all under his control. Now under such circumstances, is it wise for the Banks to disarm themselves in the presence of their enemy 1 * III. The disorders of the currency lie too deep for superficial Tenaedies, and these pallia tives irritate "withon^curiHg. Congreae, and Congress alene*can apply adequte relief. What Mr. MadisojfcMid" to Congress in 1816, ; is even more true in 1838- "F or the interests of the community at large," said he, "as well as for the purposes of the Treasury, it is es sential that the nation should possess a curren cy of equal value, credit and use wherever it may circulate. The Constitution has en trusted Congress exclusively with the powei af creating and regulating a currency of that description." The only reform in the cur rency which that body has yet made is the issue of ten millions of irredeemable paper money, and a proposal for ten millions more. Is it worth while, then, so loug as Congress fails to exercise its legitimate powers, to waste the strength of the country in efforts i to accomplish what we all know to be im practicable. To resume now without some clear understanding with the Government, seems to be throwing away the benefits of experience, and the lessons of misfortune. We have gone through all the mortification and all the in<!t)nvenience of suspension. Let us endeavor to profit by them, to fix the future on some solid basis? have some guar antee of the stability of the currency, and not set every thing afloat again, without knowiug where we may be drifted. For IV. Compare the situation of the Banks at the last resumption and now. After a sus pension of nearly three years, Congress ap plied all its power to induce, to persuade, and to assist the Banks in their efforts to re sume. They passed the Resolution of 1816, authorising the receipt of the notes of Specie paying Banks. But this alone was insuffi cient; and at the same time they established the Bank of the United States, with a capi tal of thirty -five millions. That Bank called a convention of State Banks, and agreed that if they would resume specie payments, it would 1. Assume all their debts to the Govern ment of the United States. 2. Discount to those who had payments to make to the Government, the whole a mount of their Bonds ; .and in addition, 3. Discount to those not indebted to the Government two millions in New York, two millions in Philadelphia, one and a half mil lion in Baltimore, and a half million in Rich mond? and ^ 4. Would sustain the resuming Banks in case the resumption should bring them into difficulty. *;* The Bank at the same time imported, at an expense of more than half a million, the sum of seven millions of specie;. and two months after the resumption its discounts reached twenty millions. Compare with this statement our condition now. Then the Government agreed to receive for all dues the notes of the Bank of the United States ? now all Bank notes are re fused and discredited. Then the government, endeavored to sustain the Banks? now it is striving to destroy them. Then it established :^>pg and vigorous Bank Capital ? now it refuses to create a new Bank, and seeks to cripple those in existence. Then we had two hundred aDd sixty Banks ; now we have near ly nine hundred. In short, what reliance have the Banks qow with the Executive hostile to them ? What protection like that of the late Bank of the United States have they to sustain them? None whatever. The only circumstance not wholly unfa vorable in the comparison, is the low rate of exchange with England. But nothing gen eral or permanent can be inferred from this circumstance, which frequently occurs, and on the present occasion is wholly accidental in New York, from the unnatural condition into which her measures of extreme rigor have driven every thing. If, under ordinary circumstances, while other things underwent no depression, exchange on England should decline, it might be inferred that England owes to the United States more than we have yet drawn from her. But it is not exchange alone that has fallen. Exchange on England has not fallen in New \ ork as much as the internal exchanges, or stocks, or real estate, or house-rent have fallen. This fact seems decisive as to the cause. But can this de pression continue? Certainly not. These rigorous measures are understood to be only preliminary ? only preparations for an expan sion by the banks of New York, which is to restore ease and confidence. Well, the mo ment this ease and confidence return, all things will rise, and exchange of course among the number. Besides, this unnatural condition will work its own remedy, as all ir regularities are cured by their own excesses. To sell every thing and to buy nothing is im practicable ; and when the English have bought all the pioduce we have to spare, we must of course buy from them what manu factures they have to spare. As soon as the proceeds of our industry are realized in Eng land?while we have gradually exhausted our supply of English goods ? our own merchants will convert their produce into a fresh sup ply to be brought over ; or, if this process be too slow, the English manufacturers them selves will send their own goods for sale. In either case the exchange will recover its equi librium, and of course will rise here ; for be tween two such countries as America and . England, a permanent inequality of exchange, as a basis of the metallic currency of either, is impossible. V. Perceiving nothing iu the conduct of the Governtaent to justify an early resump tion, let us see if there be any thing in the state of the country which recommends it. Now what is the condition of our affairs? The suspension found us with a heavy debt to the banks ? not less probably than five hun dred millions ? with large balances from the Southern and Western States to the Atlantic cities, and with a very considerable debt to Europe. All parties were willing to pay ; almost all were able to pay ; but great for bearance and great indulgence were necessa ry from the creditor, and above all, after such a convulsion, the great restorer was time ; I time to settle; time to adjust accounts; time to send the debtor's crops to market; time to dispose of his property with the least sacri fice; time to briug out his resources to pay his debts. In all the large movements of human affairs, as in the operations of nature, the great law is gentleness ? violence is the | last resource of weakness. The disease of the country was an overstrained and distem pered energy. The remedy was repose. ? The question of the currency, though impor tant, was only secondary. The first concern was to pay our debts, and especially not to depreciate the value of our means ot paying them. Accordingly it seemed to me that, after the suspension, the true course of this country was to begin a gentle and gradual diminution of loans sufficient to prevent the hazards of expansion while the restraint of specie payments was removed, and to prepare for the resumption, but with no rash compe tition as to the amount which the several banks could curtail ? to make no violent changes in the standard of value, and give time for a settlement with foreigners, and among ourselves, on t^e same or nearly the same.rbasis upon which these mutual e^gage ments were contracted ? letting the crops go to their destined markets without depreciat ing their price. Alter this, the resumption, I with the aid of Congress, would have been easy and spontaneous. It was in this spirit that the Bank of the United- States has not diminished ten per cent, of its loans, while it added about three millions to its specie, and will have given the necessary facilities for shipping the crops of the South and West to the amount probably of fifteen or twenty niil lions of dollars, placing its own confidential agent in England to protect the great com mercial and pecuniary interests of the coun try. This seemed to" be its proper function. ! It was thus that it hoped to discharge its du ty to the whole Union. It was thus too it could show its fidelity to Pennsylvania, by aiding its public improvements, by keeping its business and its people in comparative ease, and by not suffering the prosperity of its commercial capital to be prostrated; ob jects these, far more important than whether specie payments be resumed a few months sooner or later. The injurious effects of a contrary course are seen in all the relations of business. Take, for instance, the debts to banks and to individuals. The debts were mainly con tracted when the currency was abundant. They must now be paid in a very altered state of the currency ? and it is necessary to proceed with extreme caution when the re lation of the debtor to his creditor is changed by events which neither could control ; be cause, if this change be not made very gra dually, so as to bring at the same time all the other relations of life to the same standard, you inflict injustice, or perhaps ruin, on the debtor. It was thus that Englaud continued her suspension for twenty-five years, and by an Act of Parliament gave several years' no tice of the progressive resumption, in order that all the business of the country should adjust itself to the approaching change. Of the effect of any sudden movement, we have before us a striking instance. It appears by the published statements of the banks of the city of New York, that since the suspension to March 1, 1838, they have reduced their loans aod discounts from forty -six millions to thirty millions, and their circulation from nine millions to two millions? -an aggregate diminution from fifty-five millions to thirty - three millions. If this or any thing near this be the reduction, what is the consequence . A man who contracted a debt to the banks in New York, before the suspension, finds his ability to provide means for the payment of that debt reduced one third, or nearly one half? that is to say, the dollar he now pays is equivalent to one and a half or almost two dollars when he borrowed it, besides the in terest. Such a process of reduction would have been wholly intolerable, it the citizens had not escaped from it and sought allevia tion by loans elsewhere. But if the other cities had followed the example of New York, and made similar reductions, the whole country would have sunk under it or revolt ed against it. These inequalities between members of the same community became more striking when applied to engagements between distant parts of the Union. The Atlantic cities for in stance were creditors of#the Southern and Western States for goods sold to them, to be paid for either in those States, or in the At lantic cities? their currencies being so nearly the same that the exchange would not cost as much as the transportation of the specie. When the day of payment arrives, the credi tor city suddenly makes an artificial scarcity of its currency? renders the only money it will receive in payment almost inaccessible to its debtor? reducing at the same time the rates of exchange, and the prices of every thine. This rigor instantly recoils on the creditor. Ifpay ment is made in the Southern and Western States, the Atlantic merchant loses the whole depreciationvin the exchange. If payment is to be made in the Atlantic,! cities, and the debtor sends produce to pay his debt, the scarcity of money obliges him to sacrifice it? if he sends the Bank notes of his country they sink'to seventy five percent, in value? and he loses the difference. If he brings the stocks of his State, the scarcity of money renders the negotiation impossible. Once disappointed in this way, he sends no more produce? no more Bank notes?and the creditors in turn suffer more than the ditler- : ence by the delay. So in respect to foreigners. We owe a lar^e debt to France and England. Why should we destroy the value of our only means of paying ? We can pay it only m ca^ or , produce, or stocks . As to co^-this debt Cas contracted in an abundant currency. By t\ws artificial scarcity of money we are obliged to pay it in a currency more valuab e by one half or one third. Even at that rate we can neither borrow the money nor raise it by sales except by ruinous sacnfice. We then may pay it in produce or m s^"s'b".t the same scarcity sinks the value of (b^. debt contracted when cotton was a twenty cents wehave to pay when cotton is ten cents a pound. If we propose to pay in stocks, these too have sunk perhaps twenty five per cent, on their price last year. Our resources then are diminished in value while our debt ? ? hv interest The conscquence is increasing by interest, a" m is that the foreign debt is postponed. This operates injuriously to both parUes-to the domestic debtor by reduoing hie meaoe of payment- -to the foreign creditor by the delay and the hazard of his debt. It is true, if he 1 could now receive this money he would remit, it home at a low rate. But then the same scarcity which lowers the rate of remittance, prevents his receiving any thing to remit? and so far from being interested in the early re sumption, it injures him essentially, because I the forced preparation for it, by crushing the resources of his debtors, renders them alike unable and unwilling to pay. What the for eign creditor wants is payment? payment of the debt, not in a better currency, but in an equal currency, or if necessary, in an inferior currency, because he can better support a high rate of remittance than a reduced or postponed payment. There prevails a notion that the credit of the country abroad will be injured by not re suming. Not in the least. Every body con nected with America knew the reasons of sus pending, and entirely approved of it as the only measure that could have saved the coun try. What Europeans want now is that we should pay our debt. That is our first duty, and if they see, as they cannot fail to see, that these premature efforts to resume specie pay ments prevent the collection of what is due to them, they will perceive, that in endeavor ing to secure an object wholly domestic, they have been sacrificed. In respect to the di vidends and the stock, payable abroad, many of them are payable in pounds sterling, or guilders, or francs, so that we place the money, there at our own cost? and as to dividends payable here, they have almost universally been remitted in the equivalents to specie. ? What the general merchants of France or En gland desire, is that we should take their merchandise? that we should trade with them. The state of our currency is a very subordi nate concern. You deal with them and pay them in their own currency. They know little and care less about the sort of currency in which you deal with the South and West. Besides, who are to reproach us with the de preciation of our notes. The English ? But the Bank of England suspended specie pay ments for twenty-five years ? during nearly all which time every American Bank paid spe cie and men in England were forced byHaw to take the notes of the Bank of England when they were at thirty per cent, discount ? whereas no man is obliged here to take any note of any Bank? and at this moment a pa per dollar in Philadelphia or New York, will buy a silver dollar delivered in London. The question then of the resumption is one exclu sively domestic ? one which, however impor tant at home, does not affect the credit of the country abroad. VI. We come now to the question wheth er if an early resumption be practicable, the month of May is a fit time. My impression is that the month of May is a very unfit time. The resumption, to be useful, must be gen eral ; and no arrangement can be satisfactory which does not include the Southern and South-western States. These I do not think are yet ready to resume. They are straining every nerve to pay their debts. Their crops are going forward to provide funds in Europe and at the North ? the Banks are laboring to meet their notes at the North? the Legisla tures are pledging their credit to raise funds in order that their people may pay their debts. Why should we repulse them 1 All they want is time. They have not yet had the benefit of a single crop, and they may require another; and instead of discrediting them, or diminishing the value of their produce, or curtailing their facilities in sending their crops to market, it is better to help them and wait till they are more advanced in their prepara tions. The employment of credit, either of Banks or of individuals, most useful to the country at this moment, is to forward its pro duce to Europe. Instead of this the Banks are reducing these facilities, and calling upon their debtors for payment. This seems very unreasonable. It is stopping the locomotives as they are carrying the crop to market. The month of May too is not the right time of the year. For example, it requires on an average about fifty days to take cotton from New Or leans to Liverpool. Supposing it immediate ly sold, the usage is at the end of ten days to give a banker's acceptance, payable in two months, so that by the month of May there would not be actually realized more than the cotton which left New Orleans before Janua ry, when not more than one fourth or one fifth of the whole crop had been shipped.? Much, of ctrtirse, is drawn for when shipped, but I speak now of the actual obtaining pos session of the proceeds of the crop; and at all events not one half of the crop will have reached Europe by the month of May. The Spriug is, moreover, the season when the credits given for the shipments of Southern and Western produce, are maturing at the North ; and the crop from which reimburse ments are to come, remains unsold in Europe. The spring too, is the time when the Western business has brought from the interior the notes of the Atlantic Banks, when the circula tion presses more upon them than at any other period, and when specie is wanted for the trade to China and India, making that time particularly unpropitious for the resumption. VII. It remains now to inquire how far these general views of the expediency of a resumption in May should be changed by the determination of the Banks of the city of New York to resume at that period. I For the gentlemen of New-York who an nounced that decision, I have great personal respect, and under ordinary circumstances would willingly yield my own convictions to their better opportunities and understanding But the natural influence of their judgement I is weakened by the knowledge of the fact, that the Banks of New York would not have had the least idea of a resumption in May? but because the immunity allowed by the Legislature will then expire, and they fear that it will not be renewed. This was dis tinctly avowed at the Bank Convention, and the Deputation who visited Philadelphia re peated it again and again. Now this may be a very good reason for the Banks of New York to resume-? but certainly no reason whatever for the Banks of Pennsylvania to do the same. The States of Pennsylvania, of Vir ginia, of Kentucky, have Legislatures as well as New York has, and they have refused to direct their Banks to resume in May next. Why should they obey the Legislature of New York and not their own Legislature? The position of New York is on all hands regretted. But how is it to be remedied ? A single Legislature out of twenty six Legisla tures had passed a law forfeiting the charters of Banks, if they were unable to redeem their notes in specie. A public calamity overtakes the country, and the declining to pay specie, so far from being criminal, became an act of public safety? so adopted by all the Banks, and so confirmed by this very Legislature. The provision originally designed to guard against fraud, may thus become the punish ment of honesty. The Legislative body which protected the Banks for a vear is now in session, and in twenty-four hours can ex tend the indemnity till a more appropriate ?ea?on for resuming. I presume no difficul ty will occur in this. Why should there be ? Is it possible that such a body can see with indifference the distress which a perseverance in this course must inevitably create, or per mit the pride of opinion or any mere political or party consideration to prevent them from interposing to protect their noble but suffer ing city? If they decline how can we of Pennsylvania interfere? Why should we voluntarily place ourselves in the same situa tion into which New \ ork has been forced ? By doing so we share only a common disas I ter? instead of husbanding our resources ! against the period when our interposition may be really useful. In the mean while, the most effectual service which we can render, is to speak in a tone of frank sincerity. She may perhaps bear it from one, than whom she has never had a more true and constant friend ? who, although an entire stranger, has for a long, series of years, done every thing in his power to advance her prosperity; and j never saw her in any misfortune which he | did not anxiously strive to mitigate. But I wish to serve her, not to flatter her. I believe then that at this moment New York is in an entirely false position. She is obliged by the existing law to do what she feels to be wrong. Her natural course is to appeal to her repre sentatives to rectify their mistake, and not to thrust out their own State Banks to be. crushed by the Executive. Instead of doing j this, she perseveres from a mistaken though honorable pride in not asking reliefwhere re lief is attainable, but in preparing for the event by sacn^ing her own interests and inflicting distress. .1 the community. The apparent su periorit in the exchanges which this produc es, is wholly fallacious as well as injurious. The state of the exchanges in New York pro i ves nothing whatever, except the scarcity of money in New York. The exchanges are even less depreciated than many otherthings. The bank notes of the Southern States are at a great depreciation. But store rent and real estate in the very spot where these notes are sacrificed, are much more depreciated than the notes themselves. So too in New- York, the notes of Philadelphia are at a discount, yet at this moment New York has to pay to Philadelphia little less than ten millions of dollars, for actual debts to Philadelphia, and to foreigners represented by Philadelphia. It is not therefore the abundance but the want of means ? it is not strength but weakness which causes this difference. By the same process bread and meat may be reduced in price for the want of purchasers. You make an artificial scarcity of money, and then boast how much the little which remains will buy ? but your superiority is punished by the debtor, who does not settle with a creditor so much above him. And what is the benefit of all this ? The other States are not obliged to submit to this local legislation, and the suffering of "N. Y. is certainly not fitted to make them adopt it voluntarily. It is bet ter, therefore, for them to state with perlect frankness that they do not mean to unite with , her in this forced resumption ? to say this decidedly and finally, so that she may apply the only remedy ? an extension of her law. The whole subject would then be open for future adjustment upon principles of safety, alike to the Banks and to the community. On the whole, the course which, in my judgement, the Banks ought to pursue, is simply this : The Banks should remain exactly as they are ? preparing to resume, but not yet resum ing. They should begin, as the Bank of England did, under similar circumstances, by paying the small notes, so as to restore coin to all the minor channels of circulation?but not make ;iny general resumption until they ascertain what course the government will pursue, em ploying in the meantime their whole power to forWard the crops to market. The Amer ican Banks should do, in short, what the American Army did at New Orleans, stand fast behind their cotton bales until the ene mv has left the country. These are my opinions, very deliberately formed, and very frankly expressed. They are thus set forth, not to influence the course of others, but to explain my own. With great respect and esteem, yours, 5 N. B1DDLE. Philadelphia, April 5, 1838. General Orders, No. 7. HEAD QUARTERS OF THE ARMY. Adjutant General's Office, ? Washington, April 10, 1838. S I . Major General Jesup having reported that the operations in Florida will have ter minated by the 1st of May, and that a por tion of the troops will be disposable, the fol lowing arrangements will be carried into effect as soon thereafter as practicable. II . The 1st and Gth regiments of In fantry, the six companies of the 2d Infantry, and four Companies of the 2d Dragoons, will constitute the regular force to remain in Florida, with as many companies of the volunteers or militia of the Territory as the officer remaining in command may deem ne cessary. The three companies of the 6th Infantry, now in Louisiana, will forthwith join the Head Quarters of the regiment at Tampa Bay. HI. ? The four regiments of Artillery, the 4th regiment of Infantry, six. companies of the 2d Dragoons, and the detachment of Marines, will repair to the Cherokee country by the most convenient and expeditious routes from the several points at which they may be found on the receipt of this order. The troops, as far xas practicable, will move by regiments, and be accompanied by all the officers belonging to each. Should any of the companies ordered to the Cherokee country occupy stations in Florida from which they should be immediately with drawn, they will continue in position until they can be relieved by the troops designated to remain in the Territory ; after which they will follow their regiments without delay, it being important to concentrate the compa nies of each regiment. IV . Two Surgeons and as many Assist ants as the service may require, will be re tained in Florida, to be selected from those who have served the shortest period in the Territory. All other officers of the Medical Staff will proceed with the troops ordered to the Cherokee country. V . Major General Jksup will take all the necessary measures for the prompt execution of this order, and will then turn over the command of the troops in Florida to Brevet Brigadier General Z.Taylor, Colonel of the 1st Infantry ; and on being relieved, he will repair to the seat of Government, and re sume the duties of Quartermaster-General. VI . The officers at the heads of the seve ral branches of the Staff will make the ne cessary arrangements for moving and supply ing the troops on their routes to their desti nation, and for the service in which they are to be employed. VII.? Major General Scott is assigned to the immediate command of the troops 1 ordered to the Cherokee country, and the direction of affairs in that quarter. The commanders of detachments will report to his Head Quarters, at Athens, in Tennessee, or wherever else they may be established at the time. By order of Alexander Macomb, Major-General Commanding-in-Chief ; R. JONES, Adj. Gen. From the National Intelligencer. The highly respectable character and stand ing of the writer of the following Letter, on the subject of the next Census of the popula tion of the United States, entitles its sugges tions to respectful consideration : ' LETTER ON THE CENSUS OF 1840, To the Hon. Hugh S. Legare, -M. C. Bt Francis Lieber. Dear Sir: I take the liberty of addressing you on a subject in which I fee] convinced you take a deep interest as a true lover of accurate, fruitful, and enduring knowledge ? on the approaching Census. N You may be aware that in 1836, while you represented our Government abroad, I ad dressed a memorial to the Senate of the Uni ted States on the great importance of a com prehensive and thorough work on the statis tics of our country, and the necessity of its being undertaken, digested and published by federal authoritv. While I knpw well that a proposition, as I then made, cannot be easily adopted at once, but must follow the law of progress of all comprehensive measures, if founded upon truth and general utility, that of fighting slowly but steadily its own way, I was, nevertheless, satisfied that the publica tion of my plan, of which the Senate ordered - a large number to.be printed,* could not re -t? main without some beneficial effects. I have had the pleasure of seeing attention drawn to it in various quarters. Several periodicals have strongly recommended it, and the editor of the American Almanac? a justly popular work ? says iu (he preface to the last number: " All intelligent and judicious legislation must be founded, in a great measure, on statistical knowledge. If the statistics of all the United States, collected and digested on a judicious and uniform plan, embracing among other matters, &c. [the editor here gives a very brief abstract of the heads in my memorial,] were, at regular periods, laid before the Pub lic, a mass of information would be presented which would be of immense advantage to the National Government and to the Governments of the several States ; and the wide diffusion of such information among the citizens at large would be attended with the most salu tary consequences." The editor agrees with me that " the statistics of the whole country can never be collected by one individual, nor by a society formed for the purpose." The vastness of our country, the peculiar organi zation of its Governments, and the expenses attending so extensive a collection of facts as would be requisite ? far too heavy for private means, but trivial indeed for Congress ? must necessarily ever prevent any private individual, however industrious or wealthy, from execut ing the desirable work. You will agree that it is absolutely impossible. In various Euro pean countries there exist, as you are well aware, regularly organized bodies ? statistical boards ? for the collection and digesting of all those many facts, from which, with cautious nse, we are enabled to derive the most valua ble knowledge respecting the physical, and, as has lately been shown, likewise the moral state of society. If, at first glance, these truths may sometimes appear startling ; if they almost possess the power of Medusa's head, to petrify the beholder ? for instance, when we find the surprising regularity of crime, not only as to the general number of offences, but also as to each specific crime, committed with such or such instrument or means, in each respective period of life, and by each sex, so that the State has actually to pay a regular " budget of crime," as it nas been appropri ately called ? yet they are truths, and truths lead to truth. We are not called upon to hunt for facts in order to prove one or the other preconceived or accustomed notion, but our bounden duty is manfully to seek truth, and sternly to look her in the face. These remarks were lately brought again to ray mind with peculiar force by the perusal of a work, with the author of which you are probably personally acquainted, as he is the distinguish ed royal astronomer to the Court near which you resided. Mr. Cuetelet, who has distin guished himself by several productions of a statistic-philosophic character, shows, in, his work entitled, 44 On Man and the Develop ment of his Faculties," more successfully than any writer before him, what important results respecting the physical, moral land social state of man, a mind deeply imbued with a manly love of truth and endowed with combinatory powers, scientific steadiness!, and cautious sagacity, may .derive from well-au thenticated statistics, collected on a large scale. < J Although I am well aware that it is impos sible to obtain all the facts which are requisite for an accurate and detailed picture of the United States by the aid of a census alone, yet I believe that much might be obtained, and that the result might lead to the adoption of a more comprehensive and thoroughly or ganized plan. I believe I do not deceive my self, regardine the utility of the facts which may be obtained in this manner. I know that statistics should always be used with great caution, because it requires a circumspect and well-trained mind to view statistical facts at once, with all their concomitant circum stances, to combine them correctly, and not rashly to conclude that, because one fact has so far always been found along with another* the one is necessarily the cause of the other* I know, too, the great difficulty in the way of collecting statistics, so that we may confident ly rely upon them, even in countries where a dense population and many police regulations* uncongenial to our civic institutions, facilitate the collection. This difficulty is greatly en hanced with us by jhe sparse population bat tered over an immense territory, the indepen dence of the State Governments, and the al most total absence of a registering police au thority. Still I believe that much informa tion, valuable even for those who do not at once confide in any round and convenient number given under the auspices of some authority, without inquiring into the means or process by which it was obtained, might be collected through the next census. , The editor of the American Almanac is, I see, of the same opinion. If I state how I believe it to be possible to arrive at some satisfactory result, I do it fully conscious that I merely throw out ideas which may or may not engage your farther consid eration. False modesty, on the other hand, shall not prevent me from stating my views on a subject on which I have loqg reflected-^ There may be some grain worth preserving in the chaff. It appears to me desirable that a commit tee of Congress be appointed forthwith, to take into consideration the next census, and what measures for the farther collection of ? 24th Cong, lit Sear Senate, 314.